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The Utility of Jakobsen's *Ideal Policy* as a strategy of coercive diplomacy to prevent States attaining nuclear weapons.

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for a degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in Politics and International Studies

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¹ Alexander L George, 'Theory and Practice', in Alexander L George & William E Simmons eds, *The limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, Second Edition, (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2nd revised edn, 1994), pg.9.

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³ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, 'Reinterpreting Libya's WMD Turnaround – Bridging the Carrot-Coercion Divide', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol 35, No.4 (2012), pg.155.

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All views within this thesis are my own and are not attributable to the Royal Navy or others. Furthermore, any errors of fact or judgement are ultimately my own.

Declaration

I declare that this thesis is entirely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated it is work of others.

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Chapters 1 & 5 draw loosely on material from ‘The effectiveness of Coercive Diplomacy as a Strategy to prevent proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’ my dissertation submitted as part of MA in International Politics and Diplomacy at the University of Staffordshire. This material, however, is exclusively my own work.

I confirm that this thesis has not been submitted for a degree at another university.

Abstract

Jakobsen's *ideal policy* is a strategy of coercive diplomacy that comprises of a credible threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives quickly with little cost, a deadline for compliance, an assurance to the adversary against future demands and an offer of carrots/incentives for compliance. Although derived to understand why Western coercive diplomacy had failed to make aggressors stop or undo their actions; Jakobsen claimed the logic of the *ideal policy* should remain valid for preventing acquisition of Weapon of Mass Destruction.

In 2006 North Korea conducted a nuclear test, signifying the failure of the Treaty for Nuclear Non-proliferation and US coercive diplomacy. However, in 2003 Libya took the decision to surrender its WMDs. Arguably Libya's decision was an example of US coercive diplomacy backed by credible threat, demonstrated by the US invasion of Iraq. Nuclear proliferation is one of the most significant issues in international security; therefore, developing effective counter proliferation strategies is of interest to academics and policymakers.

Using Jakobsen's *ideal policy* as a framework this study conducts a focussed structured comparison of US coercive diplomacy, from 1992-2006, aimed at preventing North Korea and Libya from obtaining a nuclear weapon. It is the only independent study to use Jakobsen's *ideal policy* to conduct a comparison. Furthermore, it contains first-hand accounts from policy makers involved in the cases. The key finding is states do not employ a form of coercive diplomacy in the form of the *ideal policy* over the issue of nuclear proliferation, as they are unwilling to set deadlines and make direct threats. The thesis argues that the *ideal policy* has utility as an analytical framework to conduct a structured comparison; however, cannot be used to form accurate predictions of whether a strategy will be successful.

Abbreviations

Agreed Framework (AF)

Assessment Question (AQ)

Carrier Strike Task Group (CSTG)

Carrots, Coercion and Confidence-building (3Cs)

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

Counter Insurgency (COIN)

Complete, Verifiable, Irreversible, Dismantlement (CVID)

Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA)

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)

Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)

International Community (IC)

International Relations (IR)

Iranian Libyan Sanctions Act (ILSA)

Light Water Reactor (LWR)

Main Battle Tank (MBT)

Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

North Korea (NK)

Peoples Republic of China (PRC)

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

Republic Of Korea (ROK)

South Korea (SK)

Special Forces (SF)

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

United Kingdom (UK)

United States (US)

United Nations Security Council (UNSC)

United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Introduction

On the 9 October 2006 North Korea (NK) conducted its first nuclear test.¹ This test was not only a failure of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), but a failure of the United States' (US) strategy of coercive diplomacy which had sought to prevent the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) from attaining a nuclear weapon. The Clinton administration had set several escalating demands aimed at freezing NK nuclear programme; this finally culminated in 1994 when on the brink of war former US President Carter intervened enabling both sides to de-escalate and reach an accord under the Agreed Framework (AF). The AF appeared to lead NK to dismantle its plutonium based nuclear programme in return for oil and two Light Water Reactors (LWR). However, opponents of the deal argued that NK was in effect being rewarded for bad behaviour and would continue to cheat by developing a uranium based nuclear programme.

The Bush administration entered office divided over whether to maintain the AF. Furthermore, after 9/11 the rhetoric became more aggressive with Bush identifying NK as a member of an 'Axis of Evil'.² Moreover, US implied threats were given credibility by the invasion of Iraq over the issue of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). In late 2002 convinced that they had evidence of a secret NK uranium enrichment programme, the US effectively pulled out of the AF by ceasing oil shipments, which in turn led to NK breaking safeguards and becoming the first state to withdraw from the NPT. During Bush's second term, the US tried an approach, which in effect emulated the AF, offering incentives and assurances that led to the signing of the 'September 2005' agreement.

¹ BBC, 'Text of N Korea's announcement', 9 October 2006, BBC News Channel, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/6032597.stm>, accessed 28 Aug 2015.

² George Bush, 'State of the Union Speech 2002', 29 January 2002, <http://millercenter.org/president/gwbush/speeches/speech-4540>, accessed 28 Aug 2015.

However, so close to their goal, NK continued past the nuclear threshold unperturbed by a few final implied US threats.

Whilst NK was resisting US coercive efforts, Libya on 19 December 2003 decided, not only to reveal its clandestine nuclear weapons program, but also to dismantle it; seemingly without any formally agreed conditions. The Bush administration argued that Libya's decision was 'a product of the President's strategy which gives regimes a choice. They can choose to pursue WMD at great peril, cost and international isolation. Or they can choose to renounce these weapons, take steps to re-join the international community'.³ Furthermore, the White House stated that 'actions by the United States and our allies have sent an unmistakable message to regimes that seek or possess weapons of mass destruction: Those weapons do not bring influence or prestige. They bring isolation or otherwise unwelcome consequences.'⁴ Moreover, the administration directly linked Gaddafi's decision to the Iraq war with Bush stating that:

Nine months of intense negotiations involving the United States and Great Britain succeeded with Libya, while 12 months of diplomacy with Iraq did not. And one reason is clear: For diplomacy to be effective, words must be credible, and no one can now doubt the word of America.⁵

However, opponents of this view argue that Libya's surrendering of its nuclear weapons programme was the culmination of the previous administration's policy of sanctions and

³ Robert S Litwak, *Regime Change, US Strategy through the Prism of 9/11*, (Washington D.C., Woodrow Wilson International Center Press, 2007), pg.169; White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 'Fact Sheet: The President's National Security Strategy to Combat WMD-Libya's Announcement', 19 December 2003, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031219-8.html>, accessed 29 October 2015.

⁴ White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 'President Bush: Libya Pledges to Dismantle WMD Programs', 19 December 2003, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031219-9.html>, accessed 29 October 2015.

⁵ George Bush, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 'State of the Union Address 2004', 20 January 2004, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20030120-7.html>, accessed 29 October 2015.

diplomacy, and was not a result of the Iraq war.⁶ Others argue⁷ that Gaddafi's vision had shifted from being a Pan-Arab leader to being an African regional leader. This change of vision meant that Gaddafi no longer saw political utility in supporting Palestinian terrorism, as it blocked Libya's reintegration back into the International Community (IC) and the subsequent economic rewards that would strengthen his position within Africa.

The apparent success of US counter proliferation policy in Libya, at the same time as US counter proliferation policy was failing in NK, has made comparison of the cases particularly tempting for scholars and policy makers. Furthermore, nuclear proliferation is one of the most significant and difficult issues in international security; therefore, studying and developing strategies aimed at dealing with the issue has academic and practical utility. However, the primary focus of this thesis is not to draw specific conclusions on Libya and NK as individual cases, there are several studies that do that, but to examine the utility of Jakobsen's *ideal policy* as a strategy of coercive diplomacy employed to prevent states attaining nuclear weapons. This study uses the *ideal policy* as a framework to conduct a structured focussed comparison of US coercive diplomacy aimed at preventing NK and Libya obtaining nuclear weapons from 1992-2006.

Furthermore, it examines whether the *ideal policy* has utility as a conceptual framework for examining and predicting the outcome of similar nuclear proliferation cases. A more detailed statement of the contribution and research objectives will be found later within this chapter; but so it can be fully appreciated, I will first explain in more depth Jakobsen's *ideal policy*.

⁶ Author's interview with Ambassador Martin Indyk, in person, 14 March 2013.

⁷ Tiran Rothman, 'A State's Choice: Nuclear Policy in a Changing World between Libya and North Korea', *Defense & Security Analysis*, Vol.23, No.3 (2007), pg.304.

Jakobsen's *Ideal Policy*

The theoretical underpinning of the strategy of coercive diplomacy fits within the realist paradigm; as the strategy at its most simplistic relies on the logic of power, with a more powerful actor coercing a lesser power to meet a political objective. Jakobsen's *ideal policy* builds upon theories expressed in two core works⁸ on coercive theory; Thomas C. Schelling's *Arms and Influence* (1966) and Alexander L George⁹ *et al Limits to Coercive Diplomacy* (1971); and to an extent Lawrence Freedman's concept of 'Strategic Coercion'. However, I also argue within this thesis that strands of coercion theory can clearly be seen in classic work such as *On War* by Clausewitz.

George and Schelling employed different approaches to the development of theory; Schelling deductively deriving theories based on the assumption of unitary rational actor. George started with an abstract theory of coercive diplomacy; then by using a comparison of different case studies, derived empirically components of a strategy that could be utilised by policy makers.¹⁰ Neither approach has dominated the subsequent study of coercion.¹¹ From Schelling, Jakobsen adopted the assumption of a unitary rational actor; therefore, arguably negating the requirement for detailed information on the opponent or a sophisticated behavioural model. Jakobsen was influenced by George's attempt to operationalise conditions for success and identify key variables

⁸ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, 'Coercive Diplomacy', in Alan Collins, *Contemporary Security Studies*, (New York, Oxford University Press, 2007), pg.230; Michael Berger, 'How resisting democracies can defeat substate Terrorism: Formulating a theoretical framework for Strategic Coercion against Nationalistic substate Terrorist organisations', (PhD Dissertation, University of St Andrews, 2010), <https://research-repository.standrews.ac.uk/bitstream/10023/889/6/Michael%20Andrew%20Berger%20PhD%20thesis.PDF>, accessed 25 January 2014, pg.32; Lawrence Freedman, 'Strategic Coercion', in Lawrence Freedman eds, *Strategic Coercion Concepts and Cases*, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1998), pg.1.

⁹ It should be noted that Simons contributed to the second edition - Alexander L George & William E Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, (Boulder, Colo.:Westview Press, 2nd revised edn, 1994).

¹⁰ *Op.cit.* Berger (2010), pg.33.

¹¹ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, 'Pushing the Limits of Military Coercion Theory', *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol.12, No.2 (2011), pg.157.

affecting a strategy of coercive diplomacy. Furthermore, he adopted George's methodology of conducting a structured focussed comparison of case studies in order to test the *ideal policy*. From Freedman, Jakobsen adopted the assertion that the level of force within a coercive strategy is not dependent on the capabilities that are employed, but on whether the opponent has the choice of whether to comply with the demand. For example the use of a small Special Forces (SF) unit to physically remove an enemy from a position is not coercive as it leaves the opposition no choice; whereas, the overt deployment of a full Carrier Strike Task Group (CSTG) that leads to the enemy moving from its position before physical force is applied would be coercive, as the opponent moves by choice.

Jakobsen argues that coercive diplomacy is 'a strategy involving the use of a threat of punishment and/or limited force short of full-scale military operations to persuade an actor to stop and/or undo an action he is already embarked on'.¹² Interested in why post-cold war Western attempts at coercive diplomacy often failed, he derived the *ideal policy* as a 'theoretical framework' in order 'to explain why coercive diplomacy succeeds or fails when employed against military aggressors'.¹³ Jakobsen argues that if the *ideal policy* is correct then coercive diplomacy will succeed when the following three conditions apply:

1. Credible implementation of the *ideal policy* comprising;
 - a. A threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives quickly with little cost.
 - b. A deadline for compliance
 - c. An assurance to the adversary against future demands.

¹² Peter Viggo Jakobsen, *Western use of Coercive Diplomacy after the cold war, a challenge for theory and practice*, (Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 1998), pg.1.

¹³ *Ibid.* pg.3.

- d. An offer of carrots for compliance.
2. Opponent prefers to comply rather than to lose a war.
3. Opponent acts rationally and does not miscalculate or suffer from misperception.

Similarly, failure is expected if one of the following three conditions is present;

1. Failure to implement the ideal policy.
2. Opponent makes a conscious choice to fight a war it expects to lose rather than comply with the coercer demand.
3. Opponent miscalculates or suffers from misperception.¹⁴

The *ideal policy* was initially derived and tested by Jakobsen against the scenario where coercive diplomacy was being employed to undo/stop acts of aggression by states.

Jakobsen examined the Bosnian conflict, Haiti and Iraq-Kuwait conflict and found a correlation between the use of the *ideal policy* and outcome.¹⁵ In a later study, Jakobsen examined nine coercive diplomacy exchanges that aimed to stop states from attaining nuclear weapons, finding that four resulted in temporary success, two failures, one cheap success and two were ongoing (NK & Iran). However, he asserted that the *ideal policy* was not implemented in any of the WMD exchange cases as it proved impossible to use force to deny the adversary's objectives quickly with little cost.¹⁶ This study confirms Jakobsen's findings that states do not adopt the *ideal policy* when trying to prevent nuclear proliferation. Although I argue that this is because states are unwilling to set a hard deadline; as doing so may commit them to act in order to maintain credibility.

¹⁴ Jakobsen, *Western use of Coercive Diplomacy after the cold war, a challenge for theory and practice*, pg.33.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* pg.131. Of 13 exchanges examined, 11 outcomes were predicted correctly. Of the 13 exchanges only 3 used the coercive diplomacy in the form of the *ideal policy*. Of the 13, 10 predicted in failure of coercive diplomacy (as it did not employ the *ideal policy*) and 8 resulted in failure 2 in success. Of the 3 that were predicted to succeed (as they did employ the *ideal policy*) all 3 resulted in success.

¹⁶ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, 'Coercive Diplomacy', in Alan Collins, *Contemporary Security Studies*, (New York, Oxford University Press, 2007), pg.234.

Jakobsen identified that the *ideal policy* does not say why the policy was chosen. However, he asserts that the willingness of states to employ coercive diplomacy is dependent on three interrelated variables; the interest perceived to be at stake, the perceived prospects of military success and the level of domestic support.¹⁷ For each of these variables he then coded them high, medium or low. Furthermore, for the ‘perceived interest at stake’ variable he identified that there was a code above high that he termed vital. The coding ‘vital’ applied to circumstances where the sovereignty of the state itself was deemed to be threatened. As Jakobsen’s study was concerned with the use of Western coercive diplomacy to make an opponent stop or withdraw from an act of aggression on another actor, he discounted the ‘vital’ coding as for his cases the sovereignty of Western states was not being threatened. For the case of acts of aggression Jakobsen identified three combinations, which he called patterns, of the variables that should lead to states being willing to threaten force. Using the same logic I have added an additional pattern, ‘vital’ interest driven, which reflects that in the case of nuclear proliferation the coercer may in fact feel its sovereignty or existence is at stake and be willing to threaten the use of force even with low military prospect of success or low domestic support.

Jakobsen’s patterns predict that the Clinton administration should not have threatened force against NK and should have threatened Libya. However, in reality Clinton was actively considering a pre-emptive strike and a surge of a 100000 troops into South Korea (SK) to deter any aggressive action when UN sanctions were announced. He was not considering any use of force against Libya over WMD or terrorism related issues. Any use of force against NK had a high risk of escalating into a very costly conflict in both blood and treasure. In comparison threatening Libya with force would have had a

¹⁷ *Op.cit.* Jakobsen (1998), pg.5.

lower risk of escalating into a more serious conflict and would have been significantly cheaper than a war with NK. Therefore, using the patterns of interests alone does not explain the differences in outcomes. I will now explain how this thesis contributes to our understanding of coercive diplomacy.

Contribution

This thesis makes an original contribution to the discipline of strategic studies in two distinct ways; firstly, it is the only study to critique Jakobsen's *ideal policy* and his theory on when states are willing to threaten the use of force. Secondly, it is the only study that conducts a structured focussed comparison of NK and Libya using Jakobsen's *ideal policy* as a framework. This research is significant as, although the thesis is primarily about examination of Jakobsen's *ideal policy*, it is studying in-depth coercive diplomacy as a strategy for preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Another significant contribution is that the study contains primary source material from key coercive theorists such as Schelling, Art and Jentleson. Furthermore it contains primary evidence from key policy makers involved in the cases such as Gallucci, Wit, Welch and Joseph. A full list of those interviewed can be found at Appendix A.

Research Objectives

The research puzzles that I aim to answer are:

1. Does Jakobsen's *ideal policy* remain valid when applied to the context of state attainment of nuclear weapons?
2. What are the factors, conditions and variables unique to coercive diplomacy being employed against states seeking nuclear weapons that may need to be incorporated into the *ideal policy*?

3. How can the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy be improved in order to prevent states attaining nuclear weapons?

The behaviour being examined is specifically how states use coercive diplomacy as a strategy to prevent other states attaining nuclear weapons. As will be discussed in chapter 2, there are fewer cases of coercive diplomacy to stop/undo nuclear proliferation than attempts to stop/undo acts of aggression. Therefore, even if all known cases of these phenomena were studied, it would still not be enough to statistically validate the findings. However, by looking in-depth at a few case studies valuable insights on the *ideal policy*, and coercive diplomacy, have been gained. Clearly as more cases arise, statistical methods may be able to give greater confidence in the validity of any generalisations.

As this thesis is about testing the utility of Jakobsen's *ideal policy* as a strategy of coercive diplomacy in a different context than the one it was derived for, there is no requirement to test other theories of coercive diplomacy.

Case Studies

A more detailed explanation of the case selection will be covered in chapter 2. The US was chosen as it is the only state that has repeatedly used coercive diplomacy for counter proliferation policy objectives. Whilst other cases were considered, such as Iran and Iraq, NK and Libya have been chosen as between 1990 to 2003 they were both the targets of US coercive diplomacy that had the goal of stopping those states attaining nuclear weapons. NK continued its programme and exploded its first nuclear bomb in 2006; therefore ultimately the US policy clearly failed. Libya appears to have given up its WMD programme in 2003; therefore, it appears to be a demonstration of successful

US coercive diplomacy. As the coercion occurred roughly at the same time, the specific military and diplomatic capability of the US was the same in both cases; therefore, the difference in results must be dependent on other factors. By comparing the case studies the research objectives have been met. Whilst studying Iran and Iraq would have increased the number of episodes, it would still be insufficient to statistically validate any findings, but would have reduced the depth of analysis of each of the chosen case studies.

Key findings and arguments

The main finding of this research is that states do not adopt coercive diplomacy in the form of the *ideal policy* when trying to prevent other states from developing nuclear weapons. The key reason that the *ideal policy* is not implemented is that states are unwilling to set deadlines and make direct threats to states that they are seeking to attain nuclear weapons. These elements of the *ideal policy* are not adopted as states do not want to limit their options and be forced into acting for the sole reason of maintaining credibility.

Secondly, I argue the use of the *ideal policy* as an analytical framework is useful as a starting position to conduct a structured comparison of the cases; however, Jakobsen's *ideal policy* cannot be used to form accurate predictions of exactly how states will behave. Fundamentally, this is because what is a rational decision is dependent on the objectives of the decision maker, the information they have access to which in turn constructs their perception of the context of the crisis that they are within. Therefore, a rational model will form predictions based on the assumption that participants have full information of the context that they are making their decision within; which is

impossible. An individual actor may have the vital information needed, but will never have all the information.

Coercive diplomacy remains, as Jakobsen points out, a difficult strategy to employ. Furthermore, I agree with Jakobsen that the best approach for states is to avoid using coercive diplomacy by using other strategies to prevent nuclear proliferation. Primarily through reduction in established states nuclear stocks, increased international agreements backed by initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), that seek to disrupt proliferation networks, and the use of diplomatic bargaining and the offering of security assurances. Offering incentives may have a place, but there is a risk that this in fact encourages states to obtain or carry out nuclear hedging. The use of positive rewards will make some see the actual act of having a programme as a way to rewards. This in turn will increase the likelihood that in sometime in the future that they will cross the nuclear threshold; as spending money on developing a programme to drop it for little gain would be perceived as a waste; so momentum to keep the programme going if no rewards are forthcoming is maintained.

I also argue that it is highly unlikely that states, in particular democracies, will be able to significantly improve their attempts at coercive diplomacy. Democracies will be rarely willing to make direct threats of force that are sufficiently credible and backed by a clear deadline; they will be unlikely to be able to offer incentives that can be sustained with changes in the mood of domestic audiences; they will also find it difficult to provide credible assurances that subsequent governments will abide by. This is also most likely the lessons that proliferators are obtaining from study of these cases.

Furthermore, I contend that in all the episodes studied within this thesis the opponent acted rationally in the pursuit of their objectives. The key objective of both NK and Libya was regime survival. For NK obtaining a nuclear weapon would give them a deterrent or a bargaining chip to trade for the resources and money it required to exist. Even if it miscalculated US resolve and the crisis escalated into conflict it clearly had good reason to believe that it would be a limited conflict that the regime could weather and then use to its advantage internally. Furthermore, the determination of whether an act was rational is dependent on the level of analysis (i.e. individual actor, state or system) and the objectives of the actor being assessed. Individuals construct their reality based on the information that is given to them; therefore, rationality can only be judged by assessing whether under that construct they carried out actions that would logically lead them closer to achieving their objective. Therefore, the *ideal policy* based on deductive logic and a system level of analysis will determine a different rational outcome from that of a rational actor at the individual level with uncertain and limited information.

This study also supports the argument of many scholars¹⁸ that context is important. Strategy cannot be applied like a mathematical formula and lead to certain success. The differing context of the case studies and in particular the motivation of the leaders and strategic position of the states involved hugely impacted on the outcomes of the cases studied. This is particularly evident in the US' willingness to use force. The rational formulae determined by Jakobsen would indicate that Clinton should have threatened force against Libya and not NK. However, he was at the brink of making a decision that could have easily escalated to a costly war with the DPRK and did not threaten Gaddafi

¹⁸ Alexander L George, *Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics*, in Alexander L George & William E Simmons eds, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2nd revised edn, 1994), pg.291.

directly with force. The context, psychology of the main actors, and data available to them all played into producing an outcome different from that a detached rational calculation would predict. Studying and comparing these cases is only useful in that it gives us guidelines that may work in similar circumstances.

Another point, which backs up theoretical points raised by George and Schelling, is that there is a clear blurring between coercive diplomacy and deterrence when looking at the demands made in the case of nuclear proliferation. Telling a target that there is a red line that if they cross will result in a reaction would commonly be taken as a deterrent threat. However, if you are telling an opponent to stop an action that they have already started that is coercive diplomacy. Therefore, telling an opponent to not pass a certain point of a nuclear programme (i.e. do not enrich uranium to 80% or move spent fuel rods) sits in a blurred line between these strategies. They have moved towards the line, but not necessarily across it.

I also argue that for nuclear proliferation there is a strategic window where coercive diplomacy is viable strategy. This window starts at the moment that enough intelligence can be obtained to make a convincing case to gain the international and domestic backing to be able to implement an effective strategy of coercive diplomacy. It finishes the moment that the target demonstrates or is believed to hold an effective delivery system and nuclear weapon; as at that point coercive diplomacy becomes too risky and deterrence becomes the most likely course of action.

Limitations of the thesis

There are limitations to this thesis; firstly, I have only studied 4 episodes which are not enough to derive any statistically viable relationship between prediction and outcome. If

this is to be achieved, more cases, as they arise, will need to be studied in a similar manner.

I have only had access to open source material and experts who were willing to be interviewed. I have then had to make judgements and interpretations of what this limited data means in relation to Jakobsen's *ideal policy*. This process increases the risk that what I have concluded compared to the actual reality may diverge. If I had access to key members of the Libyan and NK governments and their internal documents I would perhaps have arrived at a different interpretation of events.

Normative premise

One criticism that could be levelled at this study is that it is immoral, as it is looking at methods that more powerful states can develop strategies to influence less powerful states through the use of threats of force. Furthermore, that coercive diplomacy as a threat based strategy is illegitimate as it specifically states within the UN charter that 'all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations'.¹⁹

Both these points are valid. However, the research is primarily focussed on testing Jakobsen's *ideal policy*; therefore, is theory testing and a valid academic pursuit to examine a phenomenon that is already in existence. Secondly, those lessons that may be taken by policy makers are likely to improve the ability to stop nuclear proliferation with subsequent positive effect on international security.

¹⁹ UN Charter, Chapter I: Purposes and Principles, Article 2, Point 4.
<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml>, accessed 29 Aug 2015.

Furthermore, there is value in studying illegitimate phenomena. It would not seem strange to study crimes; even if such studies would offer criminals lessons on how to improve their profession, as it usually provides greater insights into how these crimes could be dealt with better or prevented. Improving our understanding of coercive diplomacy may in fact lead states to try more innovative upstream proliferation prevention measures, as it is clear that coercive diplomacy is difficult to implement successfully.

Thesis Structure

The first chapter will examine coercive theory with the aim of introducing the key concepts that will be drawn upon within the rest of thesis. It will primarily be a review of the relevant literature; however, original quotes from key theorists will be included. The chapter is tailored to look at the work underpinning the *ideal policy*; therefore, is primarily focussed on the theories of Schelling, George, Freedman and Jakobsen. However, it will start by looking at Clausewitz arguing that there is a clear connection to coercive literature. Furthermore, criticism and key conceptual points from other coercive scholars such as, Byman&Waxman, Art and Schultz will be included. It will conclude that there are three key areas of debate that emerge from the literature; terminology, the assumption of a rational actor and what constitutes the coercive use of force.

The second chapter will examine in more depth positivism, the assumption of a rationality that underpins the *ideal policy*; recognising that whilst there are valid criticisms of both, they are a legitimate approach for this thesis to adopt. The chapter will then set out the key empirical issues that were considered in undertaking this study, followed by derivation of the analytical framework and claims that are to be examined

within the thesis. The next section will derive the criteria for case selection, determining cases that meet the criteria and justifying my selection of Libya and NK. Finally, I will point out some of the key studies that have been done on these cases regarding nuclear proliferation; highlighting that this research is different as it is the only one to use Jakobsen's *ideal policy* as an analytical framework to conduct a structured focussed comparison with.

The case studies take place over two chapters (Chapters 3&4). In both of the cases I have further subdivided them into two exchanges. The first exchange covers the period of the Clinton administration and the second exchange covers the period of the Bush administration. This division is due to a clear change in the rhetoric, and to a degree the policies, of the administrations. Furthermore, by in effect having 4 rather than 2 cases it adds validity to the findings. In chapter 5, I conduct a comparison of the two cases and discuss the empirical findings. The final chapter then provides an overall conclusion to the thesis; tying the empirical findings in with the conceptual and theoretical discussions of the previous chapters and answering the research questions. The chapter also highlights areas where future research could be conducted.

Chapter 1 – Coercion and Coercive Diplomacy Theory

The aim of this chapter is to review the key concepts and themes from coercive theory that will be drawn upon throughout this thesis. Furthermore, it aims to clearly establish the gap in the current literature that this thesis will occupy; which is primarily that it is the only independent critique of Jakobsen's *ideal policy*. The study of coercion firmly sits within the strategic studies discipline of International Relations (IR) with many of its roots found in past masters such as Sun Tzu and Clausewitz.¹ Furthermore, the theoretical underpinning of strategic studies, and in particular the study of coercion, can be viewed as pertaining closest to the realist paradigm, as coercive strategy at its most simplistic relies on the logic of power, with a more powerful actor coercing a lesser power to meet a political objective.

Whilst there have been other theories put forward on various coercive exchanges², the theory of interest to this thesis is set out by Jakobsen in *The Western Uses of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War, A Challenge for Theory and Practice* (2002). Jakobsen's *ideal policy* is of particular interest as it uniquely draws upon the work of Thomas Schelling, Alexander George and Lawrence Freedman to derive an *ideal policy* that could be used to examine Western uses of coercive diplomacy. Jakobsen tested the *ideal policy* using George's structured focussed comparison methodology against cases where coercive diplomacy was applied to undo acts of military aggression.³ Key to this thesis is Jakobsen's argument that although the *ideal policy* was 'developed to apply to counter aggression only, but its logic should hold for attempts to counter terrorism and

¹ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Book 1, *On the Nature of War*, (Ware, Wordsworth Editions' Limited, 1997), pg.5 - "Warfare therefore is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will".

² The most notable of these will be covered within this chapter include Schelling, George, Robert Pape, Bruce Jentleson, Byman&Waxman, Art&Cronin et al, Freedman et al.

³ Jakobsen, *Western use of Coercive Diplomacy after the cold war, a challenge for theory and practice*, pg.7.

WMD acquisition as well'.⁴ Furthermore, he tested his nuclear proliferation hypotheses on nine cases; finding that four resulted in temporary success, two failures, one cheap success and two were ongoing, none of the exchanges implemented the *ideal policy* as it proved impossible to use force to 'deny the adversary's objectives quickly with little cost'.⁵ However, there is no evidence within the literature that the *ideal policy* has been independently critiqued or examined.

The theoretical underpinning of the *ideal policy* is primarily developed from the work of Thomas C. Schelling's *Arms and Influence* (1966), Alexander L George's *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* (1971) and Lawrence Freedman's chapter on '*Strategic Coercion*'.⁶ There are fundamental differences to the approach of Schelling and George. Schelling applied a deductive approach to assert that rational adversaries often use the threat of military force as part of their diplomacy.⁷ Furthermore, he introduces the concept of 'compellence' to explain how states use the threat of hurting the opponent to aid in their diplomatic bargaining. Alexander George built upon an abstract theory of coercive diplomacy by using a comparison of different case studies to derive components of a strategy that could be utilised by policy makers.⁸ George coined the term 'coercive diplomacy' emphasising that it was a defensive variant of Schelling's concept of compellence and that it was a strategy that could include a more 'flexible diplomacy that can employ rational persuasion and accommodation as well as coercive threats'.⁹

⁴ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, 'Coercive Diplomacy', in Alan Collins eds, *Contemporary Security Studies*, (New York, Oxford University Press, 2007), pg.231.

⁵ *Ibid.* pg.234.

⁶ Lawrence Freedman, 'Strategic Coercion', in Lawrence Freedman eds, *Strategic Coercion Concepts and Cases*, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1998).

⁷ *Op.cit.* Berger pg.32.

⁸ *Ibid.* pg.33.

⁹ Alexander L George & William E Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, (Boulder, Colo.:Westview Press, 2nd revised edn, 1994), pg.7.

The different approaches to theory building have been largely reflected in the studies of coercion that have followed with neither approach dominating.¹⁰

As stated the focus of this thesis is to determine the utility of Jakobsen's *ideal policy* as an analytical tool for examining coercive diplomacy employed to prevent states attaining nuclear weapons. Therefore, this chapter will first examine where the coercive theory sits within the academic literature; examining theories of past masters such as Sun Tzu and Clausewitz. It will then argue that, although Schelling claims to have 'learnt nothing' from Clausewitz, there are clear connections between their approaches and concepts. It will then examine connections between limited war theory and coercive theory before arguing that whilst they are connected, if not overlapping, concepts it is useful to maintain a separation as the term 'war' is difficult to define and would confuse the use of coercion where physical force has not been initiated.

I will then examine the coercive theories developed by Schelling, George and Freedman that underpin Jakobsen's *ideal policy*. Furthermore, I will review Jakobsen's assessment of these theories and the *ideal policy* in more depth. The chapter will conclude that there are three clear areas of debate within coercive theory; Firstly, there is a lack of consensus on the terminology leading to several different terms such as limited war, strategic coercion¹¹, military coercion¹², coercion, compellence and coercive diplomacy.

¹⁰ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, 'Pushing the Limits of Military Coercion Theory', *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol.12, No.2, (2011), pg.157.

¹¹ *Op.cit.* Freedman (1998), pg.15. 'strategic coercion' as the 'deliberate and purposive use of threats to influence another's strategic choices'

¹² Stephen J.Cimbala, *Coercive Military Strategy*, (Texas, Texas A&M University Press, 1998), pg.14. 'My concept of coercive military strategy includes but is not limited to, coercive diplomacy. Coercive military strategy shares with coercive diplomacy the explicit mixture of political and military actions toward the end of conflict termination or victory, but I would include some "deterrence" and "compellence" as well as some uses of conventional military action within the compass of coercive military strategy.'

This often leads to terms such as coercive diplomacy, compellence and coercion being used interchangeably, which questions their delineation as concepts. Secondly, there is a debate to the utility of using the assumption of a unitary rational actor, as many coercive theorists argue that it does not describe how states behave and needs to be replaced by a more sophisticated empirically grounded behavioural model. This issue of rationality will be examined more comprehensively within chapter 2. The last area of contention is what constitutes an acceptable level of force within a coercive strategy. Furthermore, I argue that there is a clear gap in the literature on coercive diplomacy as there has not been a detailed study, other than by Jakobsen, which tests the utility of the *ideal policy* when employed to prevent states from attaining nuclear weapons as a strategy or as an explanatory/predictive framework. Therefore, little theoretical consideration has been given to the specific problems that this goal may have to a strategy of coercive diplomacy.

Theoretical grounding of Coercive Theories

Coercion, the ability to achieve your objective through the use of a threat, is not a new concept and has always been an element of human relations. Sun Tzu writing in the fifth century BC stated that ‘Attaining one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the pinnacle of excellence. Subjugating the enemy’s army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence’.¹³ Although, this statement is arguably about achieving objectives by peaceful means, be they politico-diplomatic, economic, or ideological; before resorting to force¹⁴, Sun Tzu’s does describe an act of violence to attack an enemy’s strategy and persuade him to a particular course of action when making this

¹³ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, translated by Ralph D Sawyer, (Boulder, Colo.:Westview Press, 1994), pg. 177.

¹⁴ Michael I Handel, *Masters of War, Classical Strategic thought*, 3rd edition, (London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), pg. 137.

statement.¹⁵

Clausewitz's states 'if this influence of the political object is once permitted, as it then must be, there is no longer any limit, and we must be pleased to come down to such warfare as consists in a mere threatening of the enemy and in negotiating'.¹⁶ This statement indicates the utility of threatening the use of force in order to achieve an objective without actually having to resort to military action; in effect 'coercion'.

However, there is little recognition of Clausewitz's theories relating specifically to the study of coercion. Often Clausewitz's work has been seen to be arguing for nothing but decisive battle and resorting to the utmost use of force; however, even his critics such as Liddel Hart claim this interpretation 'arose largely from his disciples too shallow and too extreme interpretation of it, overlooking his qualifying clauses'.¹⁷ Furthermore, as will be discussed later in this chapter Clausewitz's work has often been connected to the concept of 'limited war' which is subtly different from coercion.

Schelling, who is viewed as producing one of the first definitive work on coercion¹⁸, argues that he 'didn't learn anything from Clausewitz'¹⁹ and that 'Clausewitz was not much on coercion, he didn't really view war as a bargaining process, he saw it as a zero

¹⁵ An episode is described where a surrounded warlord sent his most trusted envoy to their opponent. The envoy was beheaded for being rude; and the message returned to submit or defend themselves. The surrounded army surrendered later that day. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Translated and with an Introduction by Samuel B Griffith, Foreword by B.H.Liddel Hart, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1963), pg.78.

¹⁶ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Translation JJ Graham, New and Revised Edition, Vol III, (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), pg.120. It should be noted that there are slightly different translations of this.

¹⁷ Basil Liddel Hart, Foreword in Samuel B Griffith Translation of Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1963), pg v.

¹⁸ Freedman, *Strategic Coercion Concepts and Cases*, pg.1; Jakobsen, *Western use of Coercive Diplomacy after the cold war, a challenge for theory and practice*, pg.3; David Byman & Daniel Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion*, (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2002), pg.15.

¹⁹ Author's interview with Thomas Schelling, in person, 7 March 2013.

sum game, it all depended upon skill, manpower and resources'.²⁰ However, there are connections between both Schelling and Clausewitz's work and approach. For example Clausewitz argues that 'war therefore is an act of violence intended to *compel* our opponent to fulfil our will'²¹ and that 'occupation of the enemy's territory, not with a view to keeping it, but in order to levy contribution upon it, or to devastate it'.²² Furthermore, he points out that 'war should be viewed above all things according to the probability of its character, and its leading features as they are to be deduced from the political forces and proportions'.²³ Therefore, Clausewitz recognises that war is about compelling the opponent to meet your objective and that the amount of force used should be dependent on that political objective. It is true that Clausewitz argues that primarily this should be through the destruction of the enemy's army²⁴ as this in turn denies them the ability to resist and forces them to comply with your demands. However, it may be through more limited measures such as causing 'devastation (hurt) within the enemies' territory. The means used depends on the importance of the ends and the differing proportions (or capabilities) of the opposing sides. This leads to the concept of limited and unlimited objectives which will be discussed further in this chapter.

In turn Schelling argues that 'war is always a bargaining process, where states issue threats, proposals, counter threats, assurances, concessions and demonstrations in the

²⁰ Author's interview with Thomas Schelling, in person, 7 March 2013.

²¹ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, eds Peter Paret and Michael Howard, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1976), pg729.

²² Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Translation JJ Graham, (Ware, Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1997), pg.29.

²³ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Translation JJ Graham, New and Revised Edition, Vol III, (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), pg125.

²⁴ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Translation JJ Graham, (Ware, Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1997), pg.38.

form of actions rather than words, or actions accompanied by words.’²⁵ Schelling also states that ‘the threat that compels rather than deters, therefore, often takes the form of administering the punishment until the other acts’.²⁶ Therefore, Schelling recognises that the power to hurt through military force is useful in order to achieve a political or bargaining objective. However, he does appear to slightly contradict his former statement, as he points also out that a state may not need to ‘enter a bargaining process if it has enough military force to achieve its objectives through its own strength, skill and ingenuity’.²⁷ Therefore, in this instance it would appear that ‘war’ is not ‘always’ a bargaining process; as no conversation is required and the desired objective is just taken by ‘brute force’. An analogy for this would be that a skilled thief does not need ‘enter into a process of bargaining’ with a jewellers if he has the capability to steal what he desires; unless you make the tenuous argument that the bargain is the thief gains a ‘diamond’ and the jewellers ‘nothing’.

Clausewitz makes a similar point but rather than viewing coercion as a strategy that the stronger power can choose to adopt from a position of strength, he argues that bargaining occurs when one side does not have the capability or will to take by ‘brute force’ stating:

When political objects are unimportant, motives weak, the excitement of forces small, a cautious commander tries in all kinds of ways, without great crises and bloody solutions, to twist himself skilfully into a peace through the characteristic weaknesses of his enemy in the field and in the cabinet, we have not right to find fault with him, if the premises on which he acts are well founded and justified by success.²⁸

²⁵ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University, 2008), pg.143.

²⁶ Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), pg.1-3.

²⁷ Thomas C. Schelling, ‘Arms and Influence’, Chapter 6, in Thomas G.Mahnken and Joseph A.Maiolo eds, *Strategic Studies, A Reader*, (New York, Routledge, 2011), pg.86.

²⁸ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Translation JJ Graham, (Ware, Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1997), pg.39.

Another common aspect of their concepts is Schelling recognises what Clausewitz would have termed 'friction'; however, as Freedman points out 'whereas Clausewitz saw friction as undermining all but the most dogged of strategies, Schelling saw how these uncertainties might be used creatively, if recklessly'.²⁹ Some of the similarities in their arguments are due to the deductive approach adopted; both form an abstract concept based on the assumption of a rational actors. Rapoport even categorises Schelling as a 'Neo-Clausewitz' because of his use of the assumption of rationality; although he does recognise that whilst Clausewitz viewed the world in terms of a zero-sum game; Schelling's emphasises is on how enemies can cooperate in order to achieve mutual advantage.³⁰ Both Schelling and Clausewitz point out that the rationality of their model may not reflect the complexity of reality.

A key difference between Schelling and Clausewitz, is the former's theories are articulated for a situation where coercion is being used in a state of war; therefore, he does not touch upon diplomacy in any depth. This is evident from Clausewitz's definition of strategy as 'the theory of the use of combats for the object of war'³¹ whereas Schelling states strategy 'is not concerned with the efficient application of force but with the exploitation of potential force. It is concerned not just with enemies who dislike each other but with partners who distrust or disagree with each other'.³² Therefore, Schelling's definition is more expansive and includes conflict before military force has been used.

²⁹ Freedman, *Strategy*, pg. 164.

³⁰ Anatop Rapoport, 'Introduction', in Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, (London, Penguin Books, 1982), reissued 1982, pg.75.

³¹ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, (London, Penguin Books, 1982), pg.173.

³² Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, pg.5.

An assumption of rationality and the derivation of an abstract theory underpin both Schelling and Clausewitz's work. Furthermore, both recognise the use of military forces to 'compel' an opponent to achieve your objective. However, whilst Clausewitz's work was never completed and is contradictory in places; Schelling's study is complete and focussed on coercion. Furthermore, Schelling's analysis is rooted in the more recognisable nuclear age where states have enormous potential to hurt an opponent from great distance without committing conventional forces. As one of the key theorists underpinning Jakobsen's work, this chapter will now examine Schelling's work in more depth.

Thomas Schelling – Coercion and Compellence

Schelling's theories on coercion are primarily expressed in *The Strategy of Conflict* (1960) and *Arms and Influence* (1966). The key contribution of Schelling's work to the field of coercion is the concept of 'compellence'. Schelling terms the use of threats to bring about some desired action as 'coercion'; although he does emphasise that coercion could include deterrence; that is, 'preventing action, as well as forcing action through fear of consequences' which he termed 'compellence'.³³ Schelling did use the term 'coercive diplomacy'³⁴, although he does not define the term, but from the context it would appear to be interchangeable with compellence. Schelling himself states:

To be honest, where and when I used the term coercive, my guess is if I was to use the term today, since compellence has become pretty widely understood as part of the vocabulary, I think I would only use coercive if it meant either or

³³ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, pg.x.

³⁴ *Ibid.* pg.5, "The difference between coercion and brute force is as often in the intent as in the instrument. To hunt down Comanches and to exterminate them is brute force; to raid their villages to make them behave was **coercive diplomacy**, based on the power to hurt." pg.32 "**Coercive Diplomacy**, based on the power to hurt, was important even in those periods of history when military force was essentially the power to take and to hold, to fend off attack and to expel invaders, and to possess territory against opposition-that is, in the era in which military force tended to pit itself against opposing forces. Even then, a critical question was how much cost and pain the other side would incur for the disputed territory".

both, as in deterrence or compellence, which are both forms of coercion.....if I use the term coercive diplomacy I probably meant either one.³⁵

Fundamental to Schelling's concept of compellence is that it involves initiating an action that will only cease if the opponent responds as demanded.³⁶ Therefore, where the objective of a deterrent threat is often 'communicated by the very preparations that make the threat credible', a compellent threat tends to communicate what is required to be compliant with the demand, and is less likely to communicate the exact nature of the threat.³⁷ Compellence is therefore recognised as being more difficult as it is an action that is trying to get a target to change its behaviour, rather than to maintain the status quo. In contrast, deterrent threats are easier for the target to appear to have ignored or submit to without loss of face.³⁸

As coercion requires finding a bargain that an adversary will accept³⁹ and the threat of damage to come it is a strategy heavily reliant on communication between opponents. Therefore, Schelling argues that it is the 'pace of diplomacy, not the pace of battle, that governs actions; and while diplomacy may not require that force is used slowly, it does require that there is capacity to cause further damage'.⁴⁰ Pape argues that Schelling's compellence strategy is a risk based strategy as it indicates to the opponent the risk of the hurt that will follow if they maintain a particular course of action. However, he points out that this strategy may be ineffective if trying to deny an opponent an objective, as slowing down the use of force 'may improve the ability of victims to

³⁵ Author's interview with Thomas Schelling, in person, 7 March 2013.

³⁶ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, pg.72.

³⁷ *Ibid.* pg.73.

³⁸ Robert J Art, Conclusion, in Robert J Art and Patrick M Cronin, *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*, (Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003), pg. 362.

³⁹ *Op.cit.* Schelling (2008), pg.88.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* pg.172.

adjust, and so may be unable to threaten even as much damage as punishment strategies.’⁴¹

Schelling argues that a compellent threat has to have a definite deadline, otherwise it becomes a ‘ceremony with no consequence’ if ‘too little time is given compliance becomes impossible; if too much time is given then compliance becomes unnecessary. Thus compellence involves timing in a way that deterrence usually does not’.⁴² Another aspect of a compellent threat identified by Schelling is that it requires assurance to be given to the target that compliance will result in the threat not being undertaken. This is essential ‘as the object of a threat is to give somebody a choice to comply’.⁴³ If the target has no assurance that their compliance will lead to a more positive outcome, they may believe that it is not worth the risk of complying.

A common criticism of Schelling’s is the strategies of deterrence and compellence in practice often merge.⁴⁴ Byman and Waxman argue that in effect coercive and deterrent threats are extreme ends of a spectrum of threats.⁴⁵ A finding of this thesis is that in certain contexts they do become blurred; however, that does not detract from the utility of having the extreme ends of the concepts defined.

Governments can be broadly categorised into types such as democracies, dictatorships, authoritarian etc. The type of government has a clear influence on the way that they would coerce or how they would respond to coercion. This is apparent in Kenneth

⁴¹ Robert A Pape Jr, ‘Coercion and Military Strategy: Why Denial Works and Punishments Doesn’t’, *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol 15, No.4 (1992), pg. 423.

⁴² Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, pg.72.

⁴³ *Ibid.* pg.74.

⁴⁴ Douglas Peifer, ‘Risk-free Coercion? Technological Disparity and Coercive Diplomacy’, *European Security*, Vol 18, No.1 (2009), pg.14; Byman&Waxman, *Dynamics of Coercion*, pg.7.

⁴⁵ Byman&Waxman, *Dynamics of Coercion*, pg.8.

Schultz's *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy* where he clearly demonstrates that democracies are restrained in the type of threats they are willing to make due to the inherent need for internal democratic debate during policy making.⁴⁶ However, Schultz also asserts that any threat that is made by a democracy is more likely to be credible than an equivalent threat from a nondemocratic counterpart, as democracies only threaten when there is clear resolve to carry out the threat if required.⁴⁷

Several authors⁴⁸ argue that Schelling's abstract rationality fails to provide an adequate description of how states actually behave. Byman and Waxman argue this 'fosters static, one-sided thinking about coercive contests. It encourages analysts to think about costs and benefits as independent variables that can be manipulated by the coercer, while the adversary remains passive and re-evaluates their perceived interests'.⁴⁹ However, some argue that Schelling was not rational enough and that he inadequately understood the central theorems of game theory and did not apply it fully; although others have countered this asserting that his work shows that it is possible to be clear, precise, and logically rigorous without being overtly mathematical.⁵⁰

A more in-depth analysis of rationality will be undertaken in Chapter 2. However, a critique that perhaps shows the misunderstanding of some authors on Schelling work is

⁴⁶ Kenneth A Schultz, *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy*, (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2001), pg.1.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* pg.8.

⁴⁸ *Op.cit* Berger pg.32; *Op.cit.* George (1994), pg.20; Byman&Waxman, *Dynamics of Coercion*, pg.16; Peter Viggo Jakobsen, 'Pushing the Limits of Military Coercion Theory', *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol.12, No.2 (2011), pg.161.

⁴⁹ Daniel L Byman and Matthew C Waxman, 'Kosovo and the great air power debate', in Thomas G.Mahnken and Joseph A.Maiolo eds, *Strategic Studies, A Reader*, (New York, Routledge, 2011), pg.158.

⁵⁰ Ester-Mirjam Sent, 'Some like it hot; Thomas Schelling as a Cold War Warrior', version 1, November 2006, pg.2, <http://www.emsent.nl>, accessed 29 October 2015.

given by Jermy who states that Schelling theories are flawed as ‘any theory founded on the idea of rational behaviour in war was – and is – flawed because, as Clausewitz explains and the record shows, armed conflicts and war are political conditions where human behaviour is often at its most irrational.’⁵¹ However, Schelling, like Clausewitz, did not expect actors to always act rationally, but asserted that the assumption of ‘rationality’ was a useful starting point for the production of theory.⁵² The fact that Schelling’s theories, like those of Clausewitz, do not automatically translate into a ‘how to formulate a strategy of coercion’ that a practitioner might want does not diminish their utility to understanding the concept of coercion.

Peifer argues that Schelling’s ‘distinguishing between “brute force” wars and coercive wars has caused successor theorists to neglect Carl von Clausewitz and Julian Corbett’s concept of limited and unlimited war, and instead focus on coercive war as a distinct, more openly political form of war than traditional war’.⁵³ Furthermore he argues that it is ‘more useful than distinguishing between “coercive wars” and “brute force” wars, is to think in terms of limited and unlimited wars. Far more useful than the coercive-brute force dichotomy of modern coercion theory is the traditional distinction between limited and unlimited wars’.⁵⁴ It is true that Schelling ignores Clausewitz; however, discarding coercive theory for limited war theory, has its own conceptual problems.

The key issue is defining ‘limited war’, and in particular ‘war’. Clausewitz stated ‘if we only require from the enemy a small sacrifice, then we content ourselves with aiming at

⁵¹ Commodore Steven Jermy RN, *Strategy For Action, Using Force Wisely in the 21st Century*, (London, Knightstone Publishing, 2011), pg.88.

⁵² Robert Ayson, Chapter 5. ‘A Common Interest in Common Interest’: Hedley Bull, Thomas Schelling and Collaboration in International Politics’, http://press.anu.edu.au/sdsc/hedley/mobile_devices/ch05.html accessed 29 October 2015.

⁵³ Douglas Peifer, ‘Risk-free Coercion? Technological Disparity and Coercive Diplomacy’, *European Security*, Vol 18, No.1 (2009), pg.13.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* pg.13.

a small equivalent by the War, and we expect to attain that by moderate efforts. The enemy reasons in very much the same way'.⁵⁵ Therefore, Clausewitz asserted that war either had a limited or unlimited objective. A limited objective required limited resources to achieve it. This concept was developed further by Corbett who argued that 'limited wars do not turn upon the armed strength of the belligerents, but upon the amount of that strength which they are able or willing to bring to bear at the decisive point'.⁵⁶ Furthermore that:

A war may be limited not only because the importance of the object is too limited to call forth the whole national force, but also because the sea may be made to present an insuperable physical obstacle to the whole national force being brought to bear. That is to say, a war may be limited physically by the strategically isolation of the object, as well as morally by its comparative unimportance.⁵⁷

Corbett's view was that sea powers could choose how much force to apply to achieve an objective as a concern of a counter strike or reprisal into their territory was minimal.⁵⁸ In the nuclear age the concept of limited war developed in importance with theorists such as Osgood in 1957 pointing out that:

A limited war is one in which the belligerents restrict the purposes for which they fight to concrete, well-defined objectives that do not demand the utmost military effort of which the belligerents are capable and that can be accommodated in a negotiated settlement.....It demands of the belligerents only a fractional commitment of their human and physical resources. It permits their economic, social, and political patterns of existence to continue without serious disruption.⁵⁹

Schelling in both *Strategy of Conflict* and *Arms and Influence* discusses various aspects of limited warfare. Within the *Strategy of Conflict* he argues that:

⁵⁵ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, (London, Penguin Books, 1982), pg.400.

⁵⁶ Julian Corbett, *Principles of Maritime Strategy*, Dover edition, first published in 2004, is an unabridged republication of *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, (New York, Dover Publications, 2004), pg. 55.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* pg.56.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* pg.55.

⁵⁹ Robert Endicott Osgood, *Limited War, The challenge to American Strategy*, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1957), Fifth impression 1970, pg.2.

The problem of limiting warfare involves not a continuous range of possibilities from most favourable to least favourable for either side; it is a lumpy, discrete world that is better able to recognise qualitative than quantitative differences, that is embarrassed by the multiplicity of choices, and that forces both sides to accept some dictation from the elements themselves.⁶⁰

Furthermore, he points out that ‘in limited warfare, two things are being bargained over, the outcome of the war, and the mode of conducting the war itself’.⁶¹ He also explains that thresholds can be reached by ‘implicit bargaining about the rules of behaviour, about what one would do, or stop doing, according to how the other side behaved’.⁶² Therefore, he clearly does set out scenarios where ‘warfare’ can be restrained to a more limited form. It is important to note that Schelling states ‘warfare’ not ‘war’.

It is hard to define ‘war’. To Clausewitz defining war was ‘abstruse’ and he viewed it as ‘nothing but a duel on an extensive scale’⁶³; a view that implied physical conflict. Colin Gray usefully differentiates between war and warfare asserting that ‘war is a relationship between belligerents; it is the whole context for warfare’⁶⁴ and that ‘although war must be characterised by organised violence, belligerents employ many of the policy instruments available to them. War can be prosecuted in several ways, among which the battlefield may not be the most important’.⁶⁵ Gray’s statement still implies that physical conflict is undertaken during war. War must involve the undertaking of physical conflict between the belligerents; otherwise states would always be at war, as they will always be engaged in political, economic, cultural competition or

⁶⁰ Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, pg.77.

⁶¹ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, pg.135.

⁶² *Ibid.* pg.136.

⁶³ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Translation JJ Graham, New and Revised Edition, Vol III, (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), pg.1.

⁶⁴ Colin S Gray, *Strategy and History, Essays on theory and practice*, Chapter 5, *From Principles of Warfare to Principles of War: A Clausewitzan solution*’ unpublished essay (2005), (New York, Routledge, 2006), pg.82.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.* pg.86.

disagreements with an opponent. The United Kingdom (UK) is not viewed to be at 'war' with Argentina despite political disagreement, including the use of UK military deterrence, over the issue of the Falklands Islands.

However, Schelling's conceptualisation of coercion and compellence do not necessarily take place within a state of 'war' and can be applied to a range of objectives; whereas the concept of limited and unlimited war is fundamentally concerned with the objective of limiting a war from escalating to 'total war'. As Freedman points out limited war:

Requires that belligerents choose not to fight at full capacity, in order that a conflict neither gains in intensity nor expands in space and time. This is different from accepting those natural limits imposed by resources and geography, and also from circumstances in which a strong state employs only limited forces to deal with opponents with inferior capabilities. Against inferior opponents complete victories can still be achieved with limited effort. To be a 'limited war', the limits must be accepted by both parties.⁶⁶

It may be that coercive strategies are required to limit a war; and this is why there appears to be an overlap between the concept of 'limited war' and 'coercive theory'. Furthermore, the kinds of capabilities required to conduct limited wars are often the same required to conduct effective coercion.⁶⁷ However, focussing purely on 'limited and unlimited war' would limit the study of coercion to 'in war' scenarios. This is not to say that Schelling's idea of 'brute force' is not without difficulties that will be discussed later in this chapter.

There are clear overlaps in the concept of limited and unlimited objectives/war and Schelling's concept of coercion/compellence. Whilst this may lead to some confusion; there is utility in distinguishing coercive theory from limited war. Furthermore, for the

⁶⁶ Lawrence Freedman, 'Ukraine and the Art of Limited War', *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* (2014), Vol.56, No.6, pg. 8.

⁶⁷ Christopher Gacek, *The Logic of Force, the dilemma of limited war in American Foreign policy*, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1994), pg.307.

purpose of this study I will remain focussed on the coercive theory that underpins Jakobsen's *ideal policy*.

Alexander George – Coercive Diplomacy

Alexander George's work is the other key theoretical contributor Jakobsen's *ideal policy*. Jakobsen was particularly influenced by George's development of structured focussed comparison to develop theory through analysis of case studies where coercive diplomacy had been employed. Furthermore, George was the first theorist to specifically define 'coercive diplomacy', thus separating it from Schelling's compellence. George was critical of the way in which game theory and rational choice had been applied to the study of coercion and did not believe that it was possible to operationalise abstract theories sufficiently by means of logical deduction.⁶⁸ Instead, he opted for an inductive approach seeking to identify the conditions influencing coercive success and replacing Schelling's rational unitary actor assumption with an empirically derived behavioural model of the adversary.⁶⁹

George distinguishes coercion from coercive diplomacy, asserting that the latter emphasises the use of threats and the exemplary use of limited force to persuade a target to back down. If force is used, it is just enough to demonstrate determination to protect one's interests and to establish credibility of one's threat.⁷⁰ Therefore, coercive diplomacy is an attractive strategy because it offers the chance to achieve reasonable objectives in a crisis with less cost in blood and treasure. Furthermore, it is likely to

⁶⁸ Alexander L George and Richard Smoke, , *Theory and Practice*, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1974), pg. 503; *Op.cit.* George (1994), pg.13–14.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.* George (1994).

⁷⁰ Alexander L George, *Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics*, in Alexander L George & William E Simmons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, (Boulder, Colo.:Westview Press, 2nd revised edn, 1994), pg.7.

have fewer political and psychological costs, and less likely to escalate than with traditional military strategies. Moreover, a crisis resolved by means of coercive diplomacy is also less likely to damage future relations between the two sides than war.⁷¹ George does not use the term compellence for two reasons; firstly he wished to 'distinguish between defensive and offensive uses of coercive threats'; Secondly, he wanted to emphasise the 'possibility flexible diplomacy', 'rational persuasion and accommodation' as well as coercive threats.⁷²

George identifies three types (shown in table 1) of demands that a coercive diplomacy strategy can be built around. He asserts that it is 'a defensive strategy that is employed to change a status quo situation in his own favour'.⁷³ Moreover, he argues that 'defensive uses are quite distinct from offensive ones, wherein coercive threats can be employed aggressively to persuade a victim to give up something of value without putting up resistance'.⁷⁴ However, George's Type C (Persuade opponent to make changes in government), as he recognised⁷⁵, clearly could be viewed as offensive. Freedman points out that 'there are few more offensive demands that can be made, for this is a challenge to basic sovereignty' and that 'the insistence that coercive diplomacy is defensive is neither tenable in practice nor useful analytically'.⁷⁶ Under the same logic, I would argue Type B and C in some scenarios could be viewed as offensive as it is possible that they could challenge sovereignty. For example the 1999 NATO bombing campaign against Serbia for its refusal to sign an agreement which it believed

⁷¹ *Ibid.* pg.9

⁷² *Ibid.* pg.7

⁷³ *Ibid.* pg.7.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.* pg.7.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.* pg.8.

⁷⁶ Freedman, *Strategic Coercion, Concepts and Cases*, pg.18.

compromised its sovereignty by having NATO troops stationed within Kosovo and its unwillingness to withdraw troops from the region.⁷⁷ Therefore, the separation between offensive and defensive is so context dependent that it is of little use analytically.

Three types of Defensive Coercive Diplomacy ⁷⁸			
	Coercive Diplomacy		
Deterrence	Type A	Type B	Type C
Persuade opponent not to initiate an action	Persuade opponent to stop short of the goal.	Persuade opponent to undo the action.	Persuade opponent to make changes in government.

Table 1.1

George argues that the abstract model is ‘an incomplete deductive theory’⁷⁹ that is limited for several reasons; Firstly, it assumes a rational opponent.⁸⁰ Secondly, it gives policy makers only limited aid in devising a policy using coercive diplomacy for any specific situation.⁸¹ Thirdly, it cannot be used to predict whether coercive diplomacy will be successful in a specific situation.⁸² In order to overcome these limitations, George sets out four tasks need to undertake to develop an effective strategy, they are; Fill in the variables of the abstract model, identify the variant of the strategy of coercive diplomacy to be applied, replace assumption of rational opponent with an empirically derived behavioural model and then take contextual variables into account. George asserts that the variables to be filled in are:

⁷⁷ UN charter Art 2.7 ‘Nothing contained in the present Charter shall Authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.’

⁷⁸ *Ibid.* pg.9.

⁷⁹ Alexander L George, *Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics*, in Alexander L George & William E Simmons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, (Boulder, Colo.:Westview Press, 2nd revised edn, 1994), pg.14.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² *Ibid.* pg.7.

1. What to demand of the opponent?
2. Whether and how to create a sense of urgency for compliance with the demand?
3. What punishment to threaten for noncompliance, and how to make it sufficiently potent and credible?
4. Whether to also offer positive inducements and, if so, what ‘carrots’ to offer together with the ‘stick’ to induce acceptance of the demand?⁸³

What to demand of the opponent seems obvious; however, as George points out there is a relationship between demand and motivation; highlighting the more a demand affects the targets vital interests, the more motivated the target will be to resist. Therefore, only demands reflecting the coercer vital interests should be made, as only then will the coercer have the motivation to carry out threats. The competing motivations of the coercer and coerced George termed ‘asymmetry of motivation’.⁸⁴ Determining the ‘sense of urgency’ required is a difficult area of this concept? George points out that this can be done by communicating a time based deadline or by ‘actions such as alerts and deployments of military forces, which may be coupled with verbal communications indicating that time is short’.⁸⁵ The latter method in particular has the possibility of miscalculation and inadvertent escalation. Another criticism is George’s use of ‘punishment’ for noncompliance. Pape convincingly argues that denial strategies are more likely to succeed than punishment.⁸⁶ This assertion is backed up Art’s study that found ‘high denial was present in four of the five cases of success’ studied.⁸⁷

⁸³ *Ibid.* pg.16.

⁸⁴ *Op.cit.* George (1997), pg.13.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.* pg.17.

⁸⁶ Robert A Pape Jr, ‘Coercion and Military Strategy: Why Denial Works and Punishments Doesn’t’, *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol 15, No.4 (1992), pg. 425 - “Two main types of military threats can be

The offer of an incentive, or ‘carrot’, is an important element of George’s strategy. The magnitude and significance of the carrot can range from small face-saving concessions to substantial payments.⁸⁸ The level of threat to positive inducements generally relies on two variables; firstly, what one demands of the opponent and secondly how strongly motivated they are to comply with that demand.⁸⁹

The second strategic task that George identifies a policy maker needs to make is the preferred variant of coercive diplomacy to be applied. He identifies four variants of the strategy. Firstly, an ultimatum comprising of three elements; (1) a demand on the opponent, (2) A time limit or sense of urgency for compliance with the demand, (3) A threat of punishment for noncompliance that is credible and sufficiently potent to convince the opponent that compliance is preferable to other courses of action.⁹⁰ Lauren identifies four risks with such an ultimatum⁹¹; firstly, the opponent may reject the ultimatum; therefore, the coercer would have to decide whether to carry out the threatened punishment.⁹² Secondly, the opponent may reject the ultimatum because they

employed to achieve these goals: threats against civilian vulnerabilities (‘punishment’) and threats against military vulnerabilities (denial). Punishments operate by raising costs or risks to civilian populations. Denial functions by military preventing the target from attaining his territorial goals, such as by threatening to capture territory held by the victim to threatening to defeat the victim’s efforts to capture territory”.

⁸⁷ Robert J Art, ‘Conclusion’, in Robert J Art and Patrick M Cronin eds, *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*, (Washington D.C, United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003), pg. 401.

⁸⁸ *Op.cit.* George (1994), pg.17.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.* George (1994) pg.7; *Op.cit.* George (2004) pg.75.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.* (1994).

⁹¹ *Ibid.* pg.276

⁹² *Ibid.*

would lose face.⁹³ Thirdly, the opponent may take the ultimatum seriously but decide to initiate war himself rather than accept the demand.⁹⁴ Fourthly, the opponent may neither accept nor reject the ultimatum outright but may attempt to defuse its coercive impact by partially accepting the demand, hoping thereby to force the coercing power to settle for less.⁹⁵ It is an argument within this thesis that the US did not adopt a definitive deadline as this would have committed it to action in order to maintain credibility.

The 'tacit ultimatum' variant contains a specific time limit for compliance; however, the threat is not detailed but hinted through other means such as the movement of military forces.⁹⁶ Another method is the 'gradual turning of the screw', where the coercing power neither creates a sense of urgency nor does it signal the nature of threatened punishment. Instead, its demands are accompanied by a threat that punishment will be gradually increased if compliance does not occur.⁹⁷ The 'try and see approach' involves the communication of a clear demand, with no deadline, but a limited coercive threat is made.⁹⁸ George does accept that in practice the 'try and see' approach and the 'gradual turning of the screw' may be blurred.⁹⁹ The latter is the approach adopted by the US in the cases examined within this thesis.

George's third strategic task is to replace the general assumption of a 'rational' opponent with an empirically derived behavioural model arguing that policy makers

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ S. Kalyanaraman, 'Operation Parakram: An Indian exercise in coercive diplomacy', *Strategic Analysis*, Vol.26, No.4 (2002), pg.481.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ *Op.cit.* George pg.8.

⁹⁹ *Op.cit.* George (1994) pg.19.

must derive strategy of coercive diplomacy with 'sensitivity to the psychological, cultural, and political variables that may influence an adversary's behaviour'.¹⁰⁰ This is a valid argument; however, rationality will be discussed briefly later in this chapter and in more depth within chapter 2.

The final task in making a coercive diplomacy strategy is to take account of contextual variables and success conditions. George identifies five contextual variables and nine conditions for coercive diplomacy to be successful. The three that seem particularly significant for influencing the outcome have to do with the opponent's perception and are that an asymmetry of motivation operates in favour of the coercing power, that it is time urgent to respond to the coercing power's demands, and that the coercing power will engage in escalation that would impose unacceptable costs. Furthermore, the clarity of the settlement terms¹⁰¹ is also deemed to be important. Kagan makes several criticism of this approach. Firstly, that the sheer number of variables (fourteen altogether) makes it difficult to apply George's strategy as an analytical tool. A second criticism is that the variables are stated in too general and abstract form and are in need of greater operationalisation. Furthermore, that the division of the fourteen variables into 'contextual variables' and conditions favouring success is misleading. Moreover, the relegation of different variables into one category or the other is unclear and confusing.¹⁰²

George argues that coercive diplomacy may, but is not required to, go beyond threats to the actual use of military force; but if force is actually used, it must be limited and fall

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.* pg. 29.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.* pg.286.

¹⁰² Korina Kagan, 'The Failure of the Great Powers to Coerce Small States in the Balkans, 1875-1877 and 1914: Situational Versus Tactical Explanation', in Lawrence Freedman eds, *Strategic Coercion, Concepts and Cases*, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1998), pg.90.

short of full-scale use or war.¹⁰³ Furthermore, George argues that any use of force should demonstrate resolution and credibility, the actual levels to demonstrate these attributes depend on the specifics of the situation.¹⁰⁴ Therefore, like the issuing of demands, George points out that designing and implementing strategies based on threats is very difficult as it involves evaluating an adversary's motives, perceptions, and values.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore it is the target's estimate of the credibility and potency of the threat, not the coercer that is paramount. This estimate will be affected by the targets psyche, perception and judgement. Therefore, the possibility of misperception and miscalculation by the opponent is a possibility.¹⁰⁶

Although George argues that demonstrative should mean only the 'quite limited' use of force, it is pointed out that in practice it can be difficult to determine what is 'just enough force' to demonstrate resolution and establish credibility, as this depends on the nature of the coercer's goals¹⁰⁷ and his capabilities. Furthermore, several theorists take issue with George's argument that coercive diplomacy is a defensive strategy arguing terms that normatively loaded terms such as 'offensive' and 'defensive' may not be of use, as the actors themselves will certainly disagree on what is offensive and what is defensive, as will some of the analysts who study these influence attempts.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰³ *Op.cit.* George (1994), pg.10.

¹⁰⁴ Robert J Art, 'Introduction', in Robert J Art and Patrick M Cronin eds, *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*, (Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003), pg.9.

¹⁰⁵ *Op.cit.* George, (1994) pg.10.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.* George, (1994) pg.7; *Op.cit.* George (2004), pg.76.

¹⁰⁷ *Op.cit.* Art&Cronin (2003), pg.9.

¹⁰⁸ Jack S Levy, 'Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy: The Contributions of Alexander George', *Political Psychology*, Vol 29, No 4 (2008), pg.542.

Freedman - Strategic Coercion

Jakobsen was also influenced by of Lawrence Freedman's theorising on strategic coercion, particularly the assertion that the level of force that can be used within a coercive strategy is dependent on the choice the opponent has to defy a demand, which has been adopted by Jakobsen's *ideal policy*. Furthermore, Freedman's categorising of the umbrella concept of 'Strategic Coercion' is also initially adopted by Jakobsen.

Strategic coercion is defined by Freedman as a 'deliberate and purposive use of overt threats to influence another's strategic choices'.¹⁰⁹ Furthermore, that strategic coercion is close to George's concept of coercive diplomacy.¹¹⁰ However, as stated Freedman diverges from George in arguing that coercive activity is not inherently defensive or offensive, nor does it necessarily involve specific modes of force. Moreover, he considers in more depth the importance of counter coercion and the influence of specific acts of coercion on strategic relationship over the long term¹¹¹; on all these points, Freedman finds 'Schelling work unsatisfactory'.¹¹²

Freedman asserts that the 'distinguishing feature of coercion is that the target is never denied choice', but judges the cost of compliance and of non-compliance. Furthermore, he points out that because coercion is a 'bargaining situation, the target may have the opportunity to issue counter-threats'. Therefore, 'the negotiation in each instance will essentially be over what is deemed acceptable compliance but also over the costs of enforcement, or resistance, to the coercer's will'. Moreover, 'each act of coercion feeds into the set of assumptions and anticipations about the behaviour' of the opponent. Due

¹⁰⁹ Freedman, *Strategic Coercion, Concepts and Cases*, pg.3.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.* pg.17.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.* pg.3.

¹¹² *Ibid.* pg.3.

to this interplay of actions, perceptions, and the affect they have on the cost calculus of both sides, Freedman argues that the study of coercion ‘cannot be considered simply to be about the design of efficient threats. It must also consider the way that strategic actors construct reality and their understanding of how their opponent constructs their reality’.¹¹³ An argument made within this thesis that connects to Freedman’s latter point is that individuals can act rationally based on the information that they have available to them, even if a more detached observer with more information can see that action not to be optimal.

A further argument put forward by Freedman is that coercion occupies part of a spectrum with ‘consent at one end and control at other’. If no force is required then there is a presumption of consent, when no compliance is anticipated then overwhelming force may have to be applied to deny the target choice and to take control.¹¹⁴ For Schelling it is no longer coercion when a state takes what it wants through ‘brute force’.¹¹⁵ George and Simons, emphasise that force should be exemplary, or demonstrative, which as discussed earlier can be hard to determine. Authors such as Byman and Waxman point out that force needs to be ‘limited’ and less than Schelling’s brute force.¹¹⁶ However, this still does not clearly emphasise at what point coercion ends and another strategy is being adopted. To Freedman if the coerced has a choice (comply or not to comply), coercion is being used, no matter the level of force employed by the coercer. Choice as a determinant of the amount of force will be discussed more when examining Jakobsen’s work.

¹¹³ *Ibid.* pg.36.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.* pg.16.

¹¹⁵ *Op.cit.* Schelling (2008), pg.2.

¹¹⁶ *Op.cit.* Byman&Waxman (2002), pg.10.

Another aspect examined by Freedman, is the use of denial and punishment strategies of coercion. Freedman agrees with Pape's argument that denying a target an objective is potentially more reliable than a strategy that punishes a target if they undertake a specific prohibited action, as denial can be measured in more physical terms.¹¹⁷

Freedman argues that this calculation is insufficient; therefore, he introduces the idea of enforcement costs, as this is the cost to the coercer in conducting an act of coercion.

Furthermore, with denial the resistance and compliance costs to the coerced are interrelated, in that if resistance fails then compliance is automatic. However, with punishment the two are separated, as even if resistance to the coercer's actions fails, compliance is still the choice of the coerced.¹¹⁸

Karnad criticises Freedman's '*Strategic Coercion*' as it does not address the assessment of risk before undertaking a coercive action, although it is pointed out that this may be because a very large and consequential differential in military capabilities is assumed between the coercer and coerced. Therefore, it is taken that there is no risk to the coercer. However it is asserted that even the possibility of just a few fatalities and their consequences on subsequent decision making cannot be ignored.¹¹⁹ I would deem this criticism to be unfair, as although it is not necessary emphasised as calculating risks, Freedman's discussion of compliance, resistance and enforcement costs¹²⁰ would imply that in weighing up the costs of whether to use coercion, a coercer is in effect examining the risks that the employing the strategy may cost too much.

¹¹⁷ *Op.cit.* Freedman (1997), pg.27.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.* pg.29.

¹¹⁹ Bharat Karnad, 'Book reviews', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol 24, No.1 (2001), pg.241.

¹²⁰ *Op.cit.* Freedman (1997), pg.3.

Jakobsen's *Ideal Policy*

This section will start by looking at Jakobsen's views on Schelling, George and Freedman's theories; before moving onto examine in more depth Jakobsen's work on coercion. Although not clearly stated in *Arms and Influence*, Jakobsen identifies five conditions¹²¹ that Schelling deems necessary for compellence to be successful:

1. The threat conveyed must be sufficiently potent to convince the adversary that the costs of non-compliance will be unbearable.
2. The threat must be credible in the mind of the adversary; he must be convinced that the coercer has the will and capability to execute it in case of non-compliance.
3. The adversary must be given time to comply with the demand.
4. The coercer must assure the adversary that compliance will not lead to more demands in the future.
5. The conflict must not be perceived as zero sum. A degree of common interest in avoiding full scale war must exist. Each side must be persuaded that it can gain more by bargaining than by trying unilaterally to take what it wants by force.

Jakobsen claims that the limited number of factors is the strength of Schelling's theory as it is easy to use, coherent and parsimonious.¹²² However, he also points out that the parsimonious nature of the theory limits its explanatory range¹²³ and makes it of little use in developing policies to implement coercive diplomacy. Although, it should be noted that Schelling did recognise this weakness pointing out that 'principles rarely lead straight to policies; policies depend on values and purposes, predictions and estimates,

¹²¹ *Op.cit.* Jakobsen (1998), pg.17.

¹²² *Ibid.* pg.20.

¹²³ *Ibid.*

and must usually reflect the relative weight of conflicting principles'.¹²⁴ Therefore, the utility of Schelling's work is that it offers useful theoretical insights into coercion, but does not offer detailed methodology on how to create a coercive strategy.

Jakobsen also identifies several weaknesses with George and Simons' general framework that limit its policy-relevance. Firstly, the large number of variables increases the risk of over-determination.¹²⁵ Secondly, the high generality of their variables creates major problems with respect to operationalising them, therefore, enabling effective measuring. Thirdly, the framework was developed during the cold war when the scope for coalitional action was limited, and conflict was between nation states. As a consequence the framework does not take the possibility of fragmented opponents into account.¹²⁶ Fourthly, George's classic works have not been tested on new case studies. Even the second edition of *Limits to Coercive Diplomacy* does not test the original theory on new cases but repeats the inductive exercise conducted in the first edition.¹²⁷ Furthermore, George appears to mark coercive diplomacy out as a set of activities along a spectrum, rather than establishing a clear dichotomy. Moreover, as suggested earlier; that the insistence that coercive diplomacy is defensive is neither tenable in practice nor useful analytically.¹²⁸

Jakobsen originally identified that Freedman's term 'strategic coercion' constitutes an umbrella concept incorporating all threat based strategies such as; compellence,

¹²⁴ *Op.cit.* Schelling (2008), pg.xv.


¹²⁵ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, 'The Strategy of Coercive Diplomacy: Refining Existing Theory to Post-Cold War Realities', in Lawrence Freedman eds, *Strategic Coercion, Concepts and Cases*, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1998), pg.69.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷ *Ibid.* pg.159.

¹²⁸ *Op.cit.* Freedman (1998), pg.18.

coercive diplomacy, blackmail and deterrence¹²⁹ (as shown in diagram 1). Taking this viewpoint compellence can be seen to incorporate coercive diplomacy; however, whereas coercive diplomacy only covers reactive threats employed in response to actions taken by an adversary, compellence also involves threats aimed at initiating adversary action through a strategy of blackmail. Jakobsen further emphasises that it is the reactive nature that distinguishes coercive diplomacy from its sister strategy of deterrence, which involves the use of threats to influence adversaries not to undertake undesired actions in the first place.¹³⁰



Overview of existing terms concerning the use of threats (Diagram 1.1)

However, there are those who do not recognise coercion as the overarching term and have different definitions. Art argues that:

Some people talk about coercion as an overall category, then talk about compellence and deterrence, I find that confusing I talk about coercion/compellence and then deterrence, but if you're trying to push somebody do something that they don't want to do, which means it can mean either prevented from initiating an action or stop doing what they're doing you can do it that, but I find that introduces an unnecessary level of confusion, so my personal way dividing it that I teach is that there is coercion/compellence and I use the terms interchangeably.¹³¹

¹²⁹ *Op.cit.* Jakobsen (1998), pg.7.

¹³⁰ *Op.cit.* Jakobsen (2007), pg.228.

¹³¹ Author's interview with Robert, in person, 15 March 2013.

Furthermore, Cimbala recognises the variants of these strategies asserting that his concept of coercive military strategy:

Shares with coercive diplomacy the explicit mixture of political and military actions toward the end of conflict termination or victory, but I would include some “deterrence” and “compellence” as well as some uses of conventional military action within the compass of coercive military strategy.¹³²

Jakobsen also points out that the term ‘(military) coercion’, rather than strategic coercion seems to be emerging within academia as the prominent term for describing the use of threats, however, he continues to use the term ‘strategic coercion’.¹³³ Therefore there is clear disagreement in the terminology within the field.

Jakobsen uses George’s definition of coercive diplomacy stating it is ‘a strategy involving the threat of punishment and/or limited force short of full-scale military operations to persuade an actor to stop and/or undo an action he is already embarked on’.¹³⁴ He further adds that coercive diplomacy is attractive from a crisis management perspective, because it can be used to stop and/or reverse acts of military aggression with limited or, at the best of times, no use of force. Furthermore, that it is attractive to policy makers, as when successful, it is a low-cost strategy.¹³⁵ Moreover, he points out that diplomacy and military force are both means to achieving a political objective, with the strategy of coercive diplomacy lying between the two extremes.¹³⁶ A similar view to this is that of Matthews who argues that:

Crisis management and coercive diplomacy can be seen as alternative means of dealing with crisis – the former is the means adopted if the emphasis is on the avoidance of war as the major objective, the latter is the means adopted if the

¹³² Cimbala, *Coercive Military Strategy*, pg.14.

¹³³ *Op.cit.* Jakobsen (2011), pg.155.

¹³⁴ *Op.cit.* Jakobsen (1998), pg.1

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ *Op.cit.* Jakobsen (2007), pg.235.

major objective is the protection of furtherance of vital national interest. It is not that coercive diplomacy is absent in crisis management, it is that the latter consists more of a mixed pattern of threat and offering incentives to your opponent for compromise or even for backing down.¹³⁷

Building upon the work of Schelling and George, Jakobsen derives the *ideal policy* stating that if its logic is correct then coercive diplomacy will succeed when the following three conditions apply:

4. Credible implementation of the *ideal policy* comprising
 - a. A threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives quickly with little cost;
 - b. A deadline for compliance;
 - c. An assurance to the adversary against future demands;
 - d. An offer of carrots for compliance¹³⁸.
5. Opponent prefers to comply rather than to lose a war.
6. Opponent acts rationally and does not miscalculate or suffer from misperception.

Similarly, failure is expected if one of the following three conditions is present;

4. Failure to implement the *ideal policy*.
5. Opponent makes a conscious choice to fight a war it expects to lose rather than comply with the coercer demand.
6. Opponent miscalculates or suffers from misperception¹³⁹.

In later work Jakobsen introduces the term the concept of the 3Cs; carrots, coercion and confidence-building¹⁴⁰ arguing that:

¹³⁷ Ken Matthews, *The Gulf Conflict and International Relations*, (New York, Routledge, 1993), pg.107.

¹³⁸ *Op.cit.* Jakobsen (1998), pg.33.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, 'Reinterpreting Libya's WMD Turnaround – Bridging the Carrot-Coercion Divide', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol 35, No.4 (2012), pg.6.

Although the coercive diplomacy literature does incorporate all three, it still privileges coercion. Similarly, the literature on positive inducements privileges the carrots and the confidence-building mentioning coercion only in passing. The 3C framework represents a way of avoiding these conceptual pitfalls.¹⁴¹

A comparison of Jakobsen's ideal policy and 3Cs concept can be found at table 1.2.

Ideal Policy ¹⁴²	3Cs; carrots, coercion and confidence-building ¹⁴³
A threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives quickly with little cost	Use of coercion (threats, sanctions, limited force) generating fear of unacceptable escalation and a sense of urgency for compliance in the mind of the target.
A deadline for compliance	Adopts George's 'sense of urgency'.
An assurance to the adversary against future demands	Confidence-building measures assuring the adversary that compliance will be rewarded and not trigger new demands.
An offer of carrots for compliance.	Carrots allowing the opponent to save face and make the costs of compliance acceptable.
Jakobsen's definition of coercive Diplomacy; a strategy involving the threat of punishment and/or limited short of full-scale military operations to persuade an actor to stop and/or undo an action he is already embarked on'	Jakobsen's definition Coercion 'involves threats, sanctions and, if required, limited use of force in order to stop or undo hostile actions already undertaken by the adversary'.
Table 1.2	

The most significant difference between Jakobsen's *ideal policy* and his concept of 3Cs is that the latter does not require a clearly stated deadline; instead adopts the slightly vaguer 'sense of urgency' is conveyed. Whilst Jakobsen argues that the 3Cs enables exchanges to be viewed more 'synergistically'; dropping the requirement for a clear deadline does enable more cases to be viewed as 3Cs case success. One of the key findings of this thesis, which will be discussed in chapter 5, is that states do not apply coercive diplomacy in the form of the *ideal policy* as they are averse to setting clear deadlines that commit them to action. George also found that 'policy-makers may

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.* pg.6.

¹⁴² *Op.cit.* Jakobsen (1998), pg.33

¹⁴³ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, 'Reinterpreting Libya's WMD Turnaround – Bridging the Carrot-Coercion Divide', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol 35, No.4 (2012), pg.7.

consider it necessary to forgo resorting to an ultimatum'.¹⁴⁴ However, as a framework for studying cases there is a difficulty that 'sense of urgency' is open to wide interpretation and could easily be misunderstood.

The 3Cs concept would also indicate that Jakobsen has abandoned the definition of coercive diplomacy and the overarching conceptualisation of strategic coercion and its sub strategies. His definition of coercion (shown in table 1) is almost identical to his previous definition of coercive diplomacy; the key element that both share being the 'stop or undo' an action already undertaken/embarked upon'. Therefore, Jakobsen uses the term coercion as if it was coercive diplomacy. This may also be a greater acceptance by Jakobsen of Byman and Waxman's argument that deterrence and compellence are effectively the same strategy but at differing ends of a spectrum. This further complicates the issue of terminology that Jakobsen himself identifies. In previous work Jakobsen argues that:

While agreement on the terminology would be nice, it is not necessary for theoretical progress and enhanced policy relevance. The problem caused by terminological confusion is not as serious as it appears at first sight because most coercion theorists, as argued above, employ the terms compellence and coercive diplomacy. Moreover, it is futile to appeal to (coercion) theorists to refrain from proposing new terms and concepts. They will continue to do so in the hope that their concepts will catch on and generate citations.¹⁴⁵

The issue of terminology though is fundamental. If coercive theorists cannot agree on terminology and conceptual models; it is difficult to build more detailed depth into the theories. Instead coercive theory will continue to broaden with more models created; which in turn creates more difficulty in determining which are valid and worth further

¹⁴⁴ George Alexander L, in George Alexander L & Simmons William E eds, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, (Boulder, Colo.:Westview Press, 2nd revised edn, 1994), pg. 274.

¹⁴⁵ *Op.cit.* Jakobsen (2011), pg.158.

exploration. Whilst this may be idealistic and a ‘futile’ pursuit; at the very least there should be a clear delineation between the terms ‘coercion’ and ‘coercive diplomacy’.

It could be argued that Jakobsen’s move away from the *ideal policy* to the concept of 3Cs invalidates the central theme of this thesis. However, there is still merit in applying the *ideal policy* as a framework and as will be discussed in later chapters it still offers an original contribution to coercive theory.

In order to test whether credible implementation of the *ideal policy* leads to compliance or whether failure to implement the *ideal policy* led to non-compliance Jakobsen conducted a structured, focused comparison of the coercive diplomacy applied to Iraq during the gulf crisis in 1991, the wars in the former Yugoslavia and the crisis in Haiti.¹⁴⁶ These three cases were broken further into 13 separate exchanges in order to increase the empirical accuracy of the findings. The *ideal policy* framework predicted correctly the result of 11 out of 13 coercive diplomacy exchanges.¹⁴⁷ Although, Jakobsen acknowledged that this was not a perfect correlation, he argued that it passed the threshold for plausibility.¹⁴⁸ In a later study he presents 36 coercive diplomacy exchanges stating that only three cases had applied the *ideal policy*. Furthermore, only six of the 36 exchanges were a lasting success, leading Jakobsen to the conclusion that coercive diplomacy is a high-risk and hard to use strategy.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁶ Jakobsen, *Western use of Coercive Diplomacy after the cold war, a challenge for theory and practice*, pg.x.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.* pg.131.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.* pg.135.

¹⁴⁹ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, ‘Coercive Diplomacy’, in Alan Collins eds, *Contemporary Security Studies*, (New York, Oxford University Press, 2007), pg.245.

Jakobsen did apply the *ideal policy* to the object of WMD with the results shown in table 1.3. Although the detailed analysis underpinning these assessments is not presented in his published work.

Western use of coercive diplomacy to suspend or end WMD programmes 1990-2005¹⁵⁰				
Location	Demand	Adversary	Coercive Strategy	Outcome
Libya				
Round 1 1992-1997	End WMD programmes; cease terrorist activities; hand over terrorist suspects; provide compensation.	Libya	Sanctions, Weak threats of force Threats of regime change.	Failure
Round 2 1997-2003	End WMD programmes; cease terrorist activities; hand over terrorist suspects; provide compensation.	Libya	Sanctions, Implicit threats of force, Carrot Assurances	Cheap Success
North Korea				
Round 1 1993-1994	Freeze nuclear programme	North Korea	US Sanction, Threats of UN sanctions and force, Inducements, Assurances	Temporary success
Round 2 1997-2003	End nuclear programme	North Korea	US sanctions, Indirect threats of force Inducements, Assurances	? ongoing negotiations

Table 1.3

Jakobsen states that:

To qualify as a case of coercive diplomacy, explicit threats, sanctions or limited force have to be employed by a Western coercer. Cases involving implicit threats and shows of force such as the crisis between the United States and China over Taiwan have consequently been excluded from the list.¹⁵¹

However, he does categorise Libya as a case of coercive diplomacy, and one leading to cheap success, even though he acknowledges that there was only an implicit threat

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.* pg.243.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.* pg.235.

applied. Therefore, Jakobsen does seem to recognise that in reality implicit threats are still an element of a strategy of coercive diplomacy.

Jakobsen, takes from George, the assertion that ‘carrots’ or incentives are required. The use of incentives within the *ideal policy* is as ‘sweeteners or face-savers to help an opponent fearing the coercer’s threat to comply with a minimum of humiliation’.¹⁵² It is argued that ‘increasing the opponent’s incentive to comply, ‘carrots’ help to prevent zero-sum situations (Schelling’s fifth condition), and give assurances against future demands more credibility’.¹⁵³ As stated earlier though, the premise that by adding incentives this is no longer a zero-sum game is dubious. Any coercion based on the fear of a threat must see one side winning at the expense of the other; however, the incentives do lessen the size of the win and provide a mechanism for saving face. A significant problem for incentives though is view that they are seen as appeasement or rewarding bad behaviour which can be punished by the electorate.¹⁵⁴

Jakobsen identifies that the *ideal policy* does not say why the policy was chosen. However, he asserts that the willingness of states to employ coercive diplomacy is dependent on three interrelated variables; the interest perceived to be at stake, the perceived prospects of military success and the level of domestic support.¹⁵⁵ From these factors Jakobsen hypothesis that states seeking to use coercive diplomacy to undo an act of military aggression will only threaten or use force in the following patterns:

¹⁵² *Op.cit.* Jakobsen (1998), pg.30.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ Miroslav Nincic, ‘Getting what you want, Positive Inducements in International Relations’, *International Security* Vol 35, No.1 (2010), pg 182.

¹⁵⁵ *Op.cit.* Jakobsen (1998), pg.5.

Pattern	Interest	Prospect of military success	Domestic support
Interest driven	High	Medium/high	Medium/high
Government driven	Medium	High	Medium/high
Domestic pressure driven	Low	High	High
Table 1.4			

These factors will be examined more in chapter 2.

Jakobsen notes several problems with determining the success or failure of coercive diplomacy. Firstly, even if the opponent has done as he was told it was not necessarily due to coercive diplomacy as compliance may result from factors unrelated to the coercer's threat.¹⁵⁶ Secondly, judging the success of the strategy is often viewed in black and white terms in terms of either success or failure. The reality is that often less clear, involving compromise between the opposing sides.¹⁵⁷ A third problem is that it's often difficult to isolate the effect that the threat of force or the use of limited force has had in a specific case. Compliance must be caused partly by fear for coercion to take place.¹⁵⁸ Other theorists have also commented on the difficulty with implementing a successful strategy of coercive diplomacy. Peifer adopts a similar position to George stating that success is dependent on the political objective and motivations at stake and is a strategy 'less to do with technological disparity than it does with the political issues in contention'. Therefore, even 'the ability to strike from afar at minimal cost often fails to compel'. This may lead to an escalation where 'limited wars from afar morph into

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.* pg.34.

¹⁵⁷ *Op.cit.* Jakobsen (2007), pg.234

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

more substantial and costly interventions, occupations and small wars'.¹⁵⁹ Similarly

Willet argues that

Effective coercion depends not so much on power itself as on its effective application, the demonstration of resolve and the ability to use the right force in the right way at the right time to change an enemy's thinking, and to shatter his will as well as his military capabilities. Yet coercive effect is difficult to quantify. Much analysis of the effectiveness of deterrence and coercion rests on, but habitually ignores, both the rationality of the opponent and the fact that the opponent may not share the same understanding.¹⁶⁰

Art argues that as coercive diplomacy is often used as the 'default' option by policymakers because the alternatives of doing nothing or using force are rejected and it is applied without consideration of whether it will be successful.¹⁶¹ A similar point is made by General Rupert Smith who points out that:

What tends to happen is that for various reasons – such as a lack of political will and domestic support or lack of forces, or lack of a clear idea of the outcome, or all of these – we settle on the military achieving amelioration or containment: we deploy force. Then, when other civilian measures and agencies – political, diplomacy, legal, economic – fail to resolve the matter as we wish, we seek to use military force or its threat to achieve the result we want by deterrence or coercion: we employ force. There is nothing wrong in this gradual response provided one know the desired outcome by the time deterrence measures are taken; for if such knowledge is absent then, as already described, one will achieve no more than containment.¹⁶²

Cimbala adds to this view pointing out that 'theories about the coercive use of military power have suffered from disbelief on the part of military professionals and charges of America's ethno-centralism laid down by scholars. There are good reasons for the

¹⁵⁹ Douglas Peifer, 'Risk-free Coercion? Technological disparity and coercive diplomacy', *European Security*, Vol 18, No.1 (2009), pg.10.

¹⁶⁰ Dr Lee Willett, 'Tomahawk in diplomacy and Combat', *RUSI Journal article*, Vol.147, No. 5 (2002), pg.23.

¹⁶¹ Alexander L George, 'Foreword', in Robert J Art and Patrick M Cronin eds, *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*, (Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003), pg xi.

¹⁶² Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force, The Art of War in the Modern World*, (London, Penguin Books, 2006), pg.376.

scepticism: coercive military strategies have been wrongly presented, and mistakenly applied, more than once.’¹⁶³

Jakobsen identifies that what constitutes limited force within coercive diplomacy/coercion is an area of debate;¹⁶⁴ pointing out that ‘coercive diplomacy must be differentiated from strategies involving full scale use of force for either defensive or offensive purposes’.¹⁶⁵ Further adding that:

If limited force is used as part of a coercive diplomacy strategy, it is used as a signal intended to convince the opponent that non-compliance is too costly. When coercive diplomacy is successful, the opponent complies without having been defeated militarily first. In contrast, full scale use of force is employed to defeat the target.¹⁶⁶

He therefore, employs Freedman’s view that the use of force has to leave an element of choice with the target. A strategy employing the use of full scale force to deny the target this choice or consent is not considered coercion.¹⁶⁷ He does point out that in practice though it is almost impossible to operationalise the level of choice given to an opponent and whether the use of force is limited or full-scale force.¹⁶⁸ However, there is a range of views on this from Schelling’s anything less than ‘brute force’ to George’s ‘exemplary or demonstrative’ use of force to demonstrate the credibility of future punishment. Other views are those of Art who expresses a position similar to George pointing out that that:

There has to be some threat of force, or limited use of force, but I think to talk about coercive diplomacy as opposed to waging war, as trying to coerce short of victory or going out just to win, that coercive diplomacy should be closer to the

¹⁶³ Cimbala, *Coercive Military Strategy*, pg.3.

¹⁶⁴ *Op.cit.* Jakobsen (2011), pg.162.

¹⁶⁵ *Op.cit.* Jakobsen (1998), pg.14.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.* pg.15.

minimal use of force. But as it is a definitional question I don't believe people need to fall on their swords about it as long as they are clear about it.¹⁶⁹

Byman and Waxman accept that there is a distinction between 'brute force' and coercion which is dependent on the level of choice given to an opponent. Furthermore, they counter the argument that no state has been so 'decimated in battle that it had a complete absence of choice'; although they counter this argument pointing out that:

There are degrees of choice that must be considered. Generally, as an adversary absorbs more and more destruction the proportion of its decisions that are motivated by the threat of future destruction declines. This is because the destruction of more and more of the adversary's assets narrows the adversary's range of options and, in some cases, leaves the adversary less and less to lose in the future. Brute force, by contrast, eliminates the adversary's options completely.¹⁷⁰

My position is that of Freedman and Jakobsen; that the level of force has to leave the opponent with a choice to comply with your demand. Therefore, as Jakobsen points out:

Successful limited military operations such as the use of Special Forces to rescue hostages will be classified as full-scale force because they settle the issue at hand, whereas major air campaigns will be classified as limited use of force. This will have the unfortunate effect of making it easier for policymakers to characterize major use of air power resulting in massive human and economic costs as "limited use of force." The Israeli destruction of Lebanon's infrastructure during the July–August 2006 war with Hezbollah is a case in point.¹⁷¹

Jakobsen identifies that some scholars would argue that the risk of misperception and miscalculation renders the *ideal policy* framework useless; as psychological biases cause threats to fail in most cases either because the 'opponent misperceives the coercer's signals (threats, carrots and assurances), or because the coercer misperceives the opponents interests'.¹⁷² However, he justifies the use of the rational unitary

¹⁶⁹ Author's interview with Robert Art, in person, 15 March 2013.

¹⁷⁰ Byman&Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion*, pg.4-5.

¹⁷¹ *Op.cit.* Jakobsen (2011), pg.162.

¹⁷² *Ibid.* pg.32.

assumption, as replacing ‘it with a more sophisticated model derived from psychological theories, strategic culture, and prospect theory would require too much information to be useful in theory building’.¹⁷³ Furthermore, Jakobsen argues that the use of deadlines, clear demands and assurances against future threats prescribed by the *ideal policy* reduces the scope for misperception.¹⁷⁴ Moreover, he claims that exponents of psychological theories tend to exaggerate the risk of misperception and that the risk certainly does not appear so great as to undermine the utility of the *ideal policy* framework Jakobsen analysis suggests that decision makers are capable of communicating effectively in times of crisis.¹⁷⁵

A controversial argument put forwarded by Jakobsen is that ‘The widespread assumption that a good understanding of the adversary and accurate intelligence is necessary for coercive success must be abandoned’ as essentially it ‘is possible to coerce opponents you do not understand’.¹⁷⁶ He then uses the examples such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kosovo crisis, Libya and NK as examples where coercion without understanding took place.¹⁷⁷ He further adds that:

It is only when effective coercion (coupled with positive incentives and assurances) leads to real negotiations that the coercer may obtain the understanding of the adversary’s motives required to use the insights provided by prospect theory, psychological theories, and area specialists to put together a package of positive incentives and assurances that may increase the likelihood that a mutually acceptable compromise can be reached.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷³ *Op.cit.* Jakobsen (2011), pg. 25.

¹⁷⁴ *Op.cit.* Jakobsen (1998), pg.135.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.* pg.32.

¹⁷⁶ *Op.cit.* Jakobsen (2011), pg.165.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.* pg.166.

Whilst I accept that it is possible to coerce without necessarily understanding the opponent and that once you get them to the table you increase your understanding, I would strongly argue that coercion is never the less going to be far more effective if you understand the opponent in the first place. Therefore, investing in intelligence capabilities that enables you to target their critical nodes (WMD sites, banks etc.), develop the evidence to gain credible domestic and international support, give the opponent the assurance and incentives that you know he wants will make coercion more efficient, effective and likely to succeed.

Conclusion

Coercion is a strategy that uses threats to achieve a political objective, therefore, the study of coercion, and the sub-strategy of coercive diplomacy, firmly sits within the Strategic Studies sub-field of international relations. Furthermore, with its emphasis on the threat of force to achieve a political aim its theories closely pertain to that of the realist paradigm which highlights the use of power and force to achieve a political aim. This chapter has primarily focussed on the coercion theories of Schelling, George, Freedman and Jakobsen as it is their work that has been directly built upon to develop the *ideal policy* that will be used as a framework for analysis within my thesis. There are three key areas of debate that emerge from the literature, terminology, the assumption of a rational opponent and what constitutes the coercive use of force.

George does not use Schelling's term compellence, which he asserts is imprecise, and clearly defines coercive diplomacy.¹⁷⁹ In contrast Schelling uses the term 'coercive diplomacy'¹⁸⁰ in context that would appear to suggest the term is interchangeable to him

¹⁷⁹ *Op.cit.* Levy (2008), pg.541.

¹⁸⁰ *Op.cit.* Schelling (2008), pg.5, "The difference between coercion and brute force is as often in the intent as in the instrument. To hunt down Comanches and to exterminate them is brute force; to raid their

with the term coercion. Freedman's work aids in clarifying the terminology with the introduction of the term 'strategic coercion' as an umbrella concept for a range of coercive strategies (Compellence, Deterrence, Coercive Diplomacy and Blackmail). However, as Jakobsen points out the term '(military) coercion', rather than strategic coercion seems to be emerging within academia as the prominent term for describing the use of threats.¹⁸¹ As the focus of this study is to test the *ideal policy*, I will adopt the terminology derived by Freedman, and utilised by Jakobsen.

There have been two different approaches to the development of coercive theory, a deductive approach based on the assumption of rational actors (Schelling camp) and an inductive approach that emphasises examination of case studies and the development of a behavioural model to explain states decision making (George camp). The number of studies that combine these approaches to theory building has been limited.¹⁸² Jakobsen justifies the use of the rational unitary assumption as the use of psychological models would require too much information to be useful in theory building.¹⁸³ Furthermore, exponents of psychological theories tend to exaggerate the risk of misperception.¹⁸⁴ Therefore, he combines the use of the assumption of rationality to aid in developing the *ideal policy* and George's structured, focused comparison methodology to test the generated hypothesis against relevant case studies.

villages to make them behave was **coercive diplomacy**, based on the power to hurt." Pg.32 "**Coercive Diplomacy**, based on the power to hurt, was important even in those periods of history when military force was essentially the power to take and to hold, to fend off attack and to expel invaders, and to possess territory against opposition-that is, in the era in which military force tended to pit itself against opposing forces. Even then, a critical question was how much cost and pain the other side would incur for the disputed territory".

¹⁸¹ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, 'Pushing the Limits of Military Coercion Theory', *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol.12, No.2 (2011), pg.155.

¹⁸² *Ibid.* pg.157.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.* pg.25.

¹⁸⁴ *Op.cit.* Jakobsen (1998), pg.135

A further area of debate is clarification of what constitutes the use of force within a coercive strategy. For Schelling it is no longer coercion when a State takes what it wants through brute force.¹⁸⁵ George emphasises that force should be exemplary, or demonstrative, which can be hard to determine. Furthermore, authors such as Byman and Waxman point out that force needs to be ‘limited’ and less than Schelling’s brute force.¹⁸⁶ However, this still does not clearly emphasise at what point coercion ends and another strategy is being adopted. A further argument put forward by Freedman is that coercion occupies part of a spectrum with consent at one end and control at other. If no force is required then there is a presumption of consent, when no compliance is anticipated then overwhelming force may have to be applied to deny the target choice and to take control.¹⁸⁷ Therefore, whilst the coerced has a choice (comply or not to comply), coercion is being used, no matter the level of force employed by the coercer.

Jakobsen states coercive diplomacy must be differentiated from strategies involving full scale use of force for either defensive or offensive purposes. Therefore, coercive diplomacy is successful when the opponent complies without having been defeated militarily.¹⁸⁸ He therefore, employs Freedman’s view on what constitutes limited force within coercion – in that the use of force has to leave an element of choice with the target.¹⁸⁹ Jakobsen does point out that in practice it is almost impossible to operationalise the level of choice given to an opponent and whether the use of force is limited or full-scale force.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁵ *Op.cit.* Schelling (2008), pg. 2.

¹⁸⁶ *Op.cit.* Byman and Waxman (2002), pg. 10.

¹⁸⁷ *Op.cit.* Freedman (1998), pg.16.

¹⁸⁸ *Op.cit.* Jakobsen (1998), pg. 14.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, pg.15.

A controversial argument put forwarded by Jakobsen is that coercion does not require accurate intelligence and a detailed understanding of the opponent.¹⁹¹ Whilst I agree that it is possible to coerce without understanding the opponent, clearly coercion will be effective if you understand the opponent. Therefore investing in intelligence capabilities that enables you to target their critical nodes (WMD sites, banks etc.), develop the evidence to gain credible domestic and international support, give the opponent the assurance and incentives that you know he wants will make coercion more efficient, effective and likely to succeed.

In latter work Jakobsen puts forward the concept of the 3Cs. The key difference between 3Cs and the *ideal policy* is that the former does not require a clearly stated deadline; instead adopts the slightly vaguer ‘sense of urgency’ is conveyed. However, as a framework for studying cases there is a difficulty that ‘sense of urgency’ is open to wide interpretation and could easily be misunderstood. The 3Cs concept would also indicate that Jakobsen has abandoned the definition of coercive diplomacy, as his definition of coercion is almost identical to his previous definition of coercive diplomacy. Therefore, Jakobsen uses the term coercion as if it was coercive diplomacy. It could be argued that Jakobsen’s move away from the *ideal policy* to the concept of 3Cs invalidates the central theme of this thesis. However, there is still merit in applying the *ideal policy* as a framework and as will be discussed in later chapters it still offers an original contribution to coercive theory.

Jakobsen’s *ideal policy* is a recent addition to the academic study of coercive diplomacy. The *ideal policy* was derived and tested on case studies where the purpose of the coercive diplomacy was to undo an act of aggression. However, Jakobsen clearly

¹⁹¹ *Op.cit.* Jakobsen (2011), pg.165.

asserts that the *ideal policy* should be valid for seeking to prevent states from attaining nuclear weapons. By testing the *ideal policy* against states seeking nuclear weapons, this thesis aims to fill the gap in the literature and determine whether the *ideal policy* remains valid for this scenario. Furthermore, it will provide clear theoretical insights into attempting to use coercive diplomacy against states that are attempting to gain nuclear weapons that may be used to adapt the *ideal policy* and aid decision makers.

Chapter 2 – Positivism, Rationality, Empirical Issues and Case Selection

This thesis aims to determine the utility of Jakobsen's *ideal policy* as an analytical tool for examining coercive diplomacy employed to prevent states attaining nuclear weapons. Jakobsen specifically set out to explain why coercive diplomacy was successful, or a failure, in situations where the strategy was used to attempt to undo, or prevent acts, of aggression. Adopting a deductive approach Jakobsen derived the *ideal policy* framework from extant theories¹, formed hypothesis that were tested using a method of structured focused comparison of selected case studies. He then made generalisations about the validity of the *ideal policy* for predicting the outcome of coercive diplomacy employed to undo/prevent acts of aggression. Therefore, Jakobsen adopted a positivistic² research philosophy that tested the hypotheses empirically. This study will adopt the same positivistic approach to test whether the *ideal policy* is valid when applied to explaining coercive diplomacy directed at preventing state attainment of nuclear weapons. However, the positivistic approach and assumption of rationality that underpin the *ideal policy* is not without criticism; but as I will argue in this section both are legitimate starting positions for the initial development of theory.

This chapter will start by examining positivism and the assumption of a rationality. It will then set out empirical issues for this study, followed by derivation of the analytical framework and claims that are to be examined within the thesis. Finally, I will derive

¹ Primarily Thomas Shelling, *Arms and Influence*, and George Alexander, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*.

² Mark Saunders, Philip Lewis and Adrian Thornhill, *Research methods for business students*, fifth edition, (Harlow, Pearson Education Ltd, 2009), pg.113 – 'Positivism is stance of the natural scientist. Prefer working with an observable social reality and that the end product of such research can be law-like generalisations similar to those produced by the physical and natural scientists similar to those produced by the physical and natural scientists. Likely to use existing theory to develop hypotheses that can be tested and confirmed'.

the criteria for case selection, determining cases that meet the criteria and justifying my selection of US coercive diplomacy against Libya and NK between 1993-2006. I will then briefly review the key studies that have already been undertaken on these cases.

Positivism and Rationality

The aim of this section is not to validate positivism as a whole, but to justify its selection as a legitimate approach for this study. This section will highlight the key criticisms and issues of using a positivistic approach. Fundamentally, the approach adopted within this thesis is the same approach used by Jakobsen, whose theory is being applied in a different way.

Jakobsen argues that the strength of adopting a deductive approach is that it allows for parsimonious development of theory that can be tested. The strongest criticism of this approach to studying coercive diplomacy comes from George who argues that the difference between the physical sciences, who adopt a positivist view of the world, and social sciences is that human agents are reflective, as they contemplate, anticipate and can work to change their social and material environments.³ Furthermore, George argues that deductive approaches “black-boxes” around both the process of policymaking and the strategic interaction between states that leads to foreign policy outcomes.⁴

George’s view implies that different humans exposed to the same variables (threats, ultimatums etc.) would not necessarily behave in the same manner; as human personalities and cognitive abilities vary; therefore a different course of action may be

³ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 2005), pg.129.

⁴ *Ibid.* pg.267.

taken even in an identical situation. Furthermore, George was critical of the assumption of rationality as it did not reflect how humans actually behave. Instead he advocated an inductive approach that analysed how humans have actually behaved in particular situations then deriving valid generalisations.

However, this argument is circular and distracts from the essential aim of research which is to advance our knowledge of a class of phenomena. Firstly, the debate seems based on the assumption that once a theory is developed it will not change. However, after deriving a theory, it needs to be tested, verified and refined. Therefore, if a deductively derived theory is disproved through empirical testing; the theory should be discarded or amended according to the empirical evidence. This is the approach that George himself adopted; in *the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, as he started with an abstract model of coercive diplomacy, which he then built upon with inductively derived generalisations to form his strategy of coercive diplomacy. As Jakobsen points out ‘the best way to build cumulative knowledge is to systematically test and refine propositions that have widespread acceptance within the field but never the less remain unclear in some respects’.⁵

The testing and resulting modification of a theory developed inductively must follow the same path; after several iterations of empirical testing and modification, the theory will either be discarded or amended to be more accurate at explaining, or predicting, the studied phenomena. George recognises that empirical testing is the key, pointing out that when studying decision-making processes and strategic interactions it is desirable to link deductive and empirical approaches together.⁶ Therefore, adopting a positivistic

⁵ *Op.cit.* Jakobsen (2011), pg.158.

⁶ George&Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, pg.267.

approach as a starting point followed by empirical testing is legitimate, as the only test of a theory's validity should be if it can explain or predict empirical findings on the class of phenomena being studied.

However, there are many criticisms of positivism; Mackenzie argues that the meaning of the word positivism has changed from a 'rejection of the correspondence theory of truth, the denial of, or more correctly agnosticism about, the existence of a single reality independent of human beings' to a 'view that accepts a correspondence theory of truth, that there is a single reality independent of human beings'.⁷ Heidtman, Wysienska & Jacek expand further stating:

According to early positivism, the abstract theoretical world is to be inferred from a real, external world. To logical positivism, abstract theoretical claims are to be tested in a real, phenomenal world (see the issue of protocol statements) and according to post-positivism, especially Lakatos and Toulmin, the abstract theoretical world should be a mirror reflection of the external, phenomenal world. Under all versions of positivism, the process of empirical theory testing should always be conducted external to the theory world, that is, in external phenomenal reality.⁸

From this definition positivism is an inductive approach, and logical positivism is deductive. Therefore, the approach adopted by Jakobsen would arguably be a 'logical positivistic' approach. Positivism's tenet that there is a real world independent of humans could be viewed to conflict with constructivist theories that claim agents construct their own truths about how the system is structured that leads to the way that they act within it. On the importance of this difference Mackenzie argues:

There is a difference between saying that a statement is true and saying that it is 'true'. Each of these is important. If we want to know what someone will try to do, to understand her actions, we should look at what is 'true' for her. To

⁷ Jim Mackenzie, 'Positivism and Constructivism, Truth and 'Truth'', *Educational Philosophy and Theory* (2011), Vol. 43, No.5, pg. 534.

⁸ Joanna Heidtman, Kinga Wysienska & Jacek Szmataka, 'Positivism and Types of Theories in Sociology', *Sociological Focus*, Vol. 33, No.1 (2000), pg.23.

understand the outcomes of her attempts, we should focus not on what is ‘true’ but on what is true.⁹

Applying a positivistic method only reveals what you believe to be true, until empirical testing reveals a deeper truth that better explains and predicts nature. For example Newtonian physics was replaced by Einstein’s theories as they explained more accurately the movement of celestial bodies; in turn these may be replaced by a new paradigm that can be verified empirically by improved technology. Therefore, you can never know for certain when you have reached the underlying truth/reality; as pointed out by Indick:

I can’t provide an empirical account of the point of the movie until the movie is over. Similarly as a human, I am also a part of an ongoing process of human evolution (the development of the human species). My own mortality decrees that I will never observe the final endpoint of human development; therefore I cannot make an empirical theory about the meaning of life.¹⁰

Indick also points out another paradox of positivism¹¹ that:

Empiricists contradict themselves, because if they believe that true answers can be tentatively accepted only when all other solutions are thoroughly disproved. Then they cannot accept positivism as the best solution to all scientific problems without falsifying all other methods. Empiricists have not accomplished this, they cannot claim that empirical arguments are a priori better or sounder than non-empirical arguments.¹²

These are valid philosophical criticisms of positivism and beyond the scope of this thesis to address satisfactorily. However, it is my argument that the use of a positivistic approach is a legitimate approach for this thesis for several reasons; Firstly, it is the approach adopted by Jakobsen, and as the primary focus of the thesis is to validate his

⁹ *Op.cit.* Mackenzie pg. 542.

¹⁰ William Indick, ‘Fight the Power: The Limits of Empiricism and the Costs of Positivistic Rigor’, *The Journal of Psychology: Interdisciplinary and Applied*, Vol.136, No.1 (2002), pg.26.

¹¹ Indick views positivism and empiricism as the same thing.

¹² *Op.cit.* Indick pg.24.

ideal policy and conduct an original focused comparison of the cases, it is logical to use the same approach.

A positivistic approach also grounds theories, as close as possible, to an observable reality; even if it is accepted that it may not be the underlying truth. Furthermore, the search for and verification of truth, even if you can never be sure if you have reached it, is what drives the improvement in our understanding of any class of phenomena. In the natural sciences you can, at the molecular level, isolate, test and verify theories in laboratory conditions that can be replicated. The social world has the same underlying truth and potential to be determined at the macro level as the natural sciences, as its components are essentially the same (matter and energy). The human body/brain obeys the laws of physics and reacts to the stimulus presented to it; therefore, theoretically you could predict how an individual would react in a range of environments and situations. However, clearly this is incredibly complex and beyond our current knowledge to extrapolate to this level. A more significant issue for strategic studies, and in particular the method being applied within this thesis, is that it is never possible to get to the underlying truth for several reasons.

Firstly; in human situations although there may be one truth (what exactly happened) there is no way of fully determining what that actually was. The best that can be achieved is analysing primary sources. However, even individuals directly involved may not have fully grasped the situation (even if they think they did), they may have interpreted what they observed in different ways, and their memory is likely to change events over time. The variation between what exactly occurred and the resulting belief in what the 'truth' is may be further exaggerated by the way the analyst interprets the available data. As stated by Heidtman:

Sociologists study phenomena which are located in space and time and always embedded in a concrete historical context. They are partially known to the researcher from his/her experience (for example, the society in which he or she lives). Investigations fill blank spots in our picture of the social world with more and more data.data collection needed to test a theoretical hypothesis is too often falsely identified with the recording of events that occur in society in conditions over which the researcher has neither control nor capacity to interpret them with the aid of his/her theory. Why is this the case? Because social reality is so complicated.¹³

A similar point is also mentioned by Friedman:

The inability to conduct experiments is not a fundamental obstacle to testing hypotheses by success of their predictions. But such evidence is far more difficult to interpret. It is frequently complex and always indirect and incomplete. Its collection is often arduous, and its interpretation generally requires subtle analysis and involved chains of reasoning, which seldom carry real conviction.¹⁴

Another issue is that individuals within the system being studied may know the sociological/strategic theories themselves, that in turn affects the way they operate in that system; therefore, changing the theory.¹⁵ If an opponent understands the strategy that is being applied against it, it will look to find the counter-strategy; this in turn may make the original strategy no longer relevant.

Furthermore, not everything can be proven empirically and other methods such as abstract rationalisation or theoretical mathematics might be the only basis of a theory. However, without empirical verification of these theories, you cannot be fully confident that they resemble the truth. There may be a raft of competing theories that logically are equally valid. The discovery of the Higgs Boson could not be achieved until improvements in technology; this discovery has validated certain theories over others that were based on predictions of theoretical physics. There may be other valid theories

¹³ Joanna Heidtman, Kinga Wysienska & Jacek Szmataka, 'Positivism and Types of Theories in Sociology', *Sociological Focus*, Vol. 33, No.1 (2000), pg.4.

¹⁴ Milton Friedman, *Essays in Positive Economics*, (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1953), pg.11.

¹⁵ *Op.cit.* Heidtman, Kinga Wysienska & Jacek Szmataka.

that are impossible to empirically verify until further technological advance occur. The mathematical logic of the discarded models may not necessarily have been flawed; they just did not reflect reality.

Separate, but related, to the use of positivism is the assumption of rationality used by Jakobsen. George was highly critical of the assumptions, particularly the assumption of rational actors. However, the only test of whether a theory is valid should be whether it explains, or predicts, the class of phenomena being studied. This view is most forcefully put by Friedman who asserts that:

A hypothesis is important if it “explains” much by little, that is, if it abstracts the common and crucial elements from the mass of complex and detailed circumstances surrounding the phenomena to be explained and permits valid predictions of the basis of them alone. To be important, therefore, a hypothesis must be descriptively false in its assumptions; it takes account of, and accounts for, none of the many other attendant circumstances, since its very success shows them to be irrelevant for the phenomena to be explained.¹⁶

However, Brav, Heaton & Rosenberg are particularly critical of this view stating:

Freed from the constraint that assumptions be causally ‘realistic,’ the researcher may pluck assumptions from anywhere in the assumption space. Assumptions can be rational, behavioural, make-believe, or just plain silly, so long as they are internally consistent and combine to generate models that make testable predictions whose predictive power improves in precision with further testing and refinement. But assumptions from a wholly unconstrained assumption space – even when internally consistent in any given model – are likely to imply ‘causal’ explanations that are unconvincing because the assumptions are too much at odds with our beliefs about the world.¹⁷

They also emphasise that ‘assumptions that work for one type of prediction might imply a causal explanation that is at odds with the causal explanation implied by a different model that predicts well for a different type of prediction’.¹⁸ This in turn would lead to models that may be good for testing and predicting but not effective at explaining

¹⁶ Friedman, *Essays in Positive Economics*, pg.15.

¹⁷ Alon Brav, J.B. Heaton & Alexander Rosenberg, ‘The rational behavioural debate in financial economics’, *Journal of Economic Methodology*, Vol.11, No.4 (2004), pg. 396.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

phenomena. Clearly the closer assumptions are to reality; the more likely they are to increase our understanding of a specific phenomenon and offer practical utility.

However, as Friedman indicates, when trying to make sense of complicated data to reveal a theory on a class of phenomena, it is necessary to make assumptions, in order to get to the important factors for the class, not just that one instance. I strongly agree with this view; assumptions are necessary in order to enable the research to focus on the key variables. Although, it is a fine orchestration that has to occur between setting assumptions that do not reflect reality in any form, but enable a coherent theory to be formed and tested, with those that reflect complexity of reality in such fidelity; that it makes it difficult to form a coherent theory and requires so much data to test it empirically that it is not an efficient study. Therefore, the question for this study is not whether making assumptions is wrong, but whether the assumption of rationality assumed with the *ideal policy* balances accuracy of assumption with the need to have theoretical coherency.

The notion of rationality for the development of theory within strategic studies can be traced back to Clausewitz, who developed an abstract rational model to explain war. However, he clearly emphasised that there were frictions in the real world that meant the abstract did not translate to reality. He also emphasised that ‘non-rational political objectives can be implemented by rational means’¹⁹; therefore, separating the end product from the way that a strategy reached its goal. It may be viewed as irrational to start a war over an insult, but the way the military fights to win could be perfectly rational. However, Clausewitz did not clearly define what it was to act rational.

¹⁹ Handel, *Masters of War, Classical Strategic Thought*, pg.79.

Within economics rationality was seen as agents making mathematically driven choices that led to the maximisation of a particular ‘utility’. As pointed out by Krugman:

For most of the past two centuries, economic thinking has been dominated by the concept of *Homo economicus*. The hypothetical Economic Man knows what he wants; his preferences can be expressed mathematically in terms of a “utility function.” And his choices are driven by rational calculations about how to maximize that function: whether consumers are deciding between corn flakes or shredded wheat, or investors are deciding between stocks and bonds, those decisions are assumed to be based on comparisons of the “marginal utility,” or the added benefit the buyer would get from acquiring a small amount of the alternatives available.²⁰

However, theories based on rationality often fail to make accurate predictions or explanations. Other concepts such as bounded rationality were put forward in order to try and reflect how ‘people actually made decisions in the absence of perfect information and computational capacity. It accepted human fallibility without losing the predictability that might still result from a modicum of rationality’.²¹

However, the concept of bounded rationality was also criticised for not reflecting actual human behaviour; most notable from Kahneman and Tversky, who demonstrated that individuals suffered from cognitive biases that affected their ability to make the most ‘rational’ decision.²² Khaneman view was that:

The only tests of rationality is not whether a person’s beliefs and preferences are reasonable, but whether they are internally consistent. A rational person can believe in ghosts so long as all her other beliefs are consistent with the existence of ghosts.²³

²⁰ Paul Krugman, ‘Who Was Milton Friedman?’ 15 February 2007, <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2007/feb/15/who-was-milton-friedman/> accessed 29 Aug 15.

²¹ Freedman, *Strategy a History*, pg.592.

²² Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, ‘Prospect Theory: an analysis of decision under risk’, *Econometrica*, Vol.47, No.2 (1979), pg. 263; Alex Viskovatoff, ‘Rationality as optimal choice versus rationality as valid inference’, *Journal of Economic Methodology*, Vol.8, No.2 (2001), pg.315.

²³ Daniel Kahneman, *Thinking Fast and Slow*, (London, Penguin Group, 2011), pg.411.

The view that consistency in an individual's actions with their own internal calculating mechanism is the determinant of rationality, not whether their actions from an external, detached, calculation would appear to be optimal; leads to a broadening of what can be deemed 'rational'. For example if an individual perceives that the use of force will achieve their objective, even if the reality viewed by everyone else is it will not, it would be rational for them to use it. However, if they don't believe that force will achieve their objective, yet they lash out any way that would be irrational. In turn if they believe that force would be the best method for achieving an objective, but chose not to apply it, that would be irrational.

Another criticism of rational choice theories is that preferences cannot always be expressed within a utility function.²⁴ As stated by Ellis:

People's goals and purposes cannot be assessed scientifically or "objectively" — because, as individuals, they can choose from a wide variety of goals, none of which (except by arbitrary definition) can be assessed as unconditionally "good" or "bad." But once they pick a certain goal (e.g., succeeding at work, love, or psychotherapy) it can often be "scientifically" or empirically determined whether (1) they actually achieve it, and (2) they achieve the results they wanted by achieving it.²⁵

This is further emphasised by Byman and Waxman in the context of coercion who point out that although the 'cost benefit model is quite useful because the ultimate goals of decision making can be derived from profit motive. Politics, however, lacks such clarity. Some leaders value power, others security, and still others glory'.²⁶

Although there are valid criticisms of rationality, the assumption of rationality can still be useful; as Krugman points out:

²⁴ Alex Viskovatoff, 'Rationality as optimal choice versus rationality as valid inference', *Journal of Economic Methodology*, Vol.8, No.2 (2001), pg.326.

²⁵ Albert Ellis, 'Secular humanism and rational-emotive therapy', *The Humanistic Psychologist*, Vol.20, No.2-3 (1992), pg.351.

²⁶ Byman&Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion*, pg.12.

You might ask, why not represent people the way they really are? The answer is that abstraction, strategic simplification, is the only way we can impose some intellectual order on the complexity of economic life. And the assumption of rational behavior has been a particularly fruitful simplification.²⁷

Although referring to economics, the point is also valid for strategic studies; which suffers from the same complexity and requirement to simplify in order to understand the studied phenomena.

Within strategic studies the adoption of a rational actor model is most obviously linked to realism where 'states are seen as unitary actors who want to maximize their self-interest under the constraints of the international system. This translates into a never ending struggle for survival, power and wealth among largely self-confined entities'.²⁸

Within this paradigm states are viewed as rational and calculating, seeking to maximise their utility, whether it survival, power or wealth. This has been translated extensively into game theoretic models demonstrating how conflict and cooperation may play out in a rational environment. A different perspective is that of constructivists who argue that States are social actors that follow international or domestic rules. Therefore, it is the structure of the system that determines the behaviour of the agents within it.²⁹

Individuals may calculate in a perfectly rational manner the best preference based on their understanding of the options that they believe to be open to them. Therefore, rationality could be viewed as dependent on the view of the structure of the system and their psychological cognitive biases. This links to Khaneman's view that rationality is acting consistent manner with ones beliefs. An observer might not agree with an agent's

²⁷ Paul Krugman, 'Who Was Milton Friedman?', 15 February 2007, <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2007/feb/15/who-was-milton-friedman/> accessed 29 Aug 15.

²⁸ Nikolas Busse, 'Constructivism and Southeast Asian security', *The Pacific Review*, Vol.12, No.139 (1999), pg.44.

²⁹ *Ibid.* pg.44.

goal or actions, but could at least see that they are acting consistent with their beliefs; therefore, rationally within their perception of the system.

Jakobsen defined the assumption of reality as ‘the assumption that both coercer and opponent are capable of ordering their interests consistently, evaluating obtained information correctly, and choosing the most cost-effective policy from the existing set of options’.³⁰ He also recognised that it may be viewed as a weakness in his theory and further argued that it should be ‘complemented by actor specific behavioural models of the adversary’.³¹ However, in later work his argument changes his view stating that:

The widespread assumption that a good understanding of the adversary and accurate intelligence is necessary for coercive success must be abandoned. It is counterproductive since detailed information about the adversary’s way of thinking and motivations is unattainable in the real world in most cases. It is also wrong. It is possible to coerce opponents you do not understand.³²

Despite valid criticisms of the assumption of rationality, it is a legitimate assumption to underpin the development of theory; as long as those theories are empirically tested.

Within this section I have examined positivism and the assumption of rationality. Furthermore I have argued that adopting, the same approach as Jakobsen, using a deductive model based on the assumption of unitary rational actor is a legitimate approach as long as it is tested empirically and subsequent refinement of the theory is made. This chapter will now examine the validity of using case studies to generate

³⁰ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, ‘The Strategy of Coercive Diplomacy: Refining Existing Theory to Post-Cold War Realities’, in Lawrence Freedman eds, *Strategic Coercion, Concepts and Cases*, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1998), pg.80.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Peter Viggo Jakobsen, ‘Pushing the Limits of Military Coercion Theory’, *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol.12, No.2 (2011), pg. 165.

empirical data and then will analyse further the assumptions within the *ideal policy* to assess whether they remain valid when applied to the context of nuclear proliferation.

Empirical Issues

The primary focus of the thesis is to test the validity of Jakobsen's *ideal policy*, I have adopted the same approach as Jakobsen; the use of case studies and structured focussed comparison. I agree with Jakobsen that this approach offers the best method for comparing the different cases to identify any patterns. Furthermore, the use of cases enables a deeper qualitative study to be conducted in order to understand the adopted coercive mechanisms. However, it is important to understand the strengths and weakness of case studies as a research strategy.

George argues that case studies are often characterised as “small n” studies, in contrast to “large N” statistical studies. Moreover, that this distinction implies that “large N” methods are always preferable when sufficient data is available for study; even though case studies maybe better at answering the research questions.³³ Coppedge adds to this view arguing that case studies and small-sample comparisons sometimes have been dismissed as ‘merely descriptive, anecdotal, historical, or journalistic, and therefore atheoretical’.³⁴ However, he also argues that case studies are useful for generating facts and identifying the ‘connections between action and reaction plausible reconstruction of events and processes can be obtained’.³⁵

³³ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005), pg.17.

³⁴ Michael Coppedge, ‘Theory Building and Hypothesis Testing: Large- vs. Small-N Research on Democratization’, Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, April 25-27, 2002, pg.3.
<http://www3.nd.edu/~mcoppedg/crd/mpsacopp02.pdf>, accessed 10 January 2016.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

Coppedge does point out two valid weaknesses with small sample cases; firstly that although propositions are integrated with theory, they are integrated more loosely. Therefore, facts can be used to support a range of theories and it is less clear which tests would confirm or disconfirm the theory. The impact of this is that without rigorous logic or mathematical tools to generate hypotheses, there is no clear way to derive what must be true if the theory is true. Furthermore, he argues that in contrast to formal theory, the theories of small-sample analysis are less clear about their assumptions; they rely more on the tacit assumptions of common sense, which leads to conditional and vaguely probabilistic predictions, which are hard to falsify.³⁶ Moreover, George and Bennett point out that with a small sample size if a theory fails to fit the evidence in a case, it is not obvious whether the theory fails to explain the particular case or fails to explain a whole class of cases, or does not explain any cases at all.³⁷ However, George does assert that the strength of case studies is that they are good for leading to the development of new theory as, unlike statistical research, the process of archival research and interviews can lead to new variables being identified.³⁸

Fundamentally, the method of focussed structured comparison has been chosen for this study as it is the same method adopted by Jakobsen; although it is noted that the small sample of this thesis means results cannot be statistically validated.

Analytical Framework

The research puzzles that I aim to answer are:

1. Does Jakobsen's *ideal policy* remain valid when applied to the context of state attainment of nuclear weapons?

³⁶ *Ibid.* pg.5.

³⁷ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005), pg.115.

³⁸ *Ibid.* pg.21.

2. What are the factors, conditions and variables unique to coercive diplomacy being employed against states seeking nuclear weapons that may need to be incorporated into the *ideal policy*?
3. How can the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy be improved in order to prevent states attaining nuclear weapons?

The behaviour being examined is how states use coercive diplomacy as a strategy to prevent other states attaining nuclear weapons. As discussed later in the chapter, there are fewer cases of coercive diplomacy aimed at preventing nuclear proliferation than cases of stopping acts of aggression. Therefore, results cannot be statistically validated. However, by looking in-depth at a few case studies valuable insights on the *ideal policy* and coercive diplomacy have been gained. As more cases arise, statistical methods may give greater confidence in the validity of empirical findings. This thesis is focussed on testing the utility of Jakobsen's *ideal policy* in a different context than the one it was formulated and tested against; therefore, there is no requirement to test other theories of coercive diplomacy.

The assessment questions that will form the basis of the structured focussed comparison have been drawn directly from the *ideal policy* and can be found at appendix B. All but questions 11 and 16 are taken straight from the *ideal policy* and will be critiqued in later chapters. However, the addition of assessment questions 11 and 16 needs to be justified.

Assessment Question (AQ) 11 - Are one of the four hypothesised patterns present when states threaten and use force?

Jakobsen's hypothesises that the willingness to use force is dependent on the interaction among three variables:

1. The nature of the threatened interests.
2. The prospects of military success.
3. The level of domestic support.³⁹

He then coded interests as either vital, strategic, stability or moral/ideological. Vital interests were defined as the defence of the homeland; where the willingness to threaten and use force and suffer pain is assumed to be highest when an act of aggression threatens the homeland directly.⁴⁰ As he was examining conflicts where a coercer responds to an act of aggression committed against a third party; Jakobsen discounted vital interests. Due to the threat that nuclear weapons pose to homelands, I will include the vital interest category for this variable. This has an effect on the patterns that Jakobsen hypothesised would lead to a willingness to threaten force.

With 3 codes for each of the variables, Jakobsen identified 27 possible outcomes (3x3x3) of which three of them were argued to be 'will-producing' patterns.⁴¹ Taking vital interests into account this leads to 36 (4x3x3) possible outcomes, with sixteen being relevant as 'will producing patterns'. Effectively, this adds a fourth 'will to threaten' pattern which is as follows:

1. Interest-driven pattern: high interest, medium/high prospects of military success and medium/high domestic support.
2. Government-driven pattern: medium interest, high prospects of military success and medium/high domestic support.

³⁹ Jakobsen, *Western use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War, A Challenge for Theory and Practice*, pg.35.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* pg.36.

⁴¹ *Op.cit.* Jakobsen (1998), pg.43.

3. Domestic pressure-driven pattern: low interest, high prospects of military success and high domestic support.⁴²
4. Vital Interest – Very high interest, High/medium/ low prospects of military success and high/medium/low domestic support.

The vital interest pattern would indicate that a state, whose existence was threatened, would be willing to threaten to use force even if doing so would not achieve its objective (i.e. remain extant) and the threat had little domestic support. This demonstrates one of the problems with this element of Jakobsen's theory for the case of nuclear proliferation. It would seem the logical thing to do in such a situation would be for the state to surrender. However, it could be argued that this scenario reflects where elites within a regime believe it is either their annihilation or the slim chance that their threat may stay an opponent. For example it may be that they threaten to use nuclear weapons on the opponent's cities if they do not halt the advance of conventional forces. This threat could be made knowing that actually going through with this threat would still end up with their annihilation through a nuclear exchange. Such a scenario demonstrates where arguably coercive diplomacy and deterrence blur.

AQ 16 - Did the issuing of a threats increase the motivation of the coerced to develop nuclear weapons?

In addition to the framework Jakobsen makes six claims about the advantages of the *ideal policy* compared to existing theories. The first claim is that it can explain coercive diplomacy outcomes more accurately with fewer variables.⁴³ Although he states 'explain'; an implied claim is that if both sides act rationally then the *ideal policy* will

⁴² *Ibid.* pg.43.

⁴³ *Ibid.* pg.5.

work; so it is a prediction of success. However, as mentioned previously the problems of individual constructions of the system and their perception of their position within it, psychological biases, cognitive limitations and asymmetric information will affect the ability of the state to calculate the most rational choice in a crisis. Therefore, the *ideal policy* is unlikely to be a reliable method for predicting outcomes. However, as will be seen in the cases studies, it is useful as an analytical framework to explain why states acted in a particular way.

The second claim is that ‘it can explain coercive diplomacy outcomes just as accurately but with fewer conditions representing the operationalisation of Schelling’s five necessary conditions and George and Simons’ ‘particularly significant’.⁴⁴ Furthermore that operationalisation enables policy-makers to decide whether they are present or not in a given crisis.⁴⁵ To verify the first element of this claim it would be necessary to examine several case studies using a framework derived from Schelling’s work and George’s framework. Then the analysis would need to be compared in order to attempt to determine which framework yields the most accurate analysis. However, the difficulty with this is that as discussed earlier in the chapter it would be difficult to determine which analysis is closer to the truth to bench mark this assessment against.

Furthermore, Jakobsen’s assertion of clarity for policy makers by clearly operationalising the variables, is over emphasised as there is still an element of subjectivity. For example what exactly constitutes a threat? Often the US makes statements such as ‘no options have been left off the table’, this is clearly an implied threat that force may be used, but does it meet the criteria for the *ideal policy* or not?

⁴⁴ *Op.cit.* Jakobsen (1998), pg.31.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* pg.5.

The third claim is that the *ideal policy* framework is testable. This will be evaluated in more depth later in the thesis. The fourth claim is that the focus on implemented policy avoids the mixture of contextual variables and success conditions that limit the explanatory power of George and Simons' framework. Again without, testing George and Simons' framework against the given cases and then comparing the results against the *ideal policy* this claim cannot be fully verified. However, the implemented policy in reality will clearly be dependent on the context of the situation. Therefore, whether the policy implemented looks like the *ideal policy* will depend on the context.

The fifth claim is that keeping messages clear and simple reduces the scope for misperception and miscalculation.⁴⁶ This would seem a logical claim. However, the simplicity of the message sent is dependent on the context and complexity of the crisis that it is being applied to and the interpretation of the opponent of the signal. For acts of aggression it is easy to see the opponent's response to demands i.e. the withdraw or halting of an advance. However, in the case of nuclear proliferation it may not be possible to verify fully compliance. The increased uncertainty of such crises makes signalling more difficult and increases the chances of miscalculation and misperception.

The final assertion is that 'the framework requires little knowledge about the opponent' and that 'one can explain and predict outcomes of coercive diplomacy attempts against aggressors by focusing on the policy pursued by the coercer and black boxing the opponent'. Jakobsen further asserts that:

To test this part of my argument I only need to determine whether the implementation of the *ideal policy* results in success and its absence in failure. There is no need to analyse the behaviour of the opponent in great detail. The only thing I need to decide in the case studies is whether the opponent

⁴⁶ Jakobsen, *Western use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War, A Challenge for Theory and Practice*, pg.5.

understands the game of coercion to ensure that both players are playing the same game.⁴⁷

Although it is recognised that ‘incorporating the behaviour of the coercer and opponent’ would lead to increased accuracy, the limit of information on the target forces assumptions and educated guesses on the opposition to be made.⁴⁸ Whilst this approach is understandable in a vacuum of data on the opponent, it does limit the depth of analysis that can be done and the explanatory power of the policy. It also limits determination of whether the *ideal policy* worked because of the implementation of the policy or because of another reason. However, in order to determine whether it was truly the coercer’s choice to comply the opponent has to be examined and incorporated into the analysis as much as possible.

Case Selection

George emphasises that the primary criterion for case selection should be relevance to the research objective of the study, whether it includes theory development, theory testing, or heuristic purposes.⁴⁹ Furthermore, the cases should also be selected to provide the kind of control and variation required by the research problem. This requires that the universe or subclass of events be clearly defined so that appropriate cases can be selected.⁵⁰

Jakobsen used two criteria to decide whether a crisis constituted a case of coercive diplomacy:

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* pg.31.

⁴⁸ *Op.cit.* Jakobsen (1998). pg.31.

⁴⁹ *Op.cit.* George&Bennett (2005), pg.83.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

1. The coercer must send a message to the aggressor(s) demanding that the use of force is stopped and/or consequences undone.
2. A threat to punish non-compliance must accompany this demand. This threat may or may not be accompanied by a carrot for compliance.⁵¹

These criteria were formulated specifically for the scenario of coercive diplomacy with the aim of undo/stopping an act of aggression. As this thesis is examining coercive diplomacy employed to prevent nuclear proliferation the first criteria needs to be amended to the following:

1. The coercer must send a message asking the target state to stop/or undo their nuclear programme.

Furthermore, in order to reduce the variables to understand the resulting outcome for my study, cases must also fit some additional criteria:

1. The selected case must have developed, or have been perceived by the USA to have developed, a nuclear programme since 1964.⁵²
2. The USA must be the primary coercer of the selected case. By maintaining the US as the primary coercer it reduces the variables, as different states will have different capabilities, strategic culture and political systems that may affect the cost calculus within it.

⁵¹ *Op.cit.* George&Bennett (2005), pg.7.

⁵² China conducted its first nuclear test in 1964 and was the last state to be recognised as a nuclear state under the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty.

3. There needs to be evidence of a completed outcome i.e. compliance or rejection of the demand. As part of the puzzle that this study looks to solve is what leads to successful outcomes; any case that is still ongoing, such as Iran⁵³, has been discounted.

Table.1 in appendix C shows states that had or still have a nuclear programme and could be considered as cases. The following states were identified as meeting the criteria:

1. North Korea (1993-2006)
2. Libya (1992-2003)
3. Iraq (1992-2003)
4. South Korea (1970-2004)
5. Taiwan (1960-1980)
6. Pakistan (1976-1998)

NK and Libya have been chosen as between 1993-2006 as both were the targets of US coercive diplomacy that had the goal of stopping them attain nuclear weapons. NK continued its programme and tested its first nuclear device in 2005; therefore, ultimately US policy can be seen as a failure. Libya surrendered its WMD programme in 2003; therefore, it appears to be a demonstration of successful US coercive diplomacy.

As the coercive diplomacy in both cases occurred roughly at the same time, the specific military and diplomatic power of the US was the same in both cases; therefore, the difference on outcome must be dependent on other factors. By comparing and contrasting the case studies it is envisaged that the key factors that led to successful and unsuccessful outcomes can be determined. Furthermore, NK was specifically mentioned as members of the 'axis of evil', and Libya was mentioned in a speech titled 'beyond the axis of evil'; this is relevant because Iraq, also identified as part of the 'axis of evil' was subsequently invaded by a US; which demonstrated its willingness to use force.

⁵³ When I started this thesis in 2011 and conducted the main research 2012-2014, Iran was still ongoing.

Iraq also had coercive diplomacy applied over the same period as NK and Libya. However, the outcome of this is unclear as eventually more than limited force was applied and it appears that Iraq did not have a WMD programme. Furthermore, as will be explained within the study, the invasion of Iraq is likely to be factor in why NK continued its nuclear programme and Libya decided to surrender its. Therefore, Iraq is a contributing factor to the outcomes in the two case studies.

South Korea, Pakistan and Taiwan do meet the selection criteria but have been discounted for two reasons. Firstly, they were only subjected to withdrawal of US aid or support, rather than a more forceful threat. Secondly, it is felt by focusing on Libya and NK a more detailed study can be achieved that will delve more deeply into the differing outcomes to form more profound explanations of the two cases.

There are several states such as South Africa⁵⁴, Sweden, Kazakhstan⁵⁵, Ukraine and Belarus who started nuclear programmes and then stopped; however, there is no evidence to suggest that coercive diplomacy was used to encourage these states to roll back their program. Furthermore, there have been states such as India who have developed and tested nuclear weapons; but again there is no evidence of a failed strategy of coercive diplomacy to prevent them becoming a nuclear power.

Libyan and North Korean Nuclear Proliferation Case Studies

This thesis is the only study that conducts a structured focussed comparison of NK and Libya using Jakobsen's *ideal policy* as a framework. The detailed analysis of the cases

⁵⁴ Terence McNamee & Greg Mills, 'Denuclearizing a Regime: What South Africa's Nuclear Rollback Might Tell Us About Iran', *Defense & Security Analysis*, Vol. 22, No.3, (2006), pg.330.

⁵⁵ Kassymzhomart Tokaev, 'Kazakhstan: From Renouncing Nuclear Weapons to Building Democracy', *American Foreign Policy Interests* Vol.26, No.2, (2004), 93-98.

will occur in chapter 3 (Libya) and chapter 4 (NK); with the subsequent structured focussed comparison in chapter 5. However, in the next section I will review the key academic studies of the Libyan and NK nuclear crises. In both cases there is literature covering the narrative of the cases; however, I have focussed on the literature that has relevance to this thesis

Libyan nuclear proliferation case studies

There are two major competing theories within the literature over Gaddafi's decision to surrender his nuclear weapons. One that argues Libya's decision was partly due to the Bush administration's tough non-proliferation policy and credible threat of force demonstrated by the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.⁵⁶ A second theory is that it was due to decades of economic sanctions, recent economic incentives and diplomacy.⁵⁷ Robert Joseph; the key US negotiator in the 2003 discussions that led to Libya surrendering its WMD, in his book *Countering WMD the Libyan Experience* (2009) highlights several lessons that fall out of the 'Libyan model' identifying 'essential to success':

1. Demonstrate Seriousness.
2. Insist on a strategic decision.
3. Employ all the tools (Diplomacy, Economic, Financial, Interdiction, Military)
4. Create the perception and reality of a Win-Win outcome.
5. Assurance of complete and continuing access for verification.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Robert Joseph, *Countering WMD the Libyan Experience*, (Fairfax, National Institute Press, 2009), pg. 1.

⁵⁷ Randall Newnham, 'Carrots, Sticks, and Bombs: The End of Libya's WMD Program', *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol 20, No.3 (2009), pg.77; Bruce W. Jentleson and Christopher A Whytock, 'Who "Won" Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy', *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (2005), pg. 47–86; Ronald Bruce St John, 'Libya is not Iraq: Preemptive Strikes, WMD and Diplomacy', *Middle East Journal*, Volume 58, No.3, (2004), pg.402; Alexander Montgomery, 'Ringing in Proliferation, How to dismantle an Atomic Bomb network', *International Security*, Vol 30, No.2 (2005), pg.180; Flynt L Leverett, "Why Libya Gave Up on the Bomb," *New York Times*, 23 January 2004.

⁵⁸ Robert Joseph, *Countering WMD the Libyan Experience*, pg.101.

In an earlier chapter Joseph also includes ‘avoid bargaining’; arguing that:

Instead of negotiating X for Y, US and UK representatives insisted that Libya acknowledge and abandon its WMD and longer –range missiles. In doing so, they also made it clear that Libya would remove a major obstacle to improved relations and greater economic and political benefits for the Libyan people.⁵⁹

However, as I will argue in chapter 3 it is difficult to see how a deal was not done; this view is amplified in several other studies.⁶⁰

Another theme in the literature is that Bush’s administration did not set the objective of Libyan regime change.⁶¹ Whilst many of the studies cover the narrative and make recommendations for policy or single factor contributions⁶² towards coercive theory, there are only a two that identify a coercive framework from the Libyan case. Jentleson and Whytock argue that the Libyan case demonstrates that ‘credible coercion and deft diplomacy’ require three criteria ‘proportionality, reciprocity, and coercive credibility’.⁶³ They also assert that ‘the extent of target state vulnerability as shaped by its domestic political and economic conditions, including the transmission belt or

⁵⁹ *Op.cit.* Joseph (2009), pg. 95.

⁶⁰ Robert S Litwak, *Regime Change, US Strategy through the Prism of 9/11*, pg.170; Author’s interview with Professor Jentleson, by telephone, 11 April 2013 - Jentleson stated ‘there is a definite deal, Tony Blair announces the deal in December 2003, he talks about what the next steps will be, first of all to implement the deal are part of a bargain, what access British, American and internationals would have to take away materials and technology, secondly the whole process that led to normalisation of relations for a period was defiantly part of a deal, one can say the official position of the United States is we will do this deal and then talk about it, but that is just public cover.’

⁶¹ Robert S Litwak, *Regime Change, US Strategy through the Prism of 9/11*, pg.199; Wyn Q Bowen, *Libya and Nuclear Proliferation, Stepping back from the brink*, (Abingdon, Routledge, 2006), pg.12; Bruce W. Jentleson and Christopher A. Whytock, ‘Who “Won” Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy’, *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (2005), pg. 82.

⁶² Randall Newnham, ‘Carrots, Sticks, and Bombs: The End of Libya’s WMD Program’, *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 20, No.3 (2009), pg.93.

⁶³ Bruce W. Jentleson and Christopher A Whytock, ‘Who “Won” Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy’, *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (2005), pg. 79.

circuit-breaker role of elites and other key political actors'.⁶⁴ The key aspect of this strategy being the specific targeting of elites in order to influence their decision making.

As discussed in chapter 1; Jakobsen puts forward a model, similar to that of the *ideal policy*, stating that Libya model demonstrated Coercion, Carrots and Confidence building measures (3Cs).⁶⁵ Furthermore, he argues that 'asking which policy instrument "won Libya", as the vast majority of studies do, leads to flawed conclusions and policy recommendations as the necessary contributions made by other tools are ignored'.⁶⁶ He also points out that Jentleson and Whytock's coercive diplomacy framework downplays 'the role played by coercion'.⁶⁷ Furthermore, Jakobsen argues that the Libya case 'highlights that analysts and policy-makers would do well to focus more on how different policy tools can be used in combination to achieve desired outcomes than on how individual tools can be employed with decisive effects. It also demonstrates that the Libya success will be hard to replicate'.⁶⁸

A common theme in the various studies is that the Libyan model will be hard to replicate.⁶⁹ Bowen, points out that the 'Libyan example attests, the prevailing political-

⁶⁴ Bruce W. Jentleson and Christopher A. Whytock, Who "Won" Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy, *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (2005), pg.79.

⁶⁵ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, 'Reinterpreting Libya's WMD Turnaround – Bridging the Carrot-Coercion Divide', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol 35, No.4 (2012), pg. 16.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ *Ibid.* pg.5.

⁶⁸ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, 'Reinterpreting Libya's WMD Turnaround – Bridging the Carrot-Coercion Divide', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol 35, No.4 (2012) , pg. 1.

⁶⁹ Bowen, *Libya and Nuclear Proliferation, Stepping back from the brink*, pg.82.

strategic context is crucial to the efficacy of such measures. Replicating this in a non-Libyan environment is likely to prove very difficult, if not impossible'.⁷⁰

North Korea nuclear proliferation

There are two NK crises; one in 1994, that concludes with the signing of the Agreed Framework (AF), and a second in 2003 when the US cancels the AF because of NK secret Uranium based programme. Most of the literature tends to focus singularly on a specific crisis; and although many offer policy recommendations and single factor contributions to coercive theory, there are no coercive frameworks/models developed. The key arguments within the literature are whether the AF was successful; and the wisdom of the Bush administration's decision to break the AF in 2003 due to NK cheating.

The key source for any study of the first nuclear crisis is *Going Critical* by Wit, Poneman and Gallucci; who were the principal negotiators with NK that led to the AF. They point out several lessons; however, one of the significant points they make, is that you have 'to integrate carrots and sticks into a strategy of coercive diplomacy'⁷¹ further adding that:

If offered only carrots, the North Koreans will conclude that the other side is more desperate for a deal than they are and will likely continue on a path of defiance and increasing negotiating demands. Offering only sticks will tell the North Koreans that there is not benefit from complying with international demands, except avoidance of pain.⁷²

⁷⁰ *Op.cit.* Bowen (2006), pg.82.

⁷¹ Wit, Poneman and Gallucci, *Going Critical, the First North Korean Nuclear Crisis*, (Washington D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2004), pg.398.

⁷² *Ibid.* pg.398.

This point is similar to the 3Cs concept that Jakobsen highlights; as essentially it is emphasising the importance of using more than one policy tool to achieve your objective.

A common criticism, which will be discussed more in chapter 4, is that the AF rewarded NK for cheating and that they would continue to cheat. There are several who defend this arguing that incentives have to be given in order to get NK to comply.⁷³

Sigal argues that although the AF could be classed as a success it was a ‘tortuous path’ and that ‘after three years of failure after failure with coercive diplomacy, it finally tried cooperation and succeeded’.⁷⁴ Jackson also points out that the first NK crisis reveals:

Two additional conditions that can hinder a two-track policy from achieving its policy aims: shifting how the objectives of coercive signals and actions are prioritized throughout the course of a crisis, and relying on international institutions and foreign governments for the implementation of a two-track policy.⁷⁵

Jackson argues that ‘the fact that this crisis led to something other than open conflict suggests that the United States might plausibly claim at least a partial coercive success’. Newnham is even more adamant that ‘even in light of this seeming failure, the paper will show that the Agreed Framework approach was actually fairly effective, especially given the extreme difficulty of the case and the lack of reasonable alternative policies’.⁷⁶

⁷³ Alexander Montgomery, ‘Ring in Proliferation, How to dismantle an Atomic Bomb network’, *International Security*, Vol 30, No.2 (2005), pg.183; John Bolton, ‘The Bush Administration and Nonproliferation, a new strategy emerges’, Department of State Archive, Washington D.C., 30 March 2004, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/us/rm/31010.htm>, accessed 25 February 2014.

⁷⁴ Leon D Sigal, *Disarming Nuclear Diplomacy Strangers with North Korea*, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1998), pg.5.

⁷⁵ Van Jackson, ‘Making Diplomacy Work: Coercion and Conciliation in the First North Korean Nuclear Crisis’, *Comparative Strategy*, Vol.31, No.2 (2012), pg.171.

⁷⁶ Randall E. Newnham, ‘Policy in International Studies’, *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2004), pg.165.

A controversial point that Wit, Gallucci and Poneman argue is that ‘negotiated arrangements can advance US interests even if the other party engages in cheating’.⁷⁷ This point clearly relates to the Bush administration’s decision to cancel the AF with NK in 2003, which was preventing NK plutonium development, over the issue of its Uranium programme. Similarly, Robert Litwak’s analysis of NK points out that the difficulty of military pre-emption. Furthermore, he argues that ‘in terminating the Agreed Framework, Washington left Pyongyang with no open avenue and with nothing to lose if it reactivated the Yongbyon facility. When NK began to reprocess the 8000 spent fuel rods in early 2003, the Bush administration essentially acquiesced to the North’s further reprocessing of plutonium for additional nuclear weapons’.⁷⁸ A further criticism of the Bush administration’s inability to develop a coherent strategy towards NK that utilised a mix of credible threat and incentives is commented on by several scholars.⁷⁹

There are several books⁸⁰ that explain the North Korean crises and policy choices for the US and allies; but do not necessarily identify any relevant points for international theory, or more specifically coercion theory. There are a few studies that argue that NK has been the most effective at coercion; securing its regime’s survival and rewards for its

⁷⁷ Wit, Poneman and Gallucci, *Going Critical, the First North Korean Nuclear Crisis*, pg. 405.

⁷⁸ Litwak, *Regime Change, US Strategy through the Prism of 9/11*, pg.287.

⁷⁹ Mike Chinoy, *Meltdown the inside story of the North Korean nuclear crisis*, (New York, St Martin Griffin, 2009), pg. xxv; Gilbert Rozman, ‘The North Korean Nuclear Crisis and US Strategy in Northeast Asia’, *Asian Survey*, Vol. 47, No. 4 (2007), pg. 621.

⁸⁰ Some examples are: Jonathan Pollack, *No Exit, North Korea, Nuclear Weapons and international security*, (Abingdon, Routledge, 2011); Victor D Cha and David Kang, *Nuclear North Korea, A debate on engagement strategies*, (New York, Columbia University Press, 2003); Michael O Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki, *Crisis on the Korean Peninsula, How to deal with a nuclear North Korea*, (New York, McGraw Hill, 2003).

threatening behaviour.⁸¹ Creekmore argues that the first NK crisis indicates that US leaders should talk directly with opponents, that governments should seek ‘consensus on how to deal with serious national security issues that could become major crises’⁸² and that ‘closer cooperation between governments, nongovernmental organisations, and scholars could enhance policymaking and implementation’.⁸³

Yochi Funabashi argues that the Bush administration was mistaken delivering an ultimatum and should have ‘instead lured NK into diplomatic negotiations toward dismantling’ their nuclear weapons and programs.⁸⁴ Furthermore, in Bush’s second term it failed ‘to uphold the joint statement of the fourth round of the six party talks in September 2005. The US ‘failed to back the diplomatic expression “to discuss the issue of light water reactors at a suitable time” with political will’.⁸⁵ Becker although more hawkish also argues that what is required is ‘political will’ to disarm such states.⁸⁶ Drennan argues that both sides attempted coercion that failed, with the escalation leading to the possibility of war neither side wanted.⁸⁷

⁸¹ Narushige, ‘Coercing to Reconcile: North Korea’s Response to US ‘Hegemony’’, *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol 29, No.6 (2006), pg.1016.

⁸² Marion Creekmore Jr, *A moment of crisis, Jimmy Carter, the power of peacemaker and North Korea’s nuclear ambitions*, (New York, Public Affairs, 2006), pg. 288.

⁸³ *Ibid.* pg. 290.

⁸⁴ Yochi Funabashi, *The Peninsula question, a chronicle of the second nuclear crisis*, (Washington D.C., Brookings Institution press, 2007), pg.469.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.* pg.470.

⁸⁶ Jasper Becker, *Rogue Regime, Kim Jong Il and the Looming threat of North Korea*, (New York, Oxford University press, 2005), pg.274.

⁸⁷ William M Drennan, *Nuclear Weapons and North Korea: Who’s Coercing Whom?*, Chapter 5 in *The United States and coercive diplomacy*, edited by Robert J. Art and Patrick M Cronin, (Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace, 2003), pg.158/159.

Comparison of NK and Libya

Although most of the studies focus either on NK or Libya; in the Libyan studies, it is not uncommon to have discussion relating to lessons that can be applied to NK.

However, this is significantly different from the structured focused comparison between the cases that will occur in this thesis. Joseph raises lessons from the Libyan case that he argues can be adapted to cases, such as NK ‘in a way that maximizes the prospects for the regimes to make the strategic choice to abandon their WMD programs’.⁸⁸ Similarly, Bowen studies the Libyan crisis, identifies similarities and draws some conclusions on how lessons might be applied towards NK.⁸⁹ Rothman examines both Libya and NK in order to determine why states facing similar threats chose to cope with them differently; however, this still does not use an analytical framework to compare these cases in depth.⁹⁰

There is a vast amount of literature on both the Libyan and North Korean proliferation efforts; however, none of these studies, other than Jakobsen himself, have used the *ideal policy* as their framework to conduct a structured focussed comparison. Furthermore, this thesis has conducted interviews with a range of key policy makers involved directly with these cases. Whilst none of the findings of the cases within this thesis provide new material, this study does confirm some of the findings of previous studies and a fresh analysis on an important strategy for dealing with nuclear proliferation.

⁸⁸ Robert Joseph, *Countering WMD the Libyan Experience*, pg.100.

⁸⁹ Wyn Q Bowen, *Libya and Nuclear Proliferation, Stepping back from the brink*, pg.82.

⁹⁰ Tiran Rothman, ‘A State's Choice: Nuclear Policy in a Changing World Between Libya and North Korea’, *Defense & Security Analysis*, Vol.23, No.3 (2007), pg.298.

Conclusion

A positivistic research approach has been adopted by this study primarily as it was the method adopted by Jakobsen. However, an advantage of a positivistic approach is that it ensures that theories are tested empirically, as far as possible, to observable reality. As opposed to theories that do not seek to test themselves against any form of reality; therefore, offering no guarantee to a practitioner that they can be applied, or offer insight, in the real world with any confidence. Furthermore, positivism actively acknowledges that theory development is a process of continual improvement, and that theories are to be continually critiqued, adjusted and built upon. This is particularly important as it justifies the assumption of rationality arguing that the essential element of the development of theory is whether it is proven correct when tested empirically. The assumption of rationality is a good starting point for the development of theory; however, if it is proven to be empirically incorrect then those assumptions should be amended or the theory discarded.

Using Jakobsen's *ideal policy* I have derived assessment questions that will be used to test the selected case studies. Furthermore, I have identified the key claims Jakobsen puts forward for the *ideal policy* superiority over theories. The validity of these claims will be determined in relation to the empirical evidence and analysed fully in the concluding chapter. NK and Libya was selected as the case studies. Both the case studies were subjected to coercive diplomacy from the US between 1993-2006 (Libya 2003), with the objective of stopping each state attain a nuclear weapon. NK continued its programme and exploded its first nuclear bomb in 2006; therefore, ultimately the US policy can be seen as a failure. Libya appears to have given up its WMD programme in 2003; therefore, appears to be a demonstration of successful US coercive diplomacy. As the coercion occurred roughly at the same time, the specific military and diplomatic

capability of the US is the same in both cases; therefore, the difference in results must be dependent on other factors. By comparing these and contrasting the case studies it is envisaged that the key factors that led to successful and unsuccessful outcomes can be determined.

CHAPTER 3 – US COERCIVE DIPLOMACY

TOWARDS LIBYA 1992-2006

In December 2003 the Libyan government announced that it would give up its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The announcement came after secret negotiations on WMD and other issues between Libya, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Bush administration heralded Gaddafi decision as clear example that there robust counter-proliferation policy backed by the credible use of force in Iraq was effective.¹ However, many argued this agreement was a product of a diplomatic negotiations and economic sanctions that were put in place by the previous administrations.² In fact three previous US administrations had kept the pressure on Libya, persuading the international community to adopt sanctions that forced Tripoli to recognize its responsibility for the Pan Am 103, stop its support for terrorism and end its pursuit of WMD.³

This chapter will, using the assessment questions derived in chapter 2, to analyse the coercive diplomacy applied by the US from 1992 to 2006 towards Libya. I have split the case into two distinct episodes; Episode 1, the Clinton administration's policy toward Libya followed by episode 2, the Bush administration's policy toward Libya. The

¹ Robert Joseph, *Countering WMD the Libyan Experience*, pg.1.

² Dirk Vandewalle, *A History of Modern Libya*, (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2006), pg.178; Randall Newnham, 'Carrots, Sticks, and Bombs: The End of Libya's WMD Program', *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol 20, No.3 (2009), pg.77; Bruce W. Jentleson and Christopher Whytock, A. "Won" Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate and its Implications for Theory and Policy, *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (2005), pg. 47–86; Ronald Bruce St John, "'Libya is not Iraq': Pre-emptive Strikes, WMD and Diplomacy', *Middle East Journal*, Volume 58, No.3 (2004). pg.402; Alexander Montgomery, Ringing in Proliferation, How to dismantle an Atomic Bomb network, *International Security*, Vol 30, No.2 (2005), pg.180; Flynt L Leverett, "Why Libya Gave Up on the Bomb", *New York Times*, 23 January 2004.

³ Joseph Biden Jr, Senate Hearing. 108–496, Libya-Next steps in US Relations, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, One Hundred Eighth Congress Second Session, 26 February 2004, <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108shrg94557/pdf/CHRG-108shrg94557.pdf>, accessed 10 January 2016, pg.4.

separation of episodes is due to a clear change in the rhetoric and policy of the Bush administration after the attacks of 11th September 2001 (9/11).

It will argue that coercive diplomacy in the form of the *ideal policy* was not applied in either episode. The Clinton administration focussed on the issue of terrorism and did not make an explicit threat to use force over either terrorism or WMD. The Bush administration gave an implied threat to Gaddafi. However, they did not give a specific deadline for compliance. Furthermore, I argue that Gaddafi acted rationally in surrendering his weapons as he had clear reasons to believe that there was a threat of force, demonstrated by the 2003 invasion of Iraq, even if the Bush administration did not intend to actually attack Libya.

EPISODE 1 – CLINTON ADMINISTRATION 1993-2000

AQ 1 - What was the US policy objective and demand?

The US policy objective was stated in the Iranian Libyan Sanctions Act (ILSA) as ‘full compliance by Libya with its obligations under Resolutions 731, 748, and 883 of the Security Council of the United Nations, including ending all support for acts of international terrorism and efforts to develop or acquire weapons of mass destruction’.⁴

The key demands within UNSC resolutions 731, 748 and 883 were:

1. That the Libyan Government immediately provide a full and effective response to those requests so as to contribute to the elimination of international terrorism.⁵
2. And in regard to the bombings of Pan Am 103 and UTA 772:

⁴ Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) of 1996 (House of Representatives-June 18 1996), H.R 3107, http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1996_cr/h960618b.htm, accessed 1 February 2014.

⁵ UN Security Council, Resolution 731 (1992), Adopted by the Security Council at its 3033rd meeting, on 21 January 1992, 21 January 1992, S/RES/731 (1992), available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f15a2c.html>, accessed 21 February 2014.

- a. Surrender for trial all those charged with the crime; and accept responsibility for the actions of Libyan officials;
- b. Disclose all it knows of this crime, including the names of all those responsible, and allow full access to all witnesses, documents and other material evidence, including all the remaining timers;
- c. Pay appropriate compensation.⁶

Therefore, although the ILSA mentioned ending Libyan ‘efforts to develop or acquire weapons of mass destruction’ as a policy objective, its main focus, and the sole focus of UNSC resolutions was on the issue of terrorism. Furthermore, US WMD concerns were primarily over Libya’s attempts to develop chemical and biological weapons, not nuclear weapons.⁷ The Clinton administration articulated a position of ‘concern’ regarding Libyan efforts to develop WMD⁸; however, no public demand regarding specially Libya’s nuclear weapons program was made.

The prioritising of terrorism over WMD as the key policy objective was maintained throughout the Clinton administration’s time in office. Martin Indyk, who as Assistant Secretary of State led on negotiations with the Libyans in November 1998, confirms this stating ‘the priority was compensation to victims, cooperation with the trial, get out of the terrorism business!’.⁹ The policy objective focus on terrorism was also highlighted by Ambassador Welch, head of the eastern desk in the state department during the

⁶ S/23308 letter dated 31 Dec 1991, United Nations Security Council, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/23308, accessed 1 February 2013.

⁷ Author’s interview with Ambassador Mahley, in person, 14 March 2013.

⁸ Ronald E Neumann, Statement of Hon, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for near eastern affairs, Department of State, S-HRG. 106-740, US Foreign policy toward Libya, hearing before subcommittee on near eastern and South Asian affairs of the committee on foreign relations US senate one hundred sixth congress second session, 4 May 2000, <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-106shrg67394/pdf/CHRG-106shrg67394.pdf>, accessed 10 January 2015, pg.5.

⁹ Author’s interview with Ambassador Martin Indyk, in person, 14 March 2013.

Clinton administration, who pointed out that US policy ‘at the time it was completely terrorist focused, we were aware that Gaddafi had some WMD programmes and we were interested in it as a country and interdicting those as we could but the international community was not involved in that at all to the same degree as they were on the terrorism issue’.¹⁰

The Libyans did eventually appear to respond positively to US demands over terrorists issues; expelling the Abu Nidal terrorist organization in 1999, breaking ties with other radical Palestinian groups, closing down training camps, and extraditing suspected terrorists to Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen.¹¹ Most significantly the Lockerbie case was settled with suspects being handed over in April 1999 for trial, in the Netherlands, by a Scottish court.¹² Furthermore, by October 1999 Libya had offered to join the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), including a pledge to comply with inspection and verification provisions.

In summary, the policy objective and clear demands of the Clinton administration were firmly focussed on Gaddafi giving up his support of terrorists, handing over terrorist suspects and paying reparations to the families of the Lockerbie victims. There was no clear demand that Gaddafi was to halt and disarm his nuclear programme, but there was mention of ‘concern’ over his WMD programmes, although this was viewed as a lower priority and related more to his pursuit of chemical and biological weapons.

¹⁰ Author’s interview with Ambassador David Welch, in person, 15 April 2013.

¹¹ Ray Takeyh, 'The rogue who came in from the cold', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 80, No.3 (2001), pg. 68.

¹² BBC News, 'World Lockerbie suspects head for trial', BBC News, 5 April 1999, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/311941.stm>, accessed 1 Feb 2014

Determination of the form of coercive diplomacy that was adopted

The *ideal policy* framework suggests that the minimum success criteria would have required a threat to defeat Gaddafi's objective of obtaining nuclear weapons, a deadline for compliance, an assurance that compliance would not lead to more demands and a carrot/incentive for compliance.

However, as I will show the Clinton administration did not apply coercive diplomacy in the form of the *ideal policy* over the issue of nuclear weapons as the primary focus of US policy was to resolve issues regarding Libya's support of terrorism. Despite this there is still utility in examining the coercive diplomacy applied towards Libya and assessing why the *ideal policy* was not implemented. Furthermore, elements of this episode impact on episode 2.

AQ 2 - Was there a threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives quickly with little cost?

The only evidence of a direct threat of force towards Libya over WMD was in April 1996 when the then Secretary of Defence William Perry responded to press questions on the Libyan development of a chemical weapons plant, pointing out that the US would not allow the plant to open and responding to a question on the 'use of U.S. military force' by stating that and that he 'wouldn't rule out or anything in'.¹³ However, he later backtracked on this statement clarifying that

Preventative action to keep the plant from coming on line is something that can be done first through diplomacy....We have a good period of time in which we can apply that diplomacy, including coercive diplomacy. If that fails, then we can consider military actions.¹⁴

¹³ Transcript: Perry media availability, Ismalia, Egypt, (Expresses concern about Libya's chemical weapons program), 4 April 1996, http://www.fas.org/news/libya/dd3_4-9.htm, accessed 18 Feb 2014

¹⁴ William Perry, Speech given 26 April 1996 at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama. Quoted in Robert S Litwak, *Regime Change, US Strategy through the Prism of 9/11*, pg.180; GlobalSecurity.org, 'Tarhuna /

Allegedly as a consequence of Perry's threat, Libya halted construction on the plant presumably to avoid a potential US attack.¹⁵ Therefore, Gaddafi apparently took this threat seriously, even if it was unintentional.

One implication from Perry's statement that 'diplomacy, including coercive diplomacy' could be applied before the consideration of a military option is that Perry did not view what he termed 'coercive diplomacy' as a policy requiring the threat of force. Coercive diplomacy in the form of the *ideal policy* requires a credible threat of force; therefore, if this was to be applied it would require the consideration and communication of credible military options from the outset. Perry's statement perhaps could be explained as an off the cuff remark. However, as it was an attempt to clarify the message made in his initial comment it is highly likely that it was carefully considered.

Many within the administration did not view force as an appropriate tool to use against Libya. Ambassador Indyk stated 'our leverage during the negotiations in 1999 had nothing to do with the threat of force, because at that point the national interest did not justify the threat of force for those objectives'.¹⁶ Furthermore Ambassador Welch commented that the use of force was 'not an option that would work out to our benefit. The risk was higher than the benefit, especially if you weighed it against other alternatives'.¹⁷ The alternative that was chosen was the maintenance of UN and US unilateral sanctions that isolated Gaddafi and put pressure on his regime.

Tarhunah [Pharma 300]', <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/libya/tarhuna.htm>, accessed 18 Feb 2014.

¹⁵ Lawrence Freedman, *Deterrence* (Cambridge: Polity, 2004), p. 93.

¹⁶ Author's interview with Ambassador Martin Indyk, in person, 14 March 2013.

¹⁷ Author's interview with Ambassador David Welch, in person, 15 April 2013.

Although there was not an overt threat of force from the US, there was always an implied threat that force could be used to back a US political objective. The US during the Regan administration had considered Libya, because of its small size and advantageous geographic location on the Mediterranean, particularly susceptible to US military and economic pressure.¹⁸ This view seemed to be proven correct in April 1986, when the US conducted bombing raids on Benghazi and Tripoli, which appeared to coerce Gaddafi into ending his overt support for terrorism. Furthermore, US fighter jets shot down two Libyan aircraft over the Gulf of Surt in January 1989 proving their vulnerability to US power projection from aircraft carriers.¹⁹

Another factor that gave credibility to US capability and willingness to use force was the ousting of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait in 1991. The US deployed over 500,000 troops, 1000 battle tanks and aircraft, and 6 Carrier battle groups. The US led coalition commenced military operations on the 16th January 1991 and by the 28th of February it had achieved the limited objective of removing Iraq forces from Kuwait.²⁰ The willingness of the US to conduct an expeditionary operation of this magnitude and the overwhelming military victory they attained, over what was at the time the 4th largest army, must have been noted by Gaddafi with concern. The Gulf war along with the previous military actions against Libya demonstrated that the US not only possessed the military capability, but it had the will to use force when it assessed it was in its interest to do so.

The strongest US unilateral action against Libya was detailed within the ILSA. This act declared that the President would enforce sanctions on a person if they ‘contributed to

¹⁸ Litwak, *Regime Change, US Strategy through the Prism of 9/11*, pg.173.

¹⁹ Vandewalle, *A history of Modern Libya*, pgxxiv.

²⁰ Alistar Finlan, *The Gulf War 1991*, (Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 2003), pg.10.

Libya's ability to acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons or enhanced Libya's military or paramilitary capabilities'.²¹ However, this measure clearly was not a threat to use force.

In summary, the approach that was adopted by the Clinton administration was to increase the international political and economic isolation of Gaddafi and his regime. The pressure was added by the enactment of the ILSA in 1996, that required the President to impose US sanctions on foreign firms investing \$40 million or more in the Iranian or Libyan oil and natural gas industries²² as well as companies exporting items to Libya that enhance its nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and advanced conventional weapons programs.²³ There was no direct threat communicated that force would be applied in a manner that conforms to the *ideal policy*.

AQ 3 - Was a deadline for compliance offered?

The clearest deadline given to Libya was within UNSC resolution 883 that was adopted on 11 November 1993. The resolution stated that 'in order to secure compliance by the Libyan Government with the decisions of the Council, to take the following measures, which shall come into force at 00.01 EST on 1 December 1993'. The resolution further stated that it would not come into force if the Secretary General in effect informed the UNSC that Libya had conformed to UN demands. Therefore, the Libyans were publicly made aware on 11 November 1993 that if they conformed fully by the UNSC deadline of the 1 December 1993 sanctions would not be implemented.

²¹ Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) of 1996 (House of Representatives-June 18 1996), H.R 3107, http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1996_cr/h960618b.htm, accessed 1 February 2014.

²² *Op.cit.* Litwak, pg.179.

²³ *Op.cit.* ILSA

Earlier UNSC resolutions were more open, including statements such as ‘we expect Libya to comply promptly and in full’²⁴ but with no fixed deadline. Therefore, the approach that seems to have been adopted initially is what Alexander George would have termed as the ‘gradual turning of the screw’; where the coercing power neither creates a ‘sense of urgency’ nor does it signal the nature of threatened punishment. Instead, its demands are accompanied by a threat that punishment will be gradually increased if compliance does not occur.²⁵ This in turn changed to an ultimatum, as UNSC 883 gave a clear indication of exactly when specific sanctions would be enacted if Libya did not meet clear demands.

The ILSA contained no formal deadline. However, Gaddafi would have been aware of the policy being developed and discussed publicly by Congress; therefore, effectively there was a tacit ultimatum, as it is likely that if Gaddafi had conformed fully with the demands of the UNSC resolutions it would have most likely stopped Libya being included within the ILSA.

In summary, although there was no deadline issued threatening the use of force relating to Gaddafi’s nuclear programme, there was a deadline given for when the measures within UNSC 883 would be applied; therefore, this element conforms partially to the *ideal policy*.

²⁴ S/23308 letter dated 31 Dec 1991, UNSC, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/23308, accessed 1 Feb 2013,

²⁵ Alexander L George, *Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics*, in Alexander L George & William E Simmons eds, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, (Boulder, Colo.:Westview Press, 2nd revised edn, 1994), pg.18.

AQ 4 – Was there an assurance given to the adversary against future demands?

Key to the *ideal policy* is that an adversary is assured that if he complies, further demands will not be placed upon him. Gaddafi reportedly was sceptical about the US and UK's assurance that the Lockerbie suspects would not be used to implicate Libya as being fully responsible for the terrorist atrocity and that the UK/US real objective was regime change. In a letter to Gaddafi in February 1999, UN Secretary General Annan provided an assurance that the trial would not be used 'to undermine' the Libyan government. The trial was limited to the two mid-level officials, leading to charges of appeasement from US hardliners who believed that the Libyan regime should be accountable for Lockerbie.²⁶ Even after Libya had met key demands, such as handing over key suspects, the US did not push to change its policies instantly. As a statement from Secretary Neumann highlights:

We will oppose lifting U.N. sanctions against Libya until we are satisfied that Libya has met all the relevant U.N. Security Council requirements. The provisions of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act regarding investment in Libya's petroleum sector will continue to be considered until, as the statute prescribes, the President has determined and certified to Congress that the U.N. Security Council resolution requirements have been met. Also until that time, we expect to maintain core unilateral economic sanctions prohibiting U.S.-Libyan business.²⁷

This statement made on the 4th May 2000 demonstrated that even though Gaddafi had handed over suspects to Scottish police on the 5 April 1999, the US still maintained

²⁶ Letter from Kofi Annan to Muammar Qaddafi dated 17 February 1999, reproduced in Khalil I. Matar and Robert W. Thabit, *Lockerbie and Libya: A Study in International Relations* (Jefferson, N.C.: ; London : McFarland, c2004) in Robert S Litwak, *Regime Change, US Strategy through the Prism of 9/11*, pg.181; Letter from Kofi Annan to Muammar Qaddafi dated 17 February 1999, reproduced in Khalil I. Matar and Robert W. Thabit, *Lockerbie and Libya: A Study in International Relations* (Jefferson, N.C.: ; London : McFarland, c2004).

²⁷ Ronald E Neumann, Statement of Hon, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for near eastern affairs, Department of State, S-HRG. 106-740, US Foreign policy toward Libya, hearing before subcommittee on near eastern and South Asian affairs of the committee on foreign relations US senate one hundred sixth congress second session, 4 May 2000, <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-106shrg67394/pdf/CHRG-106shrg67394.pdf>, accessed 10 January 2015, pg.6.

pressure over demands for reparations to the families of the Lockerbie victims and its ‘concern’ over WMD.

Libya was given an assurance within UNSC resolution 883 that if it complied the measures would be suspended immediately.²⁸ Furthermore, the ILSA detailed how the President would lift sanctions if compliance was forthcoming.²⁹ However, neither UNSC resolutions nor ILSA gave a clear assurance that if Libya complied, no further demands would be made.

In summary, the assurance given to Libya was that handing over Lockerbie suspects would not be utilised as a way of seeking regime change. However, even after suspects had been handed over the US maintained sanctions based on outstanding demands that needed to be resolved, which included the issue of WMD. Assurances were given, but not assurances that further demands would not be made; therefore, this element only partially conforms to the *ideal policy*.

AQ 5 – Was there an offer of carrots for compliance?

The key carrot that was being offered to Gaddafi was the lifting of international sanctions and reintegration into the international community, and in particular an improved relationship with the US. Removing sanctions would enable Gaddafi to attract the investment required to improve Libya’s ageing infrastructure and gain access to markets to sell oil. The oil revenues would enable him to secure his position within Libya. Furthermore, the lifting of the travel ban would allow him to increase his influence abroad aiding in Gaddafi’s personal ambition to be a regional leader. This

²⁸ UNSC Resolution 883, Adopted by the Security Council at its 3312th meeting, on 11 November 1993.

²⁹ *Loc.cit.* ILSA.

ambition is evident from a conversation recalled by Martin Indyk with the Libyan head of intelligence, Moussa Koussa who told him that Gaddafi:

Can't stand the fact that people he was in the trenches with Nelson Mandela, Robert Mugabe, they are not only out of jail, but they are now leaders of their countries heroes round the world and he can't even host them in Libya, he wants to remove the stigma of being under sanctions.³⁰

Another incentive was an improved relationship with the US, which in turn could lead to full re-integration into the International Community (IC). Integration back into the IC would enable Libya to obtain investment to develop its oil resources and in turn much needed revenue. With money Gaddafi could then deal with internal problems and also obtain more influence in Africa. The US demonstrated that it was serious about the possibility of an improved relationship with Libya by its willingness to enter secret negotiations with the Libyan regime in 1998. Entering into negotiations demonstrated its willingness to seek a solution and resolve the issues between the two states. If the US was not interested in reaching such an accommodation it did not have to enter such negotiations and could have maintained sanctions and its diplomatic stance of isolating Libya until all its demands were met.

There was a clear incentive of having UN and US sanctions lifted that in turn would have improved Libya's economic situation and bolstered Gaddafi position. Furthermore, the secret talks held between the US and Libya demonstrated that there was a possibility of an improved relationship with the US. Therefore, there was clearly an incentive on offer that conforms to the *ideal policy*.

³⁰ Author's interview with Ambassador Martin Indyk, in person, 14 March 2013.

Evaluation of the implementation of the *ideal policy* and coercive diplomacy applied

Coercive diplomacy in the form of the *ideal policy* was not applied towards Libya specifically for the policy goal of preventing it from developing nuclear weapons.

There was no clear demand that Libya halt its nuclear weapons programme and there was no direct threat to use force. There was a deadline given, but this related to when sanctions would come into force primarily over the issue of terrorism. Furthermore, the only assurances given were related to the way the Lockerbie suspects would be dealt with, not specifically that future demands would not follow. The clearest element of US' policy that conformed to the *ideal policy* was that there was a clear incentive on offer to Gaddafi that if he complied with UN and US demands, sanctions would be lifted, and an improved relationship with the US would be a possibility.

The actual strategy of coercive diplomacy applied was firmly focused on the key policy objective of resolving historic terrorist issues and relied primarily on the threat of, and actual application of, sanctions. Although it could be strongly argued that any demand the US gave to Libya contained an implied threat of force, as there was no specific demand given to Libya regarding what would happen if it did not cease developing WMDs there was effectively no coercive diplomacy applied for this objective. The only threat that was made, was later retracted, and was more concerned with chemical and biological weapons, than specifically nuclear weapons.

AQ 6 – Did the opponent prefer to comply rather than go to war?

The Clinton administration only made demands about Gaddafi ceasing his pursuit of WMDs, not specifically nuclear weapons.³¹ Veiled non-specific threats of this nature

³¹ Bill Clinton, President Clinton's first comprehensive strategy document, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, in *The Clinton foreign policy reader: presidential speeches with commentary*, in Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Albina Shayeveich, Boris Zlotnikov eds (New York, M.E. Sharpe, 2000), pg.29.

clearly did not deter Gaddafi who continued to develop a nuclear weapons capability throughout the 90s. However, there is evidence to suggest that Gaddafi would have been willing to comply. Although Secretary Perry's threat was retracted, it is claimed that work stopped on Rabata factory, an indication that they took the statement seriously. Furthermore, Gaddafi did eventually decide that it was better to comply with the demands over the Lockerbie suspects. However, his compliance with these demands was not primarily due to fear of war, but more a desire to remove sanctions that were crippling the Libyan economy.

Over terrorism there was a clear case made by the US and UK, accepted by the international community, that Gaddafi was responsible for several terrorist attacks. If a clear case could have been developed that Gaddafi had a nuclear weapons programme, it is highly likely that it would have caused international outrage and a continuation, if not increase, of international sanctions. Driven with the desire to escape such sanctions, it is highly likely that Gaddafi would have calculated that it would be preferable to surrender these weapons if it removed sanctions.

One argument that is often put forward is that Gaddafi did not have a serious nuclear programme.³² One possible implication of this assertion is that Gaddafi viewed this programme as a bargaining chip and was never fully serious about developing the capability. Therefore, in effect if Libya's nuclear weapons programme was detected it would put him in a more preferable negotiating position. There is evidence to support this claim as during the Clinton administration's negotiations, it was the Libyan's who

³² Author's interview with Ambassador David Welch, in person, 15 April 2013. Author's interview with Ambassador Mahley, in person, 14 March 2013.

raised the offer of ending its WMD programs.³³ Gaddafi was willing to sacrifice his WMD programme in order to achieve other political objectives.

As there was no direct threat that Gaddafi should halt his nuclear weapons programme or face a war it would initially appear that the opponent did not have to make a decision on whether it was better to comply or risk going to war. However, as Gaddafi did offer WMD as a possible concession during secret negotiations in 1998, it is highly likely that he would have complied rather than go to war.

AQ 7 – Did the opponent act rationally, miscalculate or suffer from misperception?

In order to determine whether Gaddafi acted rationally it is necessary to assess what was his political objective. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Gaddafi was increasingly internationally and regionally isolated. Arab nations, driven by a need to integrate fully into the world economy, came to terms with Israel and accepted the need for a US security umbrella. Moreover, Gaddafi's activist foreign policy that involved interfering in other African states isolated him further from his neighbours. Therefore, Gaddafi throughout the 1990s increasingly became side-lined whilst peers such as Nelson Mandela and Yasir Arafat were engaged with Western democracies.³⁴ The impact of this was that Gaddafi calculated that his regimes survival and personal ambition was better served by improving relations with the US in order to re-integrate into the International Community (IC).

³³ Martin S. Indyk, 'The Iraq War did not Force Gaddafi's Hand', *The Financial Times*, 9 March 2004, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1187205/posts> , accessed 17 February 2014.

³⁴ The Ray Takeyh, 'The rogue who came in from the cold', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 80, No. 3 (2001), pg.62-72, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/57032/ray-takeyh/the-rogue-who-came-in-from-the-cold> , accessed 16 February 2014.

As stated previously there is anecdotal evidence that Gaddafi's goal to re-integrate into the international community was partly based on his desire to take on the mantle of a regional leader. Therefore, assuming that Gaddafi's goal was international re-integration and increasing his influence within the region, ceasing his support of terrorists and even handing over suspects of the Lockerbie bombing was rational, as neither of these were aiding him in achieving this objective.

Whether it was rational for Gaddafi's to seek to attain nuclear weapons during the Clinton administration depends very much on what you assess to be his political objective. If it was to remain in power and deter external states from interfering with Libyan internal affairs, his pursuit on the face of it appears rational. Libya is a large country, with a small population, that had proven to be vulnerable to US attacks. Moreover, the demonstration of the US overwhelming capability to defeat Iraq's army in 1991 clearly indicated that his conventional forces would not be able to deter a determined US action. Therefore, it was logical for Gaddafi to conclude that developing a nuclear weapon as the only way of effectively deterring the US.

However, if his nuclear programme was detected, Gaddafi must have realised that it would lead to at the very least continuation of Libya's international isolation and sanctions. Furthermore, it would possible lead to a more aggressive posture from the international community and US. Therefore, if his goal was re-integration it could appear not to be a rational choice. Another possibility is that Gaddafi also saw nuclear weapons as an item of prestige that would further enhance his standing within the region and his desire to become a Pan-Arab, and latterly African leader.

It is most likely that Gaddafi saw nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip that he could use to deal with the US and IC. If he was caught before developing a full nuclear capability he most likely believed that he could extract concessions out of the international community for giving up his weapons before any further sanctions or threats of force were directed at him. The concessions he could seek would be larger the closer he got to a credible nuclear weapon system. If he actually attained a nuclear weapon, it would in provide an element of deterrence from the US and perhaps enable him to coerce neighbours.

Gaddafi must have noted that in 1994 the DPRK and US signed the AF, a road map that gave the NK concessions in the form of oil and two Light Water Reactors (LWR), in return for them dismantling their plutonium based nuclear weapons program.

Furthermore, the US prior to 2003 had not conducted a military strike against a state specifically in order to disrupt their nuclear weapons programme. Although, in 1981 Israel had conducted such a strike against an Iraq³⁵ nuclear reactor on the grounds of pre-emption; therefore, there was the risk of a similar pre-emptive strike being conducted against Libya. However, Gaddafi most likely calculated that even if his WMD program was detected he would have time to use its existence to open negotiations with the US.

Gaddafi actions in this episode would appear to be rational. He started to comply with the US and UN demands over issues of terrorism which clearly brought him closer to re-integration into the international community. Furthermore, as the US did not have clear evidence of his nuclear programme and there was no direct threat made, Gaddafi's

³⁵ BBC News, '1981: Israel bombs Baghdad nuclear reactor', 7 June 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/june/7/newsid_3014000/3014623.stm, accessed 6 Jan 2014.

pursuit of nuclear weapons program would appear to be rational as it gave him the opportunity to either obtain a deterrent and mark of prestige, or possible increase any future bargain position with the US.

AQ 8 - Does credible implementation of the *ideal policy* lead to compliance?

The *ideal policy* was not applied in this episode.

AQ 9 - Does failure to implement the *ideal policy* lead to non-compliance?

There was no form of coercive diplomacy implemented primarily for the purpose of Libya surrendering its nuclear weapons programme. The coercive diplomacy applied relied on the use of sanctions, implemented towards Libya over issues of terrorism and to an extent its pursuit of biological and chemical weapons. Even the coercive diplomacy over issues of terrorism did not take the form of the *ideal policy* as there was no threat of force, however, it did have some success as Gaddafi handed over key terrorist suspects and agreed to sign the CWC.

It could be asserted that the logic of the *ideal policy* holds, as the *ideal policy* was not applied and Gaddafi continued with his nuclear weapons programme. However, this would not be a valid assertion, as there could be various reasons for non-compliance. I would argue that as there was no real strategy of coercive diplomacy applied specifically over the issue of nuclear weapons, Gaddafi did not actually have any specific demand to comply with. Therefore, it was failure to detect, interdict and form a strategy to deal with his nuclear programme that allowed Libya to continue its nuclear programme.

AQ 10 - Was compliance caused by fear that the threatened action would be carried out?

As there was no compliance regarding nuclear weapons or a direct threat to use force it is not possible to assess this question fully.

EPISODE 1 WILL TO THREATEN AND USE FORCE

Jakobsen asserts that the willingness to use force can be explained by three 'will producing; patterns which are Interest-driven pattern, Government-driven pattern and Domestic pressure-driven pattern.³⁶ Furthermore, following Jacobsen's logic I argue that because of the unique threat of states attaining nuclear weapons, there must be an additional pattern that is a 'vital interest' driven pattern. The pattern is dependent on the coding, of low to high, of three variables; the nature of threatened interests, prospects of military success and domestic support. This section will examine each of the variables in turn, assessing the extent they were present and determining whether they explain why the US was not willing to threaten the use force over Libya's nuclear programme.

The nature of the threatened interests.

The Clinton administration articulated within the ILSA that:

The failure of the Government of Libya to comply with Resolutions 731, 748, and 883 of the Security Council of the United Nations, its support of international terrorism, and its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction constitute a threat to international peace and security that endangers the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States and those countries with which it shares common strategic and foreign policy objectives.³⁷

³⁶ Jakobsen, *Western use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War, A Challenge for Theory and Practice*, pg.43.

³⁷ *Loc.cit.* ILSA

Therefore, Libya's pursuit of WMD was seen as 'endangering' national security and foreign policy interests of the US. However, the interests actually being threatened by Libya's pursuit of nuclear weapons were not stated.

The greatest threat to the US would have been Libya developing a nuclear weapons system with the capability to strike the US. Gaddafi had stated that Libya, and other Arab nations, should develop such a capability in order to deter US attacks.³⁸ If Gaddafi was only developing a nuclear weapons capability in order to deter US acts of aggression, it would not be an existential threat to the US. Therefore, it would not be a vital US interest. However, clearly there would always be a fear expressed by some within the US that Gaddafi would not act rationally and would launch an unprovoked attack.

Clinton in his National Strategy for engagement and enlargement stated 'in those specific areas where our vital or survival interests-those of broad, overriding importance to the survival, security and vitality of our national entity-are at stake, our use of force will be decisive and, if necessary, unilateral'.³⁹ This statement emphasised that the use of force was viewed as a viable tool when vital or survival interests were at stake. Therefore, a simple deduction would be that as Clinton never issued a threat, the issue of Libyan nuclear programme was not seen by the Clinton administration as a vital threat and did not require the use or threat of force.

The threat to US interests was more likely that development of a Libyan nuclear weapons capability would complicate the balance of power in the region and the US

³⁸ Cited in Leonard S. Spector, *Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 1989-1990* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), pg.183.

³⁹ Bill Clinton, President Clinton's first comprehensive strategy document, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, in *The Clinton foreign policy reader : presidential speeches with commentary*, edited by Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Albina Shayeveich, Boris Zlotnikov, (New York, M.E. Sharpe, 2000), pg.29.

ability to influence events. This view is put forward by Litwak who states ‘The US concern was that Gaddafi would use what he characterised as a “detering force” as an offensive coercive instrument to intimidate neighbours and to provide cover for the objectionable foreign policy behaviour’.⁴⁰ Development of even a limited range nuclear weapons capability could have directly threatened Israel, who in turn, may have decided to take pre-emptive action that would destabilise the region. Gaddafi had openly been anti-Israeli; opening military camps inside Libya to train Arabs to fight the Israelis and funding armed groups within Palestinian territories.⁴¹ Furthermore, Israel had taken pre-emptive strikes on a suspected Iraq WMD sites in 1981.

Even a limited nuclear weapon system would have been enough to add to the cost-benefit calculation of conducting any form of military action against Libya.

Furthermore, there would always be a concern that Gaddafi could supply such weapons to terrorists or proliferate to other rogue states or non-state actors. The risk of proliferating nuclear weapons would increase the threat to the US that the weapons would fall into the hands of enemies willing to use them.

Ambassador Indyk pointed out the concern over proliferation stating that ‘a country like Libya getting nuclear weapons, it’s a threat to our vital interests to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it would have been treated as a threat to our vital national interests’.⁴² If Libya was allowed to develop a nuclear weapon capability it would have damaged the credibility of the NPT, possibly encouraging other countries to act similarly and causing a rapid increase in nuclear proliferation. Therefore, it was in

⁴⁰ Robert S Litwak, *Regime Change, US Strategy through the Prism of 9/11*, pg.190.

⁴¹ Alison Pargeter, *Libya The Rise and Fall of Qaddafi*, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2012), pg.125.

⁴² Author’s interview with Ambassador Martin Indyk, in person, 14 March 2013.

the US interest to prevent such nuclear proliferation as the more states with nuclear weapons the more risk was posed to the US.

Due to the ability to deter the US from acting against Libya, and the risk of proliferation That Libya's development of a nuclear weapon would have signalled it is assessed that it would have affected US strategic interests⁴³ if Gaddafi had been successful. Therefore, by Jakobsen's hierarchy this issue is coded 'high'.

The prospects of military success.

Throughout the 90s Libya's military capability declined whilst the US demonstrated convincingly in the Gulf war of 1991 its superiority in conventional forces. As pointed out by Dr El-Kikhia 'its military is antiquated. It still uses Soviet weapons of 1970's vintage, and those weapons have demonstrated their ability in the Gulf War. Even far more sophisticated weapons could not stand up to America's might or European might'.⁴⁴ The US also firmly indicated that it was capable of taking out WMD plants within Libya, with Frank Bacon, US press spokesperson stating about the Libyan Tarhunah Chemical plant 'should military options be necessary, we can accomplish this with conventional means'.⁴⁵ Therefore, the balance of power was clearly in the US favour.

⁴³ *Op.cit.* Jakobsen (1997), pg.36; Jakobsen defines a Strategic interest as one that refers to the preservation of an Acceptable balance of power, be it global or regional the interest here is to prevent areas of Greatest economic and strategic importance outside the homeland from falling into the wrong hands. Protection of access to important raw materials and important trade links falls into this category, and the American involvement in Europe during both world wars was motivated by this interest.

⁴⁴ Dr Momsour El-Kikhia, 'Hearing before the subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on international relations house of representatives', One Hundred Sixth Congress First Session, Tuesday 22 July 1999, <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-106hhrg63272/pdf/CHRG-106hhrg63272.pdf> , accessed 17 February 2013 pg.19.

⁴⁵ 05/08/96 [Excerpts] Official Transcript: Defense Department Briefing (Spokesman Kenneth Bacon on May 7) (4250), Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Kenneth Bacon held the regular Tuesday briefing for the press at the Pentagon May 7, <http://www.fas.org/news/libya/960508-436361.htm>, accessed 18 February 2014.

It was also highly unlikely that any major power would have supported Gaddafi if a clear demand had been made that he halt his WMD programmes or face military action. Libya was already politically and economically isolated due to issues over terrorism, and the international outrage would have been focussed on Libya's disregard for the NPT. Furthermore, no state would have wanted to oppose the US without strong national interests for doing so.

The 1986 bombings proved that Libya was vulnerable to US attacks. Geographically Libya was an easier target for the US than Iraq. The majority of the population lives within the littoral and its coast line goes on for 1170 km⁴⁶ making it particular susceptible to airstrikes from European or a US Carrier Group. Furthermore, a Carrier Group was continually deployed to the Mediterranean along with a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) throughout the 90s.⁴⁷

However, the high probability of being able to conduct an attack successfully, is different from conducting an attack successfully that achieves the aim of destroying Libya's nuclear programme. It is unclear whether the US had detailed knowledge of locations essential to his nuclear programme. Without detailed intelligence it is unlikely that limited air strikes alone could confidently destroy Libya's programme. The US did have the capability to conduct special operations, or even a limited amphibious operation through the use of the MEU. However, this would have raised the stakes significantly by placing ground troops in direct contact and raising the chances of US

⁴⁶ CIA World Fact book, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html>, accessed 15 January 2014.

⁴⁷ International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1993-1994*, (London, Routledge, October 1993), pg. 13; International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1994-1995*, (London, Routledge, October 1995), pg.13; International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1996-1997*, (London, Routledge, October 1996), pg.29; International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1997/98*, (London, Routledge, October 1997).

casualties. However, due to the vastly capability difference of the opposing forces, if the US had felt it was in its interest to do so it would have had a 'high' chance of a military operation succeeding.

The level of domestic support

US politicians clearly saw the issue of reparations for victims of Lockerbie as a priority, most likely because this issue could have an instant effect on votes. This is highlighted by Ambassador Welch who points out 'my dealing with Congress on the matter is that all they really cared about at the end of the day was getting satisfaction for the American claimants from Libya. If that could be afforded, they were willing to hit the pause button on other issues'.⁴⁸

Furthermore, when asked about whether there would have been domestic support for a hard line and threat of force he pointed out that 'people would have been supportive, but what does taking a hard line mean', there are limits to it, public enthusiasm can spike early and decline rapidly'.⁴⁹ This comment points to one of the common issues faced by gaining domestic support, in that it can depend heavily on the mood of the time.

If a case had been put forward to threaten the use of force against Libya over its nuclear weapons programme it is highly likely that it would have been relatively simple to gain the backing of the people for some level of intervention. A media agenda that raised the alarm of the prospect of Libya, a rogue state, led by the irrational Gaddafi, would have undoubtedly concerned many US citizens. However, whether support would have been

⁴⁸ Author's interview with Ambassador David Welch, in person, 15 April 2013.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

for air strikes or a more prolonged ground operation, with the likelihood of casualties is not possible to assess.

If Gaddafi's nuclear programme had been placed in front of the US congress and people it is not difficult to believe that a case for threatening military operations could be made. Particularly, as Gaddafi was viewed as a brutal dictator by the US. However, due to the various options it is likely that there would have been a debate regarding what form any military threat should take. Therefore, this element is assessed as 'medium'.

AQ 11 - Are one of the four hypothesised patterns present when states threaten and use force?

There was no direct threat to use force so this question cannot be assessed.

AQ 12 - Are all the hypothesised patterns absent when states lack the will to threaten and use force?

The national interest for threatening force was assessed as *high*, the chance of military success as *high* and the chance of attaining domestic support as *medium*, a pattern that conforms to an interest driven pattern. Therefore, Jakobsen's framework predicts that the US should have threatened to use force.

The most obvious explanation for why the Clinton administration did not threaten to use force and apply the *ideal policy* is that they did not know about Gaddafi's nuclear programme. The possibility aligns with a 1999 congress report that stated that 'Libya continues to develop its nascent and still rudimentary nuclear research and development program but still requires significant foreign assistance to advance to a nuclear weapons

option’.⁵⁰ Although in 2001 a subsequent report indicated that ‘Libya and other countries reportedly used their secret services to try to obtain technical information on the development of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons’ and that ‘Libya’s continuing interest in nuclear weapons and ongoing nuclear infrastructure upgrades raise concerns’.⁵¹ However, it is not until 2003 that the unclassified reports indicate Gaddafi’s intent to develop a nuclear weapon. A report evaluating the US intelligence communities’ performance in assessment over Libya, states that:

Prior to December 2003, the strength of clandestine reporting on Libya’s procurement activity provided the Intelligence Community with a fairly accurate view of what nuclear-related equipment and material Libya possessed. Intelligence suggesting that Libya was receiving nuclear equipment via the A.Q. Khan network, and reporting from the 1980s indicating that Libya had acquired yellowcake from Niger in 1978 that were later validated by inspections. Intelligence that Libya had received uranium hexafluoride feed material for its gas centrifuge program was also confirmed.⁵²

The report went on to point out that the ‘CIA and DIA had assessed that Libya could produce enough weapons grade uranium for a nuclear warhead as early as 2007’⁵³ and that: ‘By 2000, information was uncovered that revealed shipments of centrifuge technology from the Khan network were destined for Libya’.⁵⁴ The interesting aspect of

⁵⁰ Unclassified Report to Congress, July - December 1999, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions 1 July through 30 December 1999. https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/archived-reports-1/july_dec1999.htm#6 , accessed 10 January 2016.

⁵¹ Unclassified Report to Congress, July - December 2001, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July through 31 December 2001. https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/archived-reports-1/july_dec2001.htm#6, accessed 10 January 2016.

⁵² The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction Report, Report to the President of the United States, March 31, 2005, GPO-WMD-1-7, Chapter 2, <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-WMD/pdf/GPO-WMD-1-7.pdf> , accessed 14 February 2014.

⁵³ *Ibid.* pg. 253.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* pg. 257.

this report⁵⁵ is that it indicates that the intelligence community most likely knew that Gaddafi was seeking nuclear weapons before 2000 as he had gained possession of both yellow cake and uranium hexafluoride feed material for a gas centrifuge program. Most concerning is that they believed he was further along with his programme, assessing in 1999 that he could develop a nuclear weapon by 2015, an assessment that changed in 2001 to development of a nuclear warhead by 2007.⁵⁶

Gaddafi had also made several statements that indicated he was pursuing nuclear weapons. In the mid 1990s recalling the US attacks on Tripoli, he stated:

If we had possessed a deterrent—missiles that could reach New York— we would have hit it at the same moment. Consequently, we should build this force so that they and others will no longer think about an attack. Whether regarding Libya or the Arab homeland, in the coming twenty years this revolution should achieve a unified Arab nation.... This should be one homeland, the whole of it, possessing missiles and even nuclear bombs. Regarding reciprocal treatment, the world has a nuclear bomb, we should have a nuclear bomb.⁵⁷

This statement was a clear indication that Gaddafi deemed pursuit of nuclear weapons a valid policy objective, even though Libya had signed the NPT.

Taking the assessments stated within US reports and Gaddafi's rhetoric towards developing a nuclear weapon it is highly likely that at some level within the US administration individuals with policy making responsibilities were aware by 1999 that Gaddafi appeared to be seeking nuclear weapon with the possibility of obtaining a device by 2015. Therefore, why was there not a decision to make a case, backed by the

⁵⁵ It should be noted that these reports do not clearly indicate whether the assessment of the intelligence community were correct in 2003 when they could confirm the actual situation, or whether they were right periodically. i.e. Did the international community correctly estimate the status of the programme in 1992, 1993, 1994 etc. This distinction is important as it may be that prior to 1999 the intelligence estimates were not flagging up to policymakers what is now known about Libya's nuclear programme.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* pg. 260.

⁵⁷ Cited in Leonard S. Spector, *Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 1989-1990* (Boulder, Colo.:Westview Press, 1990), p.183.

threat of force, that he halt and disarm his nuclear programme? The most likely explanation is that the Clinton administration did not view the nuclear issue as an immediate threat and were more concerned with the more immediate electoral damage that could be done by not dealing with the highly motive issue of reparations for the Lockerbie victims' families. Raising the issue of nuclear weapons backed by the threat of force would have complicated obtaining compensation. Whereas obtaining compensation first, then dealing with the less immediate, but important issue of Gaddafi's emerging nuclear programme would have been a more logical strategy. Ambassador Welch also implies that Libya was not viewed a threat stating 'short of Libya actually using any of these devices there was no threat of going to war. My personal view is the threat of Libya would not have risen to the level where it would have been that much of a concern. I find it implausible they would have used them'.⁵⁸ These statements emphasise the administrations perception that a Libyan nuclear programme was not an immediate threat. Fundamentally future administrations had up to 2015 to deal with Libya nuclear weapons programme; progress on the issue of reparations for victims could gain, or lose, politicians votes at the next election.

AQ 13 - Does coalitional consensus concerning threats of force result from leadership by one or more states, and/or a shared perception that important interests are threatened?

There was no direct threat to use force so it is not possible to assess whether coalitional consensus concerning threat of force required leadership or shared perception of various states that important interests are threatened. However, an assessment of coalitional consensus required to threaten and implement sanctions can be assessed. UN sanctions required US leadership to formulate and implement. Furthermore, the enactment of

⁵⁸ Author's interview with Ambassador David Welch, in person, 15 April 2013.

sanctions was aided significantly by the US, UK and France sharing the policy objective that Libyan terrorist issues should be resolved. This united front by three permanent members of the UNSC clearly influenced states to back their claims and led to UN sanctions. Therefore, the instigation of sanctions against Libya over the issue of terrorism required US leadership and relied on shared interests with the UK and France.

As soon as the Libya handed over the Lockerbie suspects; the UN, against US wishes, suspended its sanctions. The US wished to maintain the pressure on Gaddafi until full compensation for the families of Lockerbie victims had been achieved and issues regarding Libya's pursuit of WMD had been resolved. However, the leadership of the only remaining superpower was not sufficient to influence the UN to maintain these sanctions. Once the issue of terrorism seemed to have been resolved many states within Europe believed it was in their interest to form economic ties with Libya against the wishes of the US.

Furthermore, Libya only agreed to hand over suspects after the US agreed to compromise on where the trial of the suspects should be held. The US compromise was based on its view that the UN sanctions were beginning to unravel with international leaders such as Mandela defying the travel ban and publicly stating in Libya 'we are actively encouraging our business people to develop trade relations with countries such as yours'.⁵⁹ The plight of the UN sanctions was later reflected upon by Ambassador Ronald Neumann, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs who stated:

U.N. sanctions, in place since 1992, were having an impact on Libya, but the symbolic dimensions, the ban on air travel and mandate to reduce Libyan diplomatic presence, were seen as increasingly futile. International support for new pressure on Libya was declining. Sanctions fatigue was setting in. Others in

⁵⁹ Nelson Mandela, Speech at a banquet hosted by Colonel Gaddafi, Tripoli, 22 October 1997, <http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/speech-president-nelson-mandela-banquet-hosted-colonel-qadhafi-tripoli-22-october-1997>, accessed 6 January 2014.

the region and our own allies believed it important for all concerned to try to bring the matter to a close, but Libya was coming no closer to surrendering the suspects in the Pan Am 103 bombing.⁶⁰

Ambassador Indyk also indicated this view stating ‘African leaders did not respect the sanctions, Arab leaders started to visit there as well, by the time we opened negotiations, the dirty little secret was that sanctions were failing and that is the primary reason we decided to begin negotiations’.⁶¹

The ILSA implemented US sanctions on foreign companies, which caused significant issues with several European states.⁶² Reportedly one official commented, ‘it’s one thing to lead by example. But to try to impose a secondary boycott on others who won’t go along is totally counterproductive and harms other interests’.⁶³ There was also disagreement within the US administration whether imposing such sanctions was wise. But the act was clearly going to pass congress; therefore, the administration tried to limit the scope of the legislation to foreign investment in the energy sector, and to maintain diplomatic flexibility through a provision granting the President authority to waive the ILSA sanctions.⁶⁴

Although initially there was coalitional consensus regarding the full implementation of sanctions, this started to wane once individual states saw it against their interests not to

⁶⁰ Ronald Neumann, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs, US Department of State, ‘US Libya Relations: A New Era?’ Hearing before the subcommittee on Africa of the committee on international relations house of representatives one hundred sixth congress first session, Tuesday 22 July 1999, <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-106hhrg63272/pdf/CHRG-106hhrg63272.pdf>, accessed 10 January 2016, pg.3.

⁶¹ Author’s interview with Ambassador Martin Indyk, in person, 14 March 2013.

⁶² Donald G Boudreau, ‘Economic Sanctions and Military Force in The Twenty-First Century’, *European Security*, Vol.6, No.2 (1997), pg.34.

⁶³ Robert S Litwak, *Regime Change, US Strategy through the Prism of 9/11*, pg.179.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

enforce them. This was despite US leadership and potential US sanctions for contravention of the ILSA.

AQ 14 - Does coalitional consensus concerning threats of force fail to emerge when none of the above conditions are met?

There was no threat of force discussed over the issue of terrorism or WMD that required a coalitional consensus; the chosen approach was the use of sanctions.

AQ 15 - Do international organisations make it easier for leading states to mobilise support for policies involving threats and use of force?

There was no threat of force so it is not possible to extrapolate from this episode how international organisations impact on policies involving threats and use of force.

However, whether international organisations aided the implementation of sanctions can be examined.

Gaddafi was informed in May 1993 that the US was seeking, through the UNSC, a full embargo on Libyan oil sales that would prevent Libya's export of 1.36 million barrels a day of crude, the lifeline of its economy.⁶⁵ The pressure mounted as in November 1993, the UNSC passed resolution 883, reiterating the demands of UNSC resolutions 731 and 748; that Libya cooperate by handing the suspects over to US and UK. The implication of UNSC resolution 883 was that states were called upon to freeze all Libyan foreign financial holdings, a ban on the transfer of production technology critical to the Libyan energy sector and other prohibitions that significantly impacted upon its economy.⁶⁶ However a total embargo on Libyan oil and gas exports was avoided as it was believed that such a measure would have triggered opposition from Russia and China, as well as

⁶⁵ Janice Monti-Belkaoui & Ahmed Riahi-Belkaoui, *Qaddafi: The Man and His Policies* (Aldershot, Avebury, 1996), pg.50.

⁶⁶ UNSC resolution 883, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (11 Nov), <http://www.un.org/docs/scres/1993/scres93.htm>, accessed 5 January 2014.

from European allies (notably Italy and Germany) dependent on Libya as an energy supplier.⁶⁷

Litwak points out that the UN sanctions in November 1993 proved to be the ‘high-water mark of international efforts to compel the Gaddafi regime’s compliance with Security Council resolutions requiring the Libyan government to turn over the Lockerbie suspects for trial’. After these sanctions the US and UK governments struggled to maintain collective pressure on Libya in the face of dissipating international support for multilateral sanctions.⁶⁸ However, having an international organisation that could apply sanctions, even if the effectiveness waned over time, did aid the US with compelling Libya.

AQ 16 - Did the issuing of a threats increase the motivation of the coerced to develop nuclear weapons?

There was no threat issued explicitly to Libya concerning nuclear weapons. Therefore, it is not possible to ascertain what impact this would have had on his nuclear programme.

EPISODE 2 – BUSH ADMINISTRATION 2000 - 2006

AQ 1 - What was the policy objective and demand?

9/11 had an enormous impact on the US’ nuclear proliferation policy. Bush viewed 9/11 as an act that demonstrated the vulnerability of the US and its enemies’ determination. Furthermore, he feared the next terrorist attack and gave a clear implied threat to all nations stating:

Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that

⁶⁷ Robert S Litwak, *Regime Change, US Strategy through the Prism of 9/11*, pg.177.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.* pg.178.

continues to harbour or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.⁶⁹

This was not just rhetoric in the wake of an unforeseen crisis; policy was being changed as pointed out by Litwak:

The 9/11 attacks did not change the structure of international relations, but did lead to a redefinition of threat. The Bush administration argued that unpredictable "rogue" states, like Iraq, and undeterrable terrorist groups created a dangerous nexus of proliferation and terrorism. It argued that the threat posed by the "rogues" derived from the very character of their regimes -- hence the post-9/11 emphasis on regime change over containment -- and rejected diplomatic engagement with the "rogues" as rewarding bad behaviour.⁷⁰

With the immediate objective of finding an effective way of responding to 9/11 the administration started discussing whether force should be used more broadly against targets that did not have a direct link to supporting Al-Qaida. Donald Rumsfeld, then Secretary of State for Defence articulated in a memo that 'we need to consider other nations, including Sudan, Libya, Iraq, and Iran, where terrorists had found safe haven over the years and where they might seek refuge if we were to attack al-Qaida's hub in Afghanistan'.⁷¹ Furthermore, in his memoir he reflected that 9/11 was a 'rare opportunity to persuade Libya' to choose a different path⁷², stating 'I believed that if we put sufficient pressure on Afghanistan and Iraq, other countries might recognise that their interests in self-preservation meant that they too needed to end their support for terrorism and their WMD programs'.⁷³

⁶⁹ Bush, George, Speech to a Joint Session of Congress, 20 September 2001, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf, accessed 10 January 2016,

⁷⁰ Author's interview with Dr Robert Litwak, in person, 12 March 13.

⁷¹ Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown A Memoir*, (New York, Penguin Books Ltd, 2012), pg. 346.

⁷² *Ibid.* pg 630.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

In his 2002 State of the Union message, Bush labelled NK, Iran and Iraq and ‘states like these’ as constituting an ‘Axis of Evil’.⁷⁴ Libya a state who had supported terrorism and was seeking WMD must have believed that they were within the ‘states like these’ category. An interpretation further consolidated further when Secretary Powell whilst defending the use of the term ‘Axis of Evil’ to a senate committee stated that the three identified countries were ‘probably not the only ones we could have put into the club’.⁷⁵ Furthermore, Libya was clearly identified by John Bolton, former Undersecretary of State for Arms Control, who singled out Syria, Libya, and Cuba in a speech entitled ‘Beyond the Axis of Evil’ stating ‘America is determined to prevent the next wave of terror. States that sponsor terror and pursue WMD must stop. States that renounce terror and abandon WMD can become part of our effort. But those that do not can expect to become our targets’.⁷⁶

The President also laid out a policy of pre-emptive action against states supporting terrorism and seeking nuclear weapons stating ‘we must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends’.⁷⁷ He further added that:

The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the

⁷⁴ George W. Bush, ‘Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union’, 29 January 2002, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29644>, accessed 25 Nov 2012.

⁷⁵ Secretary of State Colin Powell, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Seventh Congress, Second Session, 5 February 2002, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, pg.36.

⁷⁶ John R Bolton, ‘Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction’, US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, The Heritage Foundation, Washington, 6 May 2002, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0205/doc01.htm>, accessed 6 January 2014.

⁷⁷ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf>, accessed 10 January 2016, pg.14.

time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively.⁷⁸

The significance of this statement was that pre-emption no longer relied purely on the immediacy of the threat, but the potential impact. Therefore, indicating that the US would be willing to act against WMD threats even if the attack did not appear imminent. Although, the NSS also stated that force would not be used 'in all cases to pre-empt emerging threats'.⁷⁹

The US clearly articulated a policy objective that states that supported terrorism and sought nuclear weapons halt their activities or face the possibility of pre-emptive military action. Libya identified as a state 'beyond the Axis of Evil', who had a history of supporting terrorists and seeking WMD clearly fell into the category of a potential 'target' of a pre-emptive strike. Therefore, Gaddafi must have viewed the demand that states should halt their pursuit of nuclear weapons being implicitly directed at him.

AQ 2 - Was there a threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives quickly with little cost?

A threat was articulated by elements of the Bush administration towards Libya.

John Bolton's 'Beyond the Axis of Evil' speech named Libya and pointed out that 'States that renounce terror and abandon WMD can become part of our effort. But those that do not can expect to become our targets'.⁸⁰ This was clearly a threat to Libya from a senior official in the Bush administration. However, it was a threat that was not repeated directly by the President himself. The closest Bush came to identifying Libya specifically as a possible target was his original 'Axis of Evil' speech where he referred

⁷⁸ *Ibid.* pg. 15.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ *Op.cit* Bolton (2002) <http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0205/doc01.htm>

to NK, Iran, Iraq and ‘States like these’.

Whilst the President’s statements were not a specific threat directed to Libya, they did clearly articulate a threat to states like Libya who were developing WMD and had a history of supporting terrorism. This threat was given credibility when the Bush doctrine of pre-emption was used to justify the 2003 invasion of Iraq under the premise that Saddam had WMD and that there was a ‘risk that the current Iraqi regime will either employ those weapons to launch a surprise attack against the United States or its Armed Forces or provide them to international terrorists who would do so’.⁸¹ The importance of the invasion of Iraq was highlighted by Richard Perle, a former Bush Snr and Reagan policy official, who stated ‘our diplomacy then could be simplified to two words: “You’re next.” The point was not “we are going to invade you next”. It was we are going to turn to you next’.⁸²

Certainly several UK and US officials at the time believed that Gaddafi thought he was next. Jack Straw, then UK Foreign Secretary commented ‘those of us involved in all of this were not in any doubt that Gaddafi was worried that he might be next, and certainly the tolerance in the International Community for a rogue states attaining nuclear weapons was declining’.⁸³ A similar view was that of a senior member of the first Bush administration, who commented that Gaddafi’s view was ‘these guys invaded Iraq, who at the time Gaddafi thought had a nuclear weapon, it did not do him any good, and

⁸¹ Authorization for use of military force against Iraq resolution of 2002, Public Law 107-243, 107th Congress, Joint Resolution, To Authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq., NOTE: Oct. 16, 2002 - [H.J. Res. 114].

⁸² Richard Pearle, cited in Amity Shales, ‘Comment: Bush's doctrine starts to yield results’, *Financial Times*, 22 December 2003.

⁸³ Author’s interview with The Right Honourable Jack Straw, by telephone, 14 June 2013.

argue that it caused the invasion, so he saw what was coming’⁸⁴ and by Robert Joseph, who was the lead US negotiator in the 2003 Libyan negotiations, who stated that:

There is no question that Gaddafi’s principal motivation was his belief that Libya would be next on the target list, no question. There were other motivations in play as well, but the primary one was the perception that we were going to use force against Libya if it did not abandon its WMD programs.⁸⁵

However, there are opponents of this view that indicate that the Iraq war actually

weakened the US position, as stated by Professor Jentleson argues that:

By the time the deal is struck in December 2003, it is pretty clear that the United States is not doing that well in Iraq – the initial mission accomplished is over, so you could imagine that Gaddafi in a perfectly rational way saying “I am less worried about you coming after me militarily, now that I have seen the reaction of the international community and how you are tied down in Iraq.”⁸⁶

Many argue that Iraq was not a required element to bring about Gaddafi’s decision and the predominant factor was the desire to reintegrate into the international system and improve his economic situation.⁸⁷ However, even individuals more critical of the connection⁸⁸ between the Iraq war and Gaddafi admit that it is hard to argue against the timing as put forward by a proponent of the Iraq factor Ambassador Joseph:

On the 13th of December Saddam was pulled out of his spider hole. No doubt this had a direct impact on Gaddafi’s thinking. Did we intentionally pull him out on the 13th to effect decisions on the 16th? No, but all the stars were in alignment at that point, he didn’t want to be the guy in the spider hole.⁸⁹

⁸⁴ Author’s interview with Source A, in person, 4 March 2013.

⁸⁵ Author’s interview with Ambassador Robert Joseph, in person, 11 March 2013.

⁸⁶ Author’s interview with Professor Jentleson, by telephone, 11 April 2013.

⁸⁷ Cirincione&Wolfsthal&Rajkumar, *Deadly Arsenals, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical threats*, Second Edition, (Washington D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), pg.319; Dirk Vandewalle, *A history of Modern Libya*, pg.178; Randall Newnham, ‘Carrots, Sticks, and Bombs: The End of Libya’s WMD Program’, *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol 20, No.3 (2009), pg.77; Bruce W. Jentleson and Christopher A Whytock, “Won” Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate and its Implications for Theory and Policy’, *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (2005), pg. 47–86; Ronald Bruce St John, ‘Libya is not Iraq: Preemptive Strikes, WMD and Diplomacy’, *Middle East Journal*, Volume 58, No.3 (2004), pg.402; Alexander Montgomery, ‘Ringing in Proliferation, How to dismantle an Atomic Bomb network’, *International Security*, Vol 30, No.2 (2005), pg.180; Flynt L Leverett, ‘Why Libya Gave Up on the Bomb’, *New York Times*, 23 January 2004.

⁸⁸ Author’s interview with Ambassador Martin Indyk, in person, 14 March 2013.

⁸⁹ Author’s interview with Ambassador Robert Joseph, in person, 11 March 2013.

Was there a real intention to target Libya next? There is evidence to suggest parts of the administration were considering the threat of force towards Libya, as a memo from Secretary Rumsfeld written in April 2003⁹⁰ states ‘we need more coercive diplomacy with respect to Syria and Libya, and we need it fast. If they mess up Iraq, it will delay bringing our troops home’.⁹¹ The fact that this was written by the Secretary of Defence and not the Secretary of State, clearly indicates that the threat or actual use of force was implied in the term ‘coercive diplomacy’. Furthermore, the concern that ‘if Iraq did not go well’ it would bring troops home indicates that the credible demonstration of force in Iraq was viewed as a necessary element of any coercive diplomacy to be used against Libya.

However, the lead negotiator Ambassador Joseph implies that any threat perceived by Gaddafi was neither immediate nor directly focussed on Libya but was certainly capitalised on, stating:

We certainly didn’t discourage Gaddafi from thinking in those terms. We didn’t need to discourage or encourage him. The Libyans came to us through British intelligence in March 2003 when we were flying thousands of forces into the region to enforce multiple UNSCRs on what was assessed to be WMD in Iraq. That didn’t escape them and gave them a motivation; they started to hedge their bets at that point.⁹²

Although a definitive analysis of whether Gaddafi felt threatened by the US is not possible without access to documents and close personnel that are currently unattainable; there is enough secondary evidence to strongly indicate that Gaddafi felt threatened. Firstly, it is claimed that Gaddafi told Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi that

⁹⁰ 1 month after the start of the Iraq War and Libya contacting of UK Intelligence services.

⁹¹ Donald Rumsfeld, Memo to Douglas Feith, 7 April 2003, Issues w/Various Countries, <http://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/1686/2003-0407%20to%20Doug%20Feith%20re%20Issues%20with%20Various%20Countries.pdf>, accessed 5 January 2014.

⁹² *Op.cit.* Joseph interview.

his WMD capitulation was due to Iraq stating ‘I will do whatever the Americans want, because I saw what happened in Iraq, and I was afraid.’⁹³ Secondly, it was reported that a leaked Pentagon review claimed Libya’s inclusion as a country for which the US should be prepared when ‘setting requirements for nuclear strike capabilities’.⁹⁴ This could easily have been picked up by Gaddafi as a sign of US future intent. Furthermore, it was reported that a Bush administration strategy paper leaked in December 2002, which called for the pre-emptive use of military and covert force to prevent an enemy state from launching WMD. This directive specifically named Iran, Syria, NK and Libya as the main states against which the strategy was aimed.⁹⁵ Furthermore, the Director of the CIA, George Tenet, had talked about concerns with Libyan WMD, including nuclear programs, in his annual unclassified testimony to congress; knowing that this message would get back to the Libyan leadership.⁹⁶

It is also claimed by Abdel Rahman Shalgham that President Bouteflika of Algiers relayed a message from Bush to the Libyans that they either give up on WMD or he would destroy the weapons and everything else besides.⁹⁷ However, perhaps the strongest evidence that Gaddafi did feel threatened of the US comes in 2008, when referring to the invasion of Iraq and Hussein’s execution, he stated:

An entire Arab leadership was executed by hanging, yet we sit on the side-lines why? Any one of you might be next, yes. America fought alongside Saddam Hussein against Khomeini. He was their friend; Cheney was a friend of Saddam Hussein. Rumsfeld the secretary of defence at the time of invasion was a close

⁹³ Robin Gedye, “UN Should Fight for Rights, says Berlusconi,” *Daily Telegraph* (London), 9 April 2003, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?Xml=/news/2003/09/04/wun04.xml>, quoted in Robert S Litwak, *Regime Change, US Strategy through the Prism of 9/11*, pg.193.

⁹⁴ Roula Khalaf and Robert Cottrell, Syria, Libya broaden the ‘axis of evil’, *Financial Times*, 11 March 2002.

⁹⁵ Oxford Analytical, ‘Libya: Chances of rapprochement with US recede Tuesday’, 21 January 2003.

⁹⁶ Author’s interview with Ambassador Robert Joseph, in person, 11 March 2013.

⁹⁷ Abdel Rahman Shalgham, quoted in Alison Pargeter, *Libya The Rise and Fall of Qaddafi*, pg.185. Claim is referenced as being from an interview with Abdel Rahman Shalgham Libya’s former foreign affairs secretary.

friend of Saddam Hussein. Ultimately they sold him out and hung him. You are friends of America; let's say that "we" are, not "you" but one of these days, America may hang us.⁹⁸

Clearly if Gaddafi feared the US in 2008, he is highly likely to have felt threatened by the US in the aftermath of a successful invasion of Iraq, when US-Libya relations were significantly poorer. Furthermore, people who dealt directly with them during the negotiations were convinced that the Libyans believed they were next, as pointed out by Ambassador Joseph 'we would not have had the outcome we did, if it had not been prominent in their own mind that they were going to get whacked'.⁹⁹ Gaddafi's fear of a US invasion could also be construed from a speech he gave in October 2003 where he described how Women needed to be trained in the kind of insurgent tactics that were being used at that time against the US in Iraq.¹⁰⁰

Another element of Bush's strategy that was clearly coercive in its effect was the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) launched in May 2003. Bob Joseph who was also the key architect behind the PSI points out that Libya's final compliance was a combination of 'what we did in Iraq and the smoking gun when we seized the BBC China'. Furthermore, he argues that 'the Libyans knew we had the evidence and believed we could play it out as justification for a strike on Libya'.¹⁰¹ A senior member of the Bush administration added to this view pointing out that the PSIs 'real importance was not stopping the transfer, it was that the transfer was going through proved his complicity, and after the demonstration in Iraq he had two choices give it up

⁹⁸ Gaddafi, 'Gaddafi attacks Arab leaders at the Arab summit in Syria (2008)', http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VZZvPIGct_8, accessed 5 February 2014.

⁹⁹ Author's interview with Ambassador Robert Joseph, in person, 11 March 2013.

¹⁰⁰ Speech to the women of Sabha, 4 October 2003, Mirror website (cited in infligo), <http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/gaddafi-quotes-the-dead-libya-dictator-275336>, accessed 18 February 2014.

¹⁰¹ Author's interview with Ambassador Robert Joseph, in person, 11 March 2013.

or go through what Saddam Hussein went through and he was not prepared to do that'.¹⁰²

Although there was not a direct threat from the President of the US, the rhetoric of elements of the Bush administration, combined with credible demonstration of the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive force in Iraq clearly were perceived as a threat to Gaddafi and an indicator that he could be next. This was particularly amplified when the interdiction of the BBC China provided clear proof that he had a nuclear weapons programme. Therefore, the threat to use force to deny Gaddafi attaining a nuclear capability conforming to the *ideal policy* is deemed to be present for this episode.

AQ 3 - Was a deadline for compliance given?

There was no specific time given to Libya to halt its nuclear weapons programme by or face military strikes. However, pressure was maintained on Libya through US unilateral sanctions in the form of the ILSA and the open demands and threats already discussed. The approach that was adopted conforms closely to what George termed as the 'gradual turning of the screw', where the coercing power neither creates a sense of urgency nor does it signal the nature of threatened punishment. Instead, its demands are accompanied by a threat that punishment will be gradually increased if compliance does not occur.¹⁰³

¹⁰² Author's interview with Source A, in person, 4 March 2013.

¹⁰³ Alexander L George, *Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics*, in Alexander L George & William E Simmons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, Second Edition, (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2nd revised edn, 1994), pg.18.

However, once Libya initiated talks with the UK and US over the issue of WMD, the programme of talks between the parties, in effect became a deadline which the Libyan's had to comply by. As pointed out by Condoleezza Rice:

As we were getting close to agreement, though, the Libyans started to balk at certain demands for transparency in the destruction of their WMD. It looked as if the whole effort was unravelling as Tripoli started to deny the existence of programs to which it had already admitted. Then we got a break: a ship from Malaysia carrying a suspicious cargo bound for Libya was stopped by German and Italian authorities and diverted for inspection. On board were five large shipping containers labelled "used machine parts" later determined to have been carrying thousands of centrifuge components-including some emanating from the A.Q Kahn network. Exposed in the midst of negotiations, the Libyans retreated from their hard-line stance and an agreement was back within reach.¹⁰⁴

The interception of equipment came at a key part of the secret negotiations being held between the UK, US and Libya. The interception demonstrated to Tripoli that the UK and US knew, and had evidence, about Libya's clandestine nuclear supply network and bounded Gaddafi's room for manoeuvre during the negotiations; whilst increasing pressure for him to reveal and dismantle fully his programme.¹⁰⁵ If the Libyans did not agree at this scheduled meeting to the next step of announcing their nuclear weapons programme and plan to disarm, it is highly likely that the US and UK would have brought the issue to the UNSC. Therefore, in effect the meeting became the set deadline that Libya needed to make the decision to comply by or face increasing pressure. However, as there was no specific time stated from the outset that Libya had to surrender its nuclear programme or face military strikes, this element does not conform to the *ideal policy*.

¹⁰⁴ Condoleezza Rice, *No Higher Honour, A Memoir of my years in Washington*, (London, Simon & Schuster, 2011), pg.249.

¹⁰⁵ Wyn Q Bowen, *Libya and Nuclear Proliferation, Stepping back from the brink*, pg. 66.

AQ 4 – Was there an assurance given to the adversary against future demands?

Gaddafi was concerned that if he admitted publicly to having a nuclear weapons programme that the US would use it as a reason to conduct strikes against Libya.¹⁰⁶

Abdel Rahman Shalgham, Gaddafi's former foreign minister confirms this fear of a trick stating that Gaddafi commented 'they will laugh at us. I will speak and they won't speak after me. This is a trick and a conspiracy'.¹⁰⁷ It is also alleged that President Mubarak of Egypt, prior to the agreement warned Gaddafi 'that if you give the Americans one thing they will keep on coming back asking for another'.¹⁰⁸

This fear of a trick was only overcome by a phone call between Prime Minister Blair and Gaddafi, where he was assured that if he came clean that he could re-join the international community.¹⁰⁹ Furthermore, Blair later visited Libya, giving further assurance to Gaddafi that there was no hidden agenda against Libya.¹¹⁰ Litwak goes a step further assessing that not only was Gaddafi given an assurance that the US objective was 'policy change' and not 'regime change', but that he was given a 'tacit assurance of regime survival'.¹¹¹

Whether an assurance that future demands would not be made is an area for debate. There were several instances where the Libyans certainly felt that promises had not

¹⁰⁶ Author's interview with Ambassador Robert Joseph, in person, 11 March 2013.

¹⁰⁷ Abdel Rahman Shalgham quoted in Pargeter, *Libya The Rise and Fall of Qaddafi*, pg.188.

¹⁰⁸ Author's interview with Ambassador David Welch, in person, 15 April 2013.

¹⁰⁹ *Op.cit.* Joseph

¹¹⁰ Brian Whitaker, 'Blair visit seen as reward for disarming', *The Guardian* (London, England), published 25 March 2004.

¹¹¹ Robert S Litwak, *Regime Change, US Strategy through the Prism of 9/11*, pg.199. Also a view expressed in Author's interview with Professor Jentleson, by phone, interview 11 April 2013.

been met¹¹² and that demands continued to come from the US relating to reparations for previous terrorist attacks. This is pointed out by Ambassador Welch who stated:

They thought there would never be an end to things. There was one particularly dramatic moment in the terrorism claims negotiations where the claims courts in the United States started to impose astronomical judgements against Gaddafi and his officials. They said how are we ever going to stop all this, you have no solution to it, you say we have to pay the Panam victims, the la belle victims, and all these other cases there is never going to be an end to it.¹¹³

The US clearly did continue to pressure Libya post 2003, especially on terrorism and issues of human rights.¹¹⁴ US subsequent demands demonstrate a fundamental difficulty with assurances within a strategy of coercive diplomacy. If coercive diplomacy is seen as an option that works it becomes tempting to use the strategy again to achieve your next political objective. US military strikes in 1986 were viewed as having influenced Gaddafi to pull back from supporting international terrorism; therefore, it was thought that ‘Gaddafi might be responsive to pressure’ regarding his policies on pursuing WMD and supporting terrorism.¹¹⁵

There was a clear assurance given to Gaddafi that if he complied the US and UK would not seek regime change. However, there was not a clear indication that further demands, regarding normal diplomatic issues such as human rights would not be made.

Therefore, this element partially conforms to the *ideal policy*. Whether this assurance was actually kept is not of significant importance for this episode, but clearly could have an impact on future uses of coercive diplomacy.

¹¹² Author’s interview with Ambassador Mahley, in person, 14 March 2013.

¹¹³ Author’s interview with Ambassador David Welch, in person, 15 April 2013.

¹¹⁴ William J Burns, Statement of Hon. William J Burns, Assistant Secretary of State Bureau of near eastern affairs, *S. HRG. 108–496, Libya – next steps in US relations*, Hearing before the committee on foreign relations United States Senate one hundred eighth congress second session,(Washington, DC Government Printing Office, 2004), 26 February 2004 <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108shrg94557/pdf/CHRG-108shrg94557.pdf>, accessed 24 June 2012, pg.6.

¹¹⁵ Author’s interview with former Deputy Secretary for Defence Douglas Feith, in person, 13 March 2013.

AQ 5 – Was there an offer of carrots for compliance?

The primary incentive for Libya to surrender its nuclear weapons was the removal of UN and US sanctions, which would remove the barrier to investment in its underexploited oil assets.¹¹⁶ The American and British governments communicated to the Libyans that UN sanctions would be permanently removed if they fulfilled UNSC resolutions related to Lockerbie, but that US sanctions would then only be lifted if the WMD issue were addressed.¹¹⁷ Furthermore, Dr Mark Fitzpatrick, IISS analyst and member of the State Department at the time pointed out ‘once Britain opened up these communications with Gaddafi, and the US joined them, incentives became more important than sanctions, there was not talk of additional sanctions, all the talk was just lifting sanctions’.¹¹⁸

However, an area of contention is what deal beyond the quid pro quo to achieve WMD disarmament was made. This notion of a deal emphasised by Professor Jentleson who states:

There is a definite deal, Tony Blair announces the deal in December 2003, he talks about what the next steps will be, first of all to implement the deal are part of a bargain, what access British, American and internationals would have to take away materials and technology, secondly the whole process that led to normalisation of relations for a period was defiantly part of a deal, one can say the official position of the United States is we will do this deal and then talk about it, but that is just public cover.¹¹⁹

Even Condoleezza Rice points out that there is a deal stating ‘when the Libyans gave up their weapons of mass destruction in 2003, there was a clear diplomatic quid pro quo, in

¹¹⁶ Carl Mortished, ‘Western firms line up for consolation prize deals’, *The Times*, 22 December 2003.

¹¹⁷ Wyn Q Bowen, *Libya and Nuclear Proliferation, Stepping back from the brink*, pg. 61.

¹¹⁸ Author’s interview with Dr Mark Fitzpatrick, in person, 7 February 2013.

¹¹⁹ Author’s interview with Professor Jentleson, by telephone, 11 April 2013.

exchange, we'd help them to return to good standing in the international community'.¹²⁰

Moreover, The Foreign Secretary of the time Jack Straw also points out that:

There was an understanding between us that if you renounced nuclear weapons and do it the way that we wanted them to do it, and they did do it in the way we wanted in the way that they technically handled the issue after their announcement, rounding stuff up and shipping it away, if they did, the UK and US would as were sponsor the re-integration into the international community and that would mean the United States normalising its relationship with Libya, which had been very seriously strained for some time.¹²¹

However, he did subsequently point out that the notion of an 'elaborate bargain' was not his 'recollection of events' and that 'there was certainly an understanding that we would work with them and talk through the different aspects of Britain and Americas relationship'.¹²² Another Bush official Paula DeSutter also claimed:

We made no promises to Libya, we just said as you do this, our relations will get better, so for us we wanted them to be glad that they had done it. We wanted public statements saying hey, we give up our WMD programmes and it was a really good thing. We wanted Libya to be a good example.¹²³

However, the clearest articulation of there being no bargain is from Ambassador Joseph who led on the negotiations who stated:

From the outset US and UK participants took the position that the very process of bargaining would undercut prospects for a clear and clean outcome; bargaining would slow down the process and likely cause confusion.....Instead of negotiating X for Y, US and UK representatives insisted that Libya acknowledge and abandon its WMD and longer range missile programs. In doing so, they made clear that Libya would remove a major obstacle to improved relations and greater economic and political benefits.¹²⁴

The confusion over this issue may be the definition of a deal or a bargain. This is highlighted by as Ambassador Welch, who commented:

¹²⁰ Condoleezza Rice, *No Higher Honour, A Memoir of my Years in Washington*, pg.701.

¹²¹ Author's interview with the Right Honourable Jack Straw, by telephone, 14 June 2013.

¹²² *Ibid.*

¹²³ Author's interview with Ms Paula DeSutter, in person, 18 March 2013.

¹²⁴ Robert G Joseph, *Countering WMD, The Libyan Experience*, pg. 23.

If you look inside the American government for some offer of a deal you will not find it. That said, because of the nature of the conversations between the top levels of the Libyan leadership and those involved in the WMD side, I can't exclude that the Libyans walked away thinking there was a promise of something. Arabs tend to do that. Bob Joseph would have a very contractual view of this, the Bedouin will have a different view, and the two people most intimately involved aren't talking. Diplomacy at those levels is a fine art.¹²⁵

In my view the acknowledgement that if one party does something and there is recognition that the other party will respond in a specific manner is a deal/bargain.

Therefore, the US/UK position that Libya announce and disarm its nuclear programme, then it would consider an 'obstacle' to the opponents political objective (closer diplomatic and economic ties) removed, is clearly a bargain/deal to move to the next stage if Libya complies. Furthermore, Blair's assurance that Libya's announcing its nuclear capability would not be used as an excuse to launch attacks is also a deal.

However, neither of these are a clear promise or formal deal to give Libya everything that it wanted after that moment in time.

In response to Libya renunciation of WMD, the US did lift sanctions, expand commercial and diplomatic ties with Libya. However, in November 2004, Gaddafi voiced his disappointment that Libya had not been properly recompensed. This, he noted, provided little incentive for countries like Iran and NK to dismantle their nuclear programs. In particular Gaddafi argued he needed more security guarantees from the United States, Europe, and Japan, as well as 'civilian-use technology in return for abandoning military technology'.¹²⁶ In January 2005 Gaddafi argued that Libya should receive a program 'like the Marshall Plan, to show the world that those who wish to

¹²⁵ Author's interview with Ambassador David Welch, in person, 15 April 2013.

¹²⁶ Cirincone&Wolfsthal&Rajkumar, *Deadly Arsenals, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical threats*, pg.321.

abandon the nuclear weapon program will be helped. They promised, but we haven't seen anything yet'.¹²⁷

However, there was clearly an incentive offered to the Libyans that if they complied there would be the possibility of further discussions that could lead to the removal of sanctions and re-integration into the international community. Therefore, this element does conform to the *ideal policy*.

Evaluation of the implementation of the *ideal policy* and the strategy of coercive diplomacy employed

The strategy adopted by the US almost, but does not strictly, conform to the *ideal policy*. There was a credible threat to use force, there was clear incentives given in the form of reintegration into the international community and the removal of sanctions. However, the assurance only partially conforms to the *ideal policy* as it was assuring Gaddafi that there would be no military strikes, not specifically that there would not be further demands. Furthermore, there was no specific deadline given of when force might be used if compliance was not forthcoming. However, Gaddafi did comply with the demand and surrendered all of his WMD programmes. However, although the *ideal policy* was not implemented fully this episode of coercive diplomacy was a success.

AQ 6 – Did the opponent prefer to comply rather than go to war?

Gaddafi clearly believed that surrendering his WMD programmes was preferable to going to war. At the time of surrendering his programme weapons he had valid reasons to believe that he could be next on the US target list. Furthermore, he must have been in no doubt that if a war with the USA was to occur, it was one that he could not win.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

Although the offer of integration into the international community may have been sufficient to entice Gaddafi to surrender his weapons, the threat of force clearly increased the motivation to comply.

AQ 7 – Did the opponent act rationally and not miscalculate or suffer from misperception?

Gaddafi acted rationally in surrendering his nuclear weapons in 2003. The only misperception he could be accused of suffering from was an over estimation of the US willingness to use force at that time, as discussions with policy makers would indicate that the US was not actually considering an attack on Libya. However, it is difficult to assess whether this would have still been the case after the interdiction of the BBC China provided evidence of Gaddafi's nuclear programme.

One argument put forward for Gaddafi surrendering his nuclear weapons is that he did not have a programme to surrender. This is pointed out by Bowen who argues that:

WMD Intelligence Commission noted in March 2005 'The lack of sufficient progress in developing a nuclear weapon is one of the factors that may have prompted Gaddafi to abandon and disclose Libya's nuclear program'. Furthermore, trading in the nuclear card for such a major return could have been seen as a face-saving 'get out' measure when comparatively so little had been achieved.¹²⁸

The state of his programme at the time was reported as still in its 'embryonic stage'. It had succeeded only in providing some training to a number of students and technicians, and the establishment of a nuclear research reactor, which operates under IAEA safeguards at Tajura, southeast of Tripoli.¹²⁹ This is further backed by the then IAEA

¹²⁸ Wyn Q Bowen, *Libya and Nuclear Proliferation, Stepping back from the brink*, pg. 67.

¹²⁹ Beaumont Peter, Kamal Ahmed and Martin Bright, 'Deal with Gaddafi: The meeting that brought Libya in from the cold: Only weeks after 11 September, the first tentative overtures came from Tripoli; two years later, seven men sat down in a Pall Mall club to sign a historic deal', *The Guardian*, (London,

director general, Mohamed El Baradei, who stated that the facilities he visited indicated a program that was ‘in the initial stages of development’ without any ‘industrial scale facility to produce highly enriched uranium’.¹³⁰ Furthermore, Ambassador Mahley, who led on dismantling the Libyan WMD programme, commented:

On the nuclear programme we got there before he even started enrichment, sure they had a lot of yellow cake around, but we are talking a decade before you can put that stuff together at the scale, even if they got a shipment of centrifuges and enough nuclear material, then tried to refine it from a device into a weapon, this is grandson of Gaddafi we are talking about.¹³¹

However, others argue firmly that this was not the case and that he really did give up something stating ‘it was a turnkey programme; AQ Khan was going to supply it all’.¹³²

Bob Joseph the lead negotiator also firmly argues that:

He did have a serious nuclear weapons programme. Libya had spent lots of money on this, they were getting the assistance they needed from the AQ Khan network. Were they on the very verge of enriching uranium and building a weapon; no they weren’t!¹³³

With no immediate obtainment of nuclear weapons Gaddafi’s surrendering of his nuclear programme was rational. He either continued to develop a nuclear weapon, which in light of US policies enacted after 9/11 was at increased risk of detection, and if detected would have been at a high risk of being destroyed militarily. Negotiating and surrendering this programme seemed to be a path to achieving his goals of re-integration into the international community and developing a stable economy.

England), published 21 December 2003, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/dec/21/politics.libya>, accessed 18 February 2015

¹³⁰ *Op.cit.* Cirincone&Wolfsthal&Rajkumar, pg.320.

¹³¹ Author’s interview with Ambassador Mahley, in person, 14 March 2013.

¹³² Author’s interview with source A, in person, 4 March 2013.

¹³³ Author’s interview with Ambassador Robert Joseph, in person, 11 March 2013.

AQ 8 - Does credible implementation of the *ideal policy* lead to compliance?

The *ideal policy* was not implemented in this episode.

AQ 9 - Does failure to implement the *ideal policy* lead to non-compliance?

For this episode failure to implement the *ideal policy* did not lead to non-compliance, as Gaddafi still surrendered his WMD programmes. However, the reason for Gaddafi's compliance is related to key elements of the *ideal policy*. Firstly, Gaddafi clearly felt that there was a threat that force, as demonstrated credible by the invasion of Iraq, may be used. Secondly, there was clear incentive of improved relations with the US and the removal of sanctions, which in turn were seen as a way of improving the financial and security situation within Libya. Therefore, although the *ideal policy* was not implemented, as there was no deadline or assurance that future demands would not be made, there were elements of the *ideal policy* that clearly persuaded Gaddafi to surrender his WMD programmes.

AQ 10 - Was compliance caused by fear that the threatened action would be carried out?

Gaddafi clearly felt threatened that he could be next on the US target list; even in 2008 he stated that 'one of these days, America may hang us'¹³⁴ a clear indication that he felt threatened. It is not possible to assess what balance fear and incentives was required to bring Gaddafi finally to the decision to comply.

EPISODE 2 - WILL TO THREATEN AND USE FORCE

This section will now examine whether this episode conforms to Jakobsen's predicted patterns for when states are willing to threaten to use force. This will be done by

¹³⁴ Gaddafi, 'Gaddafi attacks Arab leaders at the Arab summit in Syria (2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VZZvPIGct_8, accessed 17 September 2013.

examining the three variables; nature of threatened interests, prospects of military success and domestic support.

The nature of the threatened interests.

Libya fit the mould of a state that in post 9/11 thinking was a threat to the interests of the US. It had a history of supporting terrorism and from 2001 Gaddafi's pursuit of nuclear weapons had 'raised concerns' within the US Intelligence community.¹³⁵ The President and senior administration officials repeatedly expressed the concern that terrorists could get nuclear weapons from a state that supported terrorism and use this capability to conduct an attack on the US.

Furthermore, as discussed in episode 1, Libya obtaining a nuclear weapon would have been against the strategic interest of the US. Primarily, it would have damaged the NPT, possibly increasing proliferation. Secondly, it would have enabled Gaddafi to deter the US, possibly emboldening his willingness to act against US interests within the region. Therefore, Gaddafi's pursuit of nuclear weapons would still be impacting on a US strategic interest¹³⁶ and is coded as *high*.

The prospects of military success.

The US military capability in 2001 was vastly more powerful than the Libyan military. This was clearly demonstrated by the invasion of Iraq in 2003 where the US, along with allies, quickly defeated Saddam's forces. Gaddafi's forces were even less capable in

¹³⁵ Unclassified Report to Congress, July - December 2001 Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2001.

¹³⁶ Jakobsen, *Western use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War, A Challenge for Theory and Practice*, pg.36.

terms of equipment and numbers than Iraq's military. However, after the initial invasion of 2003, as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq dragged on, the US military was feeling 'severely stretched'.¹³⁷ However, if the will was there the US would have been able to muster the required forces for any kind of operation against Libya.

The prospect of hostile great-power intervention to back Libya against the US would have been highly unlikely. Although there were protests by several states over the invasion of Iraq, there was no state willing to back Iraq militarily. Therefore, it is difficult to view any state that would have at the time opposed the US if it had decided to take the most extreme military operation and invade Libya. Libya's antiquated military, and its geographical positioning, would have been highly vulnerable to US coercion through military means. However, the US would still have to overcome the difficulties, of locating all the nuclear sites and destroying protected bunkers. The only way to do this with certainty would have been to conduct extensive military operations possible including a full scale invasion. In purely military terms this would have been an option, but it would have and required a significant reason to justify undertaking such an option as it would have increased the risk of having US casualties.

From 2001-2003 the US clearly had the capability and assets to conduct a range of military operations, from strikes to full invasion, within Libya. As proven by the more complicated US invasion of Iraq, any war with Libya would have been most likely quickly won at little cost. Therefore, in terms of Jakobsen's patterns this element is assessed as being *high*.

The level of domestic support

¹³⁷ Donald C F Daniel, Peter J Dombrowski & Rodger A. Payne, 'The Bush Doctrine: rest in peace?', *Defence Studies*, Vol 4, No.1 (2004), pg.31.

As with the previous episode, if a case had been put forward, that strikes on Libya were required in order to prevent Gaddafi possessing nuclear weapons it is highly likely that it would have attained domestic support. In fact due to the attacks of 9/11, it is highly likely that such a proposition would have overwhelmingly received domestic support. However, exact type of operation, and associated likelihood of casualties, would have been a topic of heated debate.¹³⁸ Therefore, this element is coded as *medium*.

Summary of Willingness to use force

Libya's pursuit of nuclear weapons was of *high* interest to US, there was a *high* chance of military success, and there would have been *medium* level of domestic support, this conforms to Jackobsen's interest-driven pattern. Furthermore, Jakobsen's pattern indicate that even if nature of interest was assessed as low that it would most likely conform to a Government-driven pattern. However, there is an underlying assumption that the government would need to frame the debate in order to gain domestic support to undertake a military action towards Libya. Therefore, any threatened action would need to be 'driven' by the government.

AQ 11 - Are one of the four hypothesised patterns present when states threaten and use force?

There is a strong implied threat in this episode and 2 patterns (interest and government) indicate that the US should have been willing to apply a more direct threat. This will be examined within the next question.

AQ 12 - Are all the hypothesised patterns absent when states lack the will to threaten and use force?

¹³⁸ Jakobsen, *Western use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War, A Challenge for Theory and Practice*, pg.42.

According to Jakobsen's hypothesised patterns the US should have been willing to make a more direct threat towards Libya regarding its nuclear weapons programme. Therefore why, like in the case of Iraq, did Libya not warrant a direct threat of force? One explanation is pointed out by a senior member of the Bush administration:

We knew roughly what the status of his programme was, and we knew how many cascades, we knew a lot about it, if you are asking would we have threatened? It is unclear, mostly the general feeling in the United States is don't take anything off the table, but don't put yourself in a cul-de-sac, enemies are always trying to put you in a cul-de-sac, but don't put yourself in one by declaring something and then not being willing to do it, you or may not be willing to do it depending on the circumstances that exist.¹³⁹

The fact the US was not willing to directly threaten at that stage would imply Gaddafi was not seen as an immediate threat, perhaps because he was not viewed as possessing a viable weapon. Domestic support also impacted on the ability of the United States to deal with Libya, as Ambassador Mahley articulates:

Nobody in the administration wanted to appear to be now trying to lean over backwards to please Libyans, because one of the things in the United States about domestic politics, is the Lockerbie victims association, and the Libyans were several million behind in making compensation payments, and those people were not satisfied with the compensation that they had gotten, so when the United States was not demanding, to the precursor to anything else that all be settled up, that became a sensitive domestic political issue in the United States.¹⁴⁰

The combination of lack of immediacy over nuclear weapons and pressure from the families of victims to still resolve outstanding claims, kept the nuclear issue one to be resolved at a later date. Therefore, until more concrete evidence was presented to politicians, or the public, issuing a direct threat of force was not seen as logical way forward. In addition almost immediately after 9/11 the Bush administration was focused on Iraq, and it is likely that it did not wish to put itself into a 'cul-de-sac' and risk

¹³⁹ Author's interview with source A, in person, 4 March 2013.

¹⁴⁰ Author's interview with Ambassador Mahley, in person, 14 March 2013

broadening the 'war on terror' beyond its means by threatening Libya, then being forced to go through with an action.

AQ 13 - Does coalitional consensus concerning threats of force result from leadership by one or more states, and/or a shared perception that important interests are threatened?

There was only a strong implied threat from the US, who in the aftermath of 9/11 firmly warned states that both supported terrorists and sought nuclear weapons could be potential targets. Although the UK did not issue similarly strong implied threats, as it supported the US in invading Iraq over the issue of WMD, demonstrating its willingness to follow the US.

It was the UK who was initially approached by Libya regarding surrendering of its WMD. The UK/US had several shared interests in preventing Gaddafi obtain WMD. Firstly, both states had historic issues over Libya's behaviour, in particular regarding its previous support of terrorism. Therefore, both were concerned that a WMD armed Gaddafi would be a destabilising influence within the region. Secondly, as both the UK and US were signatories of the NPT, permanent members of the UNSC and recognised nuclear powers there was not only an obligation, but it was in their interest, to prevent proliferation of WMD. Libya's attainment of WMD could have led to a weakening of the proliferation regime and destabilise international security.

AQ 14 - Does coalitional consensus concerning threats of force fail to emerge when none of the above conditions are met?

A consensus on whether to threaten force did not emerge because Libya had approached the UK to surrender its weapons before its pursuit of WMD had become an international

issue. It is highly likely that if Libya had not come forward when it did a more robust approach, including seeking international action against Libya, would have been taken by the US when the interdiction of BBC China supplied indisputable evidence of Gaddafi's pursuit of nuclear weapons. At this point it is more likely that a consensus on action, including possible strikes, would have been discussed.

AQ 15 - Do international organisations make it easier for leading states to mobilise support for policies involving threats and use of force?

As there was no direct threat it is not possible to assess whether international organisations make threats to use force easier.

AQ 16 - Did the issuing of a threats increase the motivation of the coerced to develop nuclear weapons?

The implied threat toward states such as Libya seems to have decreased Gaddafi motivation to attain nuclear weapons as he initiated the negotiations that led to the surrendering of their WMDs. However, even whilst US, UK and Libyan negotiations were under way, Libya was continuing with its nuclear weapons programme, as demonstrated by the interdiction of parts on the BBC China that were destined for Libya. This would indicate that Gaddafi was hedging his bets, looking to surrender the weapons only if the deal was right.

CONCLUSION

A more detailed comparison of all the episodes will take place in chapter 5; however, Table 3.1 summarises the key findings of this chapter.

	Threat to use force	Deadline given	Assurance given	Incentives offered	Ideal Policy	Predicted outcome of CD	Actual outcome of CD	Will to threaten and use of force?	Impact of org.
Libya Ep.1	No	Partial	Partial	Yes	No	Failure	Partial Success	Yes	Sanctions only
Libya Ep.2	Yes	No - implied	Partial	Yes	No	Failure	Success	Yes	No impact
Table 3.1									

Coercive diplomacy in the form of the *ideal policy* was not applied under the Clinton administration as there was no clear demand given to Gaddafi that he stop his development of nuclear weapons. The policy objective and clear demands of the Clinton administration were firmly focussed on Gaddafi giving up his support of terrorists, handing over terrorist suspects and paying reparations to the families of the Lockerbie victims. There was no clear demand that Gaddafi was to halt and disarm his nuclear programme, but there was mention of ‘concern’ over his WMD programmes, although this was viewed as a lower priority and related more to his pursuit of chemical and biological weapons.

There was no direct threat to use force, or deadline given with regard to the issue of WMD. However, Gaddafi did comply with the primary demand that Libya hand over terrorist suspects this was met and cease support of terrorism. The approach that was adopted by the Clinton administration was to increase the international political and economic isolation of Gaddafi and his regime. The pressure was delivered through the ILSA and UN sanctions. There was no direct threat communicated that force would be applied in a manner that conforms to the *ideal policy*. Furthermore, although there was no deadline issued threatening the use of force relating to Gaddafi’s nuclear programme, there was a deadline given for when the measures within UNSC 883 would be applied; therefore, this element conforms partially to the *ideal policy*.

The assurance given to Libya, by the Clinton administration, was that handing over Lockerbie suspects would not be utilised as a way of seeking regime change. However, even after suspects had been handed over the US maintained sanctions based on outstanding demands that needed to be resolved, which included the issue of WMD. Assurances were given, but not assurances that further demands would not be made; therefore, this element only partially conforms to the *ideal policy*.

There was a clear incentive offered of having UN and US sanctions lifted that in turn would have improved Libya's economic situation and bolstered Gaddafi position. Furthermore, the secret talks held between the US and Libya demonstrated that there was a possibility of an improved relationship with the US. Therefore, there was clearly an incentive on offer that conforms to the *ideal policy*.

Gaddafi's decision to comply with the US and UN demands, over issues of terrorism which clearly brought him closer to re-integration into the international community, was rational. Furthermore, as the US did not have clear evidence of his nuclear programme and there was no direct threat made, Gaddafi's pursuit of nuclear weapons program was also rational as it gave him the opportunity to either obtain a deterrent and a mark of prestige, or possible increase any future bargain position with the US.

There was initially coalitional consensus regarding the full implementation of sanctions, this started to wane once individual states saw it against their interests not to enforce them. This was despite US leadership and potential US sanctions for contravention of the ILSA.

A significant finding within this episode is that although there was no threat to use force over Gaddafi's WMDs, Jakobsen's framework predicts that the US should have been willing to threaten force. Dealing with Libya's WMD programme was of strategic interest to the US, the US was capable of conducting a successful military campaign if required, and it would not have been difficult to make a case to its domestic audience about the danger posed by a Libyan nuclear weapons capability. The combination of these variables conform to an interest driven pattern that Jakobsen asserts would lead to a willingness to threaten force.

The most likely reason that force was not threatened, was even though by 1999 the US was aware of Gaddafi's nuclear programme, it is clear that policy makers did not view it as an immediate threat and must have assumed that it was one that future administrations could deal with; the priority of the Clinton administration was achieving reparations for families of the Lockerbie bombing. Raising the nuclear issue with Libya at that time may have complicated and impacted upon the chances of receiving reparations.

Under the Bush administration the US clearly articulated a policy objective that states that supported terrorism and sought nuclear weapons halt their activities or face the possibility of pre-emptive military action. Libya identified as a state 'beyond the Axis of evil', who had a history of supporting terrorists and seeking WMD clearly fell into the category of a potential 'target' of a pre-emptive strike. Therefore, Gaddafi must have viewed the demand that states should halt their pursuit of nuclear weapons being implicitly directed at him.

Although there was not a direct threat of force issued by Bush, the rhetoric from elements of his administration, combined with credible demonstration of force in Iraq clearly were perceived by Gaddafi as a threat. This was particularly amplified when the interdiction of the BBC China provided clear proof that he had a nuclear weapons programme. Therefore, the threat to use force to deny Gaddafi attaining a nuclear capability conformed to the *ideal policy*.

A key element of this episode was the interception of equipment under the PSI at a crucial moment in the secret negotiations between the UK, US and Libya. The interception gave that the UK and US the evidence that Gaddafi knew could be used to make a convincing case against him; therefore, it increased the pressure for him to reveal and dismantle fully his programme. This interception in effect made the next meeting of the parties a deadline that Libya needed to make the decision to comply by or face increasing pressure. However, as there was no specific time stated from the outset that Libya had to surrender its nuclear programme or face military strikes, this element does not conform to the *ideal policy*.

There is a debate as to whether there was a deal done. Bob Joseph, who was the US lead negotiator, argued that there was no bargaining. I agree with most scholars that there must have been an assurance, if only an implicit one, given to Gaddafi that if he complied the US and UK they would not seek regime change and he would be re-integrated back into the international community; the latter being a clear incentive that conforms to the *ideal policy*. However, there is no evidence that further demands were removed from the table, regarding normal diplomatic issues such as human rights would not be made. Therefore, this element partially conforms to the *ideal policy*. This element also highlights one of the issues with coercive diplomacy; which is if the strategy works

it is difficult for regimes not to be tempted to use it over other issues. It should be noted that, with the overthrow of Gaddafi in 2011, whether the assurance of regime change was actually kept is not of significant importance for this episode, but clearly could have an impact on future uses of US coercive diplomacy.

With no immediate obtainment of nuclear weapons, Gaddafi's surrendering of his nuclear programme was rational. He either continued to develop a nuclear weapon, which in light of US policies enacted after 9/11 was at increased risk of detection, and if detected would have been at a high risk of being destroyed militarily. Negotiating and surrendering this programme seemed to be a path to achieving his goals of re-integration into the international community and developing a stable economy.

Another significant finding is that like episode 1, although there was no direct threat made to threaten the use of force over Gaddafi's nuclear weapons programme, Jakobsen's framework predicts there should have been. As in episode 1 dealing with Libya's nuclear programme was clearly of strategic interest to the US; the US would almost certainly have been able to conduct a successful military campaign if required and it would not have been difficult to make a case to gain domestic support. These factors conform to an interest-driven pattern or even with less domestic support it would conform to a government-driven pattern, both of which Jakobsen asserts would lead to a willingness to threaten force.

As in episode 1, it is highly likely that the reason force was not threatened was that Gaddafi's attainment of a nuclear weapons programme did not appear an immediate threat to US interests. Therefore, the more immediate politically damaging issue of Lockerbie and reparations to the families took priority. Furthermore, after 9/11 the US engaged in

conflicts in Afghanistan in 2001 and then Iraq in 2003. It is likely that US strategists did not want to engage in further conflicts unless necessary. Therefore, Libya could wait until a more opportune moment.

A significant finding is that in both episodes, although there was no direct threat to use force over Gaddafi nuclear weapons programme, Jakobsen's framework predicts there should have been. In both episodes Gaddafi nuclear programme was of strategic interest to the US; the US would almost certainly been able to conduct a successful military campaign if required and it would not have been difficult to make a case about the danger that a Libyan bomb posed to gain domestic support. These variables lead to patterns that Jakobsen asserts would lead to a willingness to threaten force.

In both episodes it is asserted that the reason force was not threatened was that Gaddafi's attainment of a nuclear weapons did not appear an immediate threat to US interests, therefore, the more immediate and politically damaging issue of Lockerbie and reparations to the families took priority. The next chapter will now examine US policy towards North Korea.

CHAPTER 4 – US COERCIVE DIPLOMACY TOWARDS DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA 1992-2006

On the 9 October 2006, in defiance of the international community, NK conducted a nuclear test.¹ This test was widely condemned by the international community and five days later the UNSC passed resolution 1718, condemning the test, imposing sanctions, and calling for NK to return immediately to multilateral talks on the issue.² The exploding of this bomb was not only a worrying failure of the NPT, but it was also a failure of the US strategy of coercive diplomacy which had sought to prevent the DPRK from obtaining a nuclear weapon capability.

The Clinton administration’s objective from the outset was to prevent the DPRK obtaining a nuclear weapon. This was done through a series of escalating demands; that ranged from holding talks with ROK over the denuclearisation agreement to finally freezing and dismantling their plutonium production programme. With both sides driven in a rational pursuit of their own objectives the crisis came to ahead in 1994 with President Clinton considering to either conduct pre-emptive strikes on NK or reinforce SK with up to 100000 troops, a move which the North would most likely have viewed as a prelude to war. In the midst of this crisis the former US President Jimmy Carter made an unofficial trip to Pyongyang and spoke directly with Kim Jong Il. This intervention enabled the tension to be reduced and further negotiations to be conducted between the opposing sides. In return for the North meeting its demand and freezing/dismantling its plutonium programme, it was offered diplomatic and financial

¹ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/6032597.stm>, accessed 28 August 2015.

² <http://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8853.doc.htm>, accessed 29 August 2015.

inducements for compliance. This approach initially worked with NK being drawn into an Agreed Framework (AF) with the US in 1994, which appeared to result in a freeze in its nuclear programme.

However, in October 2002 NK broke the safeguards that prevented verification that its enrichment of uranium had been suspended and in 2003 it withdrew from the NPT. The resumption of NK programme led to a re-ignition of the crisis, which again was believed to have been resolved in the 'September 2005' agreement. Both agreements gave substantial inducements and concessions in turn for compliance, however, both times NK appeared to take the rewards whilst covertly continuing with its nuclear weapons program, unperturbed by threats.

Although the Clinton administration applied coercive diplomacy, that led, to the AF and the dismantlement and containment of the North's plutonium programme; the strategy was not implemented in the form of the *ideal policy*. The Bush administration's policy in contrast was erratic based initially on continuing the AF, but eager to find a way out, believing that more stick was required. Ending the AF in 2002 Bush's policy was initially based on a hard rhetoric and multilateral negotiations with NK in the form of the six party talks. Eventually within Bush's second term the strategy sought to emulate the AF leading to a Joint Statement in 2005. However by this time NK was already close to attaining a nuclear weapon and the US involved in a domestically unpopular Counter Insurgency Operation (COIN) in Iraq; so NK proceeded to develop a weapon which it tested in October 2006.

This chapter will use the assessment questions derived in chapter 2 to analyse the coercive diplomacy applied by the US from 1993 to 2006 towards NK. I have split the

case into two distinct episodes; Episode 1, the Clinton administration's policy toward NK followed by episode 2, the Bush administration's policy toward NK. Again the separation of episodes is due to a clear change in the rhetoric and policy of the Bush administration.

EPISODE 1 – CLINTON ADMINISTRATION 1993-2000

Clinton's administration had three distinct approaches towards NK; initially it tried deterrence and containment, followed by coercive diplomacy leading to the AF, then an attempt to reach a grand settlement through the Perry review. Within this episode I will examine the demands leading to the AF; I will not examine the Perry approach as it was diplomatic strategy based on maintaining the AF, limiting the DPRK's missile programme and settling issues left from the Korean War through the incentive of reducing sanctions and offering the possibility of bilateral talks.³

AQ 1 - What was the US policy objective and demand?

Clinton's objective was 'to make sure that NK did not get nuclear weapons'.⁴ Trying to achieve this led to a series of escalating demands; that one analyst described as the Clinton administration 'fumbling through a series of policies towards the DPRK' and starting off with a 'posture, rather than a policy'.⁵ However, this accusation is over critical; the Clinton administration clearly maintained the goal of preventing nuclear proliferation but found its strategy, and demands, to achieve this objective had to change in response to NK's actions.

³ William Perry, Statement of the Hon William Perry, NK Policy Advisor, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Policy toward NK I: Perry Review, Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, One Hundred Sixth Congress First Session, 13 October 1999, (Serial No.106-74, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington:2000), <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-106hhrg62724/pdf/CHRG-106hhrg62724.pdf>, accessed 10 January 2016, pg.31.

⁴ Author's interview with Ambassador Robert Gallucci, by telephone, 12 February 2013.

⁵ Author's interview with Dr Nicholas Eberstadt, by telephone, 3 April 2013.

Under George Bush Snr's administration NK signed on the 20 January 1992⁶ the ROK-DPRK Joint declaration on denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. NK also agreed to IAEA safeguard measures on 30 Jan 1992.⁷ Therefore, the DPRK agreed to be subject to inspections by the IAEA under the safeguards agreement and ROK representatives under the Joint declaration.

The denuclearisation declaration prevented both Koreas from rights enjoyed under the NPT; such as the right to enrich uranium and separate plutonium as directed by IAEA safeguards. Many also believed it was triumph for US diplomacy that had been the key in encouraging the Koreas to an agreement over denuclearisation.⁸ However, even before the Bush administration had left office problems were emerging. During IAEA inspections, in July 1992, inconsistencies were found between NK's declared reactor history and what tests revealed. After a further 4 inspections, the IAEA requested access to 2 suspect sites. These requests were backed by the US who continually demanded that NK permit special inspections. However, on the 20 February 1993 the DPRK rejected the IAEA request for special inspections.

On the 22 February 1993 after an extraordinary meeting of the IAEA board of governors, at which the US presented evidence of the DPRK's nuclear programme⁹, the board adopted a resolution on the 25th calling on NK to comply with its IAEA

⁶ ROK-DPRK Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Republic of Korea – Democratic People's Republic of Korea (entered into force 19 February 1992), <http://caledavis.com/Sources/1992/JointDeclaration.pdf>, accessed 19 May 2014.

⁷ International Atomic Energy Agency, Agreement of 30 January 1992 between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, INFCIRC/403 (30 January 1992), <http://caledavis.com/Sources/1992/SafeguardsAgreement.pdf>, accessed 19 May 2014.

⁸ Joel Wit, Daniel Poneman, Robert Gallucci, *Going Critical, The first North Korean Nuclear Crisis*, pg.10.

⁹ *Ibid.* pg.20.

safeguards obligations within one month.¹⁰ In response NK announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT stating reasons such as the US-ROK resumption of exercise ‘Team Spirit’ and an unjust IAEA resolution demanding NK to open military sites that had ‘no relevance at all to the nuclear activities’.¹¹

The announcement of NK intention to withdraw from the NPT prompted Washington to demand that Pyongyang meet its non-proliferation obligations by returning to the NPT and comply with its IAEA obligations, and implement the denuclearisation declaration.¹² This was further backed by a joint letter from the US, Russia and the UK that urged ‘the DPRK to retract its announcement and to comply fully with its Treaty commitments and its safeguards obligations, which remain in force’.¹³ On the 1 April the IAEA board found the DPRK non-compliant with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement resulting in the issue being referred to the UNSC.¹⁴ The referral led to UNSC resolution 825 being issued on 11 May 1993 that called upon the DPRK to ‘reconsider’ its withdrawal from the NPT and further called upon the ‘DPRK to honour its non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty and comply with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA’.¹⁵

¹⁰ *Ibid.* pg.21

¹¹ Pak Gil Yon, Letter dated 12 March 1993 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/25405 (12 March 1993) annex 1 <http://caledavis.com/Sources/1993/DPRKWithdrawal.pdf>, accessed 19 May 2014.

¹² *Op.cit.* Wit,Poneman&Gallucci, pg.40.

¹³ Yuliy Vorontsov, Edward Walker, and David Hannay, Letter dated 1 April 1993 from the Representatives of the Russian Federation, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/25515 (2 April 1993) annex 1. <http://caledavis.com/Sources/1993/Letter.pdf>, accessed 20 Jan 2014.

¹⁴ Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency: Compliance with Arms Limitation and Disarmament Agreements, UN Doc A/48/133 and S/25556 (12 April 1993). <http://caledavis.com/Sources/1993/DPRKComplianceLetter.pdf>, accessed 20 May 2014.

¹⁵ SC Res 825, UN SCOR, 3212nd mtg, UN Doc S/Res/825 (11 May 1993) <http://caledavis.com/Sources/1993/Res825.pdf>, accessed 20 May 2014.

The DPRK seemed to avert a crisis by agreeing to ‘suspend as long as it considers necessary the effectuation of its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’.¹⁶ This shifted the US focus back on to the immediate demand that NK should honour its obligations under the NPT and IAEA safeguards agreement. Headway towards NK complying with this demand appeared to be made throughout 1993, with meetings between NK and the IAEA eventually leading to inspections of all but the reprocessing site. However, IAEA inspections found NK in further noncompliance with its safeguard agreement, referring the issue to the UNSC again which prompted a presidential statement ‘calling upon the DPRK to allow the IAEA inspectors to complete the inspection activities agreed between the IAEA and DPRK’.¹⁷

The crisis further escalated on the 19 April when Pyongyang declared to the US that it ‘intended to unload the fuel rods containing bomb-making material from its reactor’.¹⁸ The US had clearly stated to NK in negotiations throughout 1993 that ‘refuelling without proper supervision by the IAEA was a red line for the United States’.¹⁹ The IAEA reported that defueling was increasing in pace and the issue was referred to the UNSC, prompting the statement on 26 May 1993 that strongly urged ‘the DPRK only to proceed with the discharge operations at the five megawatt reactor in a manner which

¹⁶ US Department of State, ‘Joint Statement Following U.S.-NK Meeting’ (14 June 1993) 4(24) US Department of State Dispatch. <http://caledavis.com/Sources/1993/JointStatement.pdf>, accessed 20 May 2014.

¹⁷ Statement by the President of the Security Council, [S/PRST/1994/13](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PRST/1994/13), 23 March 1994, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PRST/1994/13 accessed 21 May 2014.

¹⁸ *Op.cit.* Wit,Poneman&Gallucci, pg.169.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*pg.171.

preserves the technical possibility of fuel measurements, in accordance with the IAEA's requirements'.²⁰

Unperturbed NK continued defueling and responded to the IAEA announcement that safeguard had failed and the threat of UN sanctions by withdrawing from the IAEA and preparing to move fuel rods to the reprocessing site. At this point the US contemplated surging troops into SK in order to defend against any NK attack provoked by UN sanctions. The US also considered a pre-emptive strike on Yongbyon to destroy the DPRK nuclear facilities. It was also being mooted within the US administration that the policy should be broadened to include regime change.²¹

Although regime change did not become a policy objective there was a decision to escalate the demands, as stated by one of the AF negotiators Joel Wit:

In 1994 the objectives of the negotiations got bigger, so we added to this IAEA focus, a dismantle focus. This not only allows special inspections, but they had to dismantle their nuclear facilities; that went beyond the NPT as countries are allowed to have such facilities as long as there are proper safeguards.²²

Therefore, at the beginning of the talks that would lead to the AF the US had 5 demands:

1. NK had to freeze its plutonium production program.
2. Spent fuel had to be shipped out of NK.
3. NK had to dismantle all frozen facilities.
4. NK had to acknowledge its membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and implement nuclear safeguards, including special inspection.

²⁰ Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/1994/28, 26 May 1994, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PRST/1994/28 accessed 21 May 2014.

²¹ *Op.cit.* Wit, Poneman&Gallucci, pg.204.

²² Author's interview with Mr Joel Wit, in person, 6 March 2013.

5. Implement the Denuclearisation Declaration.²³

In summary the political objective throughout the Clinton administration was to prevent the DPRK obtaining a nuclear weapon. This was done through a series of escalating demands; that are as follows:

Demand 1 (from 14 March 1992). Hold talks with ROK over denuclearisation agreement leading to inspections.

Demand 2 (from November 1992). Comply with the IAEA special inspections and safeguard agreement and comply with demand 1.

Demand 3 (from 12 March 1993). Stay within the NPT.

Demand 4 (from 4 March 1994) . Do not move fuel rods to re-processing installation without supervision of the IAEA; conform with demands 1&2.

Demand 5 (From 19 July 1994). Freeze and dismantle plutonium production programme, ship spent fuel out of NK, comply with NPT and ROK-DPRK denuclearisation agreements.

AQ 2 - Was there a threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives quickly with little cost?

Due to unresolved issues of the Korean War, there was always the threat of military force being used by either side in a crisis. During the Korean War the US had threatened to use nuclear weapons against Korean and Chinese targets.²⁴ In 1976 the US and ROK conducted a joint military exercise 'Team Spirit' with the objective of deterring NK aggression. The exercise involved up to 200,000 US and ROK service personnel in a

²³ *Op.cit.* Wit, Poneman&Gallucci, pg.298.

²⁴ *Ibid.*pg.1

demonstration of land, air and maritime capabilities.²⁵ Although staged as a defensive measure, the North argued that the exercise was a threatening action. In 1991 the exercise was slimmed down, and in 1992 after a debate on the utility of the exercise it was cancelled.²⁶ During a point of stalemate in the negotiations between the ROK and DPRK over the inspection regime, SK pushed for the resumption of Team Spirit exercise²⁷ indicating that they saw the exercise as a way of putting pressure on the DPRK.

The US threat was credible as the Gulf War of 1991 demonstrated. NK had closely studied Desert Storm and the political consequences of the war, concluding that although Saddam Hussein remained in power, Iraq had lost its independence; due to the actions of the international community.²⁸ Therefore, NK was wary of any proposed surge of troops similar to that of Desert Shield.

The US administration had continually emphasised in bilateral talks with the NK that progress on DPRK-ROK talks as part of the denuclearisation agreement, was always an element required of any final agreement. However, there was no evidence of a specific threat to use force over this demand. There was also no direct threat to use force over NK failure to comply with IAEA special inspections although sanctions through the UN was repeatedly threatened.

²⁵ Global Security.org, *Team Spirit*, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/team-spirit.htm>, accessed 21 May 2014.

²⁶ *Op.cit.* Wit, Poneman&Gallucci, pg.11.

²⁷ *Ibid.* pg.14.

²⁸ *Ibid.*pg.35.

The US and ROK did re-institute Team Spirit, partly over the DPRK's lack of progress in complying with IAEA demands and reaching agreement on inspections under the denuclearisation agreement. NK clearly indicated they perceived Team Spirit as a threat stating that resumption of the exercise was 'a nuclear war rehearsal, threatening the DPRK'. The IAEA also on several occasions threatened to declare the continuity of safeguards broken with the intention of persuading NK to comply with special inspections. This threat often complicated the US approach, as the DPRK asserted that resolving IAEA inspections was dependent on the outcome of US-NK discussions.²⁹ Therefore, the DPRK response to what it deemed as threats was to escalate the situation further by stating that it would withdraw from the NPT 'until the United States nuclear threats and the unjust conduct of the IAEA against the DPRK will be recognised to have been removed'.³⁰ These demands would finally be resolved as part of the AF.

The Clinton administration's response to NK announcement that it would leave the NPT was diplomatic. The strategy was to build multilateral consensus³¹ that led to UNSC resolution 825; which merely called upon the 'DPRK to reconsider the announcement', 'reaffirm its commitment to the treaty', 'honour its obligations under the non-proliferation treaty' and 'comply with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA'.³² Therefore, there was no direct threat over this demand.

²⁹ *Ibid* pg.80

³⁰ Pak Gil Yon, Letter dated 12 March 1993 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/25405 (12 March 1993) annex 1 <http://caledavis.com/Sources/1993/DPRKWithdrawal.pdf> accessed 19 May 2014.

³¹ *Op.cit.* Wit, Poneman&Gallucci, pg.45.

³² SC Res 825, UN SCOR, 3212nd mtg, UN Doc S/Res/825 (11 May 1993). <http://caledavis.com/Sources/1993/Res825.pdf>, accessed 25 May 2014.

At talks held between the US and NK on 2 June 1993, the DPRK held the position that they were going to withdraw from the NPT. In response the US made it clear that such an action would lead 'the international community 'to take its own steps' which was a thinly veiled threat of sanctions.³³ NK emphasised that sanctions would be a 'declaration of war' that could lead to them building nuclear weapons and extracting plutonium from its spent fuel rods. The lead negotiator, Ambassador Robert Gallucci, threatened that 'no sitting president of the US would allow NK to acquire nuclear weapons.'³⁴ However, it was not until the DPRK was given security assurances that it decided 'to suspend as long as it considers necessary the effectuation of its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'.³⁵ Therefore, NK met the US demand not to withdraw from the NPT, not based on the threat of force, but on the possibility of further talks.

NK was clearly threatened with an implied use of force if they started to re-process fuel rods from their reactor. Gallucci stated 'I warned the North Koreans about reprocessing and about how serious that would be; I told the NK negotiator that I personally did not believe that the President of the United States would tolerate a nuclear weapons programme in NK'.³⁶ Since 1993 the fear within the US was that reprocessing the plutonium rods would provide enough material to make a nuclear weapon. Therefore, a

³³ *Op.cit.* Wit, Poneman&Gallucci, pg.55.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ US Department of State, 'Joint Statement Following U.S.-NK Meeting' (14 June 1993) 4(24) US Department of State Dispatch. <http://caledavis.com/Sources/1993/JointStatement.pdf>, accessed 25 May 2014.

³⁶ Author's interview with Ambassador Robert Gallucci Phone, by telephone, 12 February 2013.

discussion emerged within the US administration regarding whether pre-emptive strikes might be needed.³⁷

On 29 December 1993 after talks between the US and DPRK, both sides agreed to a 'Super Tuesday' package where on the same day there would be IAEA inspections at seven sites, DPRK-ROK talks would be scheduled and special envoys exchanged, ROK would announce the cancellation of Team Spirit and US- NK would arrange another meeting between their chief negotiators.³⁸ However, on 26 January 1994 it was reported that the US was intending to send Patriot missiles to SK. News articles also claimed that the US was going to send new helicopters and deploy an aircraft carrier to the region. There was also speculation on a possible US war plan and the possibility of sending an additional 1000 troops to Korea for Team Spirit.³⁹ Furthermore, two members of the US senate publicly provided support for the president to 'use any means necessary and appropriate, including the use of diplomacy, economic sanctions, a blockade, and military force' to prevent NK obtaining a nuclear weapon.⁴⁰

The deployment of forces to the region would possibly be perceived by NK as a threat, mirroring Desert Storm.⁴¹ Laney, the Ambassador to the ROK at the time, pointed out that the plan to deploy forces to SK:

On the one hand we were trying to mollify the North with talks, while on the other building up for a possible preventative strike. The North had no reason not

³⁷ *Op.cit.* Wit, Poneman&Gallucci, pg.103.

³⁸ *Ibid.* pg.116.

³⁹ *Ibid.* pg.123.

⁴⁰ Benjamin Gilman, 'Nuclear Nonproliferation in Korea Resolution', 103D Congress 1ST Session, H. J. RES. 292 in the House of Representatives, Government Printing Office, Mr. Gilman (for himself, Mr. Murtha, Mr. Solomon, and Mr. Hyde) introduced the joint resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 15 November 1993, pg.10.

⁴¹ *Op.cit.* Wit, Poneman&Gallucci, pg.126.

to think we were preparing to strike Yongbyon as it had been much discussed in the press, particularly by right-wing pundits who had claimed "we can take it out surgically and it is all over."⁴²

Another threatening action by the US occurred after NK announced its intention to discharge its reactor.⁴³ The US had made it clear that this was a red line and pressed the UN to impose sanctions on NK. In order to defend against any military response to sanctions, which NK had called an act of war, the US put in place its plan to augment forces in the region. As pointed out by Ambassador Gallucci:

We escalated some conventional moves that we had planned to undertake anyway and we did it in a way that was quite transparent, so that the North Koreans could see them, we were going to switch out our Cobra helicopters for Apache, we started doing that, we placed counter battery radar so you could fire for effect with first rounds against North Koreans entrenched artillery pieces along the DMZ, and we started shipping in Bradley fighting vehicles. So we were doing things that we would have eventually done anyway, but in an escalatory way quite transparently to signal that we were doing a little flexing.⁴⁴

However, essential to the question of coercive diplomacy, is whether this was a build of forces in order to directly threaten NK with a pre-emptive strike or whether it was a build of forces in order to be prepared to deal with NK possible military response to UN sanctions. Gallucci clearly indicates that there was a credible threat that the US would have conducted a pre-emptive strike if NK had moved the fuel rods:

If the North Koreans had taken that step of moving the material from the pond to the reprocessing facility, and we would have eventually known about the separation of plutonium from intelligence sources, I think the President would have acted to destroy the nuclear facility at Yongbyon and probably the suppression strikes that would have been necessary for the safe execution of that surgical strike.⁴⁵

However, Joel Witt another of the key negotiators states:

It was more defensive than offensive, everyone knew what the first steps of the Op Plan were, how you want to interpret the Op Plan depends on where you sit,

⁴² Author's interview with Ambassador T Laney, by telephone, 11 April 2013.

⁴³ *Op.cit.* Wit, Poneman&Gallucci,, pg.150.

⁴⁴ Author's interview with Ambassador Robert Gallucci, by telephone, 12 February 2013.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

if you are the NK seeing the US moving along the Op Plan you think holy cow; Op plan danger. So we thought they were defensive, in fact patriot missiles are defensive but can have offensive implications, you defend sites where you may stream in troops, that's a problem if you are NK.⁴⁶

Although the US was primarily making military deployments to improve its defensive posture within SK, the North must have felt threatened and perceived a possibility of a pre-emptive strike. If 100,000 troops had been deployed rapidly to the region, this would have raised their fears further, reminding them of the recent Gulf war.

With war looming at the moment that Clinton was set to make the decision on deployment of troops and pre-emptive strike and intervention by President Carter led to a de-escalation. As pointed out by Joel Wit:

We were not going to back down from our position and it appeared to us they were not going to stop doing what they were doing, we had some signals that there might be a way out, but when Carter parachuted in it crystallised the escape route for them, we knew even if he hadn't shown up we had a plan to have a last meeting come to Jesus meeting with NK before launching the pre-emptive strike; we never got to the Rudolf Hess option⁴⁷.

The Carter intervention de-escalated the situation but there remained the underlying threat that the crisis could return to the brink of war. The US had demonstrated that it was not willing to back down even if it risked war. Therefore, a return to the crisis, and the implicit threat of force was ever present throughout the negotiations that led to the AF. Therefore, this element is coded as conforming to the *ideal policy*.

AQ 3 - Was a deadline for compliance offered?

Demand 1 (from 14 March 1992). Hold talks with ROK over denuclearisation agreement leading to inspections.

⁴⁶ Author's interview with Mr Joel Wit, in person, 6 March 2013.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

There was no deadline, backed by the threat of force, for the demand that NK hold talks with the ROK over inspections. Deadlines were set for NK regarding IAEA inspections. The IAEA Board of Governors on 25 February set a deadline of 1 month for NK to accept special inspections or have the issue referred to the UNSC.⁴⁸ However, the threat seems to have been an element in NK decision to withdraw from the NPT.

Regarding the demand that NK stay within the NPT, the deadline adopted was what George would have termed the 'try and see', as no specific timing was given but a warning that actions would take place if they were to go through with the threat and leave the NPT. A 'Try and see approach' was also applied to the demand that NK did not move and reprocess fuel rods. NK had been told on several occasions that the US would not allow them to obtain nuclear weapons. However, NK publicly announced the defueling of their nuclear reactor, and must have known that the US would see this as a step towards them attaining nuclear material for a bomb. Therefore, the trip wire was set for NK to break if they went ahead and moved the fuel rods. Once the crisis had been averted there was only an implicit deadline that an agreement needed to be reached by the end of the bilateral talks between the US and UK held in Geneva between 5-12 August 1994. However, as no hard deadlines, only an implied one was given, for compliance or face military strikes, the timetable for AF talks is not sufficient to code this element as conforming to the *ideal policy*.

AQ 4 – Was there an assurance given to the adversary against future demands?

The US had informally assured NK that it had no nuclear weapons on the peninsula. Furthermore, the Joint statement assured the DPRK that the US would not threaten the use of force, including nuclear weapons; it would be impartial in the application of full scope safe-guards, they would mutually respect each other's sovereignty, respect non-

⁴⁸ *Op.cit.* Wit, Poneman&Gallucci,, pg.21.

interference in each other's internal affairs and support the peaceful reunification of Korea.⁴⁹ Although the AF clearly contained an assurance that no further demands would be made regarding regime change; it did not specifically state that future demands would not be made. However, this is deemed to be sufficient to be coded as partially conforming to the *ideal policy*.

AQ 5 – Was there an offer of carrots for compliance?

US bilateral talks were the incentive for NK to suspend its withdrawal from the NPT and restart IAEA and ROK inspections. The Joint Statement stated that further dialogue relied on NK accepting IAEA inspections to ensure the continuity of safeguards.⁵⁰ In particular the carrot of high level talks up to US Secretary of State level appeared to have motivated the DPRK. However, as will be discussed the ability of the US to deliver this carrot, whilst keeping allies and domestic audiences content was often problematic.

Another incentive that was offered to induce NK was the cancelling of Team Spirit. The ROK announcement on January 1992 of the suspension of Team Spirit was a significant factor in the DPRK signing up to both the IAEA safeguards and talks with the South. However, the resumption of Team Spirit in 1993 was taken as a threat by NK who protested that ROK and US had gone back on their word. The cancelling of future Teams Spirit therefore was always viewed by NK as an incentive.

The DPRK was given no specific incentive to entice them not to unload fuel rods under the supervision of the IAEA. The US was clear that such an action could lead to UN

⁴⁹ US Department of State, 'Joint Statement Following U.S.-North Korea Meeting' (14 June 1993) 4(24) US Department of State Dispatch. <http://caledavis.com/Sources/1993/JointStatement.pdf>, accessed 24 June 2014.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

sanctions and possible a pre-emptive strike. Once tensions had been reduced by the Carter intervention NK was offered several incentives to induce them to freeze and dismantle their graphite program. They were offered LWR nuclear reactors, a carrot that would eventually cost Japan and SK in the region of \$5bn. The US agreed to provide 500,000 tons annually of heavy oil for heating and electricity production. However, the big carrot was the offer to move towards ‘normalisation of political and economic relations’. As stated by a Robert Carlin, who was an intelligence officer with the State Department at the time:

The key was not the Light Water Reactors, or freezing the graphite program in exchange for the LWR, the key was that they were now engaged long term with the Americans, and had a prospect for continuous slow steady normalisation of relations.⁵¹

The offer of incentives for NK compliance was the fundamental element that led to the AF. Therefore, this element conforms to the *ideal policy*.

Evaluation of the implementation of the *ideal policy* and coercive diplomacy applied

The strategy of coercive diplomacy that was applied throughout this episode was complicated by several escalating demands in response to NK actions, and several actors (DPRK, ROK, US, IAEA, UN and Japan), but at the centre throughout was the US. It was the threat of US military action similar to that of the Gulf War that concerned NK and compelled them to enter talks leading to the AF. It was the assurances contained within the AF that mapped out what the reciprocal the US action would be if they met key demands. It was the incentives of a LWR and heavy oil that the US promised NK that induced them. However, although there were implied deadlines and NK was aware that the bilateral talks, after the Carter intervention, may be their last opportunity to deal directly with the US. At no point was there a hard deadline backed

⁵¹ Author’s interview with Mr Robert Carlin, in person, 4 March 2013.

with the threat of force; therefore, the form of coercive diplomacy adopted did not conform to the *ideal policy*. The initial attempts of coercive diplomacy did not conform to the *ideal policy* primarily as there was not a credible threat made that force could be used if compliance was not forthcoming. The demand that NK was not to move fuel rods did not conform to the *ideal policy* as there was no clear incentive being offered for compliance. The AF resulted from coercive diplomacy, but as there was no hard deadline it was not in the form of the *ideal policy*. However, it was successful as NK did dismantle its plutonium based programme. As will be discussed in Episode 2, it was only after the US reneged on the AF that NK restarted its plutonium based programme and obtained a nuclear weapons.

AQ 6 – Did the opponent prefer to comply rather than go to war?

Continued non-compliance with demands over inspections and the withdrawal from the NPT would most likely have eventually escalated, with UN sanctions being authorised, that in turn would have required similar consideration of surging US troops; possible leading to war. However, the specific urgency of the demand that NK did not move fuel rods brought the crisis to the brink; as this was going to lead to UN sanctions, US troop reinforcements and the possibility of a US pre-emptive strike.

NK did not want to go war but most likely could see no way of complying without the regime losing face. Therefore, it was willing to go to war, even if it was likely to lose. Having studied the Gulf War, NK perhaps believed that the US would only conduct a pre-emptive strike or limited campaign. Pyongyang then could sell such an action to their domestic audience as an example of ‘Western aggression’ and claim victory if the US did not commit to a full invasion and regime change. There was precedence for this as Saddam after the Gulf war used a similar line.

The alternative for NK, complying without gaining anything in return (i.e. oil and LWR), would have appeared weak not only in the eyes of the IC, but also to subordinates within the regime; in turn this would have risked a coup or domestic instability. The Carter intervention clearly offered NK away of complying and saving face, as pointed out by Gallucci ‘it gave Kim Jung Il a face saving way to come back to the negotiating table and make some concessions that he might not have otherwise made’.⁵²

AQ 7 – Did the opponent act rationally, miscalculate or suffer from misperception?

An assessment of whether NK acted rationally is dependent on their objective. If NK objective was to increase its security, and particularly that of the regime, then it did act rationally. By seeking nuclear weapons, they forced the US to the negotiation table and were able to extract concessions and assurances unlikely to be obtained through normal diplomacy. This may have involved NK taking the crisis to the brink of war, but as stated previously even if the US did conduct a pre-emptive strike, Pyongyang may have calculated that this could be used to their advantage.

If they obtained a nuclear weapon they would be able to deter the US as pointed out by Gallucci:

I think they watched and learned that if the United States is allowed to project its force it is extremely, perhaps uniquely, powerful opponent, capable of projecting with incredible lethality and precision that no other country on earth could deal with. They may have learned that having that having nuclear weapons is a deterrent to the overwhelming force of the United States.⁵³

⁵² Author’s interview with Ambassador Robert Gallucci, by telephone, 12 February 2013.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

Another advantage that negotiation backed by a nuclear weapons programme gave them was the ability to gain concessions and much needed aid whilst still saving face. As pointed out by Ambassador Laney:

Their threats based on their nuclear program were initially based on pride, then on fear of being outclassed altogether by the US and the South. Also it involved extortion as a way of getting aid without being humiliated by receiving charity. While that certainly does not excuse their behavior it makes it intelligible. They really want and desperately need aid but they also want to be respected. They are willing to be the bad boy on the block to get attention if they can't get it any other way.⁵⁴

If NK objective was to obtain a nuclear weapon in order to coerce its neighbours then surrendering its programme was not rational, as they were giving up the only method of deterring the US and any hope of coercing neighbouring states without the threat of a US reprisal. It could be argued that they maintained this objective, but just pretended to surrender their plutonium programme, with the intention of cheating. However, as pointed out by the negotiators of the time:

They spend 10s of billions of dollars over three decades starting in the early 1960s to build these programmes. The point is if you were a rational decision maker would you totally trash a programme that you have spent billions of dollars on over 30 years that was about to produce 100 nuclear weapons material for a programme that you didn't even know was going to work?⁵⁵

It could also be argued that seeking nuclear weapons was not rational as it maintained NK position as rogue nation outside of the IC and made it a target for the US. This claim would be valid if it was from the people of NK perspective, but not for the ruling elite. International isolation aided the regime, limiting external influences and enabling it to maintain a tight grip on the populace. There was also no guarantee that coming back into the international fold would significantly aid NK. The US may have continued a policy of containment with the aim of forcing the regime to collapse.

⁵⁴ Author's interview with Ambassador T Laney, by telephone, 11 April 2013.

⁵⁵ Author's interview with Mr Joel Wit, in person, interview 6 March 2013.

NK did make tactical and operational miscalculations though. The DPRK underestimated the technical abilities of the IAEA that led to the ‘inconsistencies’ being identified. If NK knew what the IAEA was capable of it may have delayed inspections further or considered remaining out of the NPT. Furthermore, the negotiators of the time argue that the collapse of the Super Tuesday agreement was ‘the first instance of a major NK miscalculation during the crisis. Subsequently, Pyongyang would repeatedly overplay its tactical hand without seeming to calculate seriously, much less understand, how its negotiating partner react’.⁵⁶ NK also later indicated that it regretted the ‘Sea of fire’ comment which had put it on the defensive and killed the deal.

Even the random behaviour of ignoring deadlines can be viewed as rational through the prism of the regime, as NK expert Chuck Downs explains ‘from their perspective this is their opportunity to weed out weaklings who aren’t perfectly supportive of the leader’.⁵⁷

Assuming that NK key objective was regime survival its actions can be viewed as rational. Obtaining a nuclear weapon would give them a deterrent required or a bargaining chip to trade for the resources and money it required to exist. Even if it miscalculated US resolve and the crisis escalated into conflict it clearly had good reason to believe that it would be a limited conflict that the regime could weather and then use to its advantage internally.

AQ 8 - Does credible implementation of the *ideal policy* lead to compliance?

The *ideal policy* was not applied in this exchange. However, coercive diplomacy was applied that led to the AF. Furthermore, as will be discussed in the next episode it is

⁵⁶ *Op.cit.* Wit, Poneman&Gallucci, pg.151.

⁵⁷ Author’s interview with Mr Chuck Downs, in person, 9 March 2013.

only when the US ended the AF, that NK sought a plutonium based nuclear weapon. As pointed out by Ambassador Gallucci:

Without the AF there would have been 100kg of plutonium produced, lots of nuclear weapons produced, and the North would have become a bigger and greater threat a lot sooner than it has over a period of a few years than it has over 20 years.⁵⁸

However, there are critics of this view; Joseph points out:

One can argue that the AF was a tactical success in that it temporarily closed the reprocessing facility and shut down the reactor. But at the strategic level it was a failure. It strengthened the most brutal regime in the world by giving it legitimacy and aid. And as for denuclearization, the North could always resume operations at Yongbyon whenever it decided to do so. Moreover, it was already embarked on an HEU program. So it was violating the agreement from the beginning⁵⁹

Although coercive diplomacy was key in leading to the AF, it was not the grand strategy required to bring NK further into the IC and sort out the underlying issues that initiated the crisis. This is not a failure necessary of coercive diplomacy but of US ability to form a longer term policy towards NK.

AQ 9 - Does failure to implement the *ideal policy* lead to non-compliance?

For this particular episode the ideal policy was not implemented; but there was eventually a successfully outcome.

AQ 10 - Was compliance caused by fear that the threatened action would be carried out?

President Carter gave NK a way out that allowed them to save face and avert a military confrontation. This would imply that they were fearful that further pressure could be applied to them including military strikes, but needed the offer of incentives that would allow them to save face, gain a reward and enable them to negotiate.

⁵⁸ Author's interview with Ambassador Robert Gallucci Phone, by telephone, 12 February 2013.

⁵⁹ Author's interview with Ambassador Robert Joseph, in person, 11 March 2013.

EPISODE 1 - WILL TO THREATEN AND USE FORCE

Jakobsen asserts that the willingness to use force can be explained by three ‘will producing; patterns which are Interest-driven pattern, Government-driven pattern and Domestic pressure-driven pattern.’⁶⁰ Furthermore, following Jakobsen’s logic I argue that because of the unique threat posed by nuclear weapons, there is an additional pattern ‘Vital interest’ driven pattern. This section will examine each of the variables in turn, assessing the extent they were present and determining whether they explain why the US was considering the use of force over NK’s nuclear programme.

The nature of the threatened interests.

The threat of NK attaining a nuclear weapon was reportedly described to Congress by the Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey as ‘the most urgent threat to United States national security in East Asia’ and ‘that possession by NK of such a device would threaten United States allies in all of Asia as well as United States forces in the region’.⁶¹ But why did the US perceive a nuclear armed DPRK as a threat? Firstly, a nuclear armed North would impact on the calculation of any conflict and affect the strategic balance of power on the peninsula.⁶² Another concern was that if, like other communist regimes, the North’s regime rapidly collapsed it could escalate into a nuclear conflict.⁶³

⁶⁰ Jakobsen, *Western use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War, A Challenge for Theory and Practice*, pg.43.

⁶¹ Benjamin Gilman, ‘Nuclear Nonproliferation in Korea Resolution’, 103D Congress 1ST Session, H. J. RES. 292 in the House of Representatives, Government Printing Office, Mr. Gilman (for himself, Mr. Murtha, Mr. Solomon, and Mr. Hyde) introduced the joint resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 15 November 1993, <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-103hjres292ih/pdf/BILLS-103hjres292ih.pdf>, accessed 12 March 2013, pg.2.

⁶² Author’s interview with Ambassador Robert Gallucci, by telephone, 12 February 2013.

⁶³ Author’s interview with source B, in person, 5 March 2013.

There was also a proliferation risk that if NK collapsed the weapons would be lost or that they might sell fissile material, equipment or a nuclear weapon to other states or terrorists.⁶⁴ NK has few resources and methods of generating wealth; nuclear technology was one possible revenue stream. Any proliferation before the NPT review in 1995 could have had wider global impact and would have undermined US counter-proliferation policy.⁶⁵ There was a concern that in response to a NK nuke, SK and Japan would develop a nuclear deterrent.⁶⁶ The US had assured both these states that it would provide a 'nuclear umbrella', retaliating with a nuclear strike on an aggressor that attacked them with nuclear weapons, but if SK and Japan started to doubt this promise in the face of a direct threat of NK they may have decided to develop start their own programme.

Another concern was that a nuclear armed DPRK at some stage would be able to conduct a direct strike on the US. This was not a threat in the 90s as they did not have the delivery system to deliver such a weapon. However, if NK developed the ability to strike the US directly it could undermine the 'nuclear umbrella' as it would increase doubts that the US would be willing to take punishment on behalf of other states. This doubt alone could embolden NK to act more aggressively in the region.

Overall due to the clear threat to US allies and interests within the region, this element is coded *high*.

The prospects of military success.

There are three scenarios that need to be assessed in order to answer this element.

Firstly, what was the prospect of successful pre-emptive strike aimed at destroying NK

⁶⁴ *Op.cit.* Gallucci interview.

⁶⁵ Author's interview with Mr Joel Wit, in person, 6 March 2013.

⁶⁶ *Op.cit.* Gallucci interview.

nuclear programme? Secondly, what was the prospect of implementing a blockade to make sanctions effective? Thirdly, what was the prospect of successfully winning a full scale war that could result from the North's response to the implementation of sanctions or pre-emptive strike?

The US military's assessment of a pre-emptive strike was that it could destroy the facilities at Yongbyon but 'could not guarantee the destruction of plutonium the North was thought already to have, especially since it could be easily moved'.⁶⁷ The Pentagon had studied a range option for attacking Yongbyon ranging from cruise missile attacks to commando raids. However, with over 300 anti-aircraft guns, six surface to air missile bases under construction and hilly terrain any option would be risky.⁶⁸ There was also the possibility that an attack on the nuclear facility would release radiation.

Furthermore, it would destroy any chance of calculating how much fissile material they had already re-processed. The timing of such an attack would be difficult as pointed out by Gallucci, Pone and Wit:

Any attack would require timely intelligence, accurate targeting, tight command and control, and exact timing. An attack would have to be launched no sooner than when the North Koreans began to move the spent fuel to the reprocessing plant, but it would have to be executed before they moved the separated nuclear material elsewhere. That in turn, required enough information to apprise American decision makers of these activities in time to allow the military option to be executed successfully.⁶⁹

Enforcing a blockade to support UN sanctions would require a 'staggering number of ships' to implement successfully.⁷⁰ It would also require China to abstain from vetoing an UNSC action and then police its own border with the DPRK. Furthermore, even if a

⁶⁷ *Op.cit.* Wit, Poneman&Gallucci, pg.107.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.* pg.103.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.* pg.103.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.* pg.107

successful blockade was implemented it was highly likely to punish ordinary citizens than the regime.

There was also a significant risk that a pre-emptive strike or implementation of a blockade would provoke NK into launching a pre-emptive strike on SK. Even the defensive measures of moving patriot missile systems and surging 100,000 troops into the country could easily have provoked a NK offensive.

NK had a military force of 1,127,000 and a reserve of 6,000,000⁷¹ compared to the US forces within SK of 35,000⁷² and ROK forces numbering 633,000 active with a reserve of 4,500,000.⁷³ Furthermore, the DPRK boasted around 3700 MBT and 730 combat aircraft⁷⁴ to the US's 84 Combat aircraft and ROK 1800 MBT and 497 combat aircraft.⁷⁵ In terms of naval assets the US and ROK clearly had higher end capability including an aircraft carrier fleet based in Japan. However, the NK had 25 submarines⁷⁶ that clearly posed a threat to any deployed fleet. The US was capable of reinforcing the regional forces rapidly; as demonstrated by the surge of 545,000 men into Iraq in 1992.

The superiority of US and ROK equipment, doctrine and training would have most likely led to a victory over NK. The Iraq war had already provided an example of how US forces were a generation ahead of an army equipped with old Soviet technology. Therefore, the US assessment at the time was that the NK 'had a numerical advantage in manpower and in major weapons, tanks, artillery, and rocket launchers. The vastly

⁷¹ IISS, *The Military Balance*, (1993), pg. 161.

⁷² *Ibid.* pg. 20.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

superior training and readiness as well as air superiority of the allied forces offset that advantage'.⁷⁷ The US believed that it would prevail in any military confrontation although it was assessed that it could take four months of very high intensity conflict, US reinforcements of at least 545,000 men⁷⁸ and US and ROK troop casualties of around 300,000-750,000.⁷⁹

The most significant problem for any US or ROK strategy was the counter coercion that NK could apply. As pointed out by a senior member of the first Bush administration:

We got probably 200,000 US citizens in Seoul, Japan has got about 70 or 80,000 and it wouldn't really matter if a nuclear device went off in Seoul or if they released one volley of their forward deployed artillery, it would be unbelievable devastation. Now what would matter is, and no one would ever say this, the President at the time would have to make a decision on what to do, but between 11-12000 forward deployed Howitzers, there were only 2 bridges across the Han river, he {NK} has got us somewhat over a barrel that is why successive administrations have had to handle this very carefully.⁸⁰

NK knew that it had this stranglehold on SK pointing out:

We are ... prepared politically and militarily ... We have a great Party. We have strength derived from solidarity among the leader, the Party, and the people. We have [a] strong independent national economy. And we have powerful military forces. Based on these strengths, we can say for sure that we will be able to deal with any offensive or 'pressure' coming from our enemies.⁸¹

Internationally NK would have very little support if a conflict was to occur. The only state that would consider aiding the North militarily was China who had entered the Korean War on their side. Therefore, if a US full scale invasion was mounted and approached its borders history could possibly repeat itself. However, the NK-Chinese

⁷⁷ *Op.cit.* Wit, Poneman&Gallucci, pg.107.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.* pg.102.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ Author's interview with source A, in person, 4 March 2013.

⁸¹ Korean official quoted in Narushige Michishita "NK's 'first' nuclear diplomacy, 1993-94", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol.26, No.4 (2003), pg.63.

relationship was not as warm as many believed.⁸² The coldness of this relationship was further signified in 1992 when China recognised and established diplomatic relationships with the ROK, a move that infuriated NK.⁸³ Therefore, a pre-emptive strike, away from the Chinese border, on the DPRK's nuclear facilities may have been acceptable to the Chinese.

Due to the costs involved and the low prospect of achieving the objective quickly and at low cost the prospects of military success are coded *low*.

The level of domestic support

Polls in 1994 had 51% of Americans in favour of military action to destroy NK's nuclear programme with 48% indicating it was worth the risk of a war.⁸⁴ Republican figures from the previous administrations were particularly active in calling for such an attack.⁸⁵ Moreover, the Republican held Congress had signalled to the President that any means could be used 'including the use of diplomacy, economic sanctions, a blockade, and military force, to prevent' NK attaining a nuclear weapons.⁸⁶ The debate within the US was clearly mixed on whether to use force. This mixed debate means that this element is coded *medium*.

⁸² *Op.cit.* source A author's interview.

⁸³ Strategic Survey 1992-1993, (IISS, 1993), pg.149.

⁸⁴ Creekmore, *Moment of Crisis, Jimmy Carter, The power of a peacemaker and NK's nuclear ambitions*, pg.19; also stated in Marc Trachtenberg, 'Preventive War and U.S. Foreign Policy', *Security Studies*, Vol.16, No. 1 (2007), pg.16.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ Benjamin Gilman, 'Nuclear Nonproliferation in Korea Resolution', 103D Congress 1ST Session, H. J. RES. 292 in the House of Representatives, Government Printing Office, Mr. Gilman (for himself, Mr. Murtha, Mr. Solomon, and Mr. Hyde) introduced the joint resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 15 November 1993, <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-103hjres292ih/pdf/BILLS-103hjres292ih.pdf>, accessed 12 March 2013, pg.10.

AQ 11 - Are one of the four hypothesised patterns present when states threaten and use force?

The pattern for this episode has been assessed as *high* for interest, *low* for prospects of military success and *medium* regarding domestic support. This does not conform to any of the patterns described by Jakobsen that would lead to force being threatened; fundamentally because the prospects of military success of winning a quick war at low cost were evaluated as *low*. The only pattern where the logic of the *ideal policy* would imply the threat to use force, even if the prospect of success is low, is where the vital interests (i.e. state survival) are threatened. However, Clinton was actively considering a pre-emptive strike, or at the minimum UNSC resolution imposing sanctions that would have required a surge of a 100,000 troops.

There are several explanations for why Jakobsen's patterns and US willingness to threaten force do not align. Firstly, Jakobsen's logic could be wrong and states may in fact be willing to go into a costly war over an issue that does not affect vital interest, would be controversial domestically, and possibly would not succeed. It could be the US saw the credibility of its counter-proliferation policy as essential to its long term survival; but this would lead to the US threatening the use of force over other proliferation issues.

Another possibility is that the US was gambling that the deployment of US troops would not lead NK to escalate to a point of engaging in a war that it could not win. Clearly if the surge did cause an escalation it would have been a US miscalculation. It may be that the US felt that it had no option; as if it did not seek a UNSC resolution, surge troops to deter NK, it would be viewed as a 'paper tiger' and would have lost credibility globally. Therefore, it was caught in an escalatory cycle with NK.

Comparison with other episodes will provide a clearer indicator of which explanation is more likely.

AQ 12 - Are all the hypothesised patterns absent when states lack the will to threaten and use force?

Discussed in question 11.

AQ 13 - Does coalitional consensus concerning threats of force result from leadership by one or more states, and/or a shared perception that important interests are threatened?

Japan, ROK and the US shared the interest in preventing NK attaining nuclear weapons. The ROK and Japan, in had a vital interest, as unlike the US, a nuclear armed DPRK posed an almost immediate threat to those states. However, the ROK often opposed a US aggressive stance with the North, as they had the most to lose from any confrontation; as pointed out by Carlin ‘the South Koreans don’t want to see their beautiful country destroyed in the interest of US non-proliferation goals; big problem’.⁸⁷

Gallucci clearly points out issues with allies:

The most difficult ally engagement was with our allies in Seoul Kim (SK President) was a pretty serious critic of engagement with the North and there was no deal that could be made without the South, so we were in a constant consultative mode and spent a lot of time with South Korean leaders, in particular the foreign minister, but it was very hard time with the political stance of SK president, so I think most difficult. Japanese were supportive throughout, as were the Russians from a distance..... There was a fair amount of ally management; the key to the deal was ensuring that we were on the same wave length as our allies in the South.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ Author’s interview with Robert Carlin, in person, 4 March 2013.

⁸⁸ Author’s interview with Ambassador Robert Gallucci, by telephone, 12 February 2013.

Therefore, although there were shared interests that drove all parties to engage diplomatically, there was not a clear coalitional consensus to use force.

AQ 14 - Does coalitional consensus concerning threats of force fail to emerge when none of the above conditions are met?

As there was not a coalitional consensus concerning to threaten the use of force over NK nuclear programme this question cannot be answered.

AQ 15 - Do international organisations make it easier for leading states to mobilise support for policies involving threats and use of force?

The threat of UN sanctions for non-compliance was an element in the US strategy to persuade NK. However, the reliance on the IAEA complicated the strategy as it was not under US control. The IAEA threatened to refer issues to the UNSC at a moment when the US did not want to increase pressure. Joel Witt also comments ‘the IAEA was difficult, not because they were led by whacky people, they are kind of rigid international organisation with set procedures rules of behaviours and they did not get along with the North Koreans’.⁸⁹

To some seeking legitimacy through the UN seemed to unnecessarily complicate the crisis; as stated by Carlin ‘we made it pretty clear to the North Koreans that once we had got done with this UN thing we would sit down and have bi-lateral talks with them’.⁹⁰

⁸⁹ Author’s interview with Mr Joel Wit, in person, 6 March 2013.

⁹⁰ Author’s interview with Mr Robert Carlin, in person, 4 March 2013.

AQ 16 - Did the issuing of a threats increase the motivation of the coerced to develop nuclear weapons?

There is no evidence to link threats to a change in the pace of NK programme.

However, the continual NK rhetoric about the mistakes that Saddam made would suggest they were concerned that a similar fate awaited them. Therefore, it is logical to assume that they increased the pace of their nuclear programme to gain a bigger bargaining chip to achieve a better security arrangement with the US or obtain a deterrent. The only evidence of a possible connection is that when first threatened with sanctions they threatened to leave the NPT, and when the pressure had mounted further, the DPRK started to unload spent fuel rods. Both of these actions were on the path that would eventually enable them to attain a nuclear weapon.

EPISODE 2 – BUSH ADMINISTRATION 2001 – 2006

AQ 1 - What was the US policy objective and demand? The US objective throughout the Bush administration was to stop the DPRK nuclear programme.⁹¹ How this objective was to be achieved was an area of conflict within the administration that affected the policy adopted between the first and second Bush administrations.

Two opposing camps emerged within the administration; one led by Thomas Hubbard, who recognised the flaws of the AF, but wished to keep it. The opposing faction led by Robert Joseph, senior director for non-proliferation and counter proliferation believed the AF to be useless and that NK should be isolated and coerced.⁹² This conflict soon became apparent as described by a senior member of the first Bush administration:

⁹¹ Thomas Hubbard, interview in 2003, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/interviews/hubbard.html>, accessed 14 May 2014.

⁹² Interview with Michael Green in Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question, A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis*, pg.110.

Kim [South Korean President] came to Washington in May 2001, and Secretary of Powell was briefing the press before and said basically that he was going to follow the Clinton programme and this caused great consternation, Cheney himself went nuts and Powell had to go out to press to say that I was a little bit too far ahead of my Skis, so we are going to pull back a bit and re-evaluate.⁹³

Bush's view on the AF was:

The previous administration had offered concessions to North Korean dictator Kim Jong-Il in return for a pledge to abandon his nuclear weapons program. The policy had not worked, and I told the team we were going to change it. From then on, NK would have to change its behaviour before America made concessions.⁹⁴

However, at the point described the policy had led to the dismantlement and containment of the plutonium based programme, although there was suspicion that NK had a secret HEU programme. The first indication that Bush was adopting the position of the hardliners was after 9/11. In the state of the Union speech after the attacks the President stated that one of his administration goals was to:

Prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction. Some of these regimes have been pretty quiet since September the 11th, but we know their true nature. NK is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction.⁹⁵

In the same speech he pointed out that 'states like these and their terrorist allies constitute an axis of evil'.⁹⁶ Despite this rhetoric the administration did attempt to engage with NK developing what it called 'a bold approach to improve relations with NK' based on an 'offer of economic and political steps to improve the lives of the North Korean people'.⁹⁷ This approach was led by James Kelly who met with the DPRK

⁹³ Author's interview with source A, in person, 4 March 2013.

⁹⁴ George W. Bush, *Decision Points*, (London, Virgin Books, 2010), pg.90.

⁹⁵ George W. Bush: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 29, 2002. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29644>, accessed 25 June 2014.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ Richard Boucher, 'NK Nuclear Program', (Press Statement, 16 October 2002) <http://caledavis.com/Sources/2002/USPressStatement.pdf>, accessed 23 June 2014.

between 3-5 October 2002. During these meetings NK appeared to admit to having a HEU programme.⁹⁸

Although there is a debate over whether NK admitted to having an HEU programme,⁹⁹ once it was accepted in Washington that they did, even those who argued to maintain the AF realised that it was over; as Hubbard stated ‘this administration continued the fundamental policy elements of the approach of the last administration in the sense that we continued to support the Agreed Framework until it was clear the North Koreans had violated it’.¹⁰⁰ A senior member of the first Bush administration confirmed this stating ‘when they announced it; it had some effect of bringing the thing crashing down around our ears as people who were opposed to negotiating tried to find a way out of the short of military action and temporally got the upper hand’.¹⁰¹

In a press statement October 2002 the US argued that it had been willing to engage with NK, but could not due to its HEU programme and called on the ‘NK to comply with its commitments under the Non-proliferation Treaty and to eliminate its nuclear weapons program in a verifiable manner’.¹⁰² On 14 November 2002, KEDO effectively ended the AF by suspending the delivery of heavy fuel oil to the DPRK, announcing that ‘future shipments will depend on North Korea’s concrete and credible actions to dismantle

⁹⁸ Author’s interview with Ambassador DeTrani, by telephone, 12 March 2013.

⁹⁹ Interview with Michael Green in Yoichi Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question, A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis*, pg.103.

¹⁰⁰ Thomas Hubbard, interview in 2003, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/interviews/hubbard.html>, accessed 14 May 2014.

¹⁰¹ Author’s interview with source A, in person, 4 March 2013.

¹⁰² Richard Boucher, ‘NK Nuclear Program’ (Press Statement, 16 October 2002) <http://caledavis.com/Sources/2002/USPressStatement.pdf>, accessed 23 June 2014.

completely its highly-enriched uranium program'.¹⁰³ In response on 12 December 2002, the DPRK announced that it would immediately resume operation of its nuclear facilities and construction of nuclear facilities that had been frozen. The DPRK then went on to break the safeguards agreement and expel IAEA inspectors¹⁰⁴ and appeared to restart the plutonium based programme that had been bottled up by the AF.

On 11 January 2003 NK resumed its withdrawal from the NPT initiated in 1993 arguing that it was a self-defence measure due to 'the ever-intensifying United States hostile policy and pressure on the DPRK'.¹⁰⁵ The IAEA initially called upon the DPRK to re-establish the safeguard measures¹⁰⁶ before eventually on 12 February referring the issue to the UN Security Council.¹⁰⁷ The US approach to this crisis was to seek a multilateral approach through 'six-party talks'.¹⁰⁸ Again the administration was conflicted over whether to negotiate or add more pressure.

At the first round of talks the US representative Jim Kelly stated the 'immediate purpose is to ensure that the North Korean nuclear program is eliminated in a complete,

¹⁰³ Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation, 'KEDO Executive Board Meeting Concludes', 14 November 2002, <http://caledavis.com/Sources/2002/KEDOCutoff.pdf>, accessed 23 June 2014.

¹⁰⁴ *Op.cit.* Funabashi, pg.104

¹⁰⁵ Pak Gil Yon, Letter dated 24 January 2003 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2003/91 (27 January 2003), <http://caledavis.com/Sources/2003/FinalNPTWithdrawal.pdf>, accessed 23 June 2014.

¹⁰⁶ International Atomic Energy Agency, Resolution on the Report by the Director General on the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, GOV/2003/3 (6 January 2003). <http://caledavis.com/Sources/2003/IAEADGReportOnNPTSafeguardsInDPRK.pdf>, accessed 23 June 2014.

¹⁰⁷ *Op.cit.* Funabashi, pg.104.

¹⁰⁸ Author's interview with Ambassador T Laney, by telephone, 11 April 2013.

verifiable and irreversible manner'.¹⁰⁹ Complete, Verifiable, Irreversible Dismantlement (CVID) became the focus of US policy within Bush the first administration.¹¹⁰

However, there were often disagreements over its utility.¹¹¹ The rigidity of a policy tied to CVID limited the room for manoeuvre of the first administration, as Ambassador DeTrani points out 'the first administration was very consistent on the highly enriched Uranium programme - Comprehensive, Verifiable, Irreversible, dismantlement. There was much more flexibility in the second administration'.¹¹² The former British Ambassador to NK, David Slinn also points out NK's resistance to CVID commenting:

The North Korean system is hostile to the idea of transparency. It has repeatedly shown itself reluctant to accept any intrusive verification by external organisations. The Bush administration recognized that the gulf between what Washington would demand and what Pyongyang would be prepared to accept was so wide it was not worth trying for an agreement. The North Koreans would probably have not been prepared to go further than declarations, the US would, perhaps understandably given past experience of dealing with Pyongyang, have insisted on intrusive verification.¹¹³

With no movement on NK, Bush's policy within the second administration effectively U turned and sought to emulate the AF¹¹⁴; as pointed out by Dr Eberstadt 'the US was caught by surprise, was reactive, and of course the government made a 180 degree turn in its last 2 years trying to fashion a successful appeasement policy for the DPRK'.¹¹⁵ The vehicle for the policy continued to be the six party talks maintaining an aim of

¹⁰⁹ Korean Central News Agency, 'Keynote speeches made at Six-Way talks', *Korean Central News Agency* (online), 30 August 2003, <http://caledavis.com/Sources/2003/KCNAKeynoteSpeeches.pdf>, accessed 23 June 2014.

¹¹⁰ Author's interview with source A, in person, 4 March 2013.

¹¹¹ Author's interview with Ms Paula DeSutter, in person, 18 March 2013.

¹¹² Author's interview with Ambassador DeTrani, by telephone, 12 March 2013.

¹¹³ Author's interview with former Ambassador to NK David Slinn, by telephone, 23 April 2013.

¹¹⁴ Author's interview with Mr Rademaker, in person, 6 March 2013.

¹¹⁵ Author's interview with Dr Nicholas Eberstadt, by telephone, 3 April 2013.

‘verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula’.¹¹⁶ There was also a change of negotiators with Christopher Hill, who had previous experience in negotiating in Bosnia Herzegovina, being appointed.

The US also applied additional pressure through financial sanctions. On the 15 September the US Department of the Treasury designated Banco Delta Asia as a ‘primary money laundering concern’ under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act. Stating that ‘Banco Delta Asia has been a willing pawn for the North Korean government to engage in corrupt financial activities’.¹¹⁷ The importance of this act is explained by former member of the Bush administration, Rademaker:

The policy of sanctioning Banco Delta Asia hit a raw nerve. Technically what happened was that North Korea’s money in the bank was not frozen by the United States. There was North Korean controlled money in Macao, and by sanctioning that bank, the money became too hot and they could not transfer it, so basically the money became frozen. My impression was that lives were on the line in NK. I actually think people would have died if the money had not gotten unstuck, so it was powerful tool.¹¹⁸

Four days after the announcement, on the 19 September 2005 NK signed the Joint Statement that committed them to ‘abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards’¹¹⁹ in exchange for economic assistance, energy assurances and ultimately normalisation of relations and discussions over the provision of a light water reactor.¹²⁰

¹¹⁶ Six-Party Talks, ‘Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks’ (Joint Statement, 19 September 2005), <http://caledavis.com/Sources/2005/JointStatement.pdf>, accessed 24 June 2014.

¹¹⁷ US Treasury Department, ‘Treasury Designates Banco Delta Asia as Primary Money Laundering Concern under USA PATRIOT Act’ (Press Release, 15 September 2005). <http://caledavis.com/Sources/2005/TreasuryBancoDeltaAsia.pdf>, accessed 23 June 2014.

¹¹⁸ *Op.cit.* Rademaker interview.

¹¹⁹ Six-Party Talks, ‘Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks’ (Joint Statement, 19 September 2005). <http://caledavis.com/Sources/2005/JointStatement.pdf>, accessed 24 June 2014.

¹²⁰ Author’s interview with Ambassador DeTrani, by telephone, 12 March 2013.

However, the agreement soon collapsed as NK did not move on dismantling its facilities and became increasingly aggressive in their demand that the US return the funds frozen or they would withdraw from the six party talks¹²¹ as described by Rademaker:

I knew the North Koreans would become hysterical--I didn't know how hysterical--and it would seriously undermine the diplomacy he {Chris Hill} was trying to undertake. If he understood that when he signed off on it, it was not evident. For the next year and half it became the central issue in Hill's negotiations, and in the end returning the money was the key to making headway. No other bank would transfer the money, so it was transferred to the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States, as they were the only ones who could be sure they would not be sanctioned for handling North Korean money. I don't think we appreciated that the use of this legal authority would freeze the money in Banco Delta Asia. This authority had certainly never used in context of proliferation. We thought it was about forcing the bank to cut its ties with NK, not putting the bank out of business. But in effect it froze the money, because other banks thought if they took the money they would be sanctioned too. In the end, there was no middle man willing to handle the money.¹²²

The DPRK did have the funds eventually released on 19 March 2007¹²³, having them returned via the federal reserve with what Ambassador DeTrani states was the intent of 'signalling to the world that it was ok for the world's banks to do business with them, even though the US banking system was not doing business with them.'¹²⁴ However, many view this as a critical mistake by the US as pointed out by Chuck Downs:

It was really a terribly critical point in our long negotiations with NK, where we had finally found something non-hostile, non-military--not a person would have died on either side--yet we had them. We had curtailed their access to ill-gotten money around the world, and our negotiator did not see any benefit to this situation other than to give their leverage back to them.¹²⁵

¹²¹ Christopher Hill, keynote speech at the AEI/Maeil Kyungjae seminar, 'Sustaining the Alliance: US-Korean Relations in the New Asia', (American Enterprise Institute, Washington, 1 February 2006), (www.aei.org/events/eventID.1243/transcript.asp) in *The Peninsula Question, A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis*, (Brookings Institution Press, 2007), pg.412.

¹²² Author's interview with Mr Rademaker, in person, 6 March 2013.

¹²³ Zagaris, Bruce, 'U.S. Treasury Finalizes Rule Cutting Off Banco Delta Asia from U.S. Financial System, Returns Frozen Funds to North Korea', Association of Certified Financial Crime Specialists (ACFCS), 5 January 2007, <http://www.acfcs.org/u-s-treasury-finalizes-rule-cutting-off-banco-delta-asia-from-u-s-financial-system-returns-frozen-funds-to-north-korea/>, accessed 26 June 2014

¹²⁴ Author's interview with Ambassador DeTrani, by telephone, 12 March 2013.

¹²⁵ Author's interview with Mr Chuck Downs, in person, 9 March 2013.

NK further increased the tension in July 2006 test firing missiles over Japan, this resulted in the UNSCR 1695 that demanded 'that the DPRK suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme, and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launching'.¹²⁶ The resolution also strongly urged 'the DPRK to return immediately to the Six-Party Talks without precondition'¹²⁷ something they were unwilling to do until their money had been returned.

NK in response to the UNSC resolution argued that it was the:

The vicious hostile policy of the United States towards the DPRK and the irresponsibility of the UN Security Council have created an extremely dangerous situation on the Korean Peninsula where the sovereignty of the Korean nation and the security of the state have been seriously infringed..... The U.S. extreme threat of a nuclear war and sanctions and pressure compel the DPRK to conduct a nuclear test, an essential process for bolstering nuclear deterrent, as a corresponding measure for defence.¹²⁸

Furthermore the NK warned the UN that it was about to conduct a nuclear test. In response the UNSC urged 'the DPRK not to undertake such a test and to refrain from any action that might aggravate tension'.¹²⁹ However, on the 9 October 2006 NK conducted a test, thus ending in failure US attempts to prevent it attaining a nuclear weapon.

The US political objective throughout was that the DPRK did not attain a nuclear weapon. However, as will be examined in more depth the strategy adopted varied

¹²⁶ SC Res 1695, UN SCOR, 5490th mtg, UN Doc S/Res/1695 (2006) (15 July 2006). <http://caledavis.com/Sources/2006/SCRes1695.pdf>, accessed 24 June 2014.

¹²⁷ SC Res 1695, UN SCOR, 5490th mtg, UN Doc S/Res/1695 (2006) (15 July 2006). <http://caledavis.com/Sources/2006/SCRes1695.pdf>, accessed 24 June 2014.

¹²⁸ Korean Central News Agency, 'DPRK Foreign Ministry Refutes "Resolution of UN Security Council"', *Korean Central News Agency* (online), 18 July 2006 . <http://caledavis.com/Sources/2006/KCNAMissileTestResReply.pdf> accessed 24 June 2014.

¹²⁹ *Korean Central News Agency*, 'DPRK successfully conducts underground nuclear test', *Korean Central News Agency* (online), 9 October 2006. <http://caledavis.com/Sources/2006/KCNADprkDoesNukeTest.pdf> accessed 24 June 2014

between the first and second administrations. The actual demands made of NK by the US are as follows:

1. Abolish comprehensively and permanently all nuclear development activities (made by Jim Kelly on 23 April 2003)
2. Present concrete means for verification of compliance with that request. (made by Jim Kelly on 23 April 2003).¹³⁰
3. Conform to Joint Statement (2005).
4. Return to six party talks (2006).
5. Do not conduct nuclear test.

Determination of the form of coercive diplomacy that was adopted

AQ 2 - Was there a threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives quickly with little cost?

As covered in previous episode the US had a history of threatening NK with both conventional and nuclear weapons. Furthermore, under the Clinton administration the states had come to the brink of military conflict. Therefore, NK always had to assume that there was always the possibility that the US would use force to back a demand.

After 9/11 the President identified NK as part of the 'Axis of Evil' and then went on to state 'I will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons'.¹³¹ Furthermore, US Vice President Dick Cheney reportedly said

¹³⁰ *Op.cit.* Funabashi, pg.330.

¹³¹ George W. Bush: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 29, 2002. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29644>, accessed 25 June 2014.

of NK, 'We don't negotiate with evil. We defeat it'.¹³² Moreover, the President told the Chinese President that 'if we could not solve the problem diplomatically, I would have to consider a military strike against NK'.¹³³

President Bush did strike a more peaceful note occasionally stating that the US had 'no intention of invading NK.....my comments about evil was toward a regime, toward a government, not toward the North Korean people'.¹³⁴ However, there was clearly still a threat to the regime itself implied within this statement. Moreover, it was not long before aggressive statements were made such as:

We will not tolerate nuclear weapons in NK. We will not give into blackmail. We will not settle for anything less than the complete, verifiable, and irreversible elimination of NK's nuclear weapons program.¹³⁵

It was not just the rhetoric; the US poured the same kind of statements at fellow member of the 'axis of evil' Iraq, which it then invaded. Allegedly the invasion prompted Kim Jong-Il to move to a military base for 90 days fearing that NK was next.¹³⁶ The invasion demonstrated that the US was willing to act upon the notion of pre-emptive self-defence and highlighted its superior war fighting capability as pointed out by a US retired senior military officer:

In the case of Iraq it was certainly this notion of pre-emptive self defence – we have talked it about a lot then we acted. So I think a lot of people thought we could be next. I don't know if I can recall any specific reactions, but I can remember reading some of the Intel at the time, especially around the middle east where a great deal of notice was given. So I am sure that got noticed in

¹³² Hamish McDonald, 'Cheney's Tough Talking Derails Negotiations with NK', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 22 December 2003, <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/12/21/1071941611806.html>, accessed 10 January 2016.

¹³³ Bush, *Decision Points*, pg.424.

¹³⁴ George W. Bush: 'The President's News Conference with President Kim Dae-jung of South Korea in Seoul, South Korea', 20 February 2002, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsba.edu/ws/?pid=73261>, accessed 25 June 2014.

¹³⁵ George W. Bush, 'The President's News Conference With Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi of Japan in Crawford, Texas', 23 May 2003. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsba.edu/ws/?pid=922>, accessed 25 June 2014.

¹³⁶ Author's interview with Mr Chuck Downs, in person, 9 March 2013.

places like NK, especially when see the kind of warfare it was, in terms of combat operations it was pretty remarkable frankly.¹³⁷

However, a direct threat to use military force to back any of the US demands was not made.

During the initial stages of the second administration, the policy was the six party talks and the implied threats decreased. This did change prior to NK's nuclear test with Stephen Hadley, the National Security Advisor, stating on 15 May 2005 that 'if that {nuclear test} is really launched, the United States must take action.'¹³⁸ This was backed by the US government announcing that it had transferred fifteen Stealth bombers to South Korea.¹³⁹ During a press conference when pressed about the response to an imminent NK nuclear test the President stated:

If NK were to conduct a test, it's just a constant reminder for people in the neighbourhood, in particular, that NK poses a threat. And we expect our friends and those sitting around the table with us to act in such a manner as to help rid the world of the threat.¹⁴⁰

Implied threats were also made through the UNSC stating that

A nuclear test, if carried out by the DPRK, would represent a clear threat to international peace and security and that should the DPRK ignore calls of the international community, the Security Council will act consistent with its responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations.¹⁴¹

¹³⁷ Author's interview with source C, in person, 5 March 2013.

¹³⁸ David Sanger, 'US warns NK against Nuclear Test', *New York Times*, 16 May 2005 in Green&Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question, A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis*, pg.375.

¹³⁹ ABC Online (Australia), 'US Stealth Bombers deployed in South Korea', 6 July 2005, (www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200506/s1386924.htm) in Green&Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question, A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis*, pg.375.

¹⁴⁰ George W. Bush: 'Remarks Following a Meeting With Economic Advisers and an Exchange With Reporters at Camp David, Maryland', 18 August 2006. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=570>, accessed 24 June 2014.

¹⁴¹ Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/PRST/2006/41 (6 October 2006). <http://caledavis.com/Sources/2006/UNSCPresStatement.pdf>, accessed 24 June 2014

However, after NK announced its first nuclear test the President clearly emphasised that diplomacy, not military action, was the primary approach stating ‘we'll continue working to make sure that we give diplomacy a full opportunity to succeed’¹⁴² and that it was ‘very important for us to solve these problems diplomatically’.¹⁴³

The Bush administration made clear threats towards NK within the first administration and prior to the nuclear test. President Bush told China that he may have to consider military action, a threat he must have known would reach NK ears. Furthermore, the invasion of Iraq, another member of the ‘Axis of Evil’ along with the rhetoric must have given the DPRK regime the feeling of being threatened. However, for most of the second administration the rhetoric died down. Therefore it is taken that this element does partially conform to the *ideal policy*.

AQ 3 - Was a deadline for compliance offered?

There was no specific deadline given to back any of the demands; at best the ‘Try and See’ approach was applied. The DPRK on several occasions trampled over the line without consequence. When NK admitted to reprocessing rods in 2002 no response was given¹⁴⁴, even though this almost led the Clinton administration to conduct a pre-emptive strike in 1992. When NK conducted nuclear tests, in defiance of the 2005 Joint statement and US demands, the President emphasised that issue was to be resolved ‘peacefully through diplomatic means’.¹⁴⁵ Therefore, as there was no threat of returning

¹⁴² George W. Bush: "The President's News Conference," October 11, 2006. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=24077>, accessed 24 June 2014.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴ *Op.cit.* Funabashi, pg.154.

¹⁴⁵ George W. Bush: "The President's News Conference," October 11, 2006. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.

to a prior crisis at the end of any negotiations or set time to comply with a demand, it is taken that this does not conform to the *ideal policy*.

AQ 4 – Was there an assurance given to the adversary against future demands?

The DPRK was not given an assurance that further demands would not follow.

However, the 2005 Joint Statement, like the AF, set out the path for NK to take and the demands they were to comply with. Therefore, it can be taken that there was an assurance that no future demands would be made. If the US did make more demands this would have broken the agreement. This element conforms partially to the *ideal policy*.

AQ 5 – Was there an offer of carrots for compliance?

During the first administration the US did approach NK with the intention of offering ‘economic and political steps to improve the lives of the North Korean people’¹⁴⁶ however the confirming of the HEU programme soon squashed this, and rather than the quid pro quo approach of the AF, the approach was very much that rewards would only be received once CVID had been achieved.

The incentives offered by the second administration were economic assistance, security pledges and a move towards improved relations.¹⁴⁷ Furthermore, through the Banco Delta Asia the US held a clear pressure point that could be utilised to incentivise the regime. However, the position of the lead negotiator was that it was a ‘financial

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=24077>, accessed 24 June 2014.

¹⁴⁶ Richard Boucher, ‘North Korean Nuclear Program’ (Press Statement, 16 October 2002) <http://caledavis.com/Sources/2002/USPressStatement.pdf>, accessed 23 June 2014.

¹⁴⁷ Six-Party Talks, ‘Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks’ (Joint Statement, 19 September 2005). <http://caledavis.com/Sources/2005/JointStatement.pdf>, accessed 24 June 2014.

regulatory action and not a subject appropriate for discussion at the Six-Party Talks'.¹⁴⁸

Then at a later date, after the first nuclear test, the US leveraged the funds to be returned without any notable reciprocity from NK. Therefore, an element that could have been used to persuade NK was given up for very little return. Although the US could have made more of the latter, there was clearly incentives offered for NK to comply, therefore, this element conforms to that of the *ideal policy*.

Evaluation of the implementation of the *ideal policy* and coercive diplomacy applied

The coercive diplomacy applied by the US within this episode does not conform to that of the *ideal policy*. There were threats that a NK nuclear weapon would not be 'tolerated' or that it was a threat that the US and friends would 'rid the world of' which combined with the invasion of Iraq, clearly could be taken by NK that it could be next. However, there was no deadline given for when any of these threats would be undertaken. There was an assurance implied of what was demanded within the 2005 Joint Statement and the US did offer incentives, although arguable the biggest incentive the releasing of funds was given for little in return.

AQ 6 – Did the opponent prefer to comply rather than go to war?

Although the US clearly made implied threats that after the invasion of Iraq NK could be next, as time went on the DPRK either did not believe the threat to be credible or was willing to risk a war. The initial threat and invasion may have aided in persuading them to enter 6 Party Talks in April 2003. However, whether at the time taking part in these talks was a delaying tactic until they could develop a nuclear weapon capable of

¹⁴⁸ Christopher Hill, keynote speech at the AEI/Maeil Kyungjae seminar, "Sustaining the Alliance: US-Korean Relations in the New Asia," (American Enterprise Institute, Washington, 1 February 2006) (www.aei.org/events/eventID.1243/transcript.asp) in Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question, A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis*, pg.412.

detering the US or a genuine desire to partially comply rather than risk going to war is unclear.

AQ 7 – Did the opponent act rationally, miscalculate or suffer from misperception?

The DPRK's actions were rational if the goal was preserving the regime as its actions continued its grip on power. Viewed through the prism of realism NK's logic would seem to be rational. For example the DPRK stated:

A people without reliable war deterrent are bound to meet a tragic death and the sovereignty of their country is bound to be wantonly infringed upon. This is a bitter lesson taught by the bloodshed resulting from the law of the jungle in different parts of the world.¹⁴⁹

Furthermore that:

The DPRK's nuclear weapons will serve as reliable war deterrent for protecting the supreme interests of the state and the security of the Korean nation from the U.S. threat of aggression and averting a new war and firmly safeguarding peace and stability on the Korean peninsula under any circumstances.¹⁵⁰

This logic conforms to realism argument that in an anarchical system; states cannot rely on anyone for the means to ensure their own survival. Therefore, seeking a nuclear deterrent would seem to be logical, particularly when feeling threatened by the worlds remaining superpower. Ambassador Laney argues NK was a rational actor stating:

When President George W. Bush linked North Korea with Iran and Iraq as the Axis of Evil, and then invaded Iraq, it gave them incentive to build bombs and make it too costly to take them down. I think what they have tried to do is make it virtually impossible for us to go to war with them without exacting enormous costs. That for them is a rational policy.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁹ Korean Central News Agency, 'DPRK Foreign Ministry Clarifies Stand on New Measure to Bolster War Deterrent', *Korean Central News Agency* (online), 3 October 2006. <http://caledavis.com/Sources/2006/KCNANuclearTestThreat.pdf>, accessed 24 June 2014.

¹⁵⁰ Korean Central News Agency, 'DPRK Foreign Ministry Clarifies Stand on New Measure to Bolster War Deterrent', *Korean Central News Agency* (online), 3 October 2006. <http://caledavis.com/Sources/2006/KCNANuclearTestThreat.pdf>, accessed 24 June 2014.

¹⁵¹ Author's interview with Ambassador T Laney, by telephone, 11 April 2013.

However, this logic also leads to why the US would threaten the regime as expressed by

Dr Eberstadt:

The imperative of becoming a nuclear state is so central to NK policy making it may never have been viable to imagine that the NK would voluntarily relinquish the nuclear option, nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction the option or possibility of threatening the US with nuclear weapons, are in a sense the keys to the kingdom for regime survival for the DPRK, and governments don't negotiate away their presumed means for survival. Why I always thought the solution to NK is a new government.¹⁵²

NK does appear to have made some tactical miscalculations; admitting to Jim Kelly in 2002 that they had a HEU programme was perhaps one. It is possible they were looking to raise the stakes to gain a reward; however, this clearly risked the aid and fuel they were already receiving through the AF.¹⁵³ Furthermore, if they had not mentioned the HEU, it may have been possible to continue the programme for longer whilst receiving 'carrots' that the US claimed it was ready to offer them.

A vague admittance to an HEU programme may have been made with the calculation that US hardliners would use it to break the AF; therefore NK could appear justified in leaving the NPT and restarting its plutonium programme which was more likely to lead to a bomb. However, there is no evidence that supports this hypothesis, and even if true it would not have been rational to risk the rewards being received through the AF.

There is of course the possibility that they did not admit to the HEU, but elements of the US administration, interpreted NK diplomat's words in a way that suited their agenda to end the AF; therefore, a miscalculation by the US not NK.

Another possible miscalculation was the decision to fire missiles over Japan after signing the Joint Statement of 2005. The September statement promised the DPRK

¹⁵² Author's interview with Dr Nicholas Eberstadt, by telephone, 3 April 2013.

¹⁵³ Author's interview with Dr Nicholas Eberstadt, by telephone, 3 April 2013.

similar incentives as the AF. Firing the missiles contributed to destroying the agreement and gained them little. The weapon did demonstrate that NK had a delivery system for a nuclear warhead. It also put them back on to the international agenda and potentially embarrassed the US administration. It may also have been an attempt by NK to pressurise the US to release the funds frozen in the Banco Delta Asia, which were returned in 2007.

Although making some minor miscalculations the regime did appear to act rationally with its objective of regime survival.

AQ 8 - Does credible implementation of the *ideal policy* lead to compliance?

The *ideal policy* was not applied in this case therefore this question cannot be answered.

AQ 9 - Does failure to implement the *ideal policy* leads to non-compliance?

The *ideal policy* was not implemented and the DPRK did not comply with the demands made by the US. However, whether adopting a policy of coercive diplomacy that contained all of the elements of the *ideal policy* would have led to compliance is difficult to assess, as it may be that no policy could have been implemented that prevented the DPRK attaining a nuclear weapon. As pointed out by Dr Fitzpatrick ‘NK was determined to have nuclear weapons which, in a nutshell, is why it failed’.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵⁴ Author’s interview with Dr Mark Fitzpatrick, in person, 7 February 2013.

AQ 10 - Was compliance caused by fear that the threatened action would be carried out?

There was a threat but there was still no compliance. NK feared the US would emasculate them in the same manner that it did to Saddam. On April 6, 2003, a spokesperson for NK's Foreign Ministry stated:

The Iraqi war shows that to allow disarming through inspection does not help avert the war but rather sparks it...Only a physical deterrence force, a tremendous military-deterrence force powerful enough to decisively beat back an attack....can avert war and protect the security of the country and nation. This is a drawn from the Iraqi war.¹⁵⁵

NK also expressed to Japan their fear of the US.¹⁵⁶ In a confidential diplomatic exchange between China and the US, China pointed out that Pyongyang was deeply anxious about the possibility of a military threat'.¹⁵⁷ The NK themselves claimed that 'we can dismantle our nuclear program if the U.S. makes a switchover in its hostile policy towards us and does not pose any threat to us'.¹⁵⁸ However, rather than coerce NK it would appear that the threat drove them on, as they saw nuclear weapons as the only viable way to deter the US.

The DPRK also had the know how to develop a nuclear weapon. It would have developed several plutonium based weapons by the end of the 1990s, but dismantled this programme after signing the AF. It may have believed that with the US overstretched in Iraq in late 2003, that it had a couple of years to attain nuclear weapons, before the US could gain the domestic support to launch another invasion.

¹⁵⁵ *Op.cit.* Green&Funabashi, pg.126

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.* pg.70.

¹⁵⁷ US Secretary of State, A/S Kelly discusses Korea, bilateral relations with PRC Ambassador Yang Jiechi (10 January 2003). <http://caledavis.com/Sources/2003/03STATE8026.pdf>, accessed 23 June 2014.

¹⁵⁸ Korean Central News Agency, 'Keynote speeches made at Six-Way talks', *Korean Central News Agency* (online), 30 August 2003. <http://caledavis.com/Sources/2003/KCNAKeynoteSpeeches.pdf>, accessed 23 June 2014.

EPISODE 2 - WILL TO THREATEN AND USE FORCE

This section will now examine whether Jakobsen's patterns explain why President Bush was willing to initially threaten the use of force.

The nature of the threatened interests.

Bush identified three threats emanating from a nuclear armed NK. Firstly, it 'threatened two US allies – South Korea and Japan'. Secondly it 'could potentially reach America's West Coast'. Thirdly, they would sell their nuclear technology and knowhow.¹⁵⁹

As with the Clinton administration, NK conventional forces already posed a significant threat to SK, therefore, a deterrence posture based on conventional forces and US nuclear weapons was already in place. Attainment of a nuclear weapon would increase the North's power and arguably its incentive to attack. However, the US would retaliate to any NK nuclear attack on either ROK or Japan. Therefore, the deterrence posture would still be in effect. However, it would be the first time that Japan would have felt threatened by NK, but as long as both these states believed in the US nuclear umbrella it would be logical to assume that deterrence would remain intact. NK may have postured more and made conventional threats, calculating that they could deter the US from any action if they had a weapon. But as the ROK had superior conventional forces this approach is unlikely to gain them much.

The real concern for the US is that a nuclear NK forced it to remain committed to providing a nuclear umbrella and assurance to its allies. If it was deterrence based on only conventional forces, the US could leave the bulk of this to ROK and Japan; allowing the US to withdraw. However, if Japan or SK doubted the US resolve to retaliate after a NK nuclear strike, or believed that the DPRK doubted the US resolve to

¹⁵⁹ Bush, *Decision Points*, pg. 423.

retaliate on their behalf, they would be under pressure to develop their own nuclear weapon capability. This would seriously undermine US counter-proliferation policy and credibility worldwide. This view was emphasised by Robert Joseph:

Clearly if we fail in NK, if we fail in Iran, there will be more proliferation. Whether it will bankrupt the NPT, I don't know. But it will certainly move in that direction. There will be a number of countries – friends and adversaries -- that will reassess. This is especially the case if the US does not provide a credible nuclear guarantee. If our guarantee is questioned by our friends and allies, the effect will be to undermine our non-proliferation objectives.¹⁶⁰

Of course there was a possibility that if NK collapsed that a paranoid and irrational leader could decide to launch a nuclear attack on its neighbours knowing it was an act of suicide, or use it on his own people.

A more likely and threatening scenario for the US and NK's neighbours is that the DPRK collapsed and nuclear weapons would find their way into the hand of terrorists and other rogue states. This possibility gives the US a dilemma in how to deal with a nuclear armed NK; is it better to maintain the DPRK regime in order to avoid its collapse and the possibility of rogue nukes? But in doing so reward proliferation which could encourage others, or contain and pressurise the regime to surrender its nuclear weapons; risking the possibility of an uncontrolled collapse and proliferation. Clearly if the DPRK could be prevented from attaining nuclear weapons it would stop the US having to face this dilemma.

There remained the threat that NK would sell on nuclear technology. The Bush administration suspected that NK had aided Libya¹⁶¹ and Syria with their nuclear

¹⁶⁰ Author's interview with Ambassador Robert Joseph, in person, 11 March 2013.

¹⁶¹ David E Sanger and William J Broad, "Tests Said to Tie Deal on Uranium to NK," *New York Times*, February 2 2005; interview with senior US administration official, Washington, May 30, 2006. In Interview with Michael Green in Yoichi Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question, A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis*, pg.123.

programme.¹⁶² Therefore, a nuclear NK clearly posed a threat to US counter-proliferation policy.

A DPRK nuclear weapon did not pose a direct threat to the US during the Bush administration. Theoretically NK had missiles that could reach Alaska. The technology was far from proven, as a failed missile launch over Japan proved. However, the threat was an area of debate as pointed out by a senior member of the first Bush administration:

In 99/98 there was an intelligence estimate put out and the CIA concluded that it would be several years before NK had the capability to hit the United States, Senator Kyle went nuts and said they had politicised the intelligence to fit the Clinton administration. I was put on a committee with Bob Gates, a republican, to look at it and we looked at it for a month and came up with the same conclusion. Kyle put his own team together called the Rumsfeld commission and they said by 2001 NK would have the ability, they still don't have the targeting ability.¹⁶³

Jack David also points out that 'At the time North Korea was taken as a threat to our allies, Japan and South Korea. It was envisaged that North Korea might eventually hit the US mainland or Hawaii. But the main concerns were worry about troops in the area, our allies, the instability North Korea could cause and the importance of that area to our trade'.¹⁶⁴ However, the risk posed by being able hit the US is that it would enable the North to effectively threaten SK and Japan as explained by Ambassador Joseph:

There is not going to be a deliberate first strike as we thought about it in the Cold war. That is not what this is about in their calculations. This is about deterring the United States from coming to the assistance of South Korea in the event of an attack by the North by holding U.S. cities hostage. North Korean planners may believe that the U.S. will be deterred even if they use chemical or biological weapons on the peninsula. They have these weapons and would likely use them. They know that, if they go conventional against conventional, they lose.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶² Author's interview with Mr Rademaker, in person, 6 March 2013.

¹⁶³ Author's interview with source A, in person, 4 March 2013.

¹⁶⁴ Author's interview with former Secretary for Political Affairs Jack David, in person, 15 March 2013

¹⁶⁵ Author's interview with Ambassador Robert Joseph, in person, 11 March 2013.

A nuclear armed NK was not an imminent threat to the existence of the US. The danger was that allies started to doubt the US guarantee of a 'nuclear umbrella' and develop their own nuclear weapons. This would threaten US damage US counter-proliferation policy globally. Therefore as the US had strategic interests within the region this element is coded *high*.

The prospects of military success.

The US and ROK clearly had a quantitative and qualitative advantage over the DPRK in 2002.¹⁶⁶ Therefore, it was highly likely that in a full scale war the US and ROK would win. But the ROK, not the US was the key war fighter and also the state that would receive the most significant casualties; therefore, any military action would need their permission. The US would also need Japanese support as US troops would have been surged through their country. However, as in all warfare there is always the possibility that NK would be willing to take more punishment than its opponents. As pointed out by Cordesman:

The DPRK's ideological hostility to the ROK and the US could lead Pyongyang to escalate in ways that are unpredictable and make a —rational bargainer approach to scenario planning and predicting escalation highly uncertain because the perceptions of both sides can differ so much in any given scenario.¹⁶⁷

Therefore, even if likely to lose the DPRK may escalate in the belief that the threshold of pain that its opponents were willing to take was far less, and that they would submit first. Furthermore, the Iraq War and operations in Afghanistan clearly decreased the

¹⁶⁶ Alistar Finlan, *The Gulf War 1991*, pg.10.

¹⁶⁷ Anthony H. Cordesman, 'The Korean Military Balance: Comparative Korean Forces and the forces and the forces of key neighbouring states main report', pg. 7

http://csis.org/files/publication/110506_KoreaMilitaryBalanceMainRpt.pdf, accessed 30 Jun 2014.

number of forces that US could deploy; but even the ROK forces on their own would most likely win a full scale war with a non-nuclear NK.

A factor that had changed since 1994 was that the amount of support that NK could call upon. China's military and political ambitions steadily increased throughout the 90s giving it more influence. Furthermore, whereas in 1994 ROK President Kim Young-Sam took an extremely hard line towards the DPRK, in 2003 President Roh Moo-hyun seemed to be accommodating NK.¹⁶⁸ Therefore, consent for any military operation was less likely than 1994.

Even a pre-emptive strike was more difficult than in 1994 as in 2003 it was not clear where the HEU program was being developed.¹⁶⁹ There was no guarantee of destroying the programme or even threatening to destroy the programme by naming where it was located. The DPRK also had an enhanced counter coercion capability with 200 Rodong missiles deployed that could strike the ROK or Japan.¹⁷⁰ Furthermore, any pre-emptive strike would most likely have led to a counter strike by NK who would have seen it as an attack on the regime not a counter-proliferation action. Therefore, any military action would have risked escalating to a full scale war which was estimated 'could entail economic costs of \$1 trillion and result in one million casualties'.¹⁷¹

As it was unclear where the DPRK's nuclear programme was the prospect of success was unclear. Furthermore, any military action had a high risk of escalating and becoming costly in terms of casualties. Therefore the prospects of military success for the objective of destroying NK programme are deemed to be 'low'.

¹⁶⁸ Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question, A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis*, pg.157.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁷¹ General Gary Luck quoted in Litwak, *Regime Change, US Strategy through the Prism of 9/11*, pg.110.

The level of domestic support

If the case had been put forward to conduct a pre-emptive strike in late 2002, when NK announced that it was restarting its plutonium programme and broke its safeguards, it is most likely it would have been widely debated with an equal measure of proponents and opponents. However, at that point the Bush administration was highly focussed on dealing with Iraq. After the war in Iraq started to become a prolonged COIN operation, there would have been little domestic support for another highly risky intervention into a foreign country, especially one likely to have even greater casualties, over the issue of WMD. Therefore, for a small window between November 2002 (NK breaking of safeguards) to late 2003 (when the insurgency in Iraq started) the domestic support is coded *medium*. However, from late 2003 war onwards it is coded as 'low'.

AQ 11 - Are one of the four hypothesised patterns present when states threaten and use force?

The US through the Chinese could be seen to directly threaten the use of force, even though none of the patterns conform to the hypothesised patterns. From the resumption NK programme in late 2002 to the start of the insurgency in Iraq war in late 2003 it is assessed that the US national interest in preventing a nuclear weapons programme was *high*, the chances of military success were *low* and domestic support would have been *medium*. This pattern is not one that is predicted to lead to states threatening the use of force. However, if the chances of success of military force had been coded one higher (*medium*) then this would have conformed to an interest driven pattern that would indicate the willingness to threaten force. Therefore, it is possible that the US forces believed they could win with little cost.

However, once the insurgency starts in Iraq and the invasion loses domestic support, it is highly likely that any suggestion of intervening in NK would have been vehemently opposed domestically. Therefore, through the logic Jakobsen patterns the lack of success of the Iraq war would suggest that the government would be even less inclined to issue threats of force against NK's nuclear programme.

This does conform to an extent with the empirical evidence. Although the US did use threatening language towards NK it did not actively consider surging troops into the country or conducting a pre-emptive strike in the manner of the Clinton administration. The most threatening rhetoric was made 2002 to 2003. As the Iraq war moved into an intensive COIN phase (late 2003) the Bush approach became fully vested in the 6 party talks established April 2003 to deal with the issue of NK diplomatically.¹⁷² As pointed out by Douglas Feith "the fact that the Iraq war went badly affected U.S. policy. It made the U.S. less willing to consider using military action in other contexts, for example, North Korea. In any event, I don't think any American president would give serious consideration to military action against any country until after all means short of war have been exhausted".¹⁷³

Therefore, what Jakobsen's patterns perhaps shows is that although there was clearly threatening language, that to NK must have constituted a threat, as Iraq deteriorated the Bush administration was actually unlikely to use force against the DPRK. This may have been the DPRK calculation when they decided to attain a weapon.

¹⁷² George W. Bush: "The President's News Conference," October 11, 2006. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=24077>, accessed 24 June 2014.

¹⁷³ Author's interview with Mr Douglas Feith former Deputy Secretary for Defence, in person, 13 March 2013.

AQ 12 - Are all the hypothesised patterns absent when states lack the will to threaten and use force?

As discussed in Q11, although the patterns indicate there should have been no threat to use force, the Bush administration did issue threats. However, what this perhaps demonstrates is that the rhetoric was not deemed credible by NK.

AQ 13 - Does coalitional consensus concerning threats of force result from leadership by one or more states, and/or a shared perception that important interests are threatened?

There was no coalitional threat to use force. Clearly Seoul had more to fear a nuclear armed NK than anyone as it calculated that it would place them at a military disadvantage.¹⁷⁴ However, the South adopted the Sunshine policy that aimed to lessen the confrontation between the Koreas and remained committed to the AF.¹⁷⁵ Therefore, it would not support any aggressive US posture. The difficulty with this approach was highlighted by Jack David who at the time was Deputy Secretary of Defence:

It was amusing to meet with the South Korean military and officials, in the context of preparing for a war where the North Koreans might use Chemical weapons in particular or North Koreans, to talk about that whilst the official position was not to talk about war with NK. So, South Korea was an impediment in that respect, but at the end of the day it is their peninsula not ours.¹⁷⁶

There were also reports that after the North protested over the term CVID during six party talks, that the South requested the US refrain from using the term.¹⁷⁷ The South

¹⁷⁴ US Secretary of State, A/S Kelly discusses Korea, bilateral relations with PRC Ambassador Yang Jiechi (10 January 2003), <http://caledavis.com/Sources/2003/03STATE8026.pdf> accessed, 23 June 2014

¹⁷⁵ Thomas Hubbard, PBS interview in 2003, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/interviews/hubbard.html>, accessed 14 May 2014.

¹⁷⁶ Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction and Negotiations Policy, Jack David interview, 15 March 2013.

¹⁷⁷ KCNA, "KCNA Urges US to Accept DPRK's Proposal," *Korean Central News Agency*, 22 May 2004, in Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question, A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis*, pg.353.

also clearly disagreed with the US at times on how the six party talks should be conducted.¹⁷⁸ SK also took the Libyan model as a framework believing that nuclear dismantlement would occur if diplomatic normalisation was realistically worked towards. Furthermore, that as with Libya what was required was quiet diplomacy through SK and Japan.¹⁷⁹

Japan also shared a clear interest with the US and the ROK in preventing a nuclear DPRK.¹⁸⁰ Furthermore, it was a strong partner to the US as demonstrated by its deployment of Self-Defence Forces to Iraq.¹⁸¹ Therefore, it was largely willing to follow the US lead.

China's interests conflicted with that of the US, as Bush pointed out:

The Chinese wanted stability; we wanted freedom. They were worried about refugees flowing across the border; we were worried about starvation and human rights. But there was one area where we agreed: It was not in either of our interests to let Kim Jong-Il have a nuclear weapon.¹⁸²

Furthermore, Bush clearly implied that it was the threat of US force against NK that persuaded China to push for the six-party talks.¹⁸³ China had privately pointed out that it shared the US goal to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons on the peninsula and

¹⁷⁸ George W. Bush: 'Remarks Following Discussions With President Roh Moo-hyun of South Korea and an Exchange With Reporters', 14 September 2006, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=868>, accessed 23 June 2014.

¹⁷⁹ Interview with a senior Blue House Official, Seoul, September 4, 2006 in Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question, A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis*, pg.354.

¹⁸⁰ US Secretary of State, A/S Kelly discusses Korea, bilateral relations with PRC Ambassador Yang Jiechi (10 January 2003), <http://caledavis.com/Sources/2003/03STATE8026.pdf>, accessed 23 June 2014.

¹⁸¹ *Op.cit.* Funabashi, pg.71.

¹⁸² Bush, *Decision Points*, pg.424.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

that this did not 'sit well' with NK.¹⁸⁴ However, as pointed out by a former UK ambassador to the DPRK:

China still considers it in its strategic interest to maintain NK as a buffer to South Korea and the US troops based there. China has shown itself prepared to take some political heat to defend that interest, for example at the UNSC, and the chances are that it will continue to provide political and material support to North Korea until China decides that it no longer needs that strategic buffer.¹⁸⁵

The US clearly recognised this role and repeatedly urged China to 'to use its considerable influence with NK to make meaningful progress toward a Korean Peninsula that is free of nuclear weapons'.¹⁸⁶

US leadership and shared interests were essential in forming the six-party talks. However, there was no appetite, or even consideration, among either ROK or PRC to use the threat of force to achieve their shared objective of a NK without nuclear weapons. The ROK was not willing to risk the escalation to a full war that a more aggressive posture could initiate. China was concerned that more pressure could lead to the collapse and instability that could spread across their border.

AQ 14 - Does coalitional consensus concerning threats of force fail to emerge when none of the above conditions are met?

Although there was the shared goal and US leadership, the ROK and PRC were not willing to risk a war that could lead to instability within the region.

¹⁸⁴ US Secretary of State, A/S Kelly discusses Korea, bilateral relations with PRC Ambassador Yang Jiechi (10 January 2003), <http://caledavis.com/Sources/2003/03STATE8026.pdf>, accessed 23 June 2014.

¹⁸⁵ Author's interview with former Ambassador David Slinn, by telephone, 23 April 2013.

¹⁸⁶ George W. Bush: "Remarks at a Welcoming Ceremony for President Hu Jintao of China," 20 April 2006, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=72428>, accessed 10 January 2016.

AQ 15 - Do international organisations make it easier for leading states to mobilise support for policies involving threats and use of force?

The US threats towards NK did not reach a point where it was looked as though an imminent strike would be conducted or a decision to possibly seek legitimacy through the UN. The UNSC did pass resolution 1695 that strongly urged that:

The DPRK to return immediately to the Six-Party Talks without precondition, to work towards the expeditious implementation of 19 September 2005 Joint Statement, in particular to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes, and to return at an early date to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.¹⁸⁷

This was clearly not a threat of force. It is highly likely that any UNSC resolution stronger than this would have been vetoed by China.

AQ 16 - Did the issuing of a threats increase the motivation of the coerced to develop nuclear weapons?

The threat posed by the US was certainly stated by the NK as a justification for why they needed to develop a nuclear weapon. Therefore, on face value it would appear more threats actually increased their motivation to attain a nuclear weapon. However as pointed out by Joseph; perceived threats like ‘they could be next after Iraq’ may have had an affect but ‘did they do anything differently no, but it does feed their sense that nuclear weapons are essential for deterrence. But they had that sense before; it just adds to it’.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁷ Resolution 1695 (2006) Adopted by the Security Council at its 5490th meeting, on 15 July 2006 <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/431/64/PDF/N0643164.pdf?OpenElement>, accessed 25 June 2014.

¹⁸⁸ Author’s interview with Ambassador Robert Joseph, in person, 11 March 2013.

CONCLUSION

Table 4.1 shows the key findings of this chapter.

	Threat to use force	Deadline given	Assurance given	Incentives offered	<i>Ideal policy</i>	Predicted outcome of CD	Actual outcome of CD	Will to threaten and use of force?	Impact of org.
NK Ep.1	Yes	No-implied	Partial	Yes	No	Failure	Success	No	Negative
NK Ep.2	Partial – Yes at first	No	Partial	Yes	No	Failure	Failure	No	No impact
Table 4.1									

The political objective throughout the Clinton administration was to prevent the DPRK obtaining a nuclear weapon. This was done through a series of escalating demands; that brought the crisis to the brink of war in 1994, as NK looked set to walk over a US red line and move fuel rods to re-processing installation without supervision of the IAEA. This led to Clinton considering a pre-emptive strike and reinforcing SK in order to deter any NK attack that might occur in response to further UN sanctions. The Carter intervention de-escalated the situation, but there remained the underlying threat that the crisis could return to the brink of war. The US had demonstrated that it was not willing to back down even if it risked war. Therefore, a return to the crisis, and the implicit threat of force that implied was ever present throughout the negotiations that led to the AF.

The strategy of coercive diplomacy that was applied throughout this episode was further complicated by several actors (DPRK, ROK, US, IAEA, UN and Japan) with slightly differing agenda; but at the centre throughout was the US. It was the threat of US military action similar to that of the Gulf War that concerned NK and compelled them to enter talks leading to the AF. It was the assurances contained within the AF that mapped out what the reciprocal the US action would be if they met key demands.

However, these assurances did not go far as saying there would not be further demands. It was the incentives of a LWR and heavy oil that the US promised NK that induced them. Although there were implied deadlines of the end of programmed AF talks, at no point was there a hard deadline backed with the threat of force set; therefore, the form of coercive diplomacy adopted did not conform to the *ideal policy*.

The Carter intervention was pivotal to the crisis as it provided a way out for NK that enabled it to save face. The DPRK did not want to enter a war that it must have known it would lose, but could see no way of complying without the regime losing face. Therefore, it was willing to go to war, even if it was likely to lose. Having studied the Gulf War, NK perhaps believed that the US would only conduct a pre-emptive strike or limited campaign. Pyongyang then could sell such an action to their domestic audience as an example of ‘Western aggression’ and claim victory if the US did not commit to a full invasion and regime change. Assuming that NK key objective was regime survival its actions were rational. Obtaining a nuclear weapon would give them a deterrent or a bargaining chip to trade for the resources and money it required to exist.

There was clearly a willingness to threaten force by the US; although Jakobsen’s patterns predicted there should not have been. There are several explanations for why Jakobsen’s patterns and US willingness to threaten force do not align. Firstly, Jakobsen’s logic could be wrong and states may in fact willing to go into a costly war over an issue that does not affect vital interest, would be controversial domestically, and possibly would not succeed. It could be the US saw the credibility of its counter-proliferation policy as essential to its long term survival; however, this would lead to the US threatening the use of force over other proliferation issues. Another possibility is that the US was gambling that the deployment of US troops would not lead NK to

escalate to a point of engaging in a war that it could not win. Clearly if the surge did cause an escalation it would have been a significant US miscalculation. It may be that the US felt that it had no option, as if it did not seek a UNSC resolution, surge troops to deter NK, it would be viewed as a 'paper tiger' and would have lost credibility globally. Therefore, it was caught in an escalatory cycle with NK.

Although coercive diplomacy was successful in achieving the AF, it was not the grand strategy required to bring NK further into the IC and sort out the underlying issues that initiated the crisis. However, it is not a failure necessary of coercive diplomacy that the AF fell apart in 2003, but of US ability to form a longer term policy towards NK.

The Bush administration also started with the objective that the DPRK did not attain a nuclear weapon. However, the strategy adopted varied between the first and second administrations. The US made clear threats towards NK. President Bush told China that he may have to consider military action, a threat he must have known would reach NK ears. Furthermore, the invasion of Iraq, another member of the 'Axis of Evil' along with the rhetoric must have given the DPRK regime the feeling of being threatened; however, as the Iraq War moved into an intensive COIN phase (late 2003) the Bush approach became fully vested in the 6 party talks which were established in April 2003 to deal with the issue of NK diplomatically.¹⁸⁹

The US willingness to imply threats publicly and directly privately did not conform to Jakobsen's hypothesised patterns either. From the resumption of NK plutonium programme in late 2002 to the start of the insurgency in Iraq war in late 2003 it is

¹⁸⁹ George W. Bush: "The President's News Conference," October 11, 2006. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=24077>, accessed 24 June 2014.

assessed that force should not have been threatened as it would have been difficult to succeed at low cost. Furthermore, once the insurgency starts in Iraq and domestic support for any intervention declines, it seems that threats should decline further.

What Jakobsen's patterns perhaps explain is that although there was clearly threatening language, that to the NK must have constituted a threat, the Bush administration was actually unlikely to use force against the DPRK or the US overestimated its ability to achieve a military objective in NK; reassessing only after Iraq started to deteriorate. What both NK episodes demonstrate is the difficulty in persuading an opponent who is determined that they need nuclear weapons for regime survival and has potent counter coercion capabilities in the form of military forces that although inferior could still cause significant damage particularly to vulnerable civilian targets.

The next chapter will now conduct a more detailed structured focussed comparison of all the case episodes.

CHAPTER 5 – FOCUSSED STRUCTURED COMPARISON OF THE CASE STUDIES

Within this chapter I will compare the case studies in a structured manner through application of the analytical questions, derived in Chapter 2 and used in the previous two chapters. Although it will raise some of the issues regarding the use of the *ideal policy* as a framework to conduct a comparative analysis, it will not conduct an in-depth critique of the *ideal policy*; that will occur in the concluding chapter. This chapter will be primarily focussed on the findings that emerge from the use of the *ideal policy* as a framework to conduct a comparative analysis.

Table 5.1 shows the findings from the four episodes. Clearly four episodes is not a large enough data set to statistically validate a correlation between application of the *ideal policy* and outcome. However, it should be noted that in only 1 case did the predicted result occur (NK Ep.2). Although, even this finding does not offer any analytical value as failure to employ a range of different policies could lead to failure in achieving the objective. Furthermore, at no time did the US apply coercive diplomacy in the form of the *ideal policy*.

	Threat to use force	Deadline given	Assurance given	Incentives offered	Ideal Policy	Predicted outcome of CD	Actual outcome of CD	Will to threaten and use of force?	Impact of org.
Libya Ep.1	No	Partial	Partial	Yes	No	Failure	Partial Success	Yes	Sanctions only
Libya Ep.2	Yes	No - implied	Partial	Yes	No	Failure	Success	Yes	No impact
NK Ep.1	Yes	No - Implied	Partial	Yes	No	Failure	Success	No	Negative
NK Ep.2	Partial – Yes at first	No	Partial	Yes	No	Failure	Failure	No	No impact
Table 5.1									

As the US did not apply the *ideal policy* in any of the episodes; I argue that applying the *ideal policy* to stop attainment of nuclear weapons is more difficult than applying it over acts of aggression. The prime reason for this is that it is difficult for a state to issue a demand backed by a clear deadline, especially one that will be backed by direct threat of force. Furthermore, although the policy objective was always clearly to prevent the target attaining nuclear weapons, there were other security issues that influenced the demands being made. The opponent's development of a nuclear weapon is an abstract threat to the opponent until it is detected. Even upon detection the US did not view the threat, in the cases studied, as imminent. Therefore, issuing a deadline backed by force would possibly have tied the coercer into having to act in order to maintain credibility rather than for the objective of achieving compliance with their demand.

Another complication is that the dual nature of nuclear technology and the difficulty of categorically verifying that the opponent is seeking, or the stage of development of, a nuclear weapons capability leads to a strategic game between the two parties. The coercer issues incremental demands aimed to stop the known progression of the nuclear programme, whilst the coerced seeks to hide the extent of its military nuclear programme. Most likely the aim is to obtain a nuclear deterrent before a more coercive policy can be enacted or develop its capability to the point where maximum concessions can be drawn out of any diplomatic negotiations. This game further complicates the issuing of demands. For these reasons the strategy that seems to be adopted most frequently by the US is sanction based coercive diplomacy backed by an implied threat with no set deadline for compliance.

I also argue that the lack of a clear deadline to comply with the demand of stop or undo the development of nuclear weapons often makes the line between coercive diplomacy

and deterrence blurred. NK was told that the development of nuclear weapons was a US red line. As they had already started their nuclear weapon this was a demand to stop (which is a coercive diplomacy demand); however, it could be argued that if they had stopped it was because they did not act beyond the stated point that would initiate US action (which is a deterrent demand). The importance of this distinction is perhaps academic, as to policy makers it is purely applying what makes political/diplomatic sense at the time, and will be examined in more depth in the concluding chapter.

The most interesting finding comes from an examination of the cases using Jakobsen's criteria for when states should threaten force. The US was willing to take action that was a clear threat to NK and could have escalated to war when Jakobsen's criteria predicted it should not have. Furthermore, in the case of Libya, Clinton did not make a threat when Jakobsen's theory predicts he should have. This chapter will argue that these findings demonstrate that rationality can be analysed at different levels.

Policy makers can act rationally to achieve their set objectives within the bounds of their perceived reality of the situation; however, a more distant examination presented with different information can find that they don't conform to what would appear to be rational.

I will now compare the selected cases using the analytical questions derived from Jakobsen's *ideal policy*.

AQ 1 - What was the US policy objective and demand?

Episode	Demand
Libya Ep.1	Gaddafi gives up his support of terrorists. Hand over terrorist suspects and pay reparations to the families of the Lockerbie victims. Concern over WMD programme.
Libya Ep.2	States that supported terrorism and sought nuclear weapons halt their activities.
NK Ep.1	Demand 1 (from 14 March 1992). Hold talks with ROK over denuclearisation agreement leading to inspections. Demand 2 (from November 1992). Comply with the IAEA special inspections and safeguard agreement and comply with demand 1. Demand 3 (from 12 March 1993). Stay within the NPT. Demand 4 (from 4 March 1994) . Do not move fuel rods to re-processing installation without supervision of the IAEA; conform with demands 1&2. Demand 5 - (From 19 July 1994). Freeze and dismantle plutonium production programme, ship spent fuel out of NK, comply with NPT and ROK-DPRK denuclearisation agreements.
NK Ep.2	Demand 1 - Abolish comprehensively and permanently all nuclear development activities (made by Jim Kelly on 23 April 2003). Demand 2 - Present concrete means for verification of compliance with that request. (made by Jim Kelly on 23 April 2003). ¹ Demand 3 - Conform to Joint Statement (2005). Demand 4 - Return to six party talks (2006). Demand 5 - Do not conduct nuclear test.
Table 5.2	

Although always a clear policy objective that states stop their development of nuclear weapons, the actual demands made were often more complicated and often linked to other policy issues such as terrorism and general security issues.

The demands that the Clinton administration issued to Libya were primarily over terrorism and the policy objective of ending Libyan ‘efforts to develop or acquire weapons of mass destruction’ was mentioned as a lower priority. The Clinton administration articulated a position of ‘concern’ regarding Libyan efforts to develop WMD²; however, no public demand specifically stating that action would be taken if Libya progressed with its nuclear weapons program was made. The Bush administration initially continued with the Clinton administration’s policy; however, after 9/11

¹ Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question, A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis*, pg.330.

² Ronald E Neumann, Statement of Hon, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for near eastern affairs, Department of State, S-HRG. 106-740, US Foreign policy toward Libya, hearing before subcommittee on near eastern and South Asian affairs of the committee on foreign relations US senate one hundred sixth congress second session, 4 May 2000, <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-106shrg67394/pdf/CHRG-106shrg67394.pdf> , accessed 10 January 2015, pg.5.

demands were made that all states cease supporting terrorism or developing weapons mass destruction. The US also clearly articulated a policy objective that states supporting terrorism, who also sought nuclear weapons, halt their activities or face the possibility of pre-emptive military action. Libya identified as a state 'beyond the Axis of evil', who had a history of supporting terrorists and seeking WMD clearly fell into the category of a potential 'target' of a pre-emptive strike. Therefore, Gaddafi must have viewed the demand that states should halt their pursuit of nuclear weapons was being directed at him.

In the case of NK the Clinton administration clearly sought to prevent them attaining a nuclear weapon. The strategy was to keep NK within the NPT which was seen as a mechanism for ensuring that NK did not push ahead with its programme. This led to a series of escalating demands in response to various NK actions. Eventually demands, as stated within the Agreed Framework (AF) were met, at least until 2002.

Bush's strategy varied between the first and second administration. Initially starting with a strategy that was more coercive (without the diplomacy) this then changed to a similar approach to that of the AF in the form of the Joint Statement of 2005.

There are several points that can be drawn from these cases. Firstly, that the clandestine nature of nuclear/WMD programmes makes it very difficult to calculate the stage of the opponents programme and therefore the demand that should be made. This is further complicated by the fact that much of the technology for developing a military nuclear programme is also used in civilian nuclear programmes. Issuing a demand that a state should give up all its nuclear technology is therefore very difficult and arguably

illegitimate. NK continually argued that it had a right to develop nuclear technology for civilian purposes within its own borders.

To issue a credible demand the coercer needs to know what technology the opponent has and the stage of their nuclear programme. Therefore, demands tend to escalate incrementally until a point is reached where there is clear evidence of capability and intent. In Libya's case there is clear evidence of intent and capability provided by the interdiction of the BBC China; and they complied before a more coercive demand was made. In the case of NK during the Clinton administration its intent became clear when it pulled out of the NPT and declared its intent to reprocess spent fuel rods. During the Bush administration, NK's capability and intent became completely transparent when it conducted nuclear tests.

As will be discussed in more depth in this chapter, requiring the agreement of allies further complicates the calculation of what demand can be made of the opponent. The US and UK specifically left the IAEA out of the negotiations with Gaddafi in 2003 as it was assessed that they would complicate the issue by adding additional demands. Having two close allies conducting the negotiation meant demands and policy could be closely coordinated. During the NK case the conflicting objectives of the US, South Korea and IAEA did impact upon the demands that were made of NK.

AQ 2 - Was there a threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives quickly with little cost?

Episode	Threat to use force
Libya Ep.1	No
Libya Ep.2	Yes
NK Ep.1	No
NK Ep.2	Partial – Yes at first
Table 5.3	

In three of the four episodes it was assessed that a threat to use force was made towards the target. However, what constitutes a threat is difficult to define and could be interpreted differently. For example it could be argued that the Clinton administration did propose a direct credible threat of force towards Libya. Secretary of Defence William Perry in 1996 stated, then later retracted, that the US would not allow the Libya to open a suspected chemical plant and ‘wouldn’t rule out or anything in’³ in relation to US military action; it was clearly an implied threat but not a direct one. However, Gaddafi did appear to take this threat seriously as he halted construction on the plant shortly after.⁴ In others episodes I have argued that an implied threat is still a threat. Although I have discounted the implied threat in the case of Libya episode 1 as it appears to have been accidental and not consistent with the policy position of the administration. Martin Indyk and Ambassador Welch clearly emphasised that force was not an option in their dealings with Libya and the policy was to pressure Gaddafi through diplomatic and economic means.

The Bush administration’s threats against Libya, although still implied, were not an accidental remark to media but consistent with the administration’s policy stance. John

³ Perry, ‘Transcript: Perry media availability’, Ismailia, Egypt, (Expresses concern about Libya's chemical weapons program), 4 April 1996, http://www.fas.org/news/libya/dd3_4-9.htm, accessed 18 February 2014

⁴ Freedman, *Deterrence*, pg.93.

Bolton's 'Beyond the Axis of Evil' speech specifically named Libya and pointed out that 'states that renounce terror and abandon WMD can become part of our effort. But those that do not can expect to become our targets'.⁵ Furthermore, Douglas Feith pointed out that the administration believed that military action in Iraq would aid their coercive diplomacy with states like Libya. Furthermore, Bush's 'axis of evil' speech was vague enough for Libya to fall into 'states like these' category. Therefore, although implied, it meant to threaten states like Libya, unlike Perry's public statement which was later retracted.

The threat made by the US to tackle states who supported terrorism and sought WMD was given clear credibility after the invasion of Iraq based on the premise that Saddam had a WMD capability that could pose an imminent threat. Therefore, although there was not a direct threat stated from the President of the USA, the rhetoric of elements of the Bush administration, combined with credible demonstration of the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive force in Iraq clearly were perceived as a threat to Gaddafi and an indicator that he could be next.

Due to unresolved issues of the Korean War, there was always the threat of military force being used by either side of the DMZ. Therefore, although there was no direct threat made, any implied threat or military signalling must have been conducted knowing that it could be taken by the DPRK as a direct threat. The US had demonstrated in the Gulf War of 1991 that it had a superior military capability to the DPRK and would use force if it deemed necessary. The Clinton administration initially started with threats of sanctions for specific demands; however, at the point that it was

⁵ John Bolton, 'Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction', US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, The Heritage Foundation, (Washington, 6 May 2002), <http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0205/doc01.htm>, accessed 6 January 2014.

clear that the DPRK would possibly cross a US red line and move spent fuel rods to the reprocessing plant the threat of military action was clear. Gallucci told NK negotiators 'that I personally did not believe that the President of the United States would tolerate a nuclear programme in NK'.⁶ The US sent 26 patriot missiles to SK and it was reported that US helicopters and an aircraft carrier were deploying to the region. Even though tensions were finally reduced by the intervention of former President Carter there remained the underlying threat that the crisis could return to the brink of war throughout the follow on AF negotiations.

The first Bush administration sent the clearest signal that it posed a credible threat to NK's regime both in the administration's public rhetoric and closed door measures. Statements such as 'We will not tolerate nuclear weapons in NK. We will not give into blackmail. We will not settle for anything less than the complete, verifiable, and irreversible elimination of NK's nuclear weapons program'.⁷ Although not a direct threat, it was clearly implied and given credibility as fellow member of the 'axis of evil' Iraq had been invaded by the US only months earlier.

However, the credibility of this threat clearly did not endure into the Bush's second term. The policy shifted towards six party talks and the implied threats decreased. This did change prior to NK's nuclear test with clear threats from President Bush and his National Security Advisor. Although after NK announced that it had made its first nuclear test that President clearly emphasised that diplomacy, not military action, was the primary approach.

⁶ Author's interview with Ambassador Robert Gallucci, by telephone, 12 February 2013.

⁷ George W. Bush: "The President's News Conference With Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi of Japan in Crawford, Texas," May 23, 2003. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=922>, accessed 25 June 2014.

Although in three of the case studies it is assessed that there was a threat, in all of those cases the threat was implied rather than clearly stated clearly. The threat in the case of the Bush administration was initially given clear credibility by the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. The most obvious explanation for implying rather than directly threatening a named target is it allowed the US to have room to manoeuvre and did not tie it in to a course of action that it felt it would have to take to remain credible.

AQ 3 - Was a deadline for compliance offered?

Episode	Deadline given
Libya Ep.1	Partial
Libya Ep.2	No – implied
NK Ep.1	No – implied
NK Ep.2	No
Table 5.4	

Of the four cases examined none of them contained a clear deadline that if compliance was not forthcoming that strikes would follow. In the case of Libya Ep.1 it is assessed that there was a partial deadline as UNSC resolution 883 pointed out that if they were not compliant by a set time sanctions would be applied. Although there was no formal deadline for ILSA the legislative programme was well known therefore it can be seen as partially fulfilling the deadline criteria. However, none of these deadlines were specifically over Gaddafi's nuclear programme but were due to his support of terrorism with WMD as a lower priority issue. However, under the Bush administration there was no specific time given to Libya to halt its nuclear weapons programme or face military strikes. Pressure was maintained on Libya through US unilateral sanctions in the form of the ILSA and the open demands and threats already discussed. The approach was that of the 'gradual turning of the screw'; once Libya initiated talks with the UK and US over

the issue of WMD, the programme of talks between the parties, in effect became a deadline that Libya had to comply with, but it was still implied rather than stated. Although not specifically linked to the threat of force, the Clinton administration did continue to use deadlines to pressure NK into complying with specific demands. Regarding the demand that NK stay within the NPT, the deadline adopted was what George would have termed the “try and see”, as no specific timing was given but a warning that actions would take place if they were to go through with the threat and leave the NPT. A ‘try and see’ approach was also applied to the demand that NK did not move and reprocess fuel rods. NK had been told on several occasions that the US would not allow them to obtain nuclear weapons. Once the crisis instigated by NK’s apparent intent to move the rods had been averted there was only an implicit deadline that an agreement needed to be reached by the end of the bilateral talks between the US and UK held in Geneva between 5-12 August 1994. Therefore, although red lines were set that could lead to military strike, and there was clear programme set out in the AF, which if veered from may have re-ignited the threat of military action. However, there was no clear deadline set that if NK did not comply they would face military action.

The Bush administration also applied no specific deadline given to back any of the demands; at best the ‘try and see’ approach was applied. The DPRK on several occasions trampled over the line without consequence. Even, when NK conducted nuclear tests, in defiance of the 2005 Joint statement and US demands, the President emphasised that issue was to be resolved ‘peacefully through diplomatic means’.⁸ Therefore, as there was no threat of returning to a prior crisis at the end of any negotiations or a set time to comply with a demand, it is taken that this does not conform to the *ideal policy*.

⁸ George W. Bush: "The President's News Conference", 11 October 2006, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=24077>.

The deadlines if applied over the use of force were mainly of the ‘try and see’ or tacit ultimatum. Again this enabled US the freedom of manoeuvre rather than boxing themselves into a corner where they would have to back down or take action to maintain credibility. By not being fully explicit it meant that if an implied line was crossed the US credibility was not damaged to the same extent. However, clearly this also weakened the credibility of any implied deadline as it was felt that it could be crossed without impunity. This is most obvious in the case of NK. Even after the US implied that force would be used if it conducted nuclear tests; these were quickly backtracked on after the nuclear tests.

An issue for theory is whether the setting of red lines is a deterrent or coercive diplomacy strategy. Red lines indicate to an opponent if you do this (i.e. cross this red line then I will act against you – which is deterrence) then we may do this. However, in both NK cases, although the demand not to move spent fuel rods could be taken as either coercive diplomacy or deterrence. Therefore, it is possible to see where the lines between these two concepts become blurred. Whether this blurring matters beyond academic debate will be discussed in the next chapter.

AQ 4 – Was there an assurance given to the adversary against future demands?

Episode	Assurance given
Libya Ep.1	Partial – no regime change.
Libya Ep.2	Partial – no regime change.
NK Ep.1	Partial – no regime change.
NK Ep.2	Partial – no regime change.
Table 5.5	

It is assessed that this assurance was partially given in all of the cases; as in none of the episodes was a full assurance that no more demands would follow given.

Gaddafi had reason to mistrust US assurances in episode 2; in episode 1 he clearly believed that if he complied with UK/US demands and handed over suspects of the Lockerbie bombing that his regime would no longer be targeted and that he could start the integration back into the international system. However, the US still maintained its pressure on Gaddafi over concerns about its WMD programmes. Therefore, as assurances were given, but not assurances that further demands would follow, this element only partially conforms to the *ideal policy*. The Bush administration even after Gaddafi surrendered his WMD, continued to pressure Libya on terrorism and issues of human rights.⁹

There was a clear assurance given to Gaddafi that if he complied with US and UK demands they would not seek regime change. However, there was not a clear indication that further demands, regarding normal diplomatic issues such as human rights would not be made. Although this security assurance was clearly violated in 2011, in particular by the UK, as at the time this assurance was given it partially conformed to the *ideal policy*.

The clearest example of an assurance was contained in the AF where the US clearly indicated that no further demands would be made regarding regime change.

Furthermore, as long as the DPRK stuck to the agreement the US would maintain its part of the deal. This same approach was finally adopted by the Bush administration in the Joint Statement of 2005. However, by this point it was too late as NK were close to their goal of passing the nuclear threshold.

⁹ William J Burns, Statement of Hon. William J Burns, Assistant Secretary of State Bureau of near eastern affairs, *S. HRG. 108-496, Libya – next steps in US relations*, Hearing before the committee on foreign relations United States Senate one hundred eighth congress second session,(Washington, DC Government Printing Office, 2004), 26 February 2004 <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108shrg94557/pdf/CHRG-108shrg94557.pdf>, accessed 24 June 2012, pg.6.

The episodes demonstrate the fundamental difficulty with the assurances component of the *ideal policy*. If coercive diplomacy is seen as an option that has worked in the past it becomes tempting to use the strategy again to achieve your next political objective.

Coercive diplomacy through military strikes in 1986 was viewed a success in influencing Gaddafi to pull back from supporting international terrorism; therefore, it was asserted that “Gaddafi would responsive to pressure” over the issue of WMD.¹⁰

Furthermore, it is difficult for democracies to give a credible promise that further demands will not be made over a future issue. Future administrations/governments are not bound to maintain the same policy. Moreover, Libyan and North Korean human rights abuses were always going to be an issue which would lead to subsequent US and international demands. This was demonstrated clearly in 2011 with Gaddafi’s attempt to crush an internal rebellion with the threat of decimating Benghazi led effectively to the US and UK supporting forces opposing him.

AQ 5 – Was there an offer of carrots for compliance?

Episode	Incentives offered
Libya Ep.1	Yes
Libya Ep.2	Yes
NK Ep.1	Yes
NK Ep.2	Yes
Table 5.6	

In all of the cases the US offered incentives for compliance. For Gaddafi the carrot was the lifting of international sanctions and reintegration into the international community, and in particular an improved relationship with the US. Removing sanctions would enable Gaddafi to attract the investment required to improve Libya’s ageing

¹⁰ Author’s interview with Mr Douglas Feith former Deputy Secretary for Defence, in person, 13 March 2013.

infrastructure and gain access to markets to sell oil. The oil revenues would enable him to secure his position within Libya. Furthermore, the lifting of the travel ban would allow him to increase his influence abroad aiding in Gaddafi's personal ambition to be a regional leader. The US demonstrated that it was serious about the possibility of an improved relationship with Libya by its willingness to enter secret negotiations with the Libyan regime in 1998 and in 2003. The AF contained clear incentives to NK including the provision of fuel and the building of two LWR. It also held out the prospect of moving towards more normalised relations with the US.

In all cases the clearest incentive for the opposition was the normalisation, or at least improvement of relations with the US. However, this was always going to be difficult as even with the removal of the nuclear issue there remained issues of terrorism, human rights and security that needed to be resolved. Furthermore, offering clear incentives often would be jumped upon by hawks in the US as appeasement and seen as rewarding bad behaviour. Particularly in the case of the NK where many felt that it was being rewarded for flouting the international system and was still likely to be covertly maintaining a uranium based nuclear weapons programme. However, as incentives were offered in all the cases it demonstrates that the US was always willing to use methods other than force to persuade an opponent to comply.

Evaluation of the implementation of the *ideal policy* and coercive diplomacy applied

	Evaluation of Strategy adopted
Libya Ep.1	Sanction based coercive diplomacy.
Libya Ep.2	Coercive diplomacy (not in form of <i>ideal policy</i>)
NK Ep.1	Sanction based coercive diplomacy /deterrence/ coercive diplomacy (not in form of <i>ideal policy</i>)
NK Ep.2	Sanction based coercive diplomacy /deterrence/ coercive diplomacy (not in form of <i>ideal policy</i>)
Table 5.7	

None of the cases conformed to the Jakobsen's *ideal policy*. The strategy that was most commonly adopted by the US was sanction based coercive diplomacy backed by an implied threat with no set deadline for compliance.

Libya episode 1 was dominated by incentives, assurances and the threat or actual implementation of sanctions. As there was neither direct nor an implied threat of force this strategy I would call sanction based coercive diplomacy. Libya episode 2 contained an implied threat of force, but without a deadline and clear demand of the target, therefore it was coercive diplomacy but not in the form of the *ideal policy*. The US had laid out a threat to all states of pre-emptive strike if they were caught crossing a red line. Once the interdictions of the BBC China demonstrated clearly the extent of Libya's programme that is when deterrence failed and it became a strategy of coercive diplomacy, as at that point the US was directly demanding them to fully reveal, stop and undo their programme.

In both NK episodes there were red lines set, which is an element of a deterrent strategy. However, a demand of stopping or undoing is typically classed as a demand relating to coercive diplomacy. So if a target stops before a red line (i.e. does not move spent fuel

rods) it could be viewed as either deterrence or coercive diplomacy working. It is only when the demand to undo their programme is it clearly a strategy of coercive diplomacy. Furthermore, in both episodes the threat and use of sanctions was the initial tool employed, rather than a direct threat.

AQ 6 – Did the opponent prefer to comply rather than go to war?

Libya Ep.1	Desire to remove sanctions.
Libya Ep.2	Primarily to remove sanctions but threat increased motivation.
NK Ep.1	Was likely to go to war rather than lose face.
NK Ep.2	Initially complied but unclear if this was a delaying tactic.
Table 5.8	

There is not a pattern that emerges when comparing Libya and NK on whether the opponent preferred to comply rather than go to war. It is only in the case of NK.Ep1 that the threat of war was actually an imminent possibility. NK was willing to go to war rather than lose face; it took the intervention of former President Carter to open an avenue that led both sides to de-escalate. Libya's primary motivation was always to remove sanctions; therefore, it was willing to comply if this incentive was offered before the threat of war was imminent. However, the increased chance of war after 9/11 did motivate them to surrender their nuclear programme.

Although the US clearly made implied threats after 9/11; NK seemed to have reasoned correctly that as time went on it either did not believe the threat to be credible or that the US was not willing to risk a war. The initial threats and invasion of Iraq may have aided in persuading them to enter 6 Party Talks in April 2003. However, whether at the time taking part in these talks was a delaying tactic until they could develop a nuclear weapon capable of deterring the US or whether it was a genuine desire to partially comply rather than risk going to war is unclear. Overall there is no pattern amongst the

episodes; which would indicate that the answer to this element is highly dependent on the context of the individual cases and decision makers involved.

AQ 7 – Did the opponent act rationally, miscalculate or suffer from misperception?

Libya Ep.1	Libya acted rationally.
Libya Ep.2	Libya acted rationally.
NK Ep.1	NK acted rationally.
NK Ep.2	NK acted rationally.
Table 5.9	

The cases studied would indicate that the opposing leaders did act rationally. Although often publicly appearing as a ranting madman, Gaddafi's actions would appear to be rational. He started to comply with the US and UN demands over issues of terrorism which clearly brought him closer to re-integration into the international community. Furthermore, as the US did not have clear evidence of his nuclear programme and there was no direct threat made, Gaddafi's pursuit of nuclear weapons program would appear to be rational as it gave him the opportunity to either obtain a deterrent and mark of prestige, or possible increase any future bargaining position with the US. He had grounds to believe that the latter was a possibility as he had seen the incentives that NK had obtained through the AF.

Gaddafi also acted rationally in surrendering his nuclear weapons in 2003. The only misperception he could be accused of suffering from was an over estimation of the US willingness to use force at that time, as discussions with policy makers would indicate that, although the US was content for Gaddafi to believe there was a threat, they were not actually considering an attack on Libya. However, this policy could have changed

rapidly after the interdiction of the BBC China provided clear evidence of Gaddafi nuclear programme.¹¹

With no immediate attainment of nuclear weapons Gaddafi's decision to surrender his nuclear programme was rational. He was left with the choice of either continuing to develop a nuclear weapon, which in light of US policies enacted after 9/11 was at increased risk of detection, and if detected would have been at a high risk of being punished economically or destroyed militarily. Negotiating and surrendering this programme seemed to be a clearer path to achieving his goals of re-integration into the international community and developing a stable economy.

Assuming that NK key objective was regime survival its actions can be viewed as rational. Obtaining a nuclear weapon would give them a deterrent or a bargaining chip to trade for the resources and money it required to exist. Even if it miscalculated US resolve and the crisis escalated into conflict it had good reason to believe that it would be a limited conflict that the regime could weather and then use to its advantage internally.

If rationality is taken as state decision makers following the most logical path towards achieving their implicit or explicit objectives then it is assessed that in all four of these cases the leadership's acted rationally. However, in making this assessment it is realised that determining exactly what those objectives are is very difficult without access to key individuals at the top of these dictatorships or sensitive government documents.

¹¹ Author's interview with Ambassador Robert Joseph, in person, 11 March 2013.

AQ 8 - Does credible implementation of the *ideal policy* lead to compliance? & AQ

9 - Does failure to implement the *ideal policy* lead to non-compliance?

	Ideal Policy	Predicted outcome of CD	Actual outcome of CD
Libya Ep.1	No	Failure	Partial Success
Libya Ep.2	No	Failure	Success
NK Ep.1	No	Failure	Success
NK Ep.2	No	Failure	Failure
Table 5.10			

With such a low number of cases it is not possible to make statistically verifiable correlations between application of the *ideal policy* and its relation to an outcome.

However, only one of the four cases examined aligned with its predicted outcome. The Bush administration's policy towards NK did not conform to the *ideal policy* and NK did attain a nuclear weapon; therefore the predicted failure was the actual outcome.

However, the difficulty with this assessment is that there are a range of policies (diplomatic bargaining, economic sanctions, deterrence, pre-emptive strikes etc.) that if applied on their own may also have failed. Therefore, this case should be discounted as a positive correlation of prediction to outcome.

Although the *ideal policy* was not applied; two of the cases had partially successful outcomes. Clinton had partial success with Gaddafi meeting the demands that were set for him handing over terrorists and shutting down WMD programmes for a time. This was done even though there was no credible threat, just one accidental implied threat. The Bush administration gave no deadline for demands to be met and only partial assurances. However, this was the clearest success as Libya completely surrendered its nuclear weapons programme.

Perhaps the most interesting element to this is that it demonstrates that Gaddafi was always willing to comply, not primarily because of the threat of force or application of coercive diplomacy, but because he saw it in his interest (i.e. survival of his regime) to do so as it opened the possibility of being re-integrated into the international system; a goal that he clearly sought. Therefore, it did not require a crisis to rise to the level where policy in the form of the *ideal policy* was being applied in order for him to conform. What this limited sample of cases also demonstrates is that coercive diplomacy in the form of the *ideal policy* is not readily applied to the objective of preventing nuclear proliferation. Fundamentally, this is because states do not threaten with a specific deadline for when compliance has to be met. This arguably could be because none of the cases studied reached a crisis stage where this direct threat was necessary. Libya buckled way before this point was reached. The US was threatening to use against force NK in 1994, but this was not by a set deadline.

Primarily the reason that no direct threat backed by a clear deadline for implementation was set was that the US did not want to limit its room for manoeuvre. Setting hard deadlines would mean it would have to act or lose credibility. Furthermore, there does not seem to be an instant pattern where failure to apply the *ideal policy* necessarily leads to failure; what it shows is that the strategy that was applied in that episode did not lead to success. It is highly probable that there are numerous strategies if applied skilfully would come to a successful outcome. The difficulty is determining whether these strategies would have been at less cost than the one adopted; however, that question is beyond the scope of this thesis as it would be hypothetical and not based on any empirical evidence.

AQ 10 - Was compliance caused by fear that the threatened action would be carried out?

Libya Ep.1	No – continuation of sanctions led to surrendering of terror suspects and negotiations/.
Libya Ep.2	Partial - the fear of the implied threat of military action increased motivation to surrender WMD programme.
NK Ep.1	Partial – the fear of possibility of military strikes combined with incentives led to surrendering of plutonium based programme.
NK Ep.2	No – May have feared attack after 9/11 but still did not comply.
Table 5.11	

In none of the cases is it clear that the opponent complied purely out of fear; but it was a contributing factor. Gaddafi clearly felt threatened that he could be next on the US target list. Even in 2008 he stated that ‘one of these days, America may hang us’¹², a clear indication that he felt threatened. It is not possible to assess what balance fear and incentives was required to bring Gaddafi finally to the decision to comply. President Carter gave NK a way out that allowed them to save face and avert a military confrontation which the DPRK took. This would imply that they were fearful that further pressure could be applied to them including military strikes, but needed the offer of incentives that would allow them to save face, gain a reward and enable them to negotiate.

The implied threat of carrying out military force was a motivating factor for Libya in 2003 and NK in 1994, however, incentives were also an essential ingredient that enabled them to comply without losing face.

¹² Gaddafi, ‘Gaddafi attacks Arab leaders at the Arab summit in Syria’ (2008), translated by memritv.org, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VZZvPIGct_8, accessed 17 September 2013.

WILL TO THREATEN AND USE FORCE

Perhaps the most interesting element of Jakobsen's work is his theory on when states should be willing to threaten the use of force. Table 5.12 shows the coding that was given to each variable for each of the episodes, whether that combination of variables should lead to the US threatening to use force and whether there was actual a threat of force emanating from the US.

	Variables			Predictions - Will to threaten and use of force?	Was there a threat to use force?
	The nature of threatened interests	The prospect of military success	Domestic support		
Libya Ep.1	High	High	Medium	Yes	No
Libya Ep.2	High	High	Medium	Yes	Yes
NK Ep.1	High	Low	Medium	No	Yes
NK Ep.2	High	Low	Low	No	No
Table 5.12					

The most interesting results that jump out from this comparison are those that do not conform to Jakobsen's theory. According to his theory the Clinton administration should not have been willing to threaten force against NK and should have been willing to threaten force against Libya. I will now go onto examine in more depth what these results indicate.

AQ 11 - Are one of the four hypothesised patterns present when states threaten and use force?

	Variables			Predictions - Will to threaten and use of force?	Was there a threat to use force?
	The nature of threatened interests	The prospect of military success	Domestic support		
Libya Ep.2	High	High	Medium	Yes	Yes
NK Ep.1	High	Low	Medium	No	Yes
Table 5.13					

Out of the 2 cases there was a threat to use force (Libya Ep.2 and NK Ep.1) a pattern that Jakobsen predicts would lead to a threat is only in present in Libya Ep.2. The only variable that differs between these two episodes is the coding of the prospect of military success at *low* cost; which is coded *high* against Libya and low against NK. There are several explanations that I believe all contribute to the difference in prediction and actual outcome.

Firstly, Jakobsen's logic that states may in be fact willing to commit to a costly war over an issue that does not affect vital interest, would not be fully supported/or opposed at home and would have little chance of being achieved militarily at low cost is not always correct. Psychological biases and the exact context of the crisis can affect the path that decision makers on both sides take. Therefore, they become stuck in a gradually increasing face off where the stakes get higher and higher and credibility domestically and internationally becomes an issue. Similarly, both sides may be acting according to what they deem to be rational to reach their specific objective; however, to an external detached observer with all the available information their actions can appear irrational. Jakobsen's *ideal policy* has been derived from a detached rational viewpoint base on how states should try to stop or undo an opponent's acts of aggression; how actors behave in achieving an objective that tends to emerge over a greater period of time, and is harder to detect, appears to be different; this does not make their actions irrational.

Secondly, it could be that my assessment of the variables is incorrect and that for NK episode 1 either the prospect of military success should be coded high for the USA as it in fact deemed it a vital interest. My assessment is based on open source information with the gift of hindsight. However, there is clearly intelligence and other governmental

papers that may have revealed information that was known to the decision makers of the time. Furthermore, often the coding is based on what is my interpretation of the information I have access to. For example what are the objective figures to differentiate between a coding of medium for prospect of military success compared to high; is it 100 deaths, 1000 deaths or 100000 deaths. Clearly what is deemed as an acceptable cost is very much the judgement of the individuals making the decision and the context of willingness to take loss at the time. So the psychological profile of decision makers, the context of the crisis and the importance of the goal they are seeking are fundamental.

Willingness to accept loss could be viewed like a commodity. Like a trader needs to judge what the market is willing to pay for the commodity being sold, the decision maker has to evaluate what the market (Congress, Voters etc.) are willing to pay in blood and treasure to achieve a particular objective. If the value of the objective is clear and the market at that time is willing to pay the cost then action may take place. Therefore, like commodity prices can be affected by confidence in the economy, the willingness to accept loss can change dependent on the perceived value of the goal at that time.

The Clinton administration was actively considering a pre-emptive strike on NK, or at the minimum UNSC resolution imposing sanctions that would have required a surge of a 100,000 troops. Due to the overt nature of NK nuclear programme and the continuing escalating crisis it could be the US saw the credibility of its counter-proliferation policy which it deemed as essential to its long term survival. Arguably this would have led the US threatening the use of force to a range of states over proliferation issues; however, NK was the most obvious state to defy the US, having left the NPT and was clearly a direct threat to US allies such as the ROK and Japan. Therefore, unlike Libya where it

was less certain of the stage of its programme and did not threaten US strategic partners so directly, the President clearly judged that stopping NK attaining nuclear weapons was worth the possibility of war even if potentially the cost would have been high. Thirdly, it could be that the Clinton administration in fact miscalculated and either perceived NK as vital threat to its interests, felt it had to continue to escalate the situation in order to maintain credibility or that NK would eventually back down. There is no evidence to suggest that the US deemed NK to be an imminent threat to the survival of the US, although clearly he deemed the crisis as a threat to key strategic allies, US proliferation policy and the credibility of the US. It is plausible that the US was gambling that the deployment of US troops would not escalate to war. Clearly if the surge did cause an escalation it would have been a US miscalculation. Therefore, it may be that the US felt that it had no option, as if it did not seek a UNSC resolution, surge troops to deter NK, it would be viewed as a 'paper tiger' and would have lost credibility globally.

There is not enough evidence to lead to any conclusions on the accuracy of Jakobsen's theory. However, examining the cases through the rational lens of Jakobsen's model does raise intriguing questions of why the US was almost willing to go to war with NK even though it knew that this would have devastating consequences and not go to war with Libya. Therefore, Jakobsen's theories do have utility as an analytical tool for questioning the deeper logic underlying the behaviour of the US in these episodes.

AQ 12 - Are all the hypothesised patterns absent when states lack the will to threaten and use force?

	Variables			Predictions - Will to threaten and use of force?	Was there a threat to use force?
	The nature of threatened interests	The prospect of military success	Domestic support		
Libya Ep.1	High	High	Medium	Yes	No
NK Ep.2	High	Low	Low	No	No
Table 5.14					

Of the four episodes there are two episodes (Libya episode 1 and NK episode 2) where the US did not threaten to use force; however, in the Libya episode 1 it was predicted that they would. There are several explanations of why the Libya episode 1 does not conform to the predicted pattern.

Firstly, it could simply be that the context of this case involved psychological factors and asymmetric information that affected decision makers so they did not act rationally and conform to the way that Jakobsen's theory predicted. Secondly, the assessment of how much of a threat to US interests and whether victory could be achieved at low cost may be overestimated. The US may have deemed Libya as not enough of a threat to consider even a small number of US casualties or the expenditure of money, especially if it believed correctly that it could achieve its objective through diplomacy and sanctions at lower cost.

Thirdly, the most likely explanation is that threatening to use force before exploring all diplomatic and measures short of force would have defied international norms and been deemed illegitimate. Therefore, not believing Libya to be an imminent threat worth the expenditure of blood and treasure, it was willing to follow the normal international

process of taking the issue to the UNSC and implementing sanctions. The US thus did not undermine the international norms laid out in the UN charter.

Lastly, as stated previously it may be that the Jakobsen's model is simply incorrect and that cases are so context dependent that predictions in any form of statistical and scientifically verifiable way is not possible. More cases would need to be studied to build a statistical validation of whether this is the case. But even this would be difficult due to the difficulties in ensuring that any subsequent studies analyse cases in a consistent way.

Evaluation of the Willingness to Threaten

	Variables			Predictions - Will to threaten and use of force?	Was there a threat to use force?
	The nature of threatened interests	The prospect of military success	Domestic support		
Libya Ep.1	High	High	Medium	Yes	No
Libya Ep.2	High	High	Medium	Yes	Yes
NK Ep.1	High	Low	Medium	No	Yes
NK Ep.2	High	Low	Low	No	No

Table 5.12 (repeated)

In four of the cases only two resulted in the prediction matching the outcome (highlighted in Tan). Again although not enough to validate a correlation, clearly only two out of four would give the initial indication that either there is no correlation or that we are dealing with 2 statistical variations in the case of Libya episode 1 and NK episode 1. What is interesting is that the two cases that do not conform to Jakobsen's prediction occurred within the Clinton administration. This could indicate that the logic that Clinton applied when calculating whether to use force differs from that of Bush. By

examining this further may provide further indication of whether Jakobsen's model is valid, as if it is clear that Clinton's logic was different it would add value to the possibility that these outcomes would turn out to be in a larger study statistical variations from the norm.

	Variables			Predictions - Will to threaten and use of force?	Was there a threat to use force?
	The nature of threatened interests	The prospect of military success	Domestic support		
Libya Ep.1	High	High	Medium	Yes	No
NK Ep.1	High	Low	Medium	No	Yes

The only difference in the variables is the assessment that prospect of achieving success in NK was deemed low compared to *High* for Libya. Clearly if based purely on these codings it would appear that Clinton was acting irrationally as he threatened force in a crisis that he would have less chance of achieving success. But as stated there are several contextual differences between the two crises which need exploring further: Firstly, although both interests are coded high as they affected strategic aims of the United States, NK's was more distinct and urgent. NK had a clear nuclear programme and was clearly flouting international rules and endangering US counter proliferation. Also because of the cease fire that was still in place, the size of the NK army and the deployment of 35000 US troops within range of those forces, NK clearly appeared more of an obvious threat than Libya. Libya was only a threat in that it was developing WMD (although more chemical and biological, its nuclear programme was not well known or established) and although this would give it the ability to threaten the interests of the US it was not as threatening as NK. Neither state was threatening vital interests (i.e. the survival of the US). Secondly, the crisis in NK actively involved allied partners who often complicated and influenced US actions.

The most likely explanation for the US not acting in Libya is that the Clinton did not view the nuclear issue as an immediate threat and was more concerned with the more immediate electoral damage that could be done by not dealing with the highly motive issue of reparations for the Lockerbie victims' families. Raising the issue of nuclear weapons backed by the threat or actual use of force would clearly have complicated gaining compensation. Whereas dealing with the issue that would affect domestic votes first (compensation), then dealing with the less immediate, but important issue of Gaddafi's emerging nuclear programme seemed a more logical strategy.

Thirdly the motivations of the two sides opposing the US were very different. NK was an isolationist state that wanted to deter the US and had a genuine fear of invasion. Nuclear weapons were seen as a way of achieving this objective. Furthermore it was a 2 year crisis with the threat of violence only coming to the fore towards the end. Gaddafi was an outward seeking leader who sought to galvanise the Arab people into believing that he was a leader to be followed, in order to do this he needed wealth which involved trying to reintegrate back into the international community and more importantly economy. Therefore, he was willing to submit to demands before the US needed to actively threaten him.

Fourthly, the relative power of the US at different times may explain Clinton's willingness to more directly threaten force. In 1994 the US was clearly the world's only superpower both economically and militarily. The USSR had collapsed in 1989 and the US convincingly defeated the Iraq army in the Gulf war. There was a belief stated by George Bush Snr that a new world order was emerging that the US would be at the head of. Therefore, emboldened by the US's position in the world, the use of US power

including US force may have been seen as more viable tool by the Clinton administration.

Bush's administration was clearly willing to use force as demonstrated by its invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, which may have resulted in many US casualties, the following counter insurgency operation clearly made these wars highly unpopular with the domestic audience. Furthermore, the controversial nature of legal premise of the invasion of Iraq damaged the US relationship with many states.

Therefore, an over expanded military and damaged political ties with surrounding states meant that, although still a super power, its influence had waned by 2004. This reduction in relative power clearly curtailed the US to act so aggressively against NK. What these episodes show is that the finer detail of the specific scenarios is important and can lead to the threat of force even if it would appear from a more detached examination that this would not be rational.

AQ 13 - Does coalitional consensus concerning threats of force result from leadership by one or more states, and/or a shared perception that important interests are threatened?

Libya Ep.1	No direct threat of force so no consensus. US leadership in conjunction with UK.
Libya Ep.2	Implied threat of force by the US. UK and US shared approach key factor.
NK Ep.1	Implied threat of force and deterrence. South Korea, Japanese and IAEA complicated US strategy but were essential to AF; all had shared interests. US leadership.
NK Ep.2	Implied threat of force initially. Diplomatic coalition (6 party talks) built in second administration. US leadership.
Table 5.15	

There was no direct threat to use force in any of the cases so it is not possible to assess whether coalitional consensus concerning threat of force required leadership or shared perception of various states that important interests are threatened. If the US had negotiated with allies to put forward more than an implied threat of force it would have escalated both crisis and limited its freedom of manoeuvre. However, an assessment of coalitional consensus required to threaten and implement sanctions and other measures can be assessed.

US leadership was fundamental to achieving sanctions; however, other actors with shared interests also joined them. UN sanctions against Libya required US leadership to formulate and implement. Furthermore, the enactment of sanctions was aided significantly by the US, UK and France sharing the policy objective that Libyan terrorist issues should be resolved. This united front by three members of the permanent members of the UNSC clearly influenced states to back their claims and led to UN sanctions. Therefore, the instigation of sanctions against Libya over the issue of terrorism required US leadership and relied on shared interests with the UK and France. There was only a strong implied threat from the US, who in the aftermath of 9/11 firmly warned states that both supported terrorists and sought nuclear weapons that they could be potential targets. Although the UK did not issue similarly strong implied threats, it did support the US in invading Iraq over the issue of WMD demonstrating its willingness to follow US lead.

It was the UK who was initially approached by Libya regarding surrendering of its WMD. The UK/US had several shared interests in preventing Gaddafi attain WMD. Firstly, both states had historic issues over Libya's behaviour, in particular regarding its previous support of terrorism. Therefore, both were concerned that a WMD armed

Gaddafi would be a destabilising influence within the region. Secondly, as both the UK and US were signatories of the NPT, permanent members of the UNSC and recognised nuclear powers there was not only an obligation, but it was in their interests, to prevent proliferation of WMD. Libya's attainment of WMD could have led to a weakening of the proliferation regime and destabilise international security.

Japan, ROK and the US shared the interest in preventing NK attaining nuclear weapons. To the ROK and Japan it was a vital interest, as unlike the US, a nuclear armed DPRK posed an almost immediate threat to those states. However, the ROK often opposed a US aggressive stance with the North, as they had the most to lose from any confrontation; as pointed out by former Clinton staffer Robert Carlin; 'the South Koreans don't want to see their beautiful country destroyed in the interest of US non-proliferation goals— big problem'.¹³ Therefore, although there were shared interests that drove all parties to engage diplomatically, there was not a clear coalitional consensus to use force.

There was no coalitional threat to use force. Clearly Seoul had more to fear a nuclear armed NK than anyone as it calculated that it would place them at a military disadvantage.¹⁴ However, the South during the initial years of the Bush administration adopted the Sunshine policy that aimed to lessen the confrontation between the Koreas and remained committed to the AF.¹⁵ Therefore, it would not support any aggressive US posture. There were also reports that after the North protested over the term CVID

¹³ Author's interview with Mr Robert Carlin, in person, 4 March 2013.

¹⁴ US Secretary of State, A/S Kelly discusses Korea, bilateral relations with PRC Ambassador Yang Jiechi (10 January 2003). <http://caledavis.com/Sources/2003/03STATE8026.pdf> accessed 23 June 2014.

¹⁵ Thomas Hubbard, Interview in 2003, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/interviews/hubbard.html>, accessed 14 May 2014.

during six party talks, that the South requested the US refrain from using the term.¹⁶ The South also clearly disagreed with the US at times on how the six party talks should be conducted.¹⁷ SK also took the Libyan model as a framework believing that nuclear dismantlement would occur if diplomatic normalisation was realistically worked towards. Furthermore, that as with Libya what was required was quiet diplomacy through SK and Japan.¹⁸

Japan also shared a clear interest with the US and the ROK in preventing a nuclear DPRK.¹⁹ Furthermore, it was a strong partner to the US as demonstrated by its deployment of Self-Defence Forces to Iraq.²⁰ Therefore, it was largely willing to follow the US lead during the Bush era.

US leadership and shared interests were essential in forming the six-party talks. However, there was no appetite, or even consideration, among either ROK or PRC to use the threat of force to achieve their shared objective of a NK without nuclear weapons. The ROK was not willing to risk the escalation to a full war that a more aggressive posture could initiate. China was concerned that more pressure could lead to the collapse and instability that could spread across their border.²¹

¹⁶ Korean Central News Agency, "KCNA Urges US to Accept DPRK's Proposal", 22 May 2004, in Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question, A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis*, pg.353.

¹⁷ George W. Bush: "Remarks Following Discussions With President Roh Moo-hyun of South Korea and an Exchange With Reporters," 14 September 2006, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=868>.

¹⁸ Interview with a senior Blue House Official, Seoul, September 4, 2006 in Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question, A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis*, pg.354.

¹⁹ James Kelly, US Secretary of State, A/S Kelly discusses Korea, bilateral relations with PRC Ambassador Yang Jiechi (10 January 2003), <http://caledavis.com/Sources/2003/03STATE8026.pdf>, accessed 23 June 2014.

²⁰ *Op.cit.* Funabashi, pg.71.

²¹ Bush, *Decision Points*, pg.424.

In the three of the episodes the US clearly took the lead and tried to gather consensus for action, less than force, with allies who had shared interests. In only one case (Lib episode 2) was the approach shared between the US and UK. The fact that the US did seek to corral allies to support it, despite being the world superpower, does indicate that it felt there was a clear need to do this. Primarily this was because for sanctions to be effective they need to be supported internationally, which involved support from allies, who in turn could also seek to gain further support through the UN.

AQ 14 - Does coalitional consensus concerning threats of force fail to emerge when none of the above conditions are met?

Libya Ep.1	No direct threat of force so no consensus because crisis did not reach that point – Gaddafi surrendered terrorists.
Libya Ep.2	Implied threat of force and Gaddafi surrendered nuclear programme before crisis reached that point.
NK Ep.1	US, Japan, IAEA and SK had same objectives but different willingness to risk war.
NK Ep.2	US unilateral policy at first; followed by diplomatic measure (6 party talks). Threat of force never seriously considered.
Table 5.16	

As soon as the Libya handed over the Lockerbie suspects; the UN, against US wishes, suspended its sanctions. The US wished to maintain the pressure on Gaddafi until full compensation for the families of Lockerbie victims had been achieved and issues regarding Libya's pursuit of WMD had been resolved. However, the leadership of the only remaining superpower was not sufficient to influence the UN to maintain these sanctions. Once the issue of terrorism seemed to have been resolved many states within Europe believed it was in their interest to form economic ties with Libya against the wishes of the US.

A consensus on whether to threaten force did not emerge because Libya had approached the UK to surrender its weapons before its pursuit of WMD had become an international issue. It is highly likely that if Libya had not come forward when it did a more robust approach, including seeking international action against Libya, would have been taken by the US when the interdiction of BBC China supplied indisputable evidence of Gaddafi's pursuit of nuclear weapons. At this point it is more likely that a consensus on action, including possible strikes, would have been discussed.

As there was not a coalitional consensus concerning to threaten the use of force over NK nuclear programme this question cannot be answered. Although there was the shared goal and US leadership, the ROK and PRC were not willing to risk a war that could lead to instability within the region.

AQ 15 - Do international organisations make it easier for leading states to mobilise support for policies involving threats and use of force?

Libya Ep.1	No threat of force – so not assessed. UN sanctions made it easier to organise effective sanctions.
Libya Ep.2	Implied threat of force. Threat of UN involvement was an important element.
NK Ep.1	IAEA complicated US negotiation strategy. Final referring of NK to UNSC for sanctions may have led to war.
NK Ep.2	No threat of force.
Table 5.17	

In none of the episodes did the US seek to use international organisations to mobilise support for policies involving the threat or use of force. If the US had sought to do so it would have changed its threat from implied to direct, which as discussed previously was not deemed to be appropriate in this issues and would have limited its room to manoeuvre.

However, the threat of UN sanctions for non-compliance was an element in the US strategy to persuade NK. However, the reliance on the IAEA complicated the strategy as it was not under US control. The IAEA threatened to refer issues to the UNSC at a moment when the US did not want to increase pressure. To some seeking legitimacy through the UN seemed to unnecessarily complicate the crisis; as stated by former state department intelligence officer, Robert Carlin ‘we made it pretty clear to the North Koreans that once we had got done with this UN thing we would sit down and have bi-lateral talks with them’.²²

AQ 16 - Did the issuing of a threats increase the motivation of the coerced to develop nuclear weapons?

Libya Ep.1	No direct threat over nuclear weapons.
Libya Ep.2	No direct evidence.
NK Ep.1	No direct evidence
NK Ep.2	No direct evidence
Table 5.18	

There is no direct evidence that the implied threats increased the motivation of states to obtain nuclear weapons. There was no threat issued implicitly to Libya directly concerning nuclear weapons. Therefore, it is not possible to ascertain what impact this would have had on his nuclear programme. The implied threat toward states such as Libya seems to have decreased Gaddafi motivation to attain nuclear weapons as he initiated the negotiations that led to the surrendering of their WMDs. However, even whilst US, UK and Libyan negotiations were under way, Libya was continuing with its nuclear weapons programme, as demonstrated by the interdiction of parts on the BBC China that were destined for Libya. This would indicate that Gaddafi was hedging his

²² Author’s interview with Mr Robert Carlin, in person, 4 March 2013

bets, looking to surrender the weapons only if the deal was right.

There is no evidence to link threats to a change in the pace of NK programme.

However, the continual NK rhetoric about the mistakes that Saddam made would suggest they were concerned that a similar fate awaited them. Therefore, it is logical to assume that they increased the pace of their nuclear programme to gain a bigger bargaining chip to achieve a better security arrangement with the US or attain a deterrent. The only evidence of a possible connection is that when first threatened with sanctions they threatened to leave the NPT, and when the pressure had mounted further, the DPRK started to unload spent fuel rods. Both of these actions were on the path that would eventually enable them to attain a nuclear weapon.

The threat posed by the US was certainly stated by the NK as a justification for why they needed to develop a nuclear weapon. Therefore, on face value it would appear more threats actually increased their motivation to attain a nuclear weapon. However as pointed out by Joseph; perceived threats like ‘they could be next after Iraq’ may have had an affect but ‘did they do anything differently no, but it does feed their sense that nuclear weapons are essential for deterrence. But they had that sense before; it just adds to it’.²³

Although it may appear reasonable to assert that the seeking of a nuclear weapon in the first place must have been because the states involved felt threatened, it is not the only factor. Developing a nuclear weapon clearly raised the stakes at any negotiation with the US or if developed would have enabled the state to extort neighbouring states and deter the US. Without access to intelligence reports and policy makers within Libya or NK it

²³ Author’s interview with Ambassador Robert Joseph, in person, 11 March 2013.

is not possible to ascertain confidently that threats had any impact on their nuclear programmes or to ascertain what their internally stated goal in possessing weapons was.

CONCLUSION

	Threat to use force	Deadline given	Assurance given	Incentives offered	Ideal Policy	Predicted outcome of CD	Actual outcome of CD	Will to threaten and use of force?	Impact of org.
Libya Ep.1	No	Partial	Partial	Yes	No	Failure	Partial Success	Yes	Sanctions only
Libya Ep.2	Yes	No – implied	Partial	Yes	No	Failure	Success	Yes	No impact
NK Ep.1	Yes	No - Implied	Partial	Yes	No	Failure	Success	No	Negative
NK Ep.2	Partial – Yes at first	No	Partial	Yes	No	Failure	Failure	No	No impact
Same as table 5.1									

Table 5.1 summarises the key findings of the comparative analysis. As stated previously there is insufficient evidence to categorically state whether there is correlation between the application of the *ideal policy* and success. In only 1 of the cases (NK episode 2) did the outcome and prediction align. Furthermore, this result is discounted as there are a range of policies that weren't applied and failure may have still been the outcome.

In none of the episodes did the US apply coercive diplomacy in the form of the *ideal policy*. The key element of the *ideal policy* that was not applied in any of the episodes was the issuing of a direct threat that force would be applied if the opponent did not comply by a set deadline. The deadlines applied over the use of force were mainly of the 'try and see' or gradual 'turn of the screw' approach. Although in three of the episodes studied it is assessed that there was a threat, or at least a partial threat, to use force, the threat was implied rather than clearly stated.

The most obvious explanation for not giving a specific deadline and a clear threat is that doing so would tie the regime into a course of action; if the opponent did not comply it would either have to back down or go through with the action to maintain credibility. Therefore, implied threats were made that did not force the US into setting in stone a course of action. However, once the US was fully embedded into Iraq its capacity and more importantly its political capital to engage in other military action was clearly reduced and therefore the credibility of these implied threats declined.

The US did offer incentives in all of the episodes. Particularly in the case of Libya the use of incentives not only rewarded the recipient but enabled them to accept the deal without it looking like they were backing down to the implied threat of military force. Assurances were also issued; however, they were never fully articulated as an assurance that further demands would not follow.

The episodes also demonstrate a fundamental difficulty with the assurances component of coercive diplomacy. If coercive diplomacy is seen as an option that works it becomes tempting to use the strategy again to achieve your next political objective. Coercive diplomacy through military strikes in 1986 was viewed a success in influencing Gaddafi to pull back from supporting international terrorism, therefore, it was asserted that ‘Gaddafi would be responsive to pressure’ over the issue of WMD.²⁴ Furthermore, it is difficult for democracies to give a credible promise that no issue in the future is not going to arise that would not lead future administrations/governments making demands.

Moreover, Libyan and North Korean human rights abuses were always going to be an

²⁴ Author’s interview with Mr Douglas Feith former Deputy Secretary for Defence, in person, 13 March 2013.

issue which would lead to subsequent US and international demands. US and UK specifically left the IAEA out of the negotiations with Gaddafi in 2003 as it was assessed that they would complicate the issue by adding additional demands. Having two close allies conducting the negotiation meant demands and policy could be closely coordinated. During the NK case the conflicting objectives of the US, South Korea and IAEA did impact upon the demands that were made of NK.

The most frequent strategy that was adopted was the use of or threat of sanctions, incentives and assurances. There was also often an implied threat which arguably blurs the line between coercive diplomacy and deterrence. Libya Ep.1 was dominated by incentives and assurances; which is a strategy conforming to normal diplomatic bargaining along with the threat or use of sanctions. Therefore the approach used could be termed sanction based coercive diplomacy.

Libya Ep.2 contained an implied threat of force, but without a deadline and clear demand of the target, it could be argued that it was in fact deterrence. The US had laid out a threat to all states of pre-emptive strike if they were caught crossing a red line. Once the interdictions of the BBC China demonstrated clearly the extent of Libya's programme that is when deterrence failed and it became a strategy of coercive diplomacy as at that point it was more overtly demanding them to stop and undo their programme.

In both NK episodes red lines were set, which is clearly a strategy of deterrence. However, a demand of stopping or undoing is typically classed as demand relating to coercive diplomacy. So if a target stops before a red line (i.e. does not move spent fuel rods) it could be viewed as either deterrence or coercive diplomacy working. It is only

when the demand to undo their programme is it clearly a strategy of coercive diplomacy.

Another finding is that in all the episodes the opponent acted rationally in the pursuit of their objectives. The key objective of both NK and Libya was regime survival. For NK obtaining a nuclear weapon would give them a deterrent or a bargaining chip to trade for the resources and money it required to exist. Even if it miscalculated US resolve and the crisis escalated into conflict it clearly had good reason to believe that it would be a limited conflict that the regime could weather and then use to its advantage internally.

	Variables			Predictions - Will to threaten and use of force?	Was there a threat to use force?
	The nature of threatened interests	The prospect of military success	Domestic support		
Libya Ep.1	High	High	Medium	Yes	No
Libya Ep.2	High	High	Medium	Yes	Yes
NK Ep.1	High	Low	Medium	No	Yes
NK Ep.2	High	Low	Low	No	No
Same as Table 5.12					

Jakobsen's patterns (table 5.12) predict that force should not have threatened in the case of NK episode 1 and force should have been threatened in Libya episode 1.

For NK Ep.1 the only pattern where the logic of the *ideal policy* would imply the threat to use force, even if the prospect of success is low, is where the vital interests are threatened. However, Clinton was actively considering a pre-emptive strike, or at the minimum UNSC resolution imposing sanctions that would have required a surge of a 100,000 troops into the area to deter any aggressive action when sanctions were

announced; this clearly was a threatening action that risked a war that could have led to high number of casualties.

There are several reasons that this may result may have occurred. Firstly, again it could simply be that the context of this episodes involved psychological factors and asymmetric information that affected decision makers so they did not act rationally and conform to the way that Jakobsen's theory predicted.

Secondly, the assessment of how much of a threat to US interests and whether victory could be achieved at low cost may be overestimated. In fact the US may have deemed Libya as not enough of a threat to consider even a small number of US casualties or the expenditure of money, especially if it believed it could get what it wanted through diplomacy and sanctions at lower cost.

The most likely explanation for the US not acting in Libya is that the Clinton did not view the nuclear issue as an immediate threat and were more concerned with the more immediate electoral damage that could be done by not dealing with the highly motive issue of reparations for the Lockerbie victims' families. Raising the issue of nuclear weapons backed by the threat of force would clearly have complicated gaining compensation. Whereas gaining compensation first, then dealing with the less immediate, but important issue of Gaddafi's emerging nuclear programme seemed a more logical strategy. However, NK development of nuclear weapons would be a direct threat to key strategic allies, would seriously have damaged not only US nuclear proliferation policy but also perceptions of US power in the world; therefore the crisis in the US was deemed to be worth risking war over.

Lastly, as stated previously it may be that the Jakobsen's model is simply incorrect and that there are so few of these cases and that they are so context dependent that a model that would be sufficiently statistically verified to make confident predictions is not possible. More cases would need to be studied to build a statistical validation that would determine whether this is the case. But even this would be difficult due to the difficulties in ensuring that any subsequent studies analysed cases in a consistent way. As will be discussed in the next chapter it is highly unlikely to be possible to operationalise the ideal policy to the extent that consistency across those studying episodes could be achieved.

Overall the comparison of the episodes does give a clear indication of why applying coercive diplomacy in the form of the *ideal policy* is more difficult than applying it over acts of aggression. Firstly, although the policy objective is always clearly to prevent the target attaining nuclear weapons, there are usually other security issues that are wrapped up in the ensuing demand. It is also difficult to have any demand backed by a clear deadline. The targets development of a nuclear weapon is an abstract threat until it is detected. Even upon detection the threat in these cases was still not seen as imminent. Therefore, the issuing of a deadline where force would be used as it would tie the coercer into action on the bases of credibility and it would be difficult for them to determine fully whether compliance has actually been achieved. Therefore the demands aimed at stopping its progression escalate slowly and tend to be backed by less restrictive deadlines.

The next chapter will now look at how these findings relate and add to our current understanding of coercive diplomacy, critique in more depth the utility of the *ideal*

policy as strategy for preventing state attainment of nuclear weapons and the utility of the *ideal policy* as a framework to study these episodes.

CONCLUSION

This thesis makes an original contribution to the discipline of strategic studies in two distinct ways; firstly, it is the only study to critique Jakobsen's *ideal policy* and his theory on when states are willing to threaten the use of force. Secondly, it is the only study that conducts a structured focussed comparison of NK and Libya using Jakobsen's *ideal policy* as a framework. It also contains primary source evidence from interviews conducted with elite US and UK policy makers and coercive theorists.¹ This research is significant as, although the thesis is primarily an evaluation of Jakobsen's policy, it is examination of coercive diplomacy for preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons. Nuclear proliferation, and the increasing possibility of state or non-state actor possession, is one of the most significant issues within international security. Therefore, analysis of strategies that seek to prevent proliferation and learning lessons from cases is of value to both academics and policy makers.

The main finding of this thesis is that states do not adopt coercive diplomacy in the form of the *ideal policy* when trying to prevent other states from developing nuclear weapons. The key reason that the *ideal policy* is not implemented is that states are unwilling to set deadlines and make direct threats to states that are seeking to attain nuclear weapons. These elements of the *ideal policy* are not adopted as states do not want to limit their options and be forced into acting for the sole reason maintaining credibility. Secondly, I argue that the use of the *ideal policy* as an analytical framework is useful as a starting position to conduct a structured comparison of the cases; however, Jakobsen's *ideal policy* cannot be used to form accurate predictions of exactly how states will behave. Fundamentally, this is because what is a rational decision is dependent on the objectives of the decision maker, the information they have access to

¹ A list of those interviewed who are quoted within this thesis can be found at Appendix A.

which in turn moulds their perception of the context of the crisis that they are within. Therefore, a rational model will form predictions based on the assumption that participants have full information of the context that they are making their decision within; which is rarely true and in most cases impossible.

The key limitation of this study is the access to reports and individuals that would have revealed the inner working of the governments being studied. With access to this data it may be that different coding would have been given to the different variables within the cases studied. Furthermore, although there is a key attempt to operationalise the *ideal policy*, the codings are still broad enough that different analysts may interpret the same data differently and come to a different analysis. In other words the same study conducted by a different researcher with access to the same information could come up with a different interpretation.

I will also highlight within this chapter other avenues for possible research such as examination of Iraq (1992-2003), Iran (1992-ongoing) and possible applying Jakobsen's *ideal policy* to non-US coercive exchanges such as UK examples of coercive diplomacy during the Falklands campaign (1982) and Sierra Leone (Op Palliser 2001). This chapter will first provide a brief recap on the key finding of the study followed by answering the research questions. I will then examine whether the *ideal policy* meets the claims set up out by Jakobsen and then expand upon contribution and limitations of this thesis.

Key findings and comparison to Jakobsen's assessments

My findings from an analysis of the cases (2 Libyan and 2 NK) can be found in table

6.1.

	Threat to use force	Deadline given	Assurance given	Incentives offered	Ideal Policy	Predicted outcome of CD	Actual outcome of CD	Will to threaten and use of force?	Impact of org.
Libya Ep.1	No	Partial	Partial	Yes	No	Failure	Partial Success	Yes	Sanctions only
Libya Ep.2	Yes	No – implied	Partial	Yes	No	Failure	Success	Yes	No impact
NK Ep.1	Yes	No - Implied	Partial	Yes	No	Failure	Success	No	Negative
NK Ep.2	Partial – Yes at first	No	Partial	Yes	No	Failure	Failure	No	No impact
Table 6.1									

There is insufficient evidence to categorically state whether there is correlation between the application the *ideal policy* and success. In only 1 of the cases (NK episode 2) did the outcome and prediction align. However, this result is discounted as there is a range of policies whose non-application could be argued to have led to failure.

In none of the episodes did the US apply coercive diplomacy in the form of the *ideal policy*. The key element of the *ideal policy* that was not applied in any of the episodes was the issuing of a direct threat that force would be applied if the opponent did not comply by a set deadline. George would have termed the deadlines applied as ‘try and see’ or gradual ‘turn of the screw’. Although in three of the episodes studied it is assessed that there was a threat, or at least a partial threat, to use force, the threat was implied rather than clearly stated.

The US did offer incentives in all of the episodes. Particularly in the case of Libya where the use of incentives not only rewarded the recipient but enabled them to accept the deal without it appearing as if they were backing down to the implied threat of

military force. Assurances were also issued; however, they were never fully articulated as an assurance that further demands would not follow.

Allies and international organisations also clearly complicated US strategy in both cases. US and UK specifically left the IAEA out of the negotiations with Gaddafi in 2003 as it was assessed that they would complicate the issue by adding additional demands. Having two close allies conducting the negotiations meant demands and policy could be closely coordinated. Throughout the NK cases the slightly conflicting objectives of the US, SK and IAEA did impact upon the demands that were made of the DPRK.

The most frequent strategy that was adopted was the use of or threat of sanctions, incentives and assurances. There was also often an implied threat which arguably blurs the line between coercive diplomacy and deterrence. Libya Ep.1 was dominated by incentives and assurances; which is a strategy conforming to normal diplomatic bargaining along with the threat or use of sanctions. Therefore the approach used could be termed as sanction based coercive diplomacy.

Libya Ep.2 contained an implied threat of force, but without a deadline and clear demand of the target, it could be argued that it was in fact deterrence. The US had laid out a threat to all states of pre-emptive strike if they were caught crossing a red line. Once the interdictions of the BBC China demonstrated clearly the extent of Libya's programme that is when deterrence failed and it became a strategy of coercive diplomacy as at that point it was more overtly demanding them to stop and undo their programme.

In both NK episodes red lines were set, which is clearly a strategy of deterrence.

However, a demand of stopping or undoing is typically classed as demand relating to coercive diplomacy. So if a target stops before a red line (i.e. does not move spent fuel rods) it could be viewed as either deterrence or coercive diplomacy working. It is only when the demand to undo their programme is it clearly a strategy of coercive diplomacy.

	Variables			Predictions - Will to threaten and use of force?	Was there a threat to use force?
	The nature of threatened interests	The prospect of military success	Domestic support		
Libya Ep.1	High	High	Medium	Yes	No
Libya Ep.2	High	High	Medium	Yes	Yes
NK Ep.1	High	Low	Medium	No	Yes
NK Ep.2	High	Low	Low	No	No
Table 6.2					

Jakobsen's patterns predict that force should not have threatened in the case of NK Ep.1 and force should have been threatened in Libya Episode 1. For NK Ep.1 the only pattern where the logic of the *ideal policy* would imply the threat to use force, even if the prospect of success is low, is where the vital interests are threatened. However, Clinton was actively considering a pre-emptive strike, or at the minimum UNSC resolution imposing sanctions that would have required a surge of a 100,000 troops into the area to deter any aggressive action when sanctions were announced; this clearly was a threatening action that risked a war that could have led to high number of casualties.

The most interesting of these results is the prediction that force should have been threatened where it actually was not (Libya Episode 1) and where force should not have been threatened but actually was (NK Episode 1). Any use of force of against NK had a high risk of escalating into a very costly conflict in both blood and treasure. In

comparison threatening Libya with force would have had a lower risk of escalating into a more serious conflict and would have been significantly cheaper than a war with NK. Therefore, using the patterns of interests alone does not explain the differences in outcomes.

Jakobsen did apply the *ideal policy* to the object of WMD with the results shown in table 6.3; although, the detailed analysis underpinning his assessments is not published.

Western use of coercive diplomacy to suspend or end WMD programmes 1990-2005 ²				
Location	Demand	Adversary	Coercive Strategy	Outcome
Libya				
Round 1 1992-1997	End WMD programmes; cease terrorist activities; hand over terrorist suspects; provide compensation.	Libya	Sanctions, Weak threats of force Threats of regime change.	Failure
Round 2 1997-2003	End WMD programmes; cease terrorist activities; hand over terrorist suspects; provide compensation.	Libya	Sanctions, Implicit threats of force, Carrot Assurances	Cheap Success
North Korea				
Round 1 1993-1994	Freeze nuclear programme	North Korea	US Sanction, Threats of UN sanctions and force, Inducements, Assurances	Temporary success
Round 2 1997-2003	End nuclear programme	North Korea	US sanctions, Indirect threats of force Inducements, Assurances	? ongoing negotiations
Table 6.3				

There are differences in the results of my analysis and that of Jakobsen are worth examining. Firstly, Jakobsen finds that coercive diplomacy applied to Libya between 1992-1997 is a failure; whereas I find the coercive diplomacy applied between 1992-2000 to be a partial success. The difference in the assessments can be explained by the time period that the exchange is being examined over. I have assessed the Clinton administration's approach as partial success as the Libyans did respond to US demands over terrorists; expelling the Abu Nidal terrorist organization in 1999, breaking ties with

² Peter Viggo Jakobsen, 'Coercive Diplomacy', in Alan Collins, *Contemporary Security Studies*, (New York, Oxford University Press, 2007), pg.243.

other radical Palestinian groups, closing down training camps, and extraditing suspected terrorists to Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen.³ They also handed over Lockerbie suspects in April 1999.⁴ Furthermore, by October 1999 Libya had offered to join the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), including a pledge to comply with inspection and verification provisions. These actions happened after 1997; the end point of Jakobsen's first coercive exchange. What this demonstrates is that the evaluation of success is partially dependent on the time frame that the analyst applies to the comparative study.

It is also of note that Jakobsen states that:

To qualify as a case of coercive diplomacy, explicit threats, sanctions or limited force have to be employed by a Western coercer. Cases involving implicit threats and shows of force such as the crisis between the United States and China over Taiwan have consequently been excluded from the list.⁵

However, he does categorise Libya as a case of coercive diplomacy, and one leading to cheap success, even though he acknowledges that there was only an implicit threat applied. Therefore, Jakobsen does seem to recognise that implicit threats are still an element of a strategy of coercive diplomacy.

My analysis adds to Jakobsen's assessment of the NK Episode 2 exchange. At the time of Jakobsen's assessment the NK second crisis was still ongoing, whereas when my research started it is a failure as a nuclear test is taken to be conducted in 2006.

Furthermore, it adds to the key finding of both Jakobsen's research which is that in none of the cases was the coercive diplomacy applied in the form of the *ideal policy*.

Jakobsen asserts that this was because 'it proved impossible to use force to deny the

³ Ray Takeyh, 'The rogue who came in from the cold', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 80, No. 3 (2001), pg. 68.

⁴ BBC News, 'World Lockerbie suspects head for trial', BBC News, 5 April 1999, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/311941.stm>, accessed 1 February 2014.

⁵ *Op.cit.* Jakobsen, 2007, pg.235.

adversary's objectives quickly with little cost'.⁶ The difficulty with this statement is that it is difficult to determine what little cost actually means; as the cost that a coercer is willing to bear is relative to perceived value of the object at that moment in time.

My argument is that the primary reason states have not adopted coercive diplomacy in the form of the *ideal policy* is that they do not wish to limit their room to manoeuvre by making a direct threat backed by an explicit deadline. Making such a threat would force them either to act in order to maintain credibility or have to back down which would damage future coercive attempts. Furthermore, nuclear proliferation crises happen over a longer period of time than acts of aggression and within a sovereign states own borders. Therefore, it is more of an abstract threat to the domestic audience of the coercer and does not generally have the same urgency from the start. Because of the slower tempo of these crises demands and directness of the threats escalate over a longer period of time. This is unlike acts of aggression where there is more urgent pressure to make the aggressor comply in order to limit the damage and suffering that they are causing often in another sovereign state.

In this section I have set out my key empirical findings and compared them to those presented in Jakobsen's published work. I will now answer the thesis' research questions.

Research Question 1 - Does Jakobsen's *ideal policy* remain valid when applied to the context of state attainment of nuclear weapons?

Although the underpinning logic that Jakobsen *ideal policy* is based on is valid; there are contextual differences between using coercive diplomacy to stop/undo act of

⁶ *Op.cit.* Jakobsen, 2007, pg.235.

aggression as opposed to stop/undo nuclear programmes that make it highly unlikely that coercive diplomacy in the form of the *ideal policy* will in practice be applied for the latter objective. The *ideal policy* is a valid set of questions to use in order to examine selected cases; however, it is not possible to determine if it is necessarily more valid than using questions derived from Schelling or George. This section will expand on the claims further.

The comparison of the episodes does give a clear indication of why applying coercive diplomacy in the form of the *ideal policy* is more difficult than applying it over acts of aggression. Firstly, although the policy objective is always clearly to prevent the target attaining nuclear weapons, there are usually other security issues that are wrapped up in the ensuing demand. It is also difficult to have any demand backed by a clear deadline. The targets development of a nuclear weapon is an abstract threat until it is detected. Even upon detection the threat in these cases was still not seen as imminent. Therefore, the issuing of a deadline, that ties the coercer into action on the basis of credibility, was avoided. Furthermore, the covert nature of nuclear programmes means that it would be difficult for the initiator to determine fully whether their demands for compliance have actually been achieved. Therefore, the demands aimed at stopping its progression escalate slowly and tend to be backed by non-specific deadlines.

However, the finding that states do not adopt the *ideal policy* to deal with nuclear proliferation crises does not necessarily make Jakobsen *ideal policy* invalid as there is not sufficient empirical evidence to verify that adoption of *ideal policy* leads to failure. As will be expanded upon in this chapter; the logic that the *ideal policy* is based on is valid, in that it is rational to assert that applying the correct balance of threat/limited use of force backed by a hard deadline, assurances and incentives should lead to the target

calculating to comply. However, clearly the actual context of the crisis is paramount and it is not possible to determine whether the absence/or application of Jakobsen's *ideal policy* will necessarily lead to a predictable outcome. Non-adoption does not mean there is not utility in using the theory as an analytical framework to examine selected cases. Jakobsen makes several claims regarding the utility of the *ideal policy* as a tool for examining the strategies.

The first claim is that it can explain coercive diplomacy outcomes more accurately with fewer variables.⁷ Although he states 'explain'; an implied claim is that if both sides act rationally then the *ideal policy* will work; so it is actually a prediction of success. However, there is no obvious correlation between the predicted outcome and actual empirical outcome of coercive diplomacy for the studied cases. There are too many contextual factors in play that make prediction highly unlikely even if the *ideal policy* is applied. Firstly, even in the unlikely event that there is the level of information and understanding of the situation required to be able to accurately set the correct balance of sticks and carrots; it will also require the opponent to have the same level of information and understanding to realise that they should submit. Furthermore, leaders would have to be either immune to psychological biases or have the systems and culture of critical thinking in place that most closed dictatorships are highly unlikely to tolerate. This is another reason that decision makers are unlikely to commit to applying the *ideal policy* as unless they are truly confident that their calculations are correct and that the target will comply rationally, they would be limiting their options. However, the strength of the framework is that with fewer variables than Schelling and particularly George's theories it does enable a deeper explanation of why the *ideal policy* was not adopted and why the outcome of coercive diplomacy exchange occurred.

⁷ Jakobsen, *Western use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War, A Challenge for Theory and Practice*, pg.5.

The second claim is that ‘it can explain coercive diplomacy outcomes just as accurately but with fewer conditions representing the operationalisation of Schelling’s five necessary conditions and George and Simons ‘particularly significant’.⁸ Furthermore that operationalisation enables policy-makers to decide whether they are present or not in a given crisis.⁹ The difficulty with testing this claim is that to verify the first element it would be necessary to examine several case studies using different frameworks; such as those proposed by Schelling or George. Then the analysis would need to be compared in order to attempt to determine which framework yields the most accurate analysis. However, it would be difficult to determine which analysis is closer to reality, or the truth, to benchmark this assessment against. Therefore, it is not possible to verify this claim accurately.

The second element of this claim is that by operationalising the conditions where a successful outcome may occur will enable policy makers to decide whether they are present or not is difficult to validate empirically. Firstly, Jakobsen’s *ideal policy* is not operationalised to the extent that it is always clear whether an element is present or not. It is not easily determined what a state would consider as cheap in terms of blood and treasure to achieve a political objective. It is not clear whether domestic support is required to start an operation or if it is whether domestic support could be swayed to support an operation once it has started; these are contextual elements that are judged by the decision maker at the time. Furthermore, this is an element that would seem prone to cognitive dissonance or confirmation bias with policy makers interpreting the data available to them to come to the answer that they want. Therefore, although Jakobsen does go further than Schelling and George in terms of operationalising the conditions

⁸ *Ibid.* pg.31

⁹ *Ibid.* pg.5.

that may lead to success; it is not possible to reduce cases to a simple calculation of factors to come to an accurate policy. Policy making will remain an art based on the judgement and skill of the decision maker; an analysis of previous cases and a framework can only aid in developing these skills.

Furthermore, Jakobsen's assertion of clarity for policy makers by clearly operationalising the variables is over emphasised as there is still an element of subjectivity. For example what exactly constitutes a threat? The US on occasion makes statements such as 'I will take no options off the table'¹⁰, this is clearly an implied threat that force may be used, but does it meet the criteria for the *ideal policy*? This perhaps emphasised by the difference in findings between this research and Jakobsen's discussed earlier. Where Jakobsen viewed Libya episode 1 as a failure, I assessed this to be partial success. As I do not have access to the underpinning analysis that went into Jakobsen's assessment it is not possible to determine what exactly leads to the difference. However, if the *ideal policy* is as operationalised as Jakobsen claims such differences in analysis should not arise. Therefore although logically these claims are not invalid it is unlikely that in reality it will significantly aid policy makers; skill and judgement will still be required.

The third claim is that the *ideal policy* framework is testable. This is a valid claim as this study shows that you can test the policy against selected cases. However, the accuracy of the test is dependent on the information available to an analyst, interpretation of the data and their skill in synthesising the results. Furthermore, as coercion is a dynamic process; decisions as to what time periods to analyse the cases

¹⁰ Barack Obama, "Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union," 24 January 2012, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=99000>, accessed 21 March 2015.

over may lead to differing results. Therefore, although testable it is unclear whether tests by other analysts would be consistent. Strategic theories cannot be tested in the same manner as theories within the physical sciences. It is not possible to study the phenomena in a controlled environment, like a laboratory, where the factors and variables can be isolated and a methodology applied that would lead to the same outcome, or at least one within the standard deviation. Testing theories on cases has to be open to the fact that even what are presented as the controlled variables are not identical and there are always differences that may cause variation in outcome. Moreover, it is not possible to repeat the test to arrive at statistically verified results. That is not to say that testing is not worthwhile as clearly it is the only way to ascertain whether there is any accuracy to the theory; and the act of conducting the analysis improves our understanding of the phenomena being studied.

The fourth claim is that the focus on implemented policy avoids the mixture of contextual variables and success conditions that limit the explanatory power of George and Simons' framework. Again without, testing George and Simons' framework against the given cases and then comparing the results against the *ideal policy* this claim cannot be fully verified. Furthermore, it is not possible to avoid contextual variables as the implemented policy is designed based on the policy makers understanding of the context. Therefore, whether the policy implemented looks like the *ideal policy* will depend on the context that the policy maker perceives.

The fifth claim is that keeping messages clear and simple reduces the scope for misperception and miscalculation.¹¹ This would seem a logical claim. However, the simplicity of the message is also dependent on the context and complexity of the crisis

¹¹ *Op.cit.* Jakobsen (1998), pg.5.

that it is being applied to and the interpretation of the opponent of the signal. For acts of aggression it is easy to see the opponent's response to demands i.e. the withdraw or halting of an advance. However, in the case of nuclear proliferation it may not be possible to fully verify compliance. The increased uncertainty of such crises makes signalling more difficult and increases the chances of miscalculation and misperception.

The final claim is that 'the framework requires little knowledge about the opponent' and that 'one can explain and predict outcomes of coercive diplomacy attempts against aggressors by focusing on the policy pursued by the coercer and black boxing the opponent'. Jakobsen further asserts that:

To test this part of my argument I only need to determine whether the implementation of the *ideal policy* results in success and its absence in failure. There is no need to analyse the behaviour of the opponent in great detail. The only thing I need to decide in the case studies is whether the opponent understands the game of coercion to ensure that both players are playing the same game.¹²

Although it is recognised that 'incorporating the behaviour of the coercer and opponent' would lead to increased accuracy the limit of information on targets does lead to assumptions and educated guesses on the opposition.¹³ Whilst this approach is understandable in a vacuum of data on the opponent, it does limit the depth of analysis that can be done and the explanatory power of the *ideal policy*. It also limits determination of whether the *ideal policy* worked because of the implementation of the policy or because of another reason. However, in order to determine whether it was truly the coercer's choice to comply the opponent has to be examined in depth and incorporated into the analysis as much as possible.

¹² *Op.cit.* Jakobsen (1998), pg.31.

¹³ *Ibid.* pg.31.

The logic that the *ideal policy* is based on is valid. However, as discussed previously there are contextual differences between using coercive diplomacy to stop/undo acts of aggression in comparison to stop/undo nuclear programmes that make it highly unlikely that states will adopt the *ideal policy* for this objective. Furthermore, many of the claims that Jakobsen makes about the *ideal policy* are also difficult to validate without also analysing the cases using other analytical frameworks; even then it would be difficult to determine which analysis was in fact closer to the reality. However, as an analytical framework through which to examine the cases Jakobsen's framework is valid and can provide useful insight into the use of coercive diplomacy for the goal of preventing nuclear attainment.

Research question 2 - What are the factors, conditions and variables unique to coercive diplomacy being employed against states seeking nuclear weapons that may need to be incorporated into the *ideal policy*?

There are several factors that are unique or different to coercive diplomacy being employed against states seeking nuclear weapons as opposed to act of aggression; which in turn need to be considered.

Firstly, the clandestine nature of nuclear programmes means that they are well hidden and not easily detectable. Therefore, it is not easy to determine whether they have a programme in the first place. It is then difficult to know how advanced the programme is. This makes it difficult to issue credible demands. Demanding that they stop enriching Uranium or processing spent fuel rods is of little use if they have already obtained enough material to make a bomb. This issue is further complicated by the dual technological nature of most nuclear equipment. As it becomes difficult to make

legitimate demands that are calibrated to prevent the nuclear programme but not inhibit the peaceful and legal development of civilian nuclear technology.

Secondly, due to the deterrent capability of nuclear weapons there is a strategic window where coercive diplomacy, or even force, can be applied as an effective strategy to stop a programme. Once a state has a nuclear weapon and a viable delivery system it has a credible deterrent which significantly complicates the ability to coerce or use force against the target.

Thirdly, the longer time frame of nuclear crisis compared to acts of aggression means that demands and the developments of threats are more gradual. Therefore, it is more difficult to justify why action needs to be taken immediately and a willingness to look in slower time for less coercive options will always be strongly argued.

Fourthly, nuclear weapons are developed within the borders of a sovereign state.

Therefore, you need significant evidence to justify breaking a state's sovereignty by intervening within its borders. Furthermore, it can be difficult to find evidence that the nuclear programme is specifically military and not civilian. It can be difficult to justify to domestic audiences as the threat is abstract; especially if it is not even certain it exists. This is damaged further by instances such as the Iraq War where the public and international community were told that Saddam posed an immediate threat due to WMD that could be launched within 45 minutes. Finding no WMD and proof that this claim had been exaggerated shows the difficulty. Moreover, the resulting insurgency in Iraq has probably significantly damaged the likelihood that domestic audiences within democracies, at least in the short term, will support any recommendation of launching overt strikes on states that are seeking WMD.

Research Question 3 - How can the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy be improved in order to prevent states attaining nuclear weapons?

States do not adopt a policy of coercive diplomacy that conforms to that of the *ideal policy* in order to stop/undo a target state's nuclear programme. The form of coercive diplomacy that is generally adopted to prevent nuclear proliferation is what George would have termed 'turning of the screw' and utilisation of economic and other non-violent sanctions. However this does not mean that this is in fact the best policy that could be implemented.

Elements that would aid a strategy of coercive diplomacy are as follows: Firstly, increased efforts to obtain sound intelligence. It is only with sound evidence of capability and intent of the opponent can states make the threat real enough to garner the required domestic and international support to take action within the identified strategic window. Therefore, the cornerstone of nuclear proliferation policy should be obtaining intelligence on suspected proliferators. The intelligence that led to *BBC China* being interdicted under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was clearly the final straw that pushed Libya to surrender its programme, as Gaddafi believed a more coercive US policy would follow. More evidence would also enable states to remove the abstract nature of the threat and frame the domestic and international debate that brings the level of immediacy that may lead to more coercive strategies.

Secondly, there needs to be a clearer international consensus and agreement on the unacceptability of a state to have a nuclear weapons programme. If states were committed to acting against states that were clearly in breach of IAEA protocols then it would strengthen economic sanctions. It would strengthen the credibility of any threats being made. However, it is acknowledged that this is an idealistic point of view and that

creating such a culture is difficult, if not impossible. It is rarely possible to gain the required international consensus as other political issues will always influence the view point of key states. For example China most likely did not want NK to have a nuclear weapon capability; however, it was unwilling to exert the required pressure to stop it as it most likely feared the consequences of a DPRK collapse that may result from such external pressure. Furthermore, the consistent belief of US administrations that China has influence over NK in itself gives China a position of influence with the US that it may rather maintain than resolve the fundamental issues.

There is an element of hypocrisy in the P5 being allowed to maintain nuclear arsenals that makes it difficult to achieve international consensus on nuclear weapons. Whilst established nuclear states argue that the weapons are the fundamental guarantor of their nation's security¹⁴ it is difficult to see why other states would not want such a guarantee. Therefore, states that perceive themselves to be under a direct threat, where a nuclear weapon would be of deterrent value to them (i.e. Iran, NK), may in fact garner covert support or at least neutrality from some states over the issue of their weapons programme.

If an established power, such as the UK or France, who are under less immediate direct threat, were to surrender their capability, and other states such as Russia and US made a significant reduction or even disarmed completely, it would lessen the hypocrisy. However, decreasing the hypocrisy itself would be unlikely to stop a state such as NK from pursuing a nuclear weapon. But it would increase the established powers motivation to ensure that others did not proliferate which would increase the credibility

¹⁴ The Prime Minister (Mr David Cameron), House of Commons, Wednesday 4 March 2015 <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm150304/debtext/150304-0001.htm#15030460000008>, accessed 20 March 2015.

of any threat that they gave to proliferators. If states cannot rely on nuclear deterrence, as they would have given up their deterrent, they would be more motivated to ensure, with allies, that no one cheats and develops such a capability. Whereas by maintaining a nuclear weapon they always leave the calculation in the mind of the opponent that they will be allowed to obtain a nuclear weapon as the opposition would rather rely on moving to a deterrent posture than enact a threat. This can be seen in the case of NK, as the US was not willing to take a hard stand prior to the first test despite its final rhetoric in 2005; and now the US effectively relies on nuclear deterrence of NK.

The elimination of nuclear weapons would also lessen the perception that these weapons are a great power status symbol. For example if the UK surrendered its nuclear weapon capability it would be difficult to make an argument for others to remove it from the UNSC without consolidating the perception that these weapons are of value and bring status in the world. However, it is recognised that again this is idealistic and it is highly unlikely that any state, such as the UK, will surrender its nuclear weapon capability. The primary reason for this is the same issue of rationality that affects how policy makers implement a strategy of coercive diplomacy. Whilst it is rational in a short to medium term for a state to hold onto such weapons as it cannot be sure what threat it may face in the future; the status quo is highly likely to lead to more states possessing nuclear weapons and increase the chance of a future nuclear exchange that could escalate into a global catastrophe. Therefore, whilst it may be rational for a single state to keep its nuclear weapons and not to commit a radical act of disarmament that may lessen the chance of further proliferation; what may be rational for the long term survival of mankind (which includes that state) would be for such a state to surrender its capability and set in motion, or at least create an opportunity, for an international environment less tolerant of such weapons.

Another way of strengthening coercive diplomacy in the long term would be to punish a state that obtains a nuclear weapon by subjecting them to extreme punishment in the form of either large scale conventional or even nuclear attack. Clearly this would be ethically dubious, against international norms and unlikely to be palatable to domestic audiences. Furthermore, the resulting collapse within the target state would most likely lead to an even deeper crisis in the short to medium term. However, clear resolve and overwhelming punishment on a state for attainment of a nuclear weapon would make all other states considering attaining nuclear weapons in contravention to international norms rethink their position. The invasion of Iraq over issues of WMD did influence Gaddafi to believe he was next and give power to US/UK negotiators. The getting bogged down in the country and trying to achieve other strategic aims, such as attempting to set up a liberal democracy, eventually led to a weakening of US coercive power.

States could also look to further develop, or at the minimum, maintain their coercive military capabilities. This would involve investment more in capabilities such as carrier strike, amphibious forces, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), weaponised satellites and long range precision munitions. These capabilities can poise and threaten the possibility of action without necessarily committing fully to an action. It is unlikely that additional capabilities would have affected either of the cases studied; Libya was already willing to surrender its nuclear capability and NK would have carried on anyway. However, if the US did not have these capabilities it is less likely that either side would have complied without increased incentives. If the US had the capability and intelligence to detect and accurately strike at nuclear plants it may raise doubts in the minds the targets whether starting or maintaining such a programme was viable.

Increasing non-violent costs of developing nuclear programmes would also increase the potency of coercive diplomacy. Increasing the effectiveness of regimes such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) would aid in increasing the costs of not only obtaining the material and equipment for a programme but the chance of detection that may in turn affect the cost-benefit analysis of states seeking such weapons. Again though this is reliant on how the international community views the pursuit of nuclear weapons as the PSI's effectiveness is dependent on states volunteering to join it and then meeting their obligations under the initiative.

Larger incentives could be offered to adjust the cost calculation of the opponent.

However, the difficulty is how this is sold to the domestic audiences. Larger incentives are most likely to be accused of being appeasement and rewarding bad behaviour.

Therefore, opposition political parties will try to tear the policy down in the domestic arena. Furthermore, they could in fact lead to further aggressive behaviour as the target state feels it needs to keep the stakes high in order to obtain more rewards. Moreover, the rewards may in fact bolster the regime and maintain a system that left in isolation would most likely collapse. This is particularly the case for NK; where the incentives the regime received as part of the Agreed Framework (AF) aided its survival.

The offer of security assurances to states that if they cease seeking to attain nuclear weapons that forcible regime change or further advances is perhaps the most pragmatic element to adopt. However, democracies are often inconsistent in their dealings with dictatorships; which in turn damages their credibility in future exchanges. Attempts to gain a domestic consensus can be attempted, but are often difficult to achieve and even more difficult to maintain. This can clearly be seen in both cases. The Republicans from the outset were clear that the AF had to be torn up and Gaddafi's overthrow in 2011 was

effectively aided by the same states that negotiated with him over the surrender of his nuclear programme in 2003 and gave him at least a tacit security assurance.

Limitations and criticism of the research

There are clear limitations to this thesis. Firstly, I have only studied 4 episodes which are not enough to derive any statistically viable relationship between prediction and outcome. If this is to be achieved, as more cases of this nature arise they will need to be studied.

I have only had access to open source material and experts who were willing to be interviewed. I have then had to make judgements and interpretations of what this limited data means in relation to Jakobsen's *ideal policy*. This process increases the risk that my conclusions diverge from reality/truth. If I had access to key members of the Libyan and North Korean governments and their internal documents I would perhaps have arrived at a different interpretation of events. Every time I have made a judgement or interpretation there is a risk that an error has been introduced.

One criticism that could be levelled at this study is that it is immoral as it is looking at methods that more powerful states can develop strategies to influence less powerful states through the use of threats of force. Furthermore, that coercive diplomacy as a threat based strategy is illegitimate as it specifically states within the UN charter:

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.¹⁵

¹⁵ UN Charter, CHAPTER I: PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES, Article 2, Point 4.
<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml>, accessed 29 August 2015.

Both these points are valid arguments but are actually irrelevant to this research. The research is primarily focussed on testing Jakobsen's *ideal policy*; therefore, is theory testing and a valid academic pursuit, examining phenomena that already are in existence. Secondly, those lessons that may be taken by policy makers are likely to improve the ability to stop nuclear proliferation which in itself can only be advantageous to international security.

Furthermore, there is value in studying illegitimate phenomena. It would seem strange not to study crimes; even if such studies offer criminals lessons on how to improve their undertakings, as it usually provides greater insights into how these crimes could be dealt with or prevented. Improving our understanding of coercive diplomacy may in fact lead states to try more innovative upstream prevention measures as it is clear that coercive diplomacy is difficult to implement successfully.

The use of Coercive Diplomacy as a strategy to prevent nuclear proliferation

Coercive diplomacy remains as Jakobsen points out a difficult strategy to employ.

Furthermore, I firmly agree with Jakobsen that the best approach for states is to seek to avoid using coercive diplomacy by using other strategies to prevent nuclear proliferation. Primarily through reduction in established states nuclear stocks, increased international agreements backed by initiatives such as the PSI and the use of diplomatic bargaining and the offering of security assurances. Offering incentives has a place, but there is a risk that this in fact incentivises states to obtain or carry out nuclear hedging.

The use of positive rewards will make some see the actual act of having a programme as a way to rewards. This in turn will increase the likelihood that in sometime in the future they will cross the nuclear threshold; as spending money on developing a programme to drop it for little gain would be a waste; therefore, momentum will keep the programme going if no rewards are forthcoming.

It is highly unlikely that states, in particular democracies, will be able to significantly improve their attempts at coercive diplomacy. Democracies will be rarely willing to make direct threats of force that will be sufficiently credible and backed by a clear deadline; they will be unlikely to be able to offer incentives that will not be difficult to sustain with domestic audiences; they will find it difficult to provide assurances that subsequent governments will abide by. This is also most likely the lessons that proliferators are obtaining from study of these cases.

Implications for Coercive theory

The key implication for theory is that states do not adopt coercive diplomacy in the form of the *ideal policy* when trying to prevent state proliferation of nuclear weapons . However, the question still remains if they did would it be successful as a strategy? However there are several issues that make this question difficult to answer. Primarily, it is impossible to determine empirically what would have happened if it had been adopted. It is straight forward to reason that the threat of force applied at the right time should logically lead to compliance. But unless it is attempted and an empirical pattern emerges it is not possible to know whether there are other variables that would make an *ideal policy* result in failure. For example it maybe that psychological biases and miscalculation are always going to be present to an extent that the *ideal policy* rarely works. If this was a case applying a rational formed *ideal policy* may be counterproductive as the threat leads to increased motivation to develop a deterrent, or at least progress the capability to the point where a deterrent could be obtained rapidly.

Another finding of theoretical note is that in all the episodes the opponent acted rationally in the pursuit of their objectives. The key objective of both NK and Libya was regime survival. For NK obtaining a nuclear weapon would give them a deterrent or a

bargaining chip to trade for the resources and money it required to exist. Even if it miscalculated US resolve and the crisis escalated into conflict it clearly had good reason to believe that it would be a limited conflict that the regime could weather and then use to its advantage internally. Furthermore, the determination of whether an act was rational is very dependent on where you conduct the analysis from and the objectives of the actor being assessed. Individuals construct their reality based on the information that is given to them and then rationality can only be judged by assessing whether under that construct did they carryout actions that led them closer to achieving their objective. Therefore, the *ideal policy* based on deductive logic will determine that a different rational outcome will occur compared to that of the actual actor. This finding strongly confirms Freedman's concluding point that

The study of coercion cannot be considered to be simply about the design of efficient threats. It must also consider the way that strategic actors construct reality, and in particular their grasp of how their opponents construct their own reality.¹⁶

I also strongly agree with George¹⁷ that context is important. There is no one strategy that can be applied like a mathematical formula that will lead to success. The differing context of the case studies and in particular the motivation of the leaders and strategic position of the states involved hugely impacted on the outcomes. This is particular evident in the cases willingness to use force. The rational formulae determined by Jakobsen would indicate that Clinton should have threatened force against Libya and not NK. In fact he was at the brink of making a decision that could have easily escalated to a costly war with the DPRK and did not threaten Gaddafi directly with force. The context, psychology of the main actors and data available to them all played into producing an outcome different from that a detached rational calculation would

¹⁶ Freedman, *Strategic Coercion, Concepts and Cases*, pg. 36.

¹⁷ Alexander L George, *Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics*, in Alexander L George & William E Simmons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, Second Edition, (Boulder, Colo.:Westview Press, 2nd revised edn, 1994), pg. 291.

predict. Studying and comparing these cases is only useful, in far as it gives us guidelines that may work, it does not immediately provide the solution to all future success.

Another point that backs up theoretical points raised by many scholars¹⁸ is that there is a clear blurring between coercive diplomacy and deterrence when looking at the demands made in the case of nuclear proliferation. Telling a target that there is a red line that if they cross will result in a reaction would commonly be taken as a deterrent threat.

However, if you are telling someone to stop an action that they have already started that is taken as being a threat related to coercive diplomacy. Therefore, telling someone to not pass a certain point of a nuclear programme (i.e. do not enrich Uranium to 80% or move spent fuel rods) sits in a blurred line between these strategies. They have moved towards the line, but not necessarily moved across it.

I also argue that regarding nuclear proliferation there is a strategic window where coercive diplomacy is viable strategy. This window starts at the moment that enough intelligence can be obtained to make a convincing case to gain the international and domestic backing to be able to implement an effective strategy of coercive diplomacy. It finishes the moment that the target demonstrates or is believed to hold an effective delivery system and nuclear weapon; as at that point coercive diplomacy becomes too expensive and deterrence becomes the most likely course of action.

I would also add caution to Jakobsen's argument that 'that a good understanding of the adversary and accurate intelligence is necessary for coercive success must be

¹⁸ Douglas Peifer, 'Risk-free Coercion? Technological Disparity and Coercive Diplomacy', *European Security*, Vol 18, No.1(2009), pg.14; Byman&Waxman, *Dynamics of Coercion*, pg.8;

abandoned' as essentially it 'is possible to coerce opponents you do not understand'.¹⁹

Whilst it is possible to coerce states without good understanding; coercion would be far more effective if you know what to target, what to offer and what to assure. As will be discussed in a moment good intelligence is a coercive multiplier.

Implications for policy

Coercive diplomacy is a particularly difficult strategy to adopt for the purpose of preventing nuclear proliferation. Fundamentally it is reliant on receiving enough intelligence to give policymakers the confidence that they can build a case against the opposing side and justify if required a more coercive strategy. Furthermore, if a coercive strategy is to be implemented it has to be done in the strategic window between detection and the target achieving a nuclear weapon and delivery system. Therefore, policymaker's primary aim should be to collect intelligence on suspected proliferators and seek to develop stronger international regimes that engender a more hostile international environment for proliferators and tolerance for the possession of nuclear weapons. A radical, but highly unlikely, way that this shift in international acceptance of nuclear weapons could be instigated would be for a recognised nuclear power to surrender its own nuclear weapons. But it is more likely that reduction programmes would be the most that could be achieved.

Future Research avenues

The most obvious avenue of research would be to build upon this study through an examination of US coercive diplomacy against Iran and Iraq. This would aid in confirming or disproving the theoretical findings within this thesis. Jakobsen did state that the *ideal policy* could also be applied to terrorism. Therefore, another avenue of

¹⁹ *Op.cit*, Jakobsen, (2011), pg.165.

research could be to test the ideal policy to stopping, or undoing, terrorists/insurgents campaigns.

The study of coercive diplomacy within this thesis, and most of the literature, has focussed on the US as the coercer. Further studies could look to examine other states use of coercive diplomacy. The UK's use of coercive diplomacy; in particular the Falkland's Campaign and Sierra Leone, could reveal interesting differences in strategic culture and approaches.

Furthermore, neuroscience and psychology are rapidly advancing and increasingly revealing cognitive biases that decision makers are prone to and how people can be influenced. This emerging discipline could offer the development of more accurate models that could be used to underpin influence strategies such as coercive diplomacy. These studies would all enrich our understanding of coercive diplomacy and how it could be developed as an effective strategy.

Nuclear proliferation remains one of the greatest threats to international security and mankind. Whilst the hope of a world without nuclear powers remains remote, the utmost needs to be done in order to ensure that the incentive to attain these weapons is minimised. One can only have faith that leaders and the will of the people will at some stage combine to shape an international system where such weapons will be perceived by all to have no utility.

Appendix A – Interview Strategy

The aim of this section is to briefly discuss some of the key issues regarding elite interviews, followed by an explanation of the approach that was adopted within this thesis. A full review of the literature on elite interviewing has not been conducted as it is deemed to be beyond the scope of this thesis, but clearly as the research involves elite interviews a consideration of some of the key issues is required.

Stedward argues that the first question a researcher should ask themselves, before conducting interviews, is whether it is the ‘best’ or only way available to obtain the required information.¹ Secondly, Stedward points out that some researcher may not have the personal qualities to conduct effective interviews; therefore interviewing for some individuals will practically not be a suitable research strategy. George argues that the value of interviews, along with other forms of qualitative sources, is that ‘the researcher may inductively discover independent variables that previous theories may have overlooked’.² Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill also argue that the use of research interviews ‘enables the collection of a rich and detailed set of data’.³ However, as will be discussed there are criticisms of interviews and the value of data collected via this approach.

Whilst there are many different styles of interviews, I have focused specifically on ‘elite’ interviews; as that is the approach adopted for this research. Stedward states that:

¹ Gail Stedward, , On the Record: An Introduction to Interviewing, in Peter Burnham eds, *Surviving the Research Process*, (London, Pinter, 1997), pg 152.

² George&Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, pg.18.

³ Saunders&Lewis&Thornhill, *Research for business students*, pg.35.

The 'elite' interview is, as the name suggests, often (but not exclusively) conducted with a person of some status or influence within an organisation. The interviewee responds to the interviewers' inquiries, and unlike a tightly structured interview of the sort used in consumer research, the interviewee is encouraged to introduce her/his own ideas, not just in response to the questions but in suggesting areas of enquiry to the researcher.⁴

She further adds that they 'generally take the form of an unstructured or semi-structured conversation between interviewer and interviewee'.⁵ However, Lancaster argues 'that the term 'elite' is not always defined within the literature, but is generally used to describe individuals or groups who ostensibly have closer proximity to power or particular professional expertise'.⁶

One of the first problems for a researcher is to gain access to elites. The literature contains various individual tips for achieving this. A controversial suggestion by Stedward is that research students do not reveal themselves as a student, without lying, until the actual interview, where they then should be clear their status.⁷ Lancaster argues 'that the difficulties associated with gaining access and establishing rapport may have been 'exaggerated' within the literature, while other (potentially more problematic) aspects of 'studying up' remain relatively underexplored'.⁸

⁴ Gail Stedward, , On the Record: An Introduction to Interviewing, in Peter Burnham eds, *Surviving the Research Process*, (London, Pinter, 1997), pg 152

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Kari Lancaster, 'Confidentiality, anonymity and power relations in elite interviewing: conducting qualitative policy research in a politicised domain', *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*, (2016) , pg.1, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13645579.2015.1123555> accessed 28 May 2016.

⁷ Gail Stedward, , On the Record: An Introduction to Interviewing, in Peter Burnham eds, *Surviving the Research Process*, (London, Pinter, 1997), pg 153

⁸ Kari Lancaster, 'Confidentiality, anonymity and power relations in elite interviewing: conducting qualitative policy research in a politicised domain', *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*, (2016) , pg.3, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13645579.2015.1123555> accessed 28 May 2016.

Key to a good interview is the questions that are asked. Stedward argues that questions should be thought out prior and should be designed with the following in mind:

1. What sort of information will this question provide?
2. Can I get this information from elsewhere?
3. Do I really need this information?⁹

Clift also emphasises that before conducting interviews you should draft the questions and select the most 'pertinent'. Furthermore, that the most complex questions do not come right at the start.¹⁰ He also emphasises they should be open-ended questions and that the answers should not be pre-empted. Furthermore, that they should 'aim to find out how respondents perceive situations, what they feel is of central importance'.¹¹

A common criticism of interviews is that 'researchers often had predetermined hypotheses based on theory or prior research, and they used the research interview as an opportunity to test the validity of their hypotheses'.¹² George similarity relates to this stating that:

Scholars are not immune from the general tendency to attach particular significance to an item that supports their pre-existing or favoured interpretation and, conversely, to downplay the significance of an item that challenges it. As cognitive dissonance theory reminds us, most people operate with a double

⁹ Gail Stedward, 'On the Record: An Introduction to Interviewing', in Peter Burnham eds, *Surviving the Research Process*, (London, Pinter, 1997), pg 155.

¹⁰ Ben Clift, 'Elite interviewing: Drafting your questions', 18th November 2014, <http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/currentstudents/phd/academic/po961/interviewshandout2014.pdf>, accessed 29 May 2016.

¹¹ Ben Clift, 'Elite interviewing: Drafting your questions', 18th November 2014, <http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/currentstudents/phd/academic/po961/interviewshandout2014.pdf>, accessed 29 May 2016.

¹² James Joseph Scheurich, 'A postmodernist critique of research Interviewing', *International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education*, Vol.8, No.3 (1995), pg.241.

standard in weighing evidence. They more readily accept new information that is consistent with an existing mind-set and employ a much higher threshold for giving serious consideration to discrepant information that challenges existing policies or preferences.¹³

Scheibelhofer in particular points out that due to their reliance on themes; ‘semi-structured interviews are highly structured by the researcher’s concerns. Thus, a profound goal of qualitative research—that is, to be open to the social world we study without implicitly imposing our own ideas—can be at risk’.¹⁴ Scheurich argues that:

This plethora of baggage, in the guise of the interviewer, interacts with an interviewee, who, of course, brings her or his own baggage to the interaction. That the written result, the final interpretation of the interview interaction, is overloaded with the researcher's interpretive baggage is inevitable. In a very important sense, this written representation is largely, though not completely, only a mirror image of the researcher and her or his baggage.¹⁵

Clift also point out that is important to check between the interviewee’s account and other sources as the interviewee may be ‘presenting a particular self-image, perhaps involving a selective memory, retrospective perspicacity or even deceit’.¹⁶ Key to avoiding this is the process of ‘Triangulation’ with other sources. As stated:

One never treats interviewee’s account at face value as factual data. It is important not to rely on a single respondent. It is incumbent upon the researcher to verify the information supplied by interviewee. Thus research designs should attempt to incorporate the analysis, interpretation and evaluation of other sources - other interviewees, and also other research techniques e.g. archival research,

¹³ George&Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, pg.99

¹⁴ Elisabeth Scheibelhofer, ‘Combining Narration-Based Interviews with Topical Interviews: Methodological Reflections on Research Practices’, *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*, Vol.11, No.5 (2008), pg.406.

¹⁵ James Joseph Scheurich, ‘A postmodernist critique of research interviewing’, *International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education*, Vol.8, No.3 (1995), pg.249.

¹⁶ Ben Clift, Elite interviewing: Drafting your questions, 18th November 2014, <http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/currentstudents/phd/academic/po961/interviewshandout2014.pdf>, accessed 29 May 2016.

documentary analysis. This triangulation process can also include the secondary literature, in addition to other forms of primary data collection.¹⁷

My Approach

All interviews conducted as part of this research were semi-structured. Interviewees were selected based on their expertise; most were identified from reports and secondary sources during the initial research of the cases. Interviewees were provided, in the initial request, with the questions/themes that formed the structure of the subsequent interview. The questions and themes were tailored specifically to the individual and their particular area of expertise or experience. The pre-warning an individual of the questions that would be asked was done in order to encourage busy 'elites' to participate and give them a clear understanding of what would be talked about. During the interviews, questions often led quickly to a more in-depth discussion. Prior to each interview, the interviewee was asked whether they were content to be recorded on a digital voice recorder. Only one of the interviewees, whose material was used, was not content to be recorded. For this interview notes were taken, which were subsequently written up after the interview had concluded. Where an interviewee did agree to be recorded, a detailed transcript of the interview was produced after the interview.

The interviewees were sent the specific quotes to be used within the thesis. Whilst it is recognised this gives significant power to the interview as they were given the chance to amend their words; it was seen as practically necessary to offer this control in order to obtain interviews with the selected 'elites'. Interviewees were asked to confirm whether their quotes could be attributed. On occasion this led to slight amendments, via e-mail. Three interviewees have not responded to confirm whether their quotes could be

¹⁷ Ben Clift, Elite interviewing: Drafting your questions, 18th November 2014, <http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/currentstudents/phd/academic/po961/interviewshandout2014.pdf>, accessed 29 May 2016.

attributed; therefore, they are unattributed (cited as Source A, B & C). For each of the unattributed sources I have a recording of their interview. Of the 125 'elites' that were sent interview request letters/approached, 30 agreed to be interviewed. Quotes from 24 of those interviewed have been used within the thesis.

Written summaries and interview recordings were kept on my personal laptop which is kept in a safe location. All the quotations used in the thesis are semi-verbatim as all umms, ahh's, stuttering and false starts have been removed.

Interviews undertaken as part of research		Status of individual	Length of interview	Location of interview
Mr Robert Carlin	4 March 2013	<p>Bob Carlin is a Visiting Scholar at CISAC. From both in and out of government, he has been following North Korea since 1974 and has made 25 trips there. He recently co-authored a lengthy paper to be published by the London International Institute of Strategic Studies, entitled "Politics, Economics and Security: Implications of North Korean Reform."</p> <p>Carlin served as senior policy advisor at the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) from 2002-2006, leading numerous delegations to the North for talks and observing developments in-country during the long trips that entailed.</p> <p>From 1989-2002, he was chief of the Northeast Asia Division in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State. During much of that period, he also served as Senior Policy Advisor to the Special Ambassador for talks with North Korea, and took part in all phases of US-DPRK negotiations from 1992-2000. From 1971-1989, Carlin was an analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency, where he received the Exceptional Analyst Award from the Director of Central Intelligence.¹</p>	82 mins	In person, Washington DC

¹ Robert Carlin Bio, Stanford, http://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/people/Robert_Carlin/, accessed 10 January 2016.

Mr Jack David	15 March 2013	Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction and Negotiations Policy.	79 mins	In person, at his home, United States.
Ms Paula DeSutter	18 March 2013	Paula Adamo DeSutter was United States Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation from 2002 to 2009.	3 hours	In person, Fredericksburg, United States
Ambassador Joseph DeTrani	12 March 2013	President of the Intelligence and National Security Alliance (INSA). Previously, he served as the Senior Advisor to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and as the Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center (NCPC) of the ODNI. At the NCPC, Ambassador DeTrani was the National Intelligence Manager for Counter proliferation (CP) and the North Korea Mission Manager. Prior to his tenure at the ODNI, Ambassador DeTrani worked at the Department of State as both the Special Envoy for Negotiations (the Six-Party Talks) with North Korea and as the U.S. Representative to the Korea Energy Development Organization. Before his service at the State Department, he held numerous positions in the CIA, including Director of East Asia Operations. ²	31 mins	Telephone interview
Mr Chuck Downs	9 March 2013	Chuck Downs is a former senior foreign and defence policy adviser for the Republican Policy Committee in the U.S. House of Representatives and author of Over the Line, North Korea's Negotiating strategy.	120 mins	In person, At his home,

² Ambassador Joseph DeTrani Bio, <http://www.icasinc.org/bios/detrani.j.html>, accessed 10 January 2016.

Dr Nicholas Eberstadt	3 April 2013	Nicholas Eberstadt, a political economist and a demographer by training, is also a senior adviser to the National Bureau of Asian Research, a member of the visiting committee at the Harvard School of Public Health, and a member of the Global Leadership Council at the World Economic Forum. He researches and writes extensively on economic development, foreign aid, global health, demographics, and poverty. He is the author of numerous monographs and articles on North and South Korea, East Asia, and countries of the former Soviet Union. ³	56 mins	Telephone interview
Mr Douglas Feith	13 March 2013	Douglas J. Feith is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for National Security Strategies at the Hudson Institute. Mr. Feith is the author of War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism, published in April 2008 by HarperCollins. As Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from July 2001 until August 2005, he helped devise the U.S. government's strategy for the war on terrorism and contributed to policy making for the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns. ⁴	30 mins (not recorded)	In person, Hudson Institute, Inc. 1015 15th Street, N.W. 6th Floor Washington, DC 20005.
Dr Mark Fitzpatrick	7 February 2013	Executive Director, IISS-US. 26-year career in the US Department of State, where for the previous ten years he focused on non-proliferation issues. In his last posting, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Non-proliferation (acting), responsible for policies to address the proliferation problems posed by Iran, North Korea, Libya, Iraq, South Asia and other regions of concern. Among his duties, he also	34 mins	In person, IISS offices, 13-15 Arundel Street Temple Place, London WC2R 3DX

³ Dr Nicholas Eberstadt Bio, <http://www.aei.org/scholar/nicholas-eberstadt/> , accessed 10 January 2015.

⁴ Mr Douglas Feith Bio, <http://www.dougfeith.com/bio.html>, accessed 10 January 2015.

		oversaw implementation of the Proliferation Security Initiative, advanced conventional arms and technology controls, proliferation sanctions, and export control cooperation programmes. ⁵		
Ambassador Robert Gallucci	12 Feb 2013	Robert L. Gallucci was appointed Dean of Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service in 1996. He had just completed 21 years of government service, serving since August 1994 with the Department of State as Ambassador at Large. In 1998 he became the State Department's Special Envoy to deal with the threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. In 1991 he was appointed deputy Executive Chairman of the UN Special Commission overseeing the disarmament of Iraq. In 1992, he became Senior Coordinator for nonproliferation and nuclear safety initiatives in the former Soviet Union. Later in 1992 Dr. Gallucci was confirmed as the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs. ⁶	41 mins	Telephone interview.
Ambassador Martin Indyk	14 March 2013	Executive vice president of the Brookings Institution and a former U.S. ambassador to Israel. He was the founding director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings. During the Clinton administration Indyk served as assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs, special	32 mins	In person, Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts

⁵ Mark Fitzpatrick, <https://www.iiss.org/en/persons/mark-s-fitzpatrick>, accessed 10 January 2016.

⁶ Dr Robert Gallucci, <https://sfs.georgetown.edu/faculty-bio/robert-gallucci/>, accessed 10 January 2016.

		assistant to the president, and senior director for Near East and South Asia in the U.S. National Security Council. ⁷		Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036
Professor Jentleson	11 April 2013	<p>Bruce Jentleson is Professor of Public Policy and Political Science at Duke University, where he previously served as Director of the Terry Sanford Institute (now Sanford School) of Public Policy. He is a leading scholar of American foreign policy and has served in a number of U.S. policy and political positions. From 2009-11 he was Senior Advisor to the U.S. State Department Policy Planning Director. In 2012 he served on the Obama 2012 campaign National Security Advisory Steering Committee.</p> <p>He also served as a senior foreign policy advisor to Vice President Al Gore in his 2000 presidential campaign, in the Clinton administration State Department (1993-94), and as a foreign policy aide to Senators Gore (1987-88) and Dave Durenberger (1978-79). He also has served on a number of policy commissions, most recently the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Working Group co-chaired by Madeleine Albright (2011-13).⁸</p>	31 mins	Telephone Conversation
Ambassador Robert Joseph	11 March 2013	Senior Scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy. Prior to July 2007, Ambassador Joseph served as U.S. Special Envoy for Nuclear Non-proliferation. From May 2005 until March 2007, he was Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. In this capacity, he reported	46 mins	In person, National Institute for Public Policy offices 9302 Lee Hwy

⁷ Martin S Indyk, <http://www.brookings.edu/experts/indykm>, accessed 10 January 2016.

⁸ Dr Bruce Jentleson, <https://www.coursera.org/instructor/~921>, accessed 10 January 2016.

		<p>directly to the Secretary of State as the principal State Department officer for non-and counterproliferation matters, arms control, arms transfers, regional security and defence relations, and security assistance. His management responsibilities included oversight of three major bureaus headed by Assistant Secretaries of State: International Security and Non-proliferation; Political and Military Affairs; and Verification, Compliance and Implementation.</p> <p>Previously, from January 2001 through November 2004, Dr. Joseph served in the National Security Council as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation and Homeland Defense. He was responsible, under the supervision of the National Security Advisor, for developing and coordinating U.S. policies and strategies for preventing, deterring and defending against threats to the United States from weapons of mass destruction.⁹</p>		#750, Fairfax, VA 22031, United States
Ambassador James T Laney	11 April 2013	<p>President Emeritus of Emory University and former United States ambassador to South Korea.</p> <p>In 1993 he was appointed ambassador to South Korea by President Bill Clinton and was instrumental in helping defuse the nuclear crisis with North Korea in 1994. In 1997 he returned to the US and served for two years as special presidential envoy in Asia.¹⁰</p>	45 mins	Telephone interview

⁹ Ambassador Robert Joseph, <http://www.nipp.org/professional-staff/amb-robert-joseph/>, accessed 10 January 2016.

¹⁰ James T Laney, http://www.icasinc.org/bios/laney_jt.html, accessed 10 January 2016.

Dr Robert Litwak	12 March 2013	Vice President for Scholars and Director of International Security Studies at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington. He is also an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and a Consultant to the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Dr. Litwak served on the National Security Council staff as Director for Non-proliferation in the first Clinton administration. His most recent books are Outlier States: American Strategies to Contain, Engage, or Change Regimes; Regime Change: U.S. Strategy through the Prism of 9/11; and Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment after the Cold War. ¹¹	39 mins	In person, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Washington, DC 20004, United States
Ambassador Donald Mahley	14 March 2013	<p>Currently serving as Special Negotiator for Non-proliferation, on an as needed basis, currently with responsibilities for the Arms Trade Treaty Open Ended Working Group. He is also a member of the United Nations Secretary General's Disarmament Advisory Board. Prior to his April 2008 retirement, Ambassador Mahley served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Threat Reduction, Export Controls, and Negotiations. As such, he had the responsibility for chemical and biological weapons threat reduction, missile threat reduction, conventional weapons threat reduction, and export controls.</p> <p>Before that, Ambassador Mahley was the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arms Control Implementation in the Arms Control Bureau of the Department of State. He served as the</p>	44 mins	In person, Department of State, 2201 C St NW, Washington, DC

¹¹ Robert S Litwak, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/person/robert-s-litwak>, accessed 10 January 2016.

		Special Negotiator for Chemical and Biological Arms Control issues from April 1999 to September 2002. ¹²		
Mr Stephen Rademaker	6 March 2013	Former assistant secretary of state, headed three bureaus of the State Department, including the Bureau of Arms Control and the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. Served as Chief Counsel for the House Select Committee on Homeland Security of the US House of Representatives and as Deputy Staff Director and Chief Counsel of the House Committee on International Relations. ¹³	60 mins	In person, Podesta group offices, 1001 G St NW Ste 1000w, Washington, DC 20001
Professor Thomas Schelling	7 March 2013	American economist and professor of foreign policy, national security, nuclear strategy, and arms control at the School of Public Policy at University of Maryland, College Park. He was awarded the 2005 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. Author of Arms and Influence. ¹⁴	87 mins	In person, At his home, Washington DC
Mr David Slinn	23 April 2013	UK Ambassador to North Korea 2002-2006.	23 mins	Telephone interview
Mr Jack Straw	14 June 2013	British politician who served as the Member of Parliament (MP) for Blackburn from 1979 to 2015. Straw served in the Cabinet from 1997 to 2010. Home Secretary from 1997 to 2001 and Foreign Secretary from 2001	16 mins	Telephone interview

¹² Mahley, Donald A. Ambassador (ret.), <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/75286.htm>, accessed 10 January 2016.

¹³ Stephen Rademaker, <http://www.podesta.com/talent/stephen-rademaker>, accessed 10 January 2016.

¹⁴ Thomas C. Schelling – Biographical, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2005/schelling-bio.html, accessed 10 January 2016.

		to 2006. From 2007 to 2010 he served as Lord Chancellor and the Secretary of State for Justice. ¹⁵		
Ambassador David Welch	15 April 2013.	President of Bechtel's Europe, Africa, and Middle East region. He was U.S. assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs from 2005 to 2008, U.S. ambassador to Egypt from 2001 to 2005. Welch also served the U.S. government as assistant secretary for international organizations and as chargé d'affaires of the U.S. embassy in Saudi Arabia. In addition, he served on the National Security Council staff at the White House 1989-91 and in a variety of roles in Jordan, Syria, and Pakistan. ¹⁶	37 mins	In person, Bechtel's offices, 11 Pilgrim St, London EC4V 6RN
Mr Joel Wit	6 March 2013.	Concurrently a Visiting Scholar at US-Korea Institute at SAIS and a Senior Research Fellow at Columbia University Weatherhead Institute for East Asian Studies. He has served as Senior Advisor to Ambassador Robert L. Galluci from 1993-1995, where he developed strategies to help resolve the crisis over North Korea's weapons program, and as Coordinator for the US-North Korea's weapons program and as Coordinator for the US-North Korea Agreed Framework from 1995-1999, where he was the official in charge of implementation. He was also a key participant in the establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).	50 mins	In person, IISS offices 13-15 Arundel Street Temple Place, London WC2R 3DX

¹⁵ Jack Straw, <http://www.britannica.com/biography/Jack-Straw>, accessed 10 January 2016.

¹⁶ Ambassador David Welch, <http://www.tgais.com/speaker/ambassador-david-welch/>, accessed 10 January 2016.

		<p>Prior to his efforts on the Agreed Framework, Wit was assigned to the State Department's Office of Strategic Nuclear Policy, where he was responsible for U.S. policy on a range of issues related to nuclear arms control and weapons proliferation. In that capacity from 1988 to 1992, Wit helped negotiate strategic arms control agreements with the former Soviet Union and participated in the Nunn-Lugar program to dismantle its nuclear weapons.</p> <p>He was also a Guest Scholar at the Brookings Institute from 1999-2001.¹⁷</p>		
Source A	4 March 2013	Former Senior member of the first Bush Administration	29 mins	In person, Washington DC
Source B	5 March 2013	Academic North Korean expert.	45 mins	In person, Washington DC
Source C	5 March 2013	Retired US senior military officer.	26 mins	In person, Washington DC

¹⁷ Wit, Joel S, <http://uskoreainstitute.org/research/visiting-scholars/joel-wit/>, accessed 10 January 2016.

Appendix B – *Ideal policy* Assessment Questions

Assessment Question 1 - What was the US policy objective and demand?

Assessment Question 2 - Was there a threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives quickly with little cost?

Assessment Question 3 - Was a deadline for compliance offered?

Assessment Question 4 – Was there an assurance given to the adversary against future demands?

Assessment Question 5 – Was there an offer of carrots for compliance?

Assessment Question 6 – Did the opponent prefer to comply rather than go to war?

Assessment Question 7 – Did the opponent act rationally, miscalculate or suffer from misperception?

Assessment Question 8 - Does credible implementation of the *ideal policy* lead to compliance?

Assessment Question 9 - Does failure to implement the *ideal policy* lead to non-compliance?

Assessment Question 10 - Was compliance caused by fear that the threatened action would be carried out?

Assessment Question 11 - Are one of the four hypothesised patterns present when states threaten and use force?

Assessment Question 12 - Are all the hypothesised patterns absent when states lack the will to threaten and use force?

Assessment Question 13 - Does coalitional consensus concerning threats of force result from leadership by one or more states, and/or a shared perception that important interests are threatened?

Assessment Question 14 - Does coalitional consensus concerning threats of force fail to emerge when none of the above conditions are met?

Assessment Question 15 - Do international organisations make it easier for leading states to mobilise support for policies involving threats and use of force?

Assessment Question 16 - Did the issuing of a threats increase the motivation of the coerced to develop nuclear weapons?

Appendix C – Case Selection

State	Description	Criteria					All Criteria met – Possible Selected as case Y/N
		The coercer must send a message asking the target State to stop/or undo their nuclear programme.	A threat to punish non-compliance must accompany this demand. This threat may or may not be accompanied by a carrot for compliance	The selected case must have developed, or have been perceived by the USA too have developed, a nuclear programme since 1964	The USA must be the primary coercer of the selected case. By maintaining the US as the primary coercer it reduces the variables, as different states will have a different capabilities, strategic culture and political systems that may affect the cost calculus within it.	Outcome is complete – successful or failure	
North Korea (1993 – 2006)	US coercive diplomacy failed as Nuclear test conducted in 2006 ¹ .	Y	Y	Y	Y	Failure	Y
Libya (1992-2003)	US coercive diplomacy apparently succeeded	Y	Y	Y	Y	Success	Y
Iran (2002-)		Y	Y	Y	Y	Ongoing	N
Iraq (1992-2003)		Y	Y	Y	Y	Failure	Y

¹ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, 'Coercive Diplomacy', in Alan Collins, *Contemporary Security Studies*, (New York, Oxford University Press, 2007), pg.243.

South Africa (1975-1989) ²	Voluntarily surrendered covert nuclear programme after developing 6 nuclear weapons	N	N	N	N	N	N
South Korea (1970 – 2004)	US demands and withdrawal of aid. threat of cutting off political, military, and economic support to South Korea was extremely potent	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Israel	Throughout most of the 1960s, the U.S. made a quiet effort to halt the Israeli program, primarily relying on arms sales and vague warnings as carrots and sticks.	Y	Y – vague warnings	Y	Y	not confirmed	N
Sweden ³	Swedish nuclear-weapons plans are analysed during the period 1945–1968. By the end of this period, Sweden had in place a nuclear program capable of producing nuclear weapons within a few years. But for a combination of reasons—among them	N	N	N	N	N	N

² Terence McNamee & Greg Mills, 'Denuclearizing a Regime: What South Africa's Nuclear Rollback Might Tell Us About Iran', *Defense & Security Analysis*, Vol 22, No.3 (2006).

³ Thomas Jonter, 'The Swedish Plans to Acquire Nuclear Weapons, 1945–1968: An Analysis of the Technical Preparations', *Science & Global Security*, Vol.18, No.2 (2010).

	<p>rising</p> <p>public opposition to nuclear weapons, tension between civilian nuclear power goals and</p> <p>the goal of maintaining freedom of action with respect to nuclear weapons, the US policy</p> <p>to discourage the Swedes from building the bomb, and strengthening of international</p> <p>non-proliferation norms—the program was abandoned in 1968 when Sweden joined the</p> <p>Non-proliferation Treaty as a non-weapon state.</p>						
Taiwan (1960-1980)	US threatened use of withdrawal of economic and military aid.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Kazakhstan	Nuclear Rollback – no coercive diplomacy ⁴ Transferred all weapons to Russia 1995	N	N	N	N	N	N
Ukraine	Nuclear rollback - By 1996, Ukraine had voluntarily disposed of all nuclear weapons within its territory, transferring them to Russia ⁵ .	N	N	N	N	N	N

⁴ Kassymzhomart Tokaev, 'Kazakhstan: From Renouncing Nuclear Weapons to Building Democracy', *American Foreign Policy Interests*, Vol.26, No.2 (2004).

⁵ Ukraine Special Weapons, The Nuclear Information Project, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/ukraine>, accessed 10 January 2016.

Belarus	Nuclear rollback - They were all transferred to Russia by 1996. Belarus has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ⁶ .	N	N	N	N	N	N
India	Nuclear test in 1974 – covert programme prior.	N	N	N	N	N	N
Pakistan ⁷ (1976-1998)	US Sanctions and withdrawal of aid - demands (not threats) to cease.	Y	Y	Y	Y	N - Failure	Y
China	NPT stated nuclear power discounted			N			N
United Kingdom	NPT stated nuclear power discounted			N			N
Russia (Formerly USSR)	NPT stated nuclear power discounted			N			N
United States	NPT stated nuclear power discounted			N	N		N
France	NPT stated nuclear power discounted			N			N

⁶ Belarus nuclear weapons, The Nuclear Information Project, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/belarus/index.html>, accessed 10 January 2016.

⁷ Case studies in sanctions and Terrorism, Peterson Institute for International Economics, <http://www.iie.com/research/topics/sanctions/pakistan.cfm>, accessed 10 January 2016.

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